


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WORLD DIPLOMACY

VOLUME ONE

INTERVENTION AND COLONIZATION IN AFRICA

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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TO
JOHN R. HEGEMAN
THIS WORK IS
RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY
DEDICATED

PREFACE

EMPEROR WILLIAM II is fond of quoting the remark of Prince von Bülow that Germany must have "a place in the sun." By this he means that the Empire has joined the expansion movement in which all the leading nations are participating, and intends to take a prominent part in it. She desires, not only to develop her national resources, trade, and colonies, but also to secure a place of influence and of power. Great Britain and France, by reason of their history, their commerce, and their colonies, have a recognized position to-day in the forefront of the world's activities. And Germany must have a place of equal advantage. The expansion of nations in recent years has been an attempt of the European states to secure territory and economic concessions, in order that they may provide adequately for the future development of their respective countries, and that they may maintain their present prominent positions in the family of nations. It is a contest for power and privilege.

In the following pages the author has attempted to trace, chiefly from official sources, the origin and development of this movement in its main features during the past forty years. To avoid confusion, which is certain to arise with the presentation of a multiplicity of facts and events, no mention has been made of the smaller colonial developments that have had little bearing upon the general issue. Great Britain has four valuable colonies on the west coast of Africa: Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria; but the history of one — Nigeria — has been given in detail. The story of this colony furnishes an excellent example of the British colonial methods and policy on the

West Coast, and is the only one specially connected with the general contest for territory in that part of Africa. Portugal has extensive possessions in Portuguese Angola and East Africa, but thus far the development of these territories has not been materially affected by the general competition for land in Africa. Therefore they have not been dealt with extensively in this volume. And for similar reasons descriptions of the French colony of Madagascar, of Italian Eritrea, and of British, French, and Italian Somaliland have been omitted.

The author hopes to complete this study of European Expansion and World Politics in a second volume on European Intervention and Competition in Asia. And he wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to his colleague, Dr. Benjamin B. Wallace, who has read the proofs, prepared the third appendix and the index, and given valuable assistance in the collection of material.

EVANSTON, *May*, 1914.

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INTRODUCTION

THERE is a tradition among historians that, since history deals with the past, the further a subject is removed from the present, the more historical it is. School-books and lectures often reflect this point of view. The Peloponnesian War was forced upon the innocent children of the nineteenth century in all its wearisome detail, while the pages of the history manuals closed either with Napoleon in exile or at most with Bismarck dictating terms of peace. Just across the threshold of the world of to-day one read the word "finis." It was the close of the world's story!

The exclusion of recent events from the field of history was justified by the historians upon the plea that only as events receded into the past could their proper perspective be seen. Often what seems of most moment at the time proves to be but temporary and local in importance. The Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, for example, is now seen to have been an incident of less importance than the relatively unknown social revolution of 1789, which destroyed the remnants of medieval feudalism in France. The dramatic interest of the tragedy led those closest to it to concentrate unduly upon the story of mobs and guillotine, and only the sober historian of a later day could correct the perspective, after the issues involved had ceased to arouse the passions of the investigator. Warned by such experiences, scientific historians of the last century accepted it as a canon, that one could write accurately and intelligently only of things that happened before one's time.

There is much force in this contention, but if carried out to its logical conclusion,—that one must wait for facts to

be dead before the historian can deal with them, — history would cease to have interest or value for any but antiquarians. There is fortunately no need to accept such a conclusion. The history of one's own time is as proper a theme for the modern historian as it was for Thucydides or Polybius. Whatever future historians may recast of what we write or teach, if we bring to the task the scientific temper and the patient labor of scholarship, we need not hesitate to correct that worst blunder in education, which, by cutting off the past from the present, made the one unreal and robbed the other of its truer meaning.

The last thirty years have witnessed two of the greatest changes in all the varied history of European civilization. On the one hand, the rise of capitalized industry has reached such a point that it has practically remade the Old World, destroying and rebuilding out-worn, medieval cities, planting factories and awakening democracy. On the other hand, and largely as a result of the new economic and social forces, this European society has expanded throughout the world. This expansion has come both by way of the enterprise of adventurous traders pushing their wares and gathering in the rich natural treasures of savage lands, and through formal conquest by imperialistic governments. In the years of peace which followed the attainment by Germany and Italy of national unity, and more especially in the thirty years from 1884 to 1914, the main problems confronting statesmen were bound up with either of these two policies: the adjustment of the nation to the changing conditions of life at home, and expansion, for markets or colonies, abroad.

Naturally, this story of expansion cannot be properly understood when divorced from that of the affairs at home. But, if we keep the thread of connection in our minds, and from time to time refresh our memories with statistics of stock markets and parliamentary debates, we can follow

here a theme which should appeal to the imagination, like a tale from an Elizabethan romance. In the twentieth century, conquistadors, clad in khaki or glittering in helmeted display, have proclaimed to most of the savages of the globe that they belong henceforth to European nations. On the wharves of London there are goods from German workshops for the merchant adventurers of to-day to carry off to Bantus or Negritos. Piles of coal from Cardiff lie inside the coral reefs of Australasian islands, for the ships which come to break the silence of farther Hebrides than Wordsworth dreamed of. But for the historian there is more significance than romance in such events. The men whom Joseph Conrad and Kipling describe are responsible for the transformation of Africa and Asia. And that transformation in its turn is mainly responsible for those policies of imperial expansion, of commercial and colonial rivalries which underlie the causes of the present war.

The partitioning of Africa and the penetration of Asia are thus chapters of the history of European civilization. But they are of vital interest to more than historians. They furnish as well the data for a survey of economic and political forces to-day. The partitioning and penetrating are still going on : the war itself is part of the process. They will go on when the war is over, though perhaps with crippled pace from the destruction of resources. And in that vast world-movement of the coming years, the United States is bound to have a growing interest as it develops the way of other industrial nations. So far we have lacked the capital for any serious expansion of business—except in one or two branches—outside the limits of the country, and we continue to use foreign capital to help us out at home. But the time is coming rapidly when the American capitalist will be turning his attention elsewhere, and mainly toward exploiting whatever is left to exploit in the great world out-

side. When that time does come, old ideals of national seclusion will be rudely shattered. Whatever policies we may accept as a nation — and in the light of recent events it is impossible to forecast what they will be — the lessons of statecraft should be learned from those whose enterprise and whose blunderings have given us this page of history — now blurred and stained with the blood of the vastest tragedy in the history of civilization.

We have, therefore, more than a passing interest in the account here given of the various types of European civilization in Africa. The fine and heroic work of British residents in the Niger region, for instance, thrown into contrast with the sordid, cruel methods employed in other parts of the continent, the battle with disease and the conquest of natural obstacles — desert and tropical jungles — are all parts of a common heritage in the new world-history which the age of the industrial revolution has opened up. It is not simply that we are affected by such things as the increased output of African gold, which helps to raise the price of all we buy and sell, but that with the emergence of world-politics, we inherit something of the result of other nations' achievements and so make their past our own as well. It is sincerely to be hoped that, in this transformation of our outlook, this book may contribute helpfully its wealth of fact and breadth of view.

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

INTERVENTION AND COLONIZATION-
IN AFRICA

INTERVENTION AND COLONIZATION IN AFRICA

CHAPTER I

EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND WORLD POLITICS

DURING the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the leading nations of the world engaged in a remarkable territorial expansion, — an expansion with an imperialistic tendency. The age of exploration and discovery which produced a Columbus and a Cortez was reproduced again in an era which gave forth a Stanley and a King Leopold II. Africa was to be to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries what the Americas had been to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Between the years 1884 and 1900, France and Great Britain each acquired over 3,500,000 square miles of territory in the Dark Continent — an amount equal to the whole of the United States including Alaska, — while the Kaiser and the King of Belgium were marking out 1,000,000 and 900,000 square miles respectively for themselves.

This expansion, however, was not confined to Africa; it spread to Central Asia, to the Far East, to the Philippines and the distant isles of the Pacific. There was an intimate connection running through the whole movement; and the activities of Russia in Turkestan and Manchuria, of France in the Sudan and Madagascar, of England in Nigeria and South Africa, and of Germany in East Africa and Samoa,

must be carefully studied in order to grasp its real significance. At first, the European states directed their efforts towards the acquisition of territory and the founding of colonial empires, in order to secure commercial power and the control of trade centers. As time went on, however, their point of view changed; and the movement, within the last decade, has become economic and commercial, rather than territorial. Narrow and selfish ideas of colonial politics and economics have given place to broader and saner conceptions of the relations of the mother countries to their offspring and to one another. The European powers have realized that the acquisition of vast territories is not in itself genuine national expansion, and that these great possessions cannot be maintained without a scientific study of their peoples, customs, and institutions, and the proper development of their governments and natural resources. This places a great burden upon the home country, as it involves the expenditure of immense sums of money and the employment of hundreds of its best citizens. And the nations have learned that, after all, the world is a small place where the interests of all constantly overlap, and where it is no longer wise or possible to maintain exclusive trade monopolies.

Previous to 1880, the European governments were too much occupied with local affairs, and too weak financially and economically, to think seriously of colonial empires. When the smoke of those vital conflicts of the nineteenth century — the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1877-78 — had cleared away, and the map of Europe had been adjusted for a time with a fair degree of satisfaction, the statesmen were able to rise above the petty strife for military glory and local territorial aggrandizement, and to take a saner, broader view of a nation's destiny. And a transformation was begun which was to lift European diplomacy out of its Mediterranean leading-strings

and place it upon a plane as wide as the world. Man's political horizon was elevated until European and American politics became world politics, embracing every state and every land.

Fortunately, during the years 1870 to 1890 the world was undergoing a remarkable financial and economic development that would make possible this world diplomacy of the future. In Germany an industrial revolution took place, which dotted the land with factories and increased its trade to over \$1,700,000,000 in 1890. France paid off her \$1,000,000,000 war indemnity within two years; and she underwent an equally astonishing development, loaned Germany \$250,000,000 for industrial improvements, and became the banker of Europe. The extensive British trade grew from £547,000,000 in 1870 to £749,000,000 by 1890, and the production of manufactured goods in the United States from \$3,000,000,000 to \$9,000,000,000 in the same period.

The total output of gold increased from \$477,000,000 to \$836,000,000 during the same time; and the yearly product of silver grew from \$39,000,000 in 1850 to \$135,000,000 in 1885, and reached \$217,700,000 by 1904. By 1900 the wealth of European states was reputed to be approximately \$246,600,000,000; and private resources were accumulating with equal rapidity. In 1870 the Bank of England, the Bank of France, and a few private institutions in the capitals of those states and in New York City, were furnishing most of the capital for foreign investment; but by 1907 there were twenty-one private banks in England, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, which possessed a total of over \$2,480,000,000 of capital, surplus and deposits. In December of 1909, the Comptroller of the Treasury reported that the total resources of the banks of the United States reached the stupendous sum of

\$21,100,000,000. To grasp the value and significance of this marvelous growth in capital, one has only to recall the rapid development of the multitude of rich and powerful corporations both in this country and abroad during the last quarter of a century.

This astonishing increase in capital and industry was accompanied by an equally remarkable development in methods of production and transportation. Machinery replaced hand labor in the shop and on the farm, — on the latter to such an extent that in twenty years' time 600 men were doing the work formerly requiring 2145. Steam, extensively employed in manufacturing only since 1865, has more than doubled man's productive power, and electricity has increased it still more. The steamboat and the railway displaced the sailing-vessel and the horse, while at the same time the cost of transportation was greatly reduced. In 1860 to 1870 wheat could hardly be moved 150 to 200 miles in Europe without losing its value. Now it can be transported halfway round the world for a fraction of its price.

Thus, through a wonderful material development in industry, capital, and transportation facilities, the way was prepared for a world-wide colonial expansion. In the political field, also, new movements were taking place. Governments were growing in resources, in wealth, in effectiveness, and in concentration of power. The France, which with dignity, firmness, and skill incorporated Tunis and entered with determined tread the jungles of the Sudan in the early eighties, was not the prostrate and divided nation of the seventies. The British lion, which with a calm forcefulness insisted upon its share of Africa in the eighties and nineties, was not the vacillating, meek creature of the sixties and seventies. The masterful, united Germany, backed by a Triple Alliance, interfering in Southwest Africa and Morocco, was no longer the jealous group of mediocre states,

cajoled into a union by the exigencies of war and the persuasion of a Bismarck.

This development has been accompanied in nearly every state by a growth in the power of the Federal or Central authority and by a thorough organization of the work of the executive. Within the United States, where the labors of the cabinet departments have been so carefully and systematically developed, the Federal Government has been steadily taking unto itself duties and responsibilities of which none would have dreamed fifty years ago. In Germany the Imperial Government has increased steadily in strength since its organization in 1871, while its ruler has elaborated his theory of divine right. In France the growth of the Central Government in power and efficiency has been steady, until French premiers and cabinets are able to direct the affairs of state with a firmness and decision unknown in the days of Guizot and Thiers. And in England the strength of the cabinet, which became a fixture under Queen Victoria, has increased until it has now secured a control over the House of Lords nearly equal to that which it enjoys in the House of Commons.

Equally important changes were taking place in the colonial activities of European states, as well as in their general attitude towards colonization. By 1830 the old "mercantile system" had served its day; and the powers realized that colonial monopolies and the uncontrolled rule of governors from the home country were no longer an unmixed blessing, either for the colonies or for the mother country. Great Britain — the greatest of the colonial states — was the first to move; and between 1830 and 1860 a complete reversal of her whole colonial policy took place. The adoption of the free-trade policy at home brought about the emancipation of the colonies, and was the source of as much benefit abroad as it was to the British Isles themselves. This was accom-

panied, through the influence of Mr. Wakefield and of the Colonization Society founded in 1830, by the granting of home rule to the colonies. Up to that time the bureaucratic system of colonial rule employed by England, where everything—even to unimportant details—was controlled from Downing Street, had proved highly detrimental to the development and progress of the colonies. Not even the strong hand of a Lord Stanley or a Lord Grey, now and then in control of the Colonial Office, was sufficient to redeem the system.

“In some back room,” wrote Mr. C. Buller, “you will find all the Mother Country which really exercises supremacy, and really maintains connection with the vast and widely scattered Colonies of Britain. We know not the name, the history, or the functions of the individual, into the narrow limits of whose person we find the Mother Country shrunk.

“There are rooms in the Colonial Office with old and meager furniture, bookcases crammed with colonial gazettes and newspapers, tables covered with baize, and some old and faded chairs scattered about, in which those who have personal applications to make are doomed to wait until the interview can be obtained. Here, if perchance you shall some day be forced to tarry, you will find strange, anxious-looking beings, who pace to and fro in feverish impatience or sit dejected at the table, unable in the agitation of their thoughts to find any occupation to while away their hours, and starting every time the doors open, in hopes that the messenger is come to announce that their turn is arrived. Those are men with colonial grievances. . . . One is a recalled governor, boiling over with a sense of mortified pride and frustrated policy; another a judge, recalled for daring to resist the compact of his Colony; another a merchant, whose whole property has been destroyed by

some job or oversight; another the organ of the remonstrances of some colonial Parliament; another a widow struggling for some pension on which her hopes of existence hang; and perhaps another is a man, whose project is under consideration. Every one has passed hours in that dull but anxious attendance. . . . After a short conference you will generally see him return, with disappointment stamped on his brow, and, quitting the Office, wend his lonely way home to despair, or perhaps to return to his Colony and rebel."

These are the words of a partisan, but they convey a reasonably accurate picture of the actual condition of affairs at the time.

It was from such leading-strings that the colonies were gradually emancipated. Beginning with Canada in 1840, where colonial home rule and union originated through the activities of Lord Durham in 1839 and 1840, responsible government was introduced into New South Wales in 1843, South Australia in 1844, Victoria and Tasmania in 1851, New Zealand in 1852, Cape Colony in 1854, and into Queensland in 1859. By 1870 the new system was thoroughly developed and in good working order in all these typical British colonies.

While this was going on, the old wasteful system of free land grants was abolished, and the Government undertook to regulate the sale of the crown lands on an equitable and scientific basis. The discussions of party politics in Great Britain were greatly relieved by the removal of numerous petty questions of colonial life and policy from the field of Parliament's activities. And the imperial forces were gradually withdrawn from the self-supporting colonies, until the Colonial Secretary reported, in 1873, that the military expenses for the colonies were confined almost entirely to the necessities of imperial defense.

During this period territorial expansion was not popular

with the Colonial Office. Lord Derby, Lord Granville, and Lord Blachford — all pupils of the Manchester School of Bright and Cobden — had no faith in a “ Greater Britain ” or confidence in the policy of responsible government. Lord Blachford, who was a leading factor in directing the colonial policy from 1860 to 1870, wrote, “ I have always believed — and the belief has so confirmed and consolidated itself that I can hardly realize the possibility of any one seriously thinking the contrary — that the destiny of our Colonies is independence ; and that in this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connection, while it lasts, shall be as profitable as possible.”

Some acquisitions, like New Zealand in 1840, Natal in 1843, the Transvaal in 1852, Basutoland in 1871, and the Fiji Islands in 1874, were forced upon Great Britain by unexpected and serious developments. But in no case was the extension of territory due to any preconceived policy of expansion. The almost universal sentiment of the British statesmen was that none of the new acquisitions would in any way fairly compensate the Home Government for the expense and trouble of caring for them. It was felt that there should be no further expansion except through commercial enterprises. By 1860 Parliament had entered upon a policy of retrenchment ; and in 1865 a Committee of the House of Commons composed of Cardwell, C. Fortescue, Lord Stanley, Adderley, and W. E. Forster, recommended that any further extension of territory was inexpedient and that England should withdraw as rapidly as possible from all her holdings on the west coast of Africa, except Sierra Leone.

Moreover, Great Britain was too poor to embark seriously upon great colonial undertakings. In the majority of cases where she was compelled by force of circumstances to take over new lands, financial reasons forced her to entrust the development and control of those countries to commer-

cial companies, such as the New Zealand Company from 1835 to 1850, the South Australian Company from 1835, and the River Niger Navigation Company in 1864. This practice of utilizing the services of great trading companies was taken up later as a regular method of colonial expansion by Lord Granville, when he chartered the British North Borneo Company in 1882.

Through the whole period from 1830 to 1880, the spirit of conservatism and hesitation was triumphant. The British Colonial Office seemed to know its own mind; but it was "afraid to take in hand any definite policy." It was afraid of the expense, of the jealousy of other nations, and of the new responsibilities that every change of policy or accession of territory involved. But more than these was the serious handicap of a procession of colonial ministers and secretaries, each with his own policy and theories as to colonial rule and colonial expansion or regression. In the fifty-five years, extending from 1830 to 1885, there were thirty colonial secretaries,¹ of whom six served from four to six years, but the other twenty-four averaged scarcely a year and one fifth apiece.

Tendencies were at work as early as the sixties, which promised to bring to an end this period of uncertainty, and to create a new conception of the colonial relations and colonial activities of the British Empire. About 1885 the change in the policy and position of the Colonial Office was complete. The move for South African Confederation from 1874 to 1885 and the Colonial Conferences of 1883 and 1887 mark the beginning of a new era in the life of the British Empire. The "Imperial Federation Leagues" of Lord Rosebery and the colonial tariff union of Mr. Cham-

¹ The office of Secretary of State for the Colonies was not created until 1854, the work of this department being combined with the Department of War under one portfolio from 1801 to 1854.

berlain were the first suggestions of the movement for imperial federation now so popular. One of the most important factors in this transformation was the influence of the people upon the British foreign policy. The franchise, which had been placed on a sound basis by the reforms of 1832, was enlarged by the laws of 1867 and 1884; and thereafter the effect of public opinion upon the conduct of British foreign affairs was distinctly noticeable. Disraeli, one of the first modern statesmen to undertake an aggressive foreign policy, was put out of office in 1880 because his acts failed to meet with popular favor; and the Gladstone ministry which succeeded him fell five years later, on account of the public disapproval of its vacillating conduct of foreign affairs. But it is safe to say that, when the British Government took a prominent and dignified part in the forward movement for territory during the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century, it had the support of the people behind it.

The same lethargy and indecision prevailed in the direction of French foreign policy. No one took much interest in colonial affairs. To the majority of French statesmen, colonies were as useless and unjustifiable an expense as "*poids mort à trainer*" and "*une loge à l'Opéra*." Officials appointed to the colonial service considered themselves exiled; and public men generally considered colonial possessions as places fit only for the training of soldiers and sailors, for the harboring of criminals, and for the dissipation of the wealth and blood of the French nation. There was little or no public discussion of the question; and the masses were totally ignorant of, and indifferent to, the success or failure of the national colonial policy. Between 1815 and 1870 France more than doubled her territorial possessions outside of Europe, securing a firm foothold in Indo-China, Algeria, and Senegal; but this was not the result of any preconceived or aggressive forward policy. These annex-

ations were largely accidental — the result of the sudden desire of a few prominent officials to gain glory or popularity. In fact, the movement was so ill-conceived and so carelessly undertaken, while the greatest ignorance prevailed as to local conditions, that in both the Tonquin and the Algerian campaigns there was a great waste of life and money ; and it was many years before the French reaped any benefits from their new possessions.

For a decade after the Franco-Prussian War, all colonial progress was stopped by the weakness and poverty of the Government, by the long strife between the political parties which more than once brought the country to the verge of war or disrapture, and by the lack of scientific knowledge and modern methods of managing colonies. The system of home rule accompanied by universal suffrage and representation in the French Parliament, which had been given to the colonies by the First and Second Republics, and which had been the source of endless troubles, particularly in the Antilles, was replaced, from 1854 to 1866, by the more efficient rule of governors with almost full powers and supported by troops. Yet the service in many places remained so inefficient and slovenly that the French earned the reputation of poor colonizers.

It remained for Jules Ferry to stir his compatriots to an active and sane participation in foreign politics, and to arouse a genuine interest and national pride in colonial undertakings, through the Tunis episode. It was in the eighties before France had scientific and popular colonial organizations of sufficient importance and backing to prepare the way for the creation of a genuine colonial empire. Then, for the first time, was the study of colonial methods and the customs, conditions, and peoples of the new lands entered upon with intelligence, seriousness, and enthusiasm. The whole system of colonial administration, from the Colo-

nial Office down to the management of the smallest colony, was gradually but thoroughly reorganized and readjusted, until now it is as efficient as any in the world. While this was going on, the French Government had grown in strength and stability until it had won the confidence of the European states and Russia was convinced of the value of a French alliance. This was agreed upon in 1891;¹ and in the following year France rendered secure her finances, and her position as a self-sustaining and progressive nation, by the adoption of a protective tariff system.

Here, also, one must not overlook the influence of the popular will upon French colonial policy. From 1880 on, this is distinctly noticeable; and the enterprising, progressive spirit of the new Republic, resulting from the healthy development of democratic institutions and ideals, showed itself immediately in the field of colonial adventure and enterprise. The active promoters of French expansion in Africa were again and again supported and encouraged by private funds and popular approval; and it is exceedingly doubtful if the great undertakings would have succeeded but for the financial and political support afforded them by the French Chamber.

The industrial revolution which took place in all the European states, from 1870 to 1900, was sure to result in overproduction — at least in a production that far exceeded the needs of the inhabitants of the several states. Wider markets were, therefore, soon in demand; and the leading powers quickly found themselves embarked upon a silent contest for the unoccupied trade centers. Commercial monopolies were greatly in favor, and were applied wherever possible. The increased transportation facilities and methods were rapidly bringing large fields of trade into the general market, which previously had been unapproachable. In 1800, judging from the limited statistics then collected,

¹ Apparently, and apparently made more formal in 1894.

there were about 355 to 360 million people who were reached by the trade of Europe. But by 1900, the sum of those affected had attained the enormous total of 1,579,825,000, or an increase of 1,220,000,000 in round numbers during the one hundred years. Of course, a goodly proportion of this increase is due to the remarkable growth of the population of all the European and American states; but the largest share must be attributed to the opening of vast regions in Asia and Africa.

In this connection, it is to be noted that, after 1880, nearly all the European governments became alarmed at the conditions arising in their several states, due to this steady and astounding increase of population. In the ten years from 1885 to 1895 the population of Germany increased approximately 540,000 per year, Italy 300,000, Austria-Hungary, 350,000, Great Britain, 318,000, and Russia (European), 1,350,000. And in 1895 the density of the population in Germany reached 250.5 per square mile, in Great Britain, 326, in Italy, 280, and in Austria, 180. At the same time, emigration from these countries was assuming equally alarming proportions. In the ten years from 1878 to 1887 over 2,311,400 persons emigrated from Great Britain, 1,171,800 from Germany, and 609,300 from Italy; and the European governments became anxious to keep this moving population under their own flags and their own control. The only way this could be done was through providing colonial centers to which they could direct their ambitious and increasing generations. No wonder that the Continental states looked with envy upon England with her extensive colonial empire, and were anxious to share in the creation of new fields of colonial activity and in the opening of great world markets. But they were slow in recognizing the real significance of the great transformation that was in progress; and, fearing international com-

plications and doubting their ability to meet successfully the demands of such far-reaching enterprises, they hesitated to push their domains beyond the seas. "I approached the matter with some reluctance," said Bismarck. "I asked myself, How could I justify it if I said to these enterprising men [Bremen merchants with interests in South Africa], that is all very well, but the German Empire is not strong enough? It would attract the ill-will of other states." "We wished to hold ourselves free," wrote Lord Granville on May 8, 1882, to Lyons (British Minister to France), concerning the proposed occupation of Egypt, "if necessity arose, to consider all possible forms of intervention, and to choose that which was accompanied by the fewest inconveniences and risks."

Motives sufficiently powerful to overcome this timidity were soon forthcoming. In the name of humanity it was urged that it was the duty of the Christian powers to penetrate the wilds of Africa, in order to suppress the slave trade and to bring the blessings of good government and of civilization to the natives. In practically every treaty from 1815 to 1900 affecting Africa, slavery and the slave trade are mentioned. And King Leopold, speaking of the work of the Congo Association, said: "Our only program is that of the moral and material regeneration of the country." Again, it was argued that for humanity's sake the Christian nations should intervene in states where the peoples were oppressed by the misrule of incapable despots or suffered from endless internecine wars, until there was no longer any protection for life and property or hope of freedom for the masses. Lord Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin (British political agent in Egypt) on October 5, 1882, that since the rebellion was overthrown, it remained for them "to establish on a firm basis the authority of the Khedive, and to make provision for the future wellbeing of all classes of the Egyptian people."


Again, it was claimed that an inexorable law of the universe had predestined the great nations to occupy the earth, and thus to bring peace, justice, security, and a beneficent rule to all lands and people. "The Anglo-Saxon race," said Mr. Chamberlain, "is infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the history and civilization of the world." "Non, France," cried Victor Hugo in his inimitable way, "l'univers a besoin que tu vives! Je le redis, la France est un besoin des hommes." As a corollary to this, the seizure of large areas of uncontrolled and undeveloped territories was a necessity, if the blessings of good government and of our Christian civilization were to be brought to the less fortunate and the half-civilized peoples of other lands. And any state that failed to occupy its share was neglecting an imperative call of Divine Providence. The Russians penetrating the wastes of Turkestan and Central Asia, the French fighting their way into the jungles of West Africa, and the Germans forcing treaties from the chiefs of East Africa, were answering this call. "The Britons are a race endowed like the Romans with a genius for government," said Sir Wilfrid Laurier; "their colonial and imperial policy is animated by a resolve to spread throughout the world the arts of free self-government which they enjoy at home. And they are in truth accomplishing this work."

Without doubt the most vital motives for expansion are to be found in the political and economic needs of the time. To protect the commercial and financial interests of their citizens in foreign lands was a good and sufficient reason for intervention to most of the powers. And France and Great Britain entered Algiers, Tunis, and Egypt to safeguard the interests of the French, British, and other European creditors. But the economic factor was the most pressing. "Colonization is for France a question of life or death," wrote Leroy-Beaulieu. "Either France will become

a great African state, or she will be in a century or two but a second-rate power." Russia undertook a remarkable colonial expansion in Central Asia to secure control of the trade and the trade routes there. Japan fought a great war to insure the fulfillment of her economic destiny in Korea and on the Chinese mainland. And in Germany, where Bismarck had successfully introduced a policy of protection, because "under free trade we were gradually bleeding to death," colonization was determined upon definitely in 1884, as necessary to insure the economic independence and future of the Empire.

The African possessions of European states in 1870 were neither extensive nor particularly valuable. For the most part they were confined to seaport towns and the adjacent territory, which were being used as ports of call and trading centers, rather than as bases for colonial expansion. There had been no attempt to mark definitely the boundaries of any of these colonies or to stake out special claims. The different nations had merely built forts and trading factories at certain favorable points and permitted their influence to extend gradually into the interior without any definite purpose or plan of expansion. An exception was made in Algeria and Cape Colony; but, before 1870, none of the European powers had seriously considered the founding of great colonial states in Africa.

The French possessed a strong hold on Algeria at the north and had established along the west side three small colonies, on the Senegal River, at Mellicouri, and on the Ivory Coast. In addition they had begun explorations on the Gaboon River and started a settlement at Obock on the East Coast. The British controlled a struggling colony at the Cape of Good Hope, had secured substantial holdings and openings for trade at Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos on the west side, and had pushed up the



Niger River to the Benué. The Portuguese claimed extensive but indefinite tracts of land on the West Coast, extending from the mouth of the Congo to a point some distance south of Benguella, and in Mozambique, on the East Coast, reaching for a considerable number of miles north and south of the Zambesi River. But their settlements and trading posts were few and widely scattered. In addition, they had a small colony on the Guinea Coast and the islands of Príncipe and São Thomé in the Gulf of Guinea. The Spaniards had extended their sway over an indefinite area, known as Rio de Oro, on the West Coast, nearly opposite the Canary Islands, and had occupied a small strip of the Guinea Coast just north of the Gaboon country and the island of Fernando Po. None of the other European countries owned any territory in the Dark Continent, Holland having lost or sold hers to Great Britain, and Germany and Italy not having made as yet a start towards the establishment of colonies.

Fortunately, at the time when the European states began to think seriously of colonial expansion, the interest of Europe in the Dark Continent, as a field for commercial and economic activity, was aroused to a degree never before known. Considerable information existed concerning certain portions of Africa and its general contour, for, in the forty years prior to 1870, a large part of the continent had been explored; but few persons, except scholars and geographers, had taken particular notice of it. Before 1880, indeed, Mungo Park, Major Laing, and M. Caillé had gone from the West Coast up the Gambia and Senegal Rivers, found the upper waters of the Niger and Timbuctu and crossed the Sahara to Tangier and Tripoli, while Clapperton and Denham were exploring the Central Sudan from Lake Chad to the Niger River, and the brothers Lander down that stream to its mouth. Dr. Henry Barth spent

the years 1850 to 1855 in the scientific study of the languages, peoples, and geography of the region just mentioned (west of Lake Chad) including the kingdom of Sokoto. Farther south, on the East Coast, Paul du Chaillu traveled over the Gaboon River district between 1856 and 1868; and, in the interior, David Livingstone explored the Zambesi River, the region about Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika, and crossed the continent to Benguela during the eighteen years following 1851. Meanwhile, Burton, Speke, and Grant, coming up from the East Coast, had discovered Lake Victoria Nyanza and the headwaters of the Nile; and Sir Samuel Baker, traversing the whole of that river from the north to south, found its other source in Albert Nyanza.

But it was the work of Dr. Nachtigal, who in 1869 to 1871 studied carefully the Eastern Sahara and Sudan; of Cameron, who crossed the whole continent from the Zanzibar Coast to Benguela between 1873 and 1875; of Savorgnan de Brazza, who explored scientifically the whole region between Libréville on the Gaboon and the north banks of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers from 1874 to 1884; and of Henry M. Stanley, who found Livingstone in 1873, that drew the attention of the general public to Africa. Books were written, money raised, and colonial societies formed with the purpose of inducing people to study African conditions and to start colonies. By the time Stanley returned from his second journey in 1877, with the news of the discovery of the great Congo River and its tributaries, the statesmen and the intelligent public of Europe were taking a very considerable interest in African affairs. The general topography of the continent had been mapped, — in outline, at least, — the location of all the important lakes and waterways pointed out, and the possibilities of the different sections as sources of wealth and trade for Europe ascertained with a fair degree of accuracy.

l'Exploration et la Civilisation de l'Afrique Centrale," but better known as the "International African Association," was formed, with headquarters at Brussels under the immediate direction of Leopold, and with national committees in practically all the European countries and in the United States, whose business it was to arouse interest in the movement and to raise funds.

During the years 1876 and 1877, Henry M. Stanley had returned to Zanzibar, crossed with great difficulty the deserts and forests to the headwaters of the Congo, via Lakes Victoria Nyanza and Tanganyika, and descended the river some two thousand miles, amid dangers and adventures, to its mouth. On his return he was met at Marseilles by two of Leopold's agents, and later summoned to Brussels, where he gave to King Leopold and the chief promoters of the International African Association an impressive account of his discoveries and of the wonderful natural wealth of the Congo region. The result was that the "Committee for the Study and Investigation of the Upper Congo" (*Comité d'Études*), appointed in November, 1878, became a definite organization under the chairmanship of Colonel Strauch, and assumed the direction of all the activities of the Association after January, 1879.

The services of Stanley were secured, and in August of the year 1879, he had begun his mission, — to explore the Congo carefully, to make treaties with the native chiefs, to establish stations along the river for the advancement of trade and the protection of the natives, and to exert every effort to end the interior slave trade. So skillfully and energetically did the great explorer carry out this work that, when he returned to Europe in June, 1884, a vast area of 900,000 square miles, with an estimated population of 15,000,000, had been mapped out for the Association. In its early stages this enterprise was intended to be as philan-

thropic as it was commercial. Leopold hoped to found a great negro state in the basin of the Congo, which would afford adequate protection to the harassed and weaker elements of the population, suppress such vicious and barbaric customs as cannibalism, and open the country to missionaries, to trade, and to European civilization. The first Commissioner, appointed in July, 1883, to rule the district was the liberal-minded Sir Frederic Goldsmid. If it had not been for the imperative call of Egypt, General Gordon would have succeeded him in 1884; but his place was taken by another able British officer, Sir Francis de Winton, who served as the first Administrator-General of the Congo State from June, 1884, to December, 1885.

It was not to be expected that this undertaking — so vast and so costly — could long remain solely upon a philanthropic basis. The sum raised by the Comité d'Études was insignificant; and King Leopold himself was forced, not only to carry a large part of the expense from 1879 to 1890, furnishing from \$100,000 to \$200,000 yearly, but to continue his support thereafter until he had contributed approximately \$5,000,000. To make the enterprise really pay its way, it was therefore necessary to fall back upon certain commercial features which were inseparably connected with the progress of the whole undertaking. In 1882 the Association was transformed into a corporation called the "International Association of the Congo," with King Leopold as president; an Association flag was adopted; and an energetic and systematic attempt was made to develop the trade of the Congo Basin. "I have never ceased to call the attention of my countrymen to the necessity of turning their attention to countries across the seas," wrote King Leopold to M. Beernaert in 1889. "It is in serving the cause of humanity and progress that peoples of the second class appear useful members of the great family of nations. More

than any other, a manufacturing and commercial nation like ours should endeavor to assure outlets for all its workmen, — thinkers, capitalists, and laborers. These patriotic considerations have dominated my life. They decided the creation of the African work." "I was firmly convinced," wrote George Grenfell, speaking of the period from 1884 to 1894, "that if His Majesty sought anything beyond the advantage of the Congo people, it was but the benefit of his Belgian subjects, whose great need, like the Briton's, is an open market for their labor."¹ It was soon noted that the region was rich in ivory and rubber; and various sections of the country were parceled out ere long to trading companies. The Anglo-Belgian Indiarubber Company was the first and the most powerful of these; but it was followed gradually by others, until there were some ten "concessionnaire" companies in the field.

The International Association of the Congo had not been recognized by the powers and had therefore no assured territorial existence. A charter from Europe, said Stanley in 1882, was necessary to make it worth a two-shilling piece. Doubtless Leopold would have gladly postponed this issue indefinitely while consolidating the new state, but French ambitions made it impossible. However, by a fortunate combination of circumstances, in spite of the fact that the rising Congo State was most seriously threatened by French expansion, and that this in turn caused Portugal to reassert her claims to the most essential part of the new state, Leopold was able to get the support of Europe and to overthrow his enemies in detail.

For centuries Portugal had claimed the West Coast of Africa at least from lat. 5° 12' S. to lat. 18° S., and an indefinite amount inland. No country disputed the claim below lat. 8° S., but neither had any country explicitly recog-

¹ Sir Harry Johnston, *George Grenfell and the Congo*, vol. 1, p. 377.

nized the claim to the important northern strip, which included the mouth of the Congo. France, by the Convention of 1786, neither contested nor recognized Portuguese sovereignty there, but agreed not to occupy any of that territory herself, which perhaps might be said to be a recognition of it as a sphere of interest. Great Britain steadfastly refused to recognize Portuguese jurisdiction, though the Lisbon Government initiated negotiations for such recognition every few years from 1846. Portugal had never been able to enforce with any regularity her commercial monopoly on the Congo, and a complete freedom of trade had been confirmed to France by the Convention just mentioned, and was equally enjoyed by other countries, with or without treaty rights.

The rapid success of Stanley, the penetration of M. Savorgnan de Brazza to the Upper Congo, and the occurrence of several violent conflicts between natives and traders, which again raised the question of jurisdiction, once more compelled Portugal to open negotiations for the recognition of her "sovereignty." Accordingly, early in November, 1882, both France and Great Britain were approached. France gave assurances that De Brazza's third expedition, then in preparation, was merely scientific; that she would not encroach on the territories south of lat. $5^{\circ} 12'$; and that she was prepared to join in the delimitation of West African boundaries. The correspondence continued until January, 1883, and was renewed in the summer, but nothing came of it. The French Government was friendly, but apparently wished to postpone the delimitation till De Brazza had had time to consolidate their holdings along the Congo. In February, 1883, he was given the powers of a colonial governor and authorized to make such treaties with the native chiefs as were necessary to advance the French influence. His studies of the country and its resources were to be ac-

accompanied by serious efforts to accustom the natives to the idea of putting themselves under French protection.

With Great Britain, Portugal was more successful. Foreigners were largely shut out from the French colonial markets, and Great Britain did not wish these preserves enlarged. It was hardly feasible to take the territory herself; but Portugal had claims to it, she professed conversion to the most liberal principles of colonial administration, and was weak enough to be easily held to them. In his first despatch De Serpa wrote: "Portugal does not wish to close Africa, but on the contrary to open it to the colonization and the commerce of the world, and to facilitate access to it from the coasts she occupies." She would suppress the slave trade there, define the boundaries in West Africa, and coöperate with her neighbors in maintaining order and security on the Congo. Lord Granville recognized that conditions had changed since the Portuguese advances of 1877 had been repelled, and on December 15 he proposed as bases for a treaty: the recognition of the Portuguese boundaries at lat. $5^{\circ} 12'$ S. and 18° S.; unrestricted commerce on the Congo and the Zambesi; low tariffs in all the African possessions of Portugal; the equality of British and Portuguese subjects in matters of land, leases, religion, and taxes; and the cession of Portuguese claims between long. 5° W. and 5° E., i.e., the fort of St. John the Baptist of Ajuda. A lively correspondence, lasting till February, 1884, led to the signing of a treaty along the lines suggested, but with the rights of foreigners much more thoroughly safeguarded. The equality of treatment was carefully defined, elaborated, and extended to all foreigners; freedom of navigation on the Congo was guaranteed; the duties levied in the Congo territory might not for ten years exceed those of the Mozambique tariff of 1877, and might then be revised only by consent of Great Britain; and Portu-

guese sovereignty on the Congo was recognized only to Noki. This last provision shows Granville's friendliness for the Congo Association, but many feared that the cutting-off of the new state from the sea would kill Leopold's beneficent enterprise.

Almost instantly serious opposition arose to this treaty, not only in the Cortes and in Parliament, but also on the Continent. France knew the treaty was directed against her; and in Germany a score of chambers of commerce appealed to Bismarck for aid. The Woermann Line had a monthly service to the Congo and from January, 1883, to March, 1884, inclusive, had sold there 1,029,904 pounds of powder, 2452 tons of liquor, and 555 tons of weapons and rice; and the traffic in intoxicants alone had increased from 76 tons in January, 1883, to 502 tons in March, 1884. There were also many sailing-vessels that visited these regions. Bismarck imagined that this trade was threatened.

The French and German Governments approached each other at almost the same time — April 17 to 19 — to ascertain one another's views; and Count Hatzfeldt, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote likewise to Holland, Spain, Italy, and the United States, while vigorously protesting against the treaty in Lisbon and London. Granville had long recognized the necessity of Continental recognition if the treaty were to accomplish its purpose; and, when Bismarck said that it would not be accepted even if Portugal made further concessions as to the tariff and substituted an international for the dual commission (which was to regulate the navigation of the Congo), Granville announced that his Government had abandoned the treaty. However, negotiations were to be continued. Portugal had already made the suggestion of an international conference, without apparent response. But Bismarck took up the idea — if, indeed, he had not already thought of it; and, in order


to get ahead of Great Britain, the natural power to call such a conference, and to secure a prominent place for Germany in colonial affairs, in which she had had almost no share heretofore, he pressed France to unite with him in issuing the invitations. Granville was reassured by such statements as that Bismarck would be glad to name a plenipotentiary to the conference suggested by Portugal, while the French and German Governments, from May to October, were coming to an agreement on the scope of the conference and on their joint policy.

On October 8, they issued invitations for a conference to meet at Berlin, within the month, if possible, to discuss "freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths of the Congo; application to the Congo and Niger of the principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna with a view to preserve freedom of navigation on certain international rivers . . . and a definition of formalities to be observed so that new occupations on the African coasts shall be deemed effective." Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Spain, and the United States received invitations at this time, and a little later, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Turkey, and the Scandinavian states were included.

Most of the powers accepted promptly; but Granville did so only "in principle" until he had received explanations as to the scope, interpretation, and manner of discussion of the three points mentioned in the invitation. At length it was determined that, while all accepted the principle of free trade on the African rivers, the regulation of the navigation and commerce of the Niger should be left to the powers controlling that river, — Great Britain and France; that the Upper Congo should be included in the discussions; that the term "newly acquired territory" should not include lands under the protection of any European state when the conference was called; and that the

“status and proceedings of the International Association of the Congo” should “not come within the compass” of the deliberations. England thereupon gave her approval and designated Sir Edward Malet as her representative. The conference began its sittings on November 15, 1884, with Bismarck in the chair, and concluded them on February 26, 1885, when the “General Act of the West African Conference” was duly signed by all the representatives present.

The conference officially ignored the International Association until its last session, at which the Independent State of the Congo (or, as it is better known, the “Congo Free State”) was formally welcomed into the family of nations; for many members of the conference, in behalf of their respective governments, had been busy making treaties which established its position as a state and defined its territory. The United States had, indeed, recognized it as a “friendly government” in the preceding April, but Germany, the first of the European nations, did not recognize it till November 8, and the other states followed between December 16 (Great Britain) and February 23 (Belgium). Bismarck saw in this a means of preventing armed conflict over the Congo Basin, of restricting the Portuguese advance, and of preserving the region to free trade. The Association agreed not to levy import duties on goods brought into its territory and to accord to German subjects all rights granted to the subjects of the most favored nation. On her side, Germany recognized the flag and the boundaries of the Independent State to be formed by the Association, as given in a map appended to the treaty. The treaties signed by the other powers were very similar, though much European pressure was required to compel Portugal to recognize the north bank of the Congo as belonging to the new state (February 14, 1885). The south bank as far as Noki was relinquished to Portugal, and the coast province of Cabinda.



THE BELGIAN CONGO in 1908

The Congo territory on the north bank was only a narrow strip west of Manyanga, while to the east of that point France insisted on the Congo and the Ubangi as boundaries.

The Association gave its adhesion to the Act of 1885, and proclaimed the neutralization of its territory. The Belgian Legislature granted Leopold II permission to become sovereign of the new state; and the transformation of the Association into the Independent State of the Congo was officially proclaimed in the summer of 1885.¹

The new state came into existence with a territory of

¹ The independence and new constitution were proclaimed at Banana, on the Congo, by Sir Francis de Winton, the first Governor-General, on July 19, 1885.

about 900,000 square miles and a population of approximately 15,000,000, chiefly Bantus. The Association had been rewarded for its remarkable explorations by being entrusted with the government of this vast region with nearly three times the population of Belgium (5,500,000 in 1880) and 80 times its area (11,343 square miles). It had access to the Atlantic and possessed practically all of the vast drainage basin of the Congo, from the Kwango River to Lake Tanganyika, and from the Ubangi to the Upper Luapula, at lat. 12° S.

The primary purpose, both of the International Association and of the promoters of the Berlin Conference, was to secure free navigation and free trade on the Congo and its tributaries, and to have the development of the region, as well as the protection of the natives, placed in the hands of some responsible but independent organization. To this end the Congo Independent State, joined to Belgium only through a personal union, was created. And the Conference marked off for free trade the entire region between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans lying between lat. $2^{\circ} 30' \text{ S.}$ and the Loji River (lat. $7^{\circ} 50' \text{ S.}$) on the West Coast and lat. 5° N. and the mouth of the Zambesi on the East Coast, including all the territory drained by the Congo and its branches. Navigation of every foot of the Congo and its tributaries was to be free; and an international commission, composed of representatives of states signing the act, was to supervise the navigation of the river, the levying of river tolls and pilotage dues, the surveillance of quarantine stations, and all matters necessary for the upkeep of the river.

Conditions on the Congo were well known to many members of the conference; and Stanley was present to explain both the claims of the Association and the needs of the natives, with whom he was deeply in sympathy. The ravages and suffering caused by the slave trade in Central Africa

were thoroughly established facts and carefully considered by the conference. Nor were its members ignorant of the other barbarous customs, such as cannibalism, the burial sacrifices upon the death of chieftains, and the killing of persons for witchcraft, which George Grenfell and other missionaries have so vividly described. It was therefore provided in the act that all the powers should coöperate to put an end to the slave trade; and it was understood that all were to support the Independent State in its efforts to stop these atrocities and to care for the welfare of the natives.

It was confidently expected that the creation of the Congo State would be the greatest philanthropic movement of the time; and all the promoters of the conference—including King Leopold—seem to have been largely actuated by motives of humanity. Stanley wrote: "All men who sympathize with good and noble works, and this has been one of unparalleled munificence and grandeur of ideas, will unite in hoping that King Leopold II, the royal Founder of this unique humanitarian and political enterprise (whose wisdom rightly guided it and whose moral courage bravely sustained it to a successful issue), will live long to behold his Free State expand and flourish to be a fruitful blessing to a region that was until lately as dark as its own deep sunless forest shades." England shared Stanley's view that humanity and politics should go hand in hand on the Congo. Lord Granville, in his official instructions to Sir E. Malet (British representative at the conference) on November 7, 1884, wrote: "While the opening of the Congo markets is to be desired, the welfare of the natives should not be neglected; to them it would be of no benefit, but the reverse, if freedom of commerce, unchecked by reasonable control, should degenerate into license. . . . The principle which will command the sympathy and the support of Her Majesty's Government will be that of the advancement of legitimate commerce, with security

for the equality of treatment of all nations, and for the well-being of the native races." In a further letter of instructions, dated November 12, he adds that there was "a very strong feeling in this country for the abolition of the slave trade and the restriction of the importation of spirituous liquors."

The powers, indeed, bound themselves to suppress the slave trade; but by far the greater portion of their discussions was devoted to the commercial and political questions involved. In the "General Act" itself, only two out of thirty-eight articles dealt with the humanitarian interests. In Article VI the powers agreed "to protect the natives in their moral and material well-being, to coöperate in the suppression of slavery and the slave trade; to further the education and civilization of the natives; to protect missionaries, scientists and explorers"; and to preserve freedom of religion. Article XIX reiterates the intention of the European states to abolish the slave trade. Sir E. Malet, in three long letters to Granville on the work and results of the conference, devotes only a few sentences to its philanthropic achievements. In the third epistle, dated February 21, 1885, in answer to the criticism that more time had been given to the interests of commerce than to the interests of the natives, he says: "I venture to say that, if this objection is sound, the work of the conference has not fulfilled its intentions. But to meet it I would point to the Slave-Trade Declaration. . . . The slave dealer's trade will be, in the Congo regions at, it may be hoped, no distant date, as effectually extinguished on land as it has been on the sea. . . . The powers have further, by their Neutrality Declaration, engaged to endeavor to preserve these regions from the evils of war. If considerations of material interests and economic motives have prevented the approval of measures for the prevention of the introduction of spirits [and he should have added firearms], a step has been taken

in that direction by the expression of a general wish in favor of the control of the traffic."

In order to prevent conflicts between European states and to provide for the proper and regular extension of colonial possessions in Africa, it was agreed that the marking-out of all new protectorates must be preceded by due notification to the powers; that to retain titles to lands the occupation must be effective; and that recourse would be had to arbitration in case of differences. This was all excellent, and as desirable as the regulations on freedom of trade; but nowhere do we find any attempt to provide in a systematic and effectual manner for the vital interests of the natives. The statement that such things ought to be done for them was not sufficient. Some machinery ought to have been devised whereby the wishes of the powers could have been carried out. The natives should not only have been securely protected against themselves and the slave-hunters, but also shielded from the sale of firearms, the evils of the rum traffic, and other dangers attendant upon the coming of European civilization to Central Africa. It was evidently and confidently expected that all these matters would be carefully and promptly regulated by all the states individually, including the Congo Independent State. This was a grave blunder, as it left the natives completely at the mercy of individual governments and irresponsible trading companies to whom they might let out the country in concessions. It provided no check against the aggression of states like Germany and Holland, when forced into unfortunate and harmful colonial enterprises by the rapacity of their great commercial organizations.¹

¹ The influence of the German trading companies prevented the abolition of the sale of liquors and firearms on the Congo in 1885; and the Act of July 2, 1890, was not put into force till 1902 owing to the opposition of Holland, whose Government feared the new regulations would seriously affect the Dutch trade on the Upper Congo.

It was not until the Conference of Brussels in 1890 that any serious attempt was made to provide adequately for the care and protection of the native population. In the "General Act," signed July 2 of that year, the system was outlined, by which the interior slave trade was to be successfully exterminated within the next few years. It included the institution of an active military administration with a series of fortified stations and flying columns, and the establishment of effective means of communication and transportation such as telegraph lines and post-routes, roads, railways, and steamboat lines. The sale of firearms, except at some central public warehouse under the control of one of the signatory powers, in the region between lat. 20° N. and lat. 22° S., and reaching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, was strictly forbidden for twelve years. In the same zone the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors were prohibited in districts "where — either on account of religious belief or from some other causes — the use of distilled liquors does not exist or has not been developed." Those states, having possessions within this region not coming under the prohibition clause, were required to levy an import duty on liquors of 15 francs per hectolitre, at 50° C., with the option of raising it to 25 francs at the end of three years. This was raised to 70 francs per hectolitre for six years by the Brussels Convention of June 8, 1899. Yet the enforcement of all these regulations was left to the discretion and intelligence of the individual states, with no other incentive to obedience than the code of national honor and the pressure of public opinion. In the protectorates of states like England, Germany, and France, whose governments possessed a recognized and forceful organization and where public sentiment was more or less of a factor in national affairs, such a scheme worked fairly well; although it is well known that the officials and subjects of all three of these

nations broke the stipulations of both these conferences on more than one occasion. But in such a case as that of the Congo Independent State, outside the control of any established state and utterly indifferent to public opinion anywhere, it was quite a different matter.

After the independence of the Congo State was established and its boundaries defined, there remained the task of surveying the country and of extending the administrative control — till 1885 exercised only through a few stations on the main stream — to all sections of its vast territory. This was an undertaking requiring an enormous amount of painstaking effort combined with great patience and tact; yet it was accomplished with remarkable skill and expedition, owing to the devotion and energy of the Belgian officials. Unfortunately, however, they were compelled to push the work more rapidly than wisdom and their own needs warranted, because of pressure from the neighboring colonies and the demand that the occupation of all protectorates should be effective. King Leopold II began early to transform the organization into a strictly Belgian affair. In 1887 he paid off all the contributions from individuals of other nationalities, mostly British, to the sum of £16,888; and all the money that had to be borrowed after that date was secured from the Belgian Government, — such as the Congo loan of \$30,000,000 in 1887, the \$5,000,000 advanced in 1890, and the \$10,000,000 furnished in 1901 for public works. Previous to 1886 at least one half of the explorers and officials employed by the International Association were of British or foreign birth. From the appointment of M. Camille Janssen as Administrator-General, at the close of 1885, practically all the employees engaged in the public service of the Congo Independent State were Belgians.

In May, 1887, Captain Thys, representing a commercial organization of which he was a member, went out with an

expedition to open up the Kasai River. In 1888 the railway from Matadi to Stanley Pool was begun and Stanley Falls was occupied by Vangele and Van Kerckhoven. Vangele, Le Marinel, and Haanolet extended the Belgian rule on the Upper Ubangi as far as Banzyville in 1889; and Lieutenant Clément de Saint-Marcq was stationed as Resident in Kasongo. Hodister explored the Upper Mongala and the region between the Upper Lomami and the Lualaba in 1890, while Vangele was pushing up the Ubangi-Welle (or Uelle) to Jabbir, which brought the Congo administration in touch with the Sudan. In 1891 a strong force, under Captain Stairs (a Nova Scotian) and Captain Bodson (a Belgian), penetrated into the Katanga country and subdued the great kingdom of Msidi,—the most notorious and oppressive native tyrant of Central Africa,—while the gallant Captain Jacques was establishing a fortified post at Albertville on Lake Tanganyika.

Perhaps the most remarkable exploit accomplished by the representatives of the Congo Independent State at this period was the destruction of the Arab power on Lake Tanganyika. It extended all the way from Victoria Nyanza to Lake Nyasa, from Uganda to the headwaters of the Congo; and its centers were at Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, Kotakota on Lake Nyasa, and Nyangwe and Kasongo on the Upper Congo, with numerous fine towns and hundreds of plantations on the rivers and lakes. The notorious Tippoo Tib and his son Sefu or Sef, with their partner Rumalisa, were the leaders and promoters of the organization. Their main business was slave-hunting¹ and exporting ivory and other valuable produce by means of

¹ Captain Storms, a Belgian in the service of the International Association, and Mr. Alfred Swann, in the employ of the London Missionary Society, and later Senior Resident of British Nyasaland, going out to Africa in 1879 and in 1882 respectively, performed valiant services in protecting the natives about Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa from the slave-raiders.

slave caravans to the Zanzibar coast; and in one of the richest portions of Central Africa, they exercised a tyrannical and vicious dominion over the pagan blacks. It was only with the aid of Tippoo Tib¹ and his associates that Stanley had been able to make his first trip down the Congo, and he always remained friendly to the British; but the Arab leaders became bitterly hostile to the Europeans² when they realized that the white man was determined to destroy the slave trade and to take over the control of the country and its commerce.

As the Belgian officers advanced on the Upper Congo and its tributaries, the Arab leaders intrigued against them, opposed them vigorously step by step, and finally resorted to force and treachery to overthrow their hold in the region. In 1892 the chiefs made prisoners of the Belgian residents at Kasongo, attacked the Belgian expedition on the Lomami River and put to death its leaders, including the intrepid Hodister, and killed Emin Pasha at Kinona. The Congo executive at Brussels seemed for the moment paralyzed at the sudden attack and disaster. But a number of valiant and resourceful officials in the Congo State determined to avenge their comrades.

In July, 1892, a poorly equipped but determined band left Lusambo for the Lomami district. It was officered by Commandant Dhanis, Captain de Wouters, Commandant Ponthier, Captain Doorm, — all Belgians, — with a British officer, Captain Sidney L. Hinde, as medical adviser, and two efficient negro leaders, Albert Frees, a Liberian ser-

¹ Dr. Brode, *Tippoo Tib*. Arnold, 1906.

² "Without my help he [Stanley] could never have gone down the Congo; and no sooner did he reach Europe than he claimed all my country. Surely your people must be unjust. . . . The white man is stronger than I am; and they will eat my possessions as I ate those of the Pagans, and some one will eat up yours." Tippoo Tib to Swann, in *Fighting the Slave Hunters in Central Africa*, by A. J. Swann, 1910, pp. 174-75.

geant from Monrovia, and Gongo Lutete, an extremely able chief of the Manyema people. Their troops were chiefly Hausas recruited from Lagos with the consent of the British Government, together with some irregulars from Sierra Leone and Liberia. After a year of astounding adventures, daring exploits, great suffering, and numerous misfortunes, they succeeded in capturing Nyangwe and Kasongo and in destroying almost completely the Arab power on the Upper Congo.¹

Meanwhile the Congo officials were steadily pushing their explorations north and east along the Ubangi and Welle and Mbomu Rivers until they reached the confines of the Bahr-el-Ghazal region. In September, 1892, Milz reached the Nile, and Captain Delanghe occupied three posts on its left bank in the following June. The Belgians carefully avoided conflicts with the Dervishes, to whom Egypt and England had abandoned the Sudan after 1885; but in 1894 the troops of the Khalifa attempted to occupy the mountain districts of Bahr-el-Ghazal and to penetrate into the Congo Basin. A lively contest ensued in which the Congo forces under Delanghe, Gerard, Denekier, and Francqui achieved a decisive victory; and the Dervish leaders were compelled to retreat to the main Nile. These successes of the Belgians prevented the Mahdists from invading Uganda² and led to the Belgian occupation of the Lado Enclave. For in the same year — 1894 — Great Britain signed a boundary convention with the Congo State by which, in exchange for leaseholds on a part of Bahr-el-Ghazal and on the Lado Enclave, she was to receive a recognition of her claims to the rest of the Sudan, a piece of land at the southwest corner of Lake Tanganyika, and a narrow strip of territory connecting Uganda with the lake. Unfortunately this agreement aroused such lively protests from Germany that Eng-

¹ Captain S. L. Hinde, *The Fall of the Congo Arabs*. Methuen & Co., 1897.

² Sir Harry Johnston, *George Grenfell and the Congo*, vol. I, p. 437.

land was forced to give up the small piece of land between Ankole and Tanganyika, which would have completed the Cape to Cairo route; and the Congo State was compelled by France to limit her territory on the northeast at the Mbomu River. The Belgians, however, leased Lado from the British and went ahead with its occupation; and, after defeating the followers of the Mahdi in two important engagements, Captain Chaltin, in February, 1897, raised the Congo flag at Rejaf, opposite Gondokoro.

The work of exploring the Congo Basin was greatly furthered and well-nigh completed through the efforts of George Grenfell,¹ who spent twenty-six years on the Congo in the service of the Baptist Missionary Society, dying at Basoko on July 1, 1906. He traveled thousands of miles on the main stream and its great tributaries, making an accurate topographical study of the country as he proceeded. He made a fine detailed map of the Congo from Stanley Pool to Stanley Falls; and, from May, 1892, to June, 1893, he led the Lunda Expedition which met the Portuguese commission on the Kwango and delimited the Congo-Portuguese boundary line. Beginning with the Ubangi, the Mongala, and the Lomami in 1884, he explored one after the other the extensive water-courses that feed the Congo until he reached Mawambi on the Aruwimi—only eighty miles from Uganda—in November, 1902, and the Hinde Cataracts on the Lua-laba-Congo in 1903. Although the Congo officials refused to permit the establishment of missions on the Aruwimi and in some other districts, or to allow him to carry on his work and his investigations freely in all sections of the Congo Basin, his labors among the natives (with whom he was very popular because of his gentle manners, cheerful patience, and

¹ The best account of the life and work of Grenfell is to be found in Sir Harry Johnston's *George Grenfell and the Congo*. 2 vols., D. Appleton & Co., 1910.

friendly spirit) were remarkably successful, and as an explorer he earned a reputation in Central Africa second only to that of Stanley.

For twenty-three years King Leopold administered the State through two ministers resident at Brussels and one Administrator-General living at Boma on the Lower Congo, the latter controlling the fourteen districts, each under a commissioner, into which the territory was divided. The Government appropriated all the land not then actually in use by the natives to itself as the public domain, which it divided into the "Domaine de la Couronne" and the "Domaine Privé." The "Domaine de la Couronne," located in the center of the Congo region, embraced a district six times the size of Belgium, and was set aside as the special property of the ruler. The "Domaine Privé" was the exclusive property of the State and included nearly one half the area of the Congo Basin. It was situated north of the "Domaine de la Couronne" and of lat. 3° S.; and, beginning about 1890, the Government began to sublet large districts to trading companies and to confer extensive monopolies of various sorts on private corporations in order to insure the development of the country. The remaining territory to the south and west of the crown property and the state domain was left open at first; but after 1898 the greater part of this was let out in large districts to concessionnaire companies with both commercial rights and political powers. In several of the most promising of these Leopold was careful to retain a large share of the capital stock. The trade of the region increased rapidly until the total imports and exports reached \$9,000,000 in 1897, and the enormous total of \$37,000,000 in 1907; while large fortunes were made by King Leopold and the other stockholders.¹

¹ Sir Harry Johnston has estimated, after a careful perusal of all the figures obtainable and allowing Leopold a liberal sum in profits, together with

The rule of the subordinate officials, particularly upon the lands of the companies, was often harsh and violent. As the pressure on them for larger commercial returns increased, the more heavily they bore down on the natives. Cruel and inhuman punishments were resorted to, and villages burned, in order to compel the negroes to work and to search for rubber and ivory. The seat of government at Boma was hundreds of miles from many of the stations; and the Administrator-General knew very little oftentimes of what was going on in the interior. No ruler was ever better or more faithfully served than King Leopold, in the opening and exploration of the country; and, after the government was organized, many of the officials on the state lands were honest and consistent in the management of their districts, and considerate and skillful in their treatment of the natives whose confidence and respect they won and enjoyed until the very end of their service.¹ But the system of administration employed both on the state domain and on the territories of the private companies was vicious and led finally to the total collapse of the Congo Independent State as a ruling body.

all the money advanced to the Congo Association and his salary as president, that he took out of the country at least \$20,000,000. *George Grenfell and the Congo*, vol. I, pp. 451-52 (note).

¹ "The agents, though able, willing, and intelligent men, are undermanned and overworked," wrote Vice-Consul Mitchell in 1906. "No discrimination is shown in their distribution. Civilians or soldiers are set in a post to do all the various work of the place — house-building, road-making, rubber-collecting, transport, food-supply, planting, police, judicial administration and other miscellaneous occupations, in which he has no training or experience, and for which he receives neither extra pay nor promotion. He is allowed a little money, or rather barter goods, for payment of laborers and purchase of materials; and it is only with personal exertion and ingenuity that he can keep things going at all. . . . Under the circumstances of isolation and overwork, the industry and good conduct of nearly all the state agents I have met are greatly to their credit. Their numbers ought to be doubled, and in most cases trebled." *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1906, *Congo*, cd. 3450, no. 9, p. 26.

In the first place, the salaries were pitiably low, — most of them from \$400 to \$1000 per year, — and, in order to equalize matters, the officials were allowed a commission on all ivory, rubber, or other produce purchased or secured for the State. It soon became necessary to levy light taxes to provide the necessary funds for the legitimate expenses of the Government. The natives were not used to taxation. Nor did they understand either the necessity or the meaning of the levies; but they were compelled to pay just the same, by force or intimidation. The payment was always in native products or in labor; and it was easy for an unscrupulous official to collect two or three times the required amount of taxes under various pretenses, and to make another neat profit for himself. In 1889¹ rubber, gum, and elephant hunting were forbidden without a license from the State, while in 1892² natives on the state lands were prohibited from selling or disposing of ivory or rubber, found on the domains, to foreign traders. In most districts the natives were paid for their labor or services in kind and they traded the payments back into the State's or the company's store for the ordinary necessities or luxuries of life. So in every way the profits of opening the country and developing its trade fell to the State or to the concessionnaire companies or their officials. The native received almost nothing for the loss of his lands or for his forced or free labor.

All this was serious enough, if the officials could have collected all the taxes and superintended the details of administration personally. But this was impossible where one white man with twenty or thirty soldiers had to garrison five thousand square miles of territory. The soldiers col-

¹ Government Ordinances of July 25 and October 17.

² Special order of M. de Marinel of February 14 in explanation of Government Ordinance of September 29, 1891.

lected the taxes and the purchased products; and they — particularly the blacks, who love power and the display of force — had no scruples in threatening or punishing the natives when they did not get the usual stipend or find the stipulated ivory or rubber awaiting them. “A staff of some fifteen hundred Europeans has to fill the various branches of the Administration, including railway and steamboat service, and control some seven thousand native troops,” wrote Grenfell in 1902.¹ “The fifteen hundred must do everything that has to be done in a territory nearly a third the size of Europe. This involves a lot of rough-and-ready work, much slackness at many points, and stress at not a few.”

If the Code Congolais could have been universally applied, and the levies equitably distributed in the form of a head-tax throughout all the districts of the Congo Basin, a satisfactory relationship between the rulers and the governed might have been ultimately established. But this was beyond the powers of the overburdened and underpaid “fifteen hundred.” The soldiers did not care whether the taxes fell equitably or not. Their only concern was to get them in as quickly and as easily as possible. Evasion was easy and frequent where so vast a region was patrolled by so few collectors. The bold and skillful often escaped, while the burden fell on the honest and the timid. Unfortunately the matter did not end here. The demands of the Government increased year by year; and, when they were ignored, severe punishments were meted out to chiefs and villages. “It is the incessant and varying requirements from the people on the part of the representatives of the Government that constitute in my opinion a grave danger for the future of the State,” to quote again the words of Grenfell — the mildest critic of the Congo administration.

¹ Letter dated December 29, 1902, and printed in *George Grenfell and the Congo*, vol. 1, p. 480.

Conditions in the districts under the concessionnaire companies, to whom the Government had given political powers as well as commercial rights, were even worse, — particularly on the domains of the Anglo-Belgian Indiarubber Company and the “Société Anversoise du Commerce du Congo.” And as time went on, the pressure on the natives steadily increased until whole districts were depopulated or raised to the verge of revolt. Inferior officers were seldom called to account by their superiors as long as the proper returns came in ; and the depredations of these men in more than one instance became notorious. The terrible cruelties perpetrated upon the inhabitants went unpunished to a large degree, because the officials were afraid to punish the soldiers. Chieftains were slain ; men and boys horribly mutilated ; villages burned ; and men, women, and children killed, because a certain number of laborers were not furnished, the taxes not paid, or the required amount of rubber had not been brought in. Armed sentries were stationed in numerous villages to enforce the payment of the tithes and to compel the gathering of the native products. Beatings and imprisonments were frequent ; and “it is very evident,” wrote Consul Nightingale to Sir Edward Grey as late as 1906, “that an idea prevails that the native is as much a part and parcel of the Concessionary Companies’ property, as if he were a bundle of rubber or gum.”¹

In some portions of the country the policy of employing the leading chiefs in the collection of rubber — introduced by Major Lothaire, Director-General of the Société Anversoise — was practiced extensively. Districts were subdivided into sections ; and the most prominent chief of the section was well furnished with rifles and ammunition, given suzerainty over the other chieftains, and authorized to super-

¹ November 30, 1906. *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1906, *Congo*, cd. 3450, no. 28, p. 57.

intend the gathering of rubber in his section. The result was that jealousies and troubles soon arose among the natives of those districts; and, when the chiefs became dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Company's officials, they armed and led their people in revolts so widespread and violent that, in some regions, it has only recently become possible to restore the old order and security.

There was practically no other recourse for the native except rebellion or flight to the domains of Kalambo, King of the Bena Lulua, or some other native potentate who still maintained his independence, although in some regions they began to destroy the forests in order to render abortive the rubber-collecting. It was exceedingly difficult for the natives to get beyond the Chef de Poste with their troubles or grievances. He conducted all the judicial affairs touching the inhabitants of his district, and settled them on the spot usually without special trial, investigation, or record; and appeals to the law courts or superior officials were comparatively rare and exceedingly burdensome owing to the expense and the great distances to be traveled. When the agents offered to pay the taxes of a community for one month's collection of rubber or ivory, and then followed this with increasing demands until six, eight, or ten months' labor was necessary to fulfill the requirements, nothing remained for the native but to leave his home and fields in desolation, while he waited patiently for the appointment of an honest and fair-dealing official.

The freedom of trade guaranteed to the Congo Basin, by the treaties of the International Association and by the Berlin Conference, had become a farce. The factories of foreign states already in existence were undisturbed and freedom of navigation on the main stream of the Congo was not seriously interfered with; but the "free zone" was actually limited to a "strip twenty kilometers broad on

both sides of the Congo from Stanley Falls to Isangi.”¹ In no other part were traders permitted to purchase products or remain for more than a day at a time, while large districts in the interior were closed to both traders and travelers on the ground of grave danger from revolting or unfriendly chieftains. Even missionaries were forbidden to set up their stations outside of certain prescribed regions and their movements were carefully restricted. In fact, the whole policy both of the Government and of the concessionaire companies was monopoly and exclusion on the one hand, and extortion and exploitation on the other, with as little exertion and expense on their part as possible in the development of the country. “So long as the policy of the State Government is to extract all it can from the country, while using only local materials and spending the least possible amount on developments and improvements,” wrote Vice-Consul Mitchell to the British Foreign Office in 1906, “no increase in the general well-being can be expected.”

¹ Consul Nightingale's report of December 31, 1906. *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1906, *Congo*, ed. 3450, no. 30, p. 63.

CHAPTER III

TRANSITION TO THE BELGIAN CONGO

RUMORS of the misgovernment of the Congo State and of the ill-treatment of the natives were not lacking in European circles. As early as 1891 and 1892 complaints reached the Congo ministers at Brussels and the presidents of some of the Congo companies; and in 1893 Mr. H. R. Fox-Bourne, of the Aborigines Protection Society of Great Britain, because of the incriminating reports of the late Major Parninter, the Reverend J. B. Murphy, and Captain Salisbury, began to protest "timidly and confidentially" to the Congo State officials.

Between the middle of 1893 and 1895 the system of forced labor was introduced in the Congo and the cases of ill-treatment of natives increased rapidly. The news from the Congo became more and more disquieting, until the spring of 1897 when the Reverend Sjeblem, a Swedish missionary who had spent five years on the Congo River, appeared in London with a detailed report (accompanied by a letter from George Grenfell, dated February 13, 1897) so startling and so straightforward that not even the clever denials of M. Wahis, the Governor-General of the Congo State, who happened to be then in Brussels, could wholly discredit it. About the same time Captain Hinde's book, *The Fall of the Congo Arabs*, showing how cannibalism was encouraged among the native troops by the Belgian officers, was published. And, on April 2, Sir Charles Dilke called the attention of the British Parliament to the conditions in the Congo Independent State.

This agitation aroused the Congo officials just enough to prevent some of the worst excesses ; it did not bring about any serious attempt at reform. Matters dragged on as they were until 1903, when the well-founded reports of the Reverend J. H. Weeks and other missionaries and the investigations of Consul Casement, supported by popular opinion, forced the British Government to take the initiative in demanding of the Congo State Government a strict account of affairs. On August 8, 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne sent a despatch to the British representatives at all the Continental capitals, calling attention to the alleged cases of ill-treatment of natives and of the existence of trade monopolies in the Congo Basin in open violation of Articles I and V of the Berlin Act, and stating that the British Government thought that the time had come for the powers signatory of the Berlin Act to consider whether or not the Congo State had violated the obligations concerning the treatment of natives and the maintenance of the freedom of trade. M. de Cuvelier finally replied to this note for the Congo Government, after pressure from the other powers, on March 13, 1904. He described the situation from their point of view and questioned vigorously the truth of many statements in the report of Consul Casement. From then until 1908, when the Belgian Government took over the Congo, a lively correspondence ensued between Great Britain and the officials of the Congo Independent State.

The British ministers, while admitting that some of the reports concerning the situation on the Congo were probably exaggerated, endeavored to convince the Congo administrators that the situation was such as to demand a thorough investigation and a complete public report, as a token of their good will and of the sincerity of their intentions. Surely, some vital and far-reaching reforms were necessary ; and the whole matter ought to be carefully studied and remedies

applied at the earliest possible moment. The Congo Government expressed its willingness to have the subject investigated; but it denied the right of the powers signatory of the Berlin Act to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo State. If British subjects were ill-treated on the Congo, Great Britain might protest; but she had no right to interfere in matters between the Congo Independent State and its own subjects.

The Congo Government had appointed in 1896 a "Commission for the Protection of the Natives," composed of three Catholic and three Protestant missionaries, among whom were Father de Clun and George Grenfell. This was reconstituted in March, 1901, with practically the same members, for two years; but it accomplished nothing of any value, on account of the lack of proper funds and authority, and of the impossibility of effective coöperation between men located in widely separated fields of labor, where communication was slow and uncertain at the best. From November 1, 1904, till January 26, 1905, a "Nonpartisan Commission of Inquiry," appointed at the suggestion of Lord Lansdowne, traveled along the Congo River trying to ascertain the real conditions prevalent in the Independent State. The result of its labors was unsatisfactory, owing to the short time devoted to investigation and to the fact that it made no recommendations as to methods of reform. It went far enough, however, to demonstrate clearly that no white man had ever inflicted, as a punishment for shortage of rubber, "mutilation on living natives." But its report, in spite of its reserved and dignified tone, contained, as Sir Constantine Phipps wrote to Lansdowne, "the most scathing criticisms of the policy pursued in the Congo State."¹

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1906, *Africa No. 1*, cd. 3002; for the correspondence between Great Britain and Belgium, see *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1903, *Africa No. 14*, cd. 1809; 1904, *Africa No. 7*, cd. 2097; 1905, *Africa No. 1*, cd. 2333;

Finally, under considerable pressure from Great Britain and other states, the authorities of the Congo Independent State nominated a "Special Commission" which made an exhaustive study of the whole situation, holding its final session on March 1, 1906. A detailed report of its work has never been made public; but the most important results are supposed to have been embodied in the report of the Secretary-General of the Congo to King Leopold in June, 1906, which the king used so effectively in persuading the Belgian Legislature to take over the control of the Congo territory.

Meanwhile, the agitation for reform within the Congo State kept up unabated and the pressure on the Belgian Government increased. Evidences of misrule and of the ill-treatment of natives came in from various sources; but the reports, in some important particulars, seemed contradictory. It was apparently difficult to reconcile the statements of such travelers as Major Powell Cotton, Henry Savage Landor, Captain Boyd Alexander, Professor Starr, and of the members of the Nonpartisan Commission, who found nothing seriously remiss in the Congo administration, with the incriminating reports of the consuls and missionaries. The facts are that not one of these explorers visited the more remote regions where the worst misdeeds were committed. They journeyed only through the best-governed districts of the state lands and of concession companies; and they were never thoroughly conversant with the whole situation. The evidences of misrule were carefully collected and sifted by men whose integrity and ability no one can question; and there is no longer any doubt of the correctness of their reports. No better testimony

1907, *Africa No. 1*, ed. 3450; 1908, *Africa Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4*, ed. 3880, 4070, 4135, and 4178, etc. For other reports on conditions, see *Archives Diplomatiques*, 1904, vol. 1, p. 748 ff.

could be demanded than the report of Lord Mountmorres, who made an extended tour of the Congo Independent State in 1904-05; the minutes of the trial of the agent Coudron at Boma, concluded on April 7, 1904; the researches of Father A. Vermeersch embodied in his book — *La Question Congolaise*; the papers of M. S. Lefranc, a judge of the First Instance on the Congo, published in 1906 in *Le Patriote*; the verbatim reports of the famous five-days debate in the Belgian Legislature in February and March, 1906; the accounts sent in by the British consuls, Casement, Armstrong, Mitchell, and Nightingale, from 1903 to 1907; and the evidence of some fifty-two missionaries of various denominations including the Reverend J. H. Weeks and George Grenfell. In 1904 and 1905 some minor reforms were introduced in the sentry system, but no serious attempt was made by the Congo Government either to dispel the accusations of misrule by a public statement of the facts in their possession, or to remedy the grave faults of their administration. Their policy was merely one of evasion and makeshift until they should be able to pass on the direction of affairs to the Belgian Government.

The misgovernment of the Congo State and the ill-treatment of the natives being established at length by indisputable evidence, the matter soon attracted international attention. Official protests were entered with the Belgian Government by all the powers, including the United States, and a vigorous public agitation was conducted by the Aborigines Protection Society of Great Britain, the Belgian, British, and American Congo Reform Associations, and similar organizations. At length the pressure from all sides became so great that the authorities in Belgium were compelled to undertake — what King Leopold had in vain tried to induce them to do — the serious consideration of the annexation of the Congo territory.

The old king was not only willing, but anxious, to make this transfer. On August 2, 1889, he had made a will bequeathing the Congo Independent State to Belgium on his death, thinking to assure to his country, as he expressed it, "indispensable outlets for its commerce and industry and . . . new paths for the activity of its citizens." In a letter to M. A. Beernaert, Belgian Minister of Finance, accompanying the testament and dated August 5, Leopold adds: "A great future is reserved for the Congo, whose immense value will soon burst upon the sight of all. . . . When death shall overtake me, it [Belgium] will profit by my work as well as by the labors of these who have aided me in its foundation and management. . . . Until the day of my death I shall continue to be guided by the same thought of national interest as heretofore, to direct and maintain our African work; but if, without waiting until that time, the country should desire to contract closer relations with my possessions in the Congo I would not hesitate to put them at its disposal."

Although it was stipulated in the terms of the agreement of July 3, 1890, whereby Belgium guaranteed to loan the Congo Independent State \$5,000,000 in the ten succeeding years, that the Belgian Government might annex the Congo State within six months after the expiration of the ten years, no steps were ever taken to do so until the end of 1906. A proposal to annex the Congo territory in 1901 had been laid on the table; and, in spite of a lively debate in June and July, 1903, engendered by further reports of misrule on the Congo, and by the strong speech of Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons on May 20 of that year, and by another discussion of the subject opened by M. Vandervelde, the Socialist leader, on February 20, 1906, the Belgian Chambers made no further progress than to promise "an early consideration of the bill of 1901."

In the spring of 1906 the Special Commission at length made its report, recommending numerous reforms in the shape of twenty-four decrees, which King Leopold laid before the Belgian Chambers on June 3 with his official sanction and with a message urging again the annexation of the Congo by Belgium. The most important of these measures included the establishment of four more courts of appeal; improvements in the methods of administering the lands and of collecting taxes — the latter to be done only by government officials assisted by the chiefs; the coinage of a million francs; the creation of a “*Domaine National*” embracing all the lands and mines not ceded to companies; the appointment of a “*Conseil du Congo*” of nine members with administrative powers — to examine the situation from time to time and report to the king; and the raising of \$30,000,000 to extend the railways and to fight the sleeping sickness.

In his message of recommendation, King Leopold II did not attempt to describe the situation on the Congo, or to explain the causes of the misrule and disturbances there. He contented himself with the statement that such disturbances are inseparable from human affairs, and that the Congo has suffered in this respect perhaps even less than many more civilized communities; he reiterated his claim that he had founded the Congo in the interests of civilization and for the good of Belgium, and that his motives were “patriotic and disinterested.” He reviewed the twenty years’ history of the Congo State, showing all that had been done to develop and civilize through the abolition of the slave trade and other heathen customs, the prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors, and the commencement of the work against the sleeping sickness. And he closed by calling attention to the needs of economic improvements and of trained men in the public service, and to the wisdom

of encouraging the missionaries and of transforming the Congo State into a Belgian colonial possession.

It was not, however, until December (1906) that the Chamber began the serious investigation of the question of annexation; and a commission of sixteen members, composed of the leading men of all political parties, was appointed to study the whole matter carefully. After an extended discussion between the Congo administrators and the commission, a tentative treaty of cession and annexation was signed on November 28, 1907, and approved by Leopold on the same day. It was agreed, pending the approval of these measures by the Belgian Legislature, that the Belgian Government should take over the control of the Congo revenues and expenditures on January 1, 1908, and that a special "Colonial Law" providing for the government of the Belgian Congo should be drafted immediately. The "Commission of Sixteen" entered promptly upon its labors, and, although interrupted from February 4 to March 5 by the controversy between the cabinet and the king over the disposition of the crown domain, completed its work on March 25, with an almost unanimous vote approving the bill for annexation and the Colonial Law, and laid its report on the table of the Chamber on April 3.

The main difference between these measures and the draft law of 1901 was, that it was now proposed to give the Chamber a share in the government of the Congo territory and the right to control the budget, while the former law left the power of the sovereign absolute. There were no material alterations in the old system of administration, but the changes recommended were suggestive of a genuine interest in the welfare of the natives and mark a decisive step in the progress of reform. The king was to rule the Congo, as formerly, through a Governor-General and such Vice-Governors as were necessary; but a "Colonial Office"

was created in the Belgian Cabinet to which a "Colonial Council" was added with power to supervise all royal decrees affecting the colony, to advise changes and make recommendations in the form of periodic reports. It was to consist of fifteen members, six elected by the two houses of the Belgian Legislature and eight nominated by the king, with the Minister for the Colonies as president.

To insure the welfare of the native population, a permanent commission of seven members was ordered. It was to be presided over by the Procureur-Général, or Chief Justice of the Congo, and was charged "with the responsibility of watching over the protection of the natives throughout the whole territory and the betterment of their moral and material condition." The assistance of the Governor-General in these matters was made imperative. He was ordered to "guard the preservation of the native population"; to "favor the expansion of individual liberty, the gradual abandonment of polygamy, and the development of individual holdings"; and to "protect and favor, without distinction of nationality or religion, all the religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and enterprises created and organized for the purpose or aim of instructing the natives and bringing them to a comprehension and appreciation of the advantages of civilization." Christian missionaries, scholars, and explorers were to receive special protection. Natives were to enjoy civil rights conceded to them by colonial legislation, and "by their customs, provided these are not contrary either to law or public order."

Every royal act must in the future be signed by a minister; and a regular colonial budget, accompanied by a complete report on the administration of the Congo, must be submitted annually to the Chamber in the name of the sovereign. This gives the Chamber a practical control over the Congo finances and is an excellent way of keeping the

subject prominently in the minds of the Belgian people and their legislators. Such publicity will make impossible many of the misdeeds perpetrated on the Congo peoples in the past. In addition, no member or stockholder of a concessionnaire company may serve on the Colonial Council or in any administrative capacity in the Congo ; and a special law is to be passed, regulating the granting of all future concessions for trade or public development.

For financial and administrative reasons the Belgian Government felt it would be unwise to assume the ownership and control of the Congo Independent State without the possession of the crown domain as well. Early in February, 1908, M. Schellaert, the Prime Minister, opened negotiations with King Leopold on this point. The ruler of the Congo was willing to turn over the royal lands, but only on condition that \$30,000,000 were voted by the Belgian Legislature for the completion of certain public works in Belgium and on the Congo, together with annuities for Prince Albert and the Princess Clementine. This demand was declared inadmissible by the Premier; and he, supported by a united cabinet, steadily declined to consider any such enormous concession. Ultimately a compromise was effected; and on March 5, Leopold deeded to Belgium all of the royal Congo possessions and rights, — except two tracts of twenty thousand hectares in the Mayumbe district, where experiments in rubber and cocoa culture were in progress, — together with the most of his stock in the various concessionnaire companies.¹ For public works and fortifications in Belgium the sum of \$9,000,000 was to be appropriated, of which no more than \$6,000,000 was to be spent without the further consent of the Chamber.

As a token of gratitude for his numerous sacrifices and generosity, a fund of \$10,000,000 was to be paid over in

¹ This gave the Belgian Government control of about one half of the stock of the concessionnaire companies.

fifteen installments to Leopold. It was understood, however, that this sum was to be used entirely in carrying out certain royal plans relative to the Congo, which included the "construction of hospitals, schools for the instruction and the education of negroes, the expenses of scientific missions, the establishing of institutions for the prevention and cure of the sleeping sickness, the aid of missions, and of works in favor of the whites who have rendered good service in Africa." This cession was legalized by a special act; and large sums were voted to insure the completion of the various railways and public improvements under construction, while special laws were passed defining the status of the negroes, the work of the courts of justice, the relations of the colony to the mother country, and many other vital matters of organization and administration. The Chamber began its discussion of the proposed bill for annexation and of the Colonial Law on April 15 and continued until May 6, when the Government tactfully decided to postpone the vote on the measures until after the regular May elections. Being returned victorious with only four fewer supporters in the Chamber and two more in the Senate, the Premier had the Legislature summoned at once to consider the new bill for annexation. The discussion began on June 10 and lasted until July 19, the opposition making a determined effort to reduce the sum proposed for Belgium improvements. This was followed by a thorough debate upon the Colonial Law, which was prolonged until August 20, when the Chamber passed both measures, — the vote for the annexation being 83 to 54 and that on the Colonial Law 90 to 48, — a small section of the Liberal party, led by M. Hy-mans, supporting the Government. The Senate took up the matter on August 27 and passed both decrees with substantial majorities on September 9; and King Leopold affixed his signature on October 18, 1908.

Belgium has thus undertaken the rôle of a colonial power. It remains to be seen whether she can play the part successfully or not. It was simply a question whether Belgium, by assuming the risks, responsibilities, and expense of managing a great and difficult colonial enterprise, would reap the reward of the arduous labors of King Leopold and his associates, or would let the Congo go by default to France, to whom a first lien on the territory had been given by treaties in April, 1884, and February, 1895. Two alternatives were open to the Belgian authorities. They could take over the colony and administer it in the name of the signatory powers of the Berlin Act of 1885 and on the precise terms of that act, primarily for the benefit and development of the native peoples, and secondarily for whatever profits in trade might accrue to Belgium from the transaction. Or they could administer the Congo as a government territory in their own way and primarily for their own purposes, giving to the natives whatever protection lay in their power. Few of the Belgian statesmen ever considered the first alternative seriously. The financial and commercial interests of Belgium in the Congo were already too extensive and the future burdens too heavy to permit undertaking any such utopian and philanthropic task. They were, moreover, jealous of outside interests and opposed to any foreign interference; and it was generally believed that annexation by Belgium put an end to any rights of assistance or interference that the Act of 1885 may have given to the powers. The Belgian leaders agreed with the writer in the *Indépendance Belge* of February 24, 1908, that the Congo could not "be an international colony administered by Belgium; it must be nothing more or less than a Belgian colony, for whose administration and profitable working Belgium alone shall be responsible." ¹

¹ Quoted in the *London Times*, February 26, 1908.

Belgium should have annexed the Congo in 1901 ; and if she had done so, she would have gained the confidence of the powers immediately, and saved herself considerable criticism and constant prodding from the signatory states. Now that she has at length made up her mind, she has taken hold of the matter with her usual intelligence and energy: "The Government will see to it that the taxation falling on the natives shall be moderate and Belgium will pursue the realization of reforms of all kinds," said M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Chamber on April 15, 1908. "No one can doubt the loyalty of our intentions. We have an ideal and nothing shall prevent us from realizing it. We shall know how to respond to the wishes of a nation sincerely eager for colonization and to justify the confidence of Europe." ¹

But Belgium is severely handicapped by her lack of experience in colonization. She has practically everything to learn and must proceed slowly and with caution. The political spirit of the Belgian people is essentially conservative and somewhat provincial; and her entrance upon the untried field of international politics must necessarily be accompanied by various readjustments, to meet the new international relations and obligations. It is by no means certain that the mass of the people are vitally interested in the new colonial enterprise; and the Socialist party is sure to make all the capital it can out of every mistake of the Government. This may prove beneficial to the Congo natives in securing them from misrule and ill-treatment; but it is likely to prove a source of increasing embarrassment to the Government because of the necessary slowness of all successful colonial reforms and development.

One of the most serious difficulties to be met at present is the problem of finding experienced and trained men suf-

¹ Quoted in the *London Times*, April 16, 1908.

ficient to administer honestly, properly, and efficiently their new and vast territory. "The Belgian people as a whole are not in the least convinced that Belgium wants a colony at all," wrote the Brussels correspondent of the London *Times* on August 22, 1908. "The average Belgian is in temperament essentially a stay-at-home. In fact, the difficulty of getting good men to expatriate themselves, even for the sake of better pay and prospects than the miserably inadequate terms hitherto offered, is recognized as one of the most serious problems confronting the future administration of the colony."

The Belgians are a young and enterprising people, naturally intelligent and generous; they have grit, and we may count upon their rising to the "dignity of their new burdens." Their leaders are anxious to share in the world movement for colonization and commerce, for it is essential to the economic progress and development of the Belgian nation. And they wish to play a dignified and worthy part in the opening-up of the new lands and in bringing European civilization to the heathen people of Africa. Some of the ablest statesmen and keenest minds of Belgium have enlisted themselves in this cause; and they understand thoroughly the gravity of the problem, the complexity of duties and responsibilities involved, and the manifold and intricate difficulties in the path of its successful solution.

"Every nation has to undertake the burden of civilizing the people which walk in darkness," wrote the editor of the Brussels *Gazette* on August 21, 1908. "We know that *our* task is heavy. We mean to acquit ourselves of it with dignity, honesty and enthusiasm, because we feel the nobility of the action. We are not becoming the masters of a race. We are assuming tutelage of children whom it is our business to make men. No doubt we may legitimately require from their work some compensation for the sacrifice which the

task will impose upon us. But we do not wish to avail ourselves at their expense, first, because that would seem to lack nobility, and secondly, because it would not be prudent. . . . If only we could give Europe an example of a new kind of colonial policy, exerting itself loyally in an admirable task of human culture, while ourselves remaining a laborious nation respecting the liberty of others in proportion to our own passionate love of it.”¹

In accordance with this spirit of philanthropy and devotion, the Belgian Government entered earnestly upon the work of reform in its own colony. M. Renkin, the new Colonial Minister, prepared a set of reform measures by which the administration of the country would be materially improved, the principle of free trade established (including the right of the native to traffic in the products of his own land), and the character and methods of taxation completely revised. These improvements were embodied in the law of March 22, 1910,² which provided for their gradual introduction. On July 1, 1910, the districts of the Lower Congo, Stanley Pool, Ubangi, Bangala, Kwango, the Kasai, the Katanga, Aruwimi, the southern portion of the Eastern Province, and the banks of the Congo River as far as Stanleyville, were thrown open to trade. On July 1, 1911, the former *Domaine de la Couronne*, lying in the center of the colony, was made a free-trade district; and one year later, the remaining region, the Welle, was placed on a similar basis.

In the same way the new method of taxation has been gradually introduced; and the practice of forced labor abolished. Many material improvements are already noticeable, particularly in the field of public utilities and transportation. The entire course of the Congo River has been opened

¹ Quoted in the *London Times*, August 22, 1908.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1911, *Congo No. 1*, ed. 5559.

by rail or by steamer to international trade; numerous distant places have been brought into communication with the world by roads, boats, and the telegraph; and Elizabethville, the capital of the Upper Congo, will ere long be brought a thousand miles nearer Europe by the completion of the Benguela Railway from Portuguese Angola to the Katanga branch of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway. The trade of the country has been carefully protected and cultivated, so that the combined imports and exports, which in 1895 were only about \$9,100,000, and at the time of annexation approximately \$31,770,000, reached \$47,508,000 in 1911. Yet the colony is still far from being a financial success. The expenditures for 1912 exceeded the revenue by \$5,215,000; and the total public debt in the same year had already reached \$55,749,440.

It is evident, also, from the reports of the Reverend J. H. Harris,¹ Consuls Thursten, Armstrong,² Campbell, and others, that the Belgian Government is making a conscientious and progressive effort to ameliorate the condition of the natives and to introduce all the promised reforms affecting their welfare. Conditions have very materially improved in many districts. Indeed, so well and so faithfully have the Belgian officials performed their work and redeemed their promises, that the British Government officially recognized the Belgian annexation early in June, 1913, and the Congo Reform Association of Great Britain ended its labors with a dinner on the 16th of that month.

But it will, of necessity, be some years before the administration of the entire colony — nearly four times the area of Texas with a population of 15,000,000 — can be completely reorganized, the development of the vast region

¹ *London Times*, September 4 and 7, 1911; May 7, 1912; May 12, 1913, etc.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1910, *Africa* No. 6, cd. 6145; 1911, *Africa* No. 2, cd. 5860; 1912, *Africa*, cd. 6606.

placed upon an enlightened and systematic basis, and the natives everywhere provided with adequate protection, both against the officials and against each other. The financial, economic, and administrative difficulties which will have to be faced before a successful régime can be established, and before Belgium can take an honorable place among the colonial powers of the world, are so tremendous that even richer and more powerful states might well hesitate to undertake the task. It will require, indeed, a very considerable sacrifice in money and labor, great tact, the most careful planning, and infinite patience, to carry out an enlightened program, such as was suggested to Belgium in March and April, 1908, by Great Britain¹ and the United States.² It may be briefly summarized as follows: The exemption of the native inhabitants from excessive taxation; the abolition of forced labor; the introduction of a system of sound currency; the creation of a new system of land tenure by which the natives may become landowners and encouraged to take up land; the establishment of a more equitable and efficient system of justice, assuring an impartial and exact justice to all; and the preservation of the freedom of trade so that "traders and settlers of all nationalities [may] secure unoccupied tracts of land, needed for the prosecution and development of peaceful commerce, at reasonable prices in any part of the Congo."

The present King and Government, however, are in entire sympathy with this plan, and, if not hindered, will see it finally achieved in a broad and liberal spirit. "Belgium is firmly resolved that there shall be in the Congo the widest economic system," wrote the Belgian Premier on April 25, 1908, "and that the expansion of commerce and industry

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1908, *Africa*, cd. 4135, nos. 1 and 2.

² *Supplement to Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, vol. III, no. 1, January, 1909, p. 94.

shall be furthered in the most liberal manner, without distinction being made between Belgian subjects and foreigners. . . . Private persons, to whatever nationality they belong, will be able to acquire the lands necessary for the prosecution of their commerce and their occupation. The government of the future colony will be regulated by these principles and Belgium will see that they are loyally and fully applied.”¹ And King Albert, at his New Year reception in 1914, said to the Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, “It is my duty to tell the Chamber that modifications in the charter of the Congo Colony are necessary. . . . It is indispensable that a government be constituted on the spot, which shall formally receive from the home Legislature really effective power. The intensive tutelage of the mother country cannot endure on African soil. A responsible autonomy must be able to assert itself under the direction, control, and sovereignty of the motherland.”²

¹ *London Times*, June 16, 1908.

² *Ibid.*, January 2, 1914.

CHAPTER IV

GERMAN COLONIZATION IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

THE interest of European powers in the colonization of Africa was aroused, next to the founding of the Independent State of the Congo, by the entrance of Germany into Southwest Africa. Great Britain was engaged, at the time the International Association of the Congo was formed, in taking over the administration of Egypt for financial and philanthropic reasons. She was accordingly hardly in a position either to participate in, or to oppose successfully, other enterprises. "Your father might have upset our apple-cart in Egypt, if he had liked," said a member of the British Cabinet once to Herbert Bismarck. "And we ought to have been grateful." Yet Germany was ready and anxious for colonial expansion; and the Chancellor knew it. But he was conservative, and unwilling either to take any step until the time was propitious or to assume greater responsibilities than his country could bear at the moment. Although under strong pressure after 1878 to enter the field of colonial politics, Prince Bismarck successfully postponed action until after he had firmly secured the position of the new German Empire in Europe, through the adoption of a sane tariff program and the creation of the Triple Alliance of Austria, Italy, and Germany, in 1882.

Since 1842 the Gesellschaft der Rheinischen Missionen had been at work in Great Namaqualand and Hereroland in Southwest Africa, and had acquired twelve mission stations and considerable property there. In 1863 civil war broke out between the Hereros and the Hottentots, in the



GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA

Showing acquisitions in 1883 1884 1885 1886 and 1890

course of which several of the missions were attacked and destroyed. In 1868 the Prussian Government and the Rheinische Society petitioned the British Government for

protection for these missionaries, the society asking that a British protectorate be established, particularly over Walfish Bay and the Hereroland. This, however, the British Foreign Office declined to do. Nor would they countenance the use of force at all in the region. But they sent out a British Commissioner, Mr. Palgrave, from Cape Colony, who succeeded finally, in 1870, in establishing peace between the warring tribes.

Conditions in Great Namaqualand remained far from satisfactory; and in 1875 the Cape Parliament voted to extend the limits of Cape Colony as far north of the Orange River as the Crown should deem expedient, including Walfish Bay. Mr. Palgrave made another tour of the country in 1876, securing the coöperation of the chieftains; and in 1877 Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of Cape Colony, energetically urged the British Government to occupy Walfish Bay immediately, and to pass an Order in Council authorizing Cape Colony to annex Namaqualand. On March 12, 1878, Commander Dyer took possession of Walfish Bay and three hundred square miles adjacent, for Great Britain; but the Government refused to accept the submission of the chiefs generally. The ten islands along the coast were taken over in 1863 and 1869, and chartered to De Pass, Spence & Co., of Cape Colony. The steady refusal of Britain to establish a protectorate over the entire country was due to the fact that the Foreign Office was unwilling to encumber either itself or Cape Colony with further expenses and responsibilities in South Africa. The "Cape, Zulu, and Sikukuni wars" were costing a pretty penny; and the difficulties in Bechuanaland, the rebellion in Basutoland, the unrest in Zululand, and the lawlessness in the Transkei, were troubles enough for a weak colonial government like the Cape and for an overworked Colonial Office.

In 1880 war broke out again in Namaqualand. Great Britain refused to interfere, recalling Palgrave from the Trans-Garieb district and Major Musgrove from Hereroland to Walfish Bay, on the ground that it "had been decided from the very first that no attempt to employ any other kind of force [than moral suasion] should be made." To Germany's reiterated request for protection for the missions, the Foreign Office replied that Germans in Namaqualand would receive the same protection as British subjects, but the British Government would "not be responsible for what might take place outside of British territory, which only included (north of the Orange River) Walfish Bay and a very small portion of country surrounding it." The German Government declared it was out of the question for it to afford direct protection to the German missionaries and traders in that district then; and so the matter rested.

On February 7, 1883, Count Herbert Bismarck called upon Sir Julian Pauncefoot and asked if England would give protection to a Bremen merchant who was about to set up a factory on the Southwest Coast of Africa. If not, or if Great Britain did not have jurisdiction there, the German Government would do its best to extend "the same measure of protection there as they extend to their subjects in remote parts of the world," but "without having the least design to establish any footing in South Africa." The organization of the British Government in those days was such as to impede seriously the conduct of all diplomatic relations affecting colonial affairs. The Foreign Office could not act without first consulting the Colonial Office; and the Colonial Office had adopted the policy of always consulting the colonial authorities of the self-governing colonies on all questions affecting their interests. Usually almost interminable delays resulted from this system; but

in this instance Lord Granville, with the concurrence of Lord Derby, Colonial Secretary, was able to reply on February 23 to the effect that Cape Colony had certain establishments along the southwest coast of Africa, and, if the precise location of the German factory were given the Foreign Office, inquiries would be made as to the possibility of affording it British protection.

In April, 1883, Herr F. A. E. Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant, sent out an expedition under the command of Herr Vogelsand, who purchased, for two hundred rifles and one hundred dollars in cash, one hundred and fifty square miles in the neighborhood of the bay of Angra Pequena from Joseph Frederica, the Hottentot chief of the region. In August, Herr Lüderitz himself went out and negotiated the purchase of the entire tract from the Orange River to lat. 26° S., extending twenty miles inland, for three thousand dollars and sixty guns. In spite of the fact that British traders had stations already on this coast and that the islands had been leased to a British firm, Lüderitz, basing the interpretation of his grants on a general rule of international law, claimed control of everything in sight. This irrepressible German, as Mr. Spence called him, was not satisfied with the land and harbors, but wanted the sea as well — at least for the five miles nearest shore.

Meanwhile, petitions from the British traders for aid and protection began to pour in at the British Foreign Office, and Lüderitz besieged his Government to support his claims. The British Government proceeded with great deliberation to inquire into the truth of the matter from the Cape Government and to send H.M.S. Boadicea to Angra Pequena Bay to prevent conflicts between the German and British traders. On September 10, Baron von Plessen, German Chargé d'Affaires in London, left at the British Foreign Office a "Memorandum," stating that Herr

Lüderitz had purchased one hundred and fifty square miles of territory on Angra Pequena Bay and asking if England claimed suzerainty over that region. The German Government followed this with an inquiry on November 16, raising again the question of sovereignty, and requesting a definite statement of the grounds on which the British claims were based.

These communications were misleading in two particulars. In the first place, the two purchases of Lüderitz amounted to three thousand two hundred English square miles instead of one hundred and fifty; and while the cession of the latter amount of land would not be of much moment in a sterile and half-civilized Damara-Namaqualand comprising over one hundred and fifty thousand square miles of territory, an acquisition of the former size would be highly significant. In the second place, no indication was advanced that Germany was expecting to establish any special protectorate over Angra Pequena, in case England had no control there. In fact, the British Foreign Office, assured by its representative in Berlin on August 31, that the German Government had no intention of setting up colonies or protectorates in Southwest Africa and that Lüderitz's expedition was everywhere in the press referred to as a commercial enterprise (*Handelsniederlassung*), considered these communications as friendly inquiries as to the propriety of Lüderitz's setting up a factory in this region and the probability of his receiving protection from the British authorities.

Lord Granville, realizing that considerable time would elapse before a definite, detailed answer could be prepared, felt that some definite statement of the British position should be made at once. Accordingly, on November 21, he replied that the sovereignty of the Queen had not been proclaimed over the whole country, but only over Walfish Bay and the islands near Angra Pequena Bay. "But," he added,

"Her Majesty's Government considered that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18° and the frontier of Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights." And Derby wrote the Cape Government on December 13 asking it to take up the advisability of Cape Colony extending its jurisdiction to Angra Pequena.

Count Münster answered Granville's note in a long letter, dated December 31, 1883, in which he argued strongly to prove that Great Britain had no claim to sovereignty in the disputed region, and asserted that it was the duty of the German Government to "afford protection and encouragement to German subjects trafficking in districts where sufficient protection is not guaranteed by a recognized civilized government." He concluded with the following query: "What institutions [does] England possess on that coast, which could secure such legal protection for German subjects in their commercial enterprises as would relieve the Empire from the duty of providing itself, directly, for its subjects in that territory the protection of which they might stand in need?" This was interpreted by the British Government to mean that the German authorities would extend their protection to Angra Pequena, in case the British declined to place it under their jurisdiction, and give all the traders there the benefit of their institutions and military protection.

Lord Granville, feeling that perhaps the time had come when his Government could afford to widen its jurisdiction in South Africa,—particularly if Cape Colony should assume the expense involved,—referred the matter to Lord Derby asking that the Government of Cape Colony be approached with this move in view. He recognized that the position of Lüderitz on the coast could easily be defended and that, while the German missions were located rather far in the

interior and were not easy of access, it would not be a serious problem to afford them protection. Then, too, the political situation in South Africa had become easier. Lord Derby consulted Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of Cape Colony, then in England, who was favorable to an extension of jurisdiction; and a letter was dispatched by the Cape Ministry dated January 30, 1884, urging the British occupation of the region between the Orange River and lat. 26° S., on the ground that the "interests of order and civilization [would be] best served by annexation."

But the British authorities were unwilling to assume the responsibilities and expenses incident to such occupation. So, on February 3, Derby wired the administrative officer at the Cape: "Any prospect of the Cape Government undertaking the control of Angra Pequena?" If not, it will "be difficult to resist the representation made by the German Government that, failing other protection for German subjects there, they would be compelled to assume jurisdiction over the place." A reply came back on the 6th, asking that the matter be kept open, in the absence of the Prime Minister, until a cabinet meeting could be held. Shortly afterwards, a ministerial crisis occurred at the Cape followed by an entire change of cabinet; and for three months, unfortunately, nothing further was done in the matter.

At length, on May 7, Derby sent an imperative telegram to the Cape, demanding a reply at once, if the Colony desired to see the British jurisdiction extended to Angra Pequena and would "accept responsibility and cost" of the move. Another delay ensued in order to give the new ministry opportunity to study the question carefully; but, finally, on May 29, Sir H. Robinson wired Lord Derby that the ministry would recommend the Cape Parliament to undertake the control and cost of extending the British jurisdiction in Southwest Africa. And on June 2, this decision

was referred to the Foreign Office with the suggestion that Germany be assured that protection would be afforded to all Germans in Angra Pequena, and that the question of land grants be referred to a joint commission.

Meanwhile the German Government, growing impatient at the delay, began to act. On April 24, Bismarck wired Lippert, imperial consul-general at Cape Town, to declare officially that Herr Lüderitz and his establishments were under the protection of the German Empire. And on June 4 the German ambassador called upon Granville and informed him confidentially that Bismarck could not recognize the right of Cape Colony to annex Angra Pequena; nor could he approve of that method of extending the British jurisdiction. This was followed by an intimation by Herbert Bismarck, who called on June 14, that Derby had been taking advantage of the delay to gain time for Cape Colony to annex the district in dispute. This was denied emphatically by Granville; and later Lord Derby prepared a "Memorandum,"¹ explaining in detail each step in these negotiations, as seen from the English side, which was forwarded to Berlin in October, 1884. In this document it was clearly demonstrated that the German Foreign Office purposely permitted the British authorities to assume that the Kaiser had no definite intentions of setting up a German protectorate in Southwest Africa. The British officials were guilty of no breach of faith; but they cannot escape criticism for their lack of penetration and slowness in following up the advantages of their original position. The pressure of other matters of seeming greater importance and the delayed action of the Cape Government are not sufficient excuse for a lack of acuteness and promptness in following up a matter of this character.

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1884, *Angra Pequena*, cd. 4262, p. 39. See for whole correspondence, also, cd. 4265, cd. 4190, and the German *Weiss Buch* for the same year on "Angra Pequena."

It is true that, when the "cat was out of the bag," Lord Derby wired Robinson on July 17, 1884, to rush the bill for the annexation of the land north of Angra Pequena through the Cape Parliament, and it was passed on the 23d. But it was too late. The Foreign Office had announced on July 12 that it would not contest the German claim to a protectorate over Angra Pequena; and on August 7, before the British authorities had time to occupy the coast north of Angra Pequena where their claims were very weak, the German warship *Elizabeth* took possession of the whole region between the Orange River and lat. 26° S. At first the British Government protested at this action; but in September they decided to welcome Germany as a colonial neighbor in South Africa and to recognize her "protectorate" from the Portuguese possessions at lat. 18° S. to the Orange River, on the understanding that their own claims to Walfish Bay and to the islands along the coast should not be questioned. To this Germany assented. A joint commission was appointed to settle the questions of private claims like those of De Pass and Lüderitz; and the whole matter was amicably adjusted in the treaty of October, 1885, by which Germany made her début as an African colonial power with 215,000 square miles of territory. The eastern boundary of this new possession was fixed in the treaty of 1890 with England, in which Germany obtained access to the Zambesi River; and the northern line was determined in an agreement with Portugal signed on December 30, 1886.

The German hesitation concerning a colonial policy had come to an end in June, 1884. In the course of a debate over the Postal Subsidy Bill in the Reichstag on June 23 and again on June 26,¹ Bismarck took occasion to explain for the first time, and in detail, the contemplated colonial pro-

¹ *Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 25, 1884, and June 27, 1884.

gram of his Government. He was opposed to colonial expansion of the usual type at that time. It would be foolhardy for the Empire, without trained officials and a well-developed colonial system, to attempt to acquire unexplored lands of doubtful value and to develop them through colonization schemes. He was not sure that the Empire would be able to furnish either the necessary funds or the required protection for persons and property.

But the extension of German sovereignty and protection "to free settlements of German subjects, which are, in a certain sense, offshoots of the German nation, in districts which are not under the recognized sovereignty of any other state," was quite another matter. In such cases it was the duty of the home country to protect not only the persons and properties of such subjects, but the "territories which they may have acquired" as well. The Government did not propose, however, to assume the financial burdens in any large degree of such territorial expansion. The development of the new lands would be left to the energy and ingenuity of individual pioneers and corporations; and imperial charters, similar to those granted by England to the East Indian Company and the North Borneo Company, would be issued to the leading trading companies. For his policy was "not to found provinces, but mercantile settlements, which would be placed under the protection of the Empire; if they did not succeed, the Empire would not lose much and the cost would not have been very great." The establishment of coaling-stations, the granting of ship subsidies to encourage trade, and the extension of the consular service, would, therefore, mark the limits of the Government's activities in colonial affairs for some time to come.

Bismarck was not a colonial enthusiast. He entered the field only because it was forced upon him as a duty; and as late as 1889 he declared, "I am no colony man." As

long as he remained in office, he advocated extreme caution and moderation in colonial expansion.¹ The Empire ought not to acquire more land in Africa than it could safely handle; and no general colonial policy should be entered upon without the support of a united people and Parliament. The duty of the Federal Government, he declared in 1884, was "to carry forward our colonial policy so long as they have reason to hope that a majority of the German nation are behind them, but to drop it should this hope be unjustified." And again in another speech, "To carry on a colonial policy successfully the Government must have behind it in Parliament a solid majority in sentiment, a majority which is superior to the momentary decline of individual parties. Without such a reserve of force in the background we cannot carry on a colonial policy. The national energy, when neutralized by party struggles, is not strong enough with us to encourage the Government to undertake the step which we first tried in the case of Samoa in 1880." To his mind it was better to trust to the genius of the Hanseatic merchants than to the rigors of the Prussian bureaucratic system, for the rule of the colonies; and the study of colonial methods and training of colonial officials should precede any territorial expansion on a large scale.

The advice of the old chancellor was excellent, and Germany would have been saved much in men and money if it had been followed. With the establishment of a protectorate over Southwest Africa with a nominal area of 215,000 square miles, her work had barely commenced. Through the efforts of Dr. Nachtigal and the signing of more treaties with native chiefs, Togoland and the Cameroons were taken under her protection in the same year (1884), the latter being acquired only after a lively competition with the British consul, Mr. Hewitt, who secured the Oil Rivers.

¹ Resigned, 1890.

district for England. Then began the work of securing actual control of the vast interior districts of these protectorates. Through vigorous and consistent diplomacy, resulting in treaties with Portugal in 1886, with Great Britain in 1890 and 1893, with the Congo Independent State in August, 1894, and with France in February, 1896, the boundary of Togoland was pushed north to lat. 9° N., that of the Cameroons extended to Lake Chad including the Adamaua country, and that of German Southwest Africa advanced north and east so that the areas of the three became 33,700, 191,130, and 322,450 square miles respectively.

Limits being thus set to their territorial expansion in West and South Africa, the Germans immediately set about the task of organizing, consolidating, and establishing authority and order throughout these extensive domains. It was an extremely difficult task, for which they were ill-prepared and poorly equipped. And it cannot be said that they have been particularly successful. None of these colonies is as yet on a paying basis. Up to the end of 1906 the three protectorates had cost the German Government \$30,875,000, with \$150,000,000 for wars in Southwest Africa in addition; and in 1909 the Empire was still contributing over \$5,000,000 to their annual budgets, besides large sums for public buildings and internal development. With little or no practical experience in colonization, the Germans rushed with self-confidence and misguided zeal into a task, tremendous and beset with difficulties, before which even an experienced colonial state, like Great Britain, might well have hesitated. They were unfortunate in the selection of many of their earlier officials. Those that were not domineering, pompous, and inexperienced, were incompetent or corrupt. Little effort was made to secure the confidence and coöperation of the natives; and small regard

was had for local customs and traditions. With true Teutonic thoroughness they set vigorously to work to civilize the inhabitants and to transform the country into a European paradise within a year or two. The merchants expected to build up an extensive trade immediately in the new lands, and immense profits were looked for within a few months on every hand. Colonization was supposed to be an easy method of developing a country through land grants, and it was not deemed necessary to pay any attention to the rights or claims of natives.

Many undesirable and inefficient colonists, as well as fortune-hunters, were thus attracted to these colonies, and the lands and property of the natives were ruthlessly seized. The result has been that almost constant irritation existed between the settlers and inhabitants, and the Government was continually in hot water. For twenty years after the acquisition of German Southwest Africa, the imperial authorities were compelled to resort to the use of force frequently in order to preserve peace and to protect the lives and property of its colonists. And it was not until after the great Herero uprising in 1904 had been put down with the annihilation of a large percentage of the Herero nation, the most capable and promising people in their territories, that real peace was secured.

In recent years, particularly since the introduction of the "new colonial era" by Herr Dernburg in 1907, matters have been handled in a more scientific and intelligent manner. A Colonel Office has been created by the imperial authorities to supervise the government and the development of the colonies. Railways are being constructed into the interior, harbors built, roads opened, and excellent experimental stations erected; and everything possible is being done to conserve the natural resources of the German West African possessions and to place them upon a sound and

prosperous basis. Colonization is encouraged, but only settlers who possess from \$2500 to \$12,000 are permitted to purchase land, as it is not in any sense a poor man's country. Although possessing more than thrice the area of the mother country, it is still a question whether the three protectorates will ever pay. Togo, about the size of Maine, and the Cameroons, now somewhat larger than Texas, although containing large reaches of unhealthy or unproductive territory, possess a fair share of fertile soil and some excellent promise of future worth. Much time, labor, care, and money will have to be expended still, before any real reward to the Empire can be expected. The hundred thousand square miles added to the Cameroons by the Franco-German treaty of 1911¹ have made the situation even more difficult, because little had been done previously to develop the territory, and the resident natives are doing all in their power to resist the German occupation.

But German Southwest Africa, while it is one fifth larger than Texas and possesses some mines and other valuable assets, is still a veritable "white elephant" to the German Government. It has a population of less than 100,000; and the greater portion of the country, particularly the southern section, is either a sandy desert or a sterile plain. The ultimate cost of placing such a colony on a self-sustaining or remunerative basis will be enormous. One doubts if it will ever prove a paying proposition to the mother country; for, in spite of all that has been done during the first twenty-six years of its history as a German colony, the Imperial Government had to make a contribution of over \$3,450,000 to its budget in 1911 in order that the revenues might equal the general expenditures. From

¹ An account of the Franco-German negotiations of 1911 will be found on pp. 269-276, the territorial changes in the Congo region being defined on p. 275.

a commercial standpoint, however, this protectorate is already a source of considerable profit to the merchants of the Empire. The sum of its imports and exports, which in 1899 equaled only \$2,585,150, reached by 1911 the very creditable total of \$18,468,500, of which the share of Germany was approximately \$6,080,750. And the total trade of the three colonies — Togoland, Cameroons, and German Southwest Africa — in the same year approximated \$35,845,000.

CHAPTER V

BRITISH AND GERMAN EAST AFRICA, AND UGANDA

IN the seventies and eighties of the last century, East Africa was a name loosely applied to the entire East Coast from the Portuguese colony of Mozambique to the Gulf of Aden, most of which was supposed to belong — actually or nominally — to the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Muscat rulers of Oman, on the Arabian peninsula, had exercised a precarious sovereignty over Mombasa and the neighboring territory on the East Coast of Africa ever since 1698; but the last important Mazrui prince of Mombasa died in 1837, leaving Said, Sultan of Zanzibar, supreme in East Africa. In 1822, Seyyid Said annexed the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, and to the latter he moved his residence in 1840. But after his death, in 1856, his sons quarreled over his possessions. No law of succession existed, except that described by Abdul-Aziz, brother of Said, as the “law of the keenest sword.” Lord Canning arbitrated the matter at length in 1861, assigning Zanzibar and East Africa to Majid, the younger son, who left them in turn to his son, Barghash, in 1870. The territory on the mainland over which Barghash ruled extended from Tungi Bay northward to Witu and the island of Lamu, and he claimed to exercise control over the interior as far inland as lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. He maintained military posts at a number of places in order to keep open the main trade routes; and the chiefs of this region, it is true, paid him tribute and recognized the supremacy of Zanzibar. But there was no such occupation and control of the interior district by the Sultan as the powers laid down in the Con-

ference of Berlin for the establishment of all claims of sovereignty in Africa. Effective occupation was defined by Lord Salisbury, in his correspondence with Portugal, to be "in sufficient strength to maintain order, protect foreigners, and to control the natives." It was this agreement concerning the occupation of territory, and the extension (at the same conference) of the Congo free-trade zone straight east to the Zanzibar coast which brought upon the Sultan of Zanzibar the loss of most of his possessions on the mainland, and led to the creation of the German and British East African protectorates.

Through the efforts of John Kirk, who had been British consul to Zanzibar for twenty years and who had become the Sultan's most trusted adviser, Great Britain might have secured control of all of East Africa if she had been so minded. Barghash, in fact, offered to lease his entire continental possessions to Kirk and Mackinnon in 1877; but the Foreign Office hesitated. The British Government was not ready at that time to consider seriously any general policy of colonial expansion. It was still undecided, although forced by circumstances to interfere in Egypt, when Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs, who went out in 1884 ostensibly to explore the East Coast of Africa, turned up as German consul-general in Zanzibar. When asked what was the purpose of this mission, Bismarck, disclaiming any intention of acquiring territory, informed Lord Granville that Rohlfs was sent "to exert his influence to secure freedom of commerce in the Sultan's domains," in accordance with the plan agreed upon at the Conference of Berlin. Meanwhile, in April of the same year, the Society for German Colonization had been founded, with Dr. Carl Peters as president; and in November and December, Peters, Count J. F. Pheil, and Carl Juehlke were in East Africa making treaties with the native chieftains. In February, 1885, the German East African

Company with a capital of 3,000,000 marks was organized. It received, on the 17th¹ a protective charter from the Government based on a few flimsy treaties signed by chiefs who were persuaded by Peters that they needed German protection, and who were willing to swear that Sultan Barghash possessed no sovereignty over them or their lands.² From May to July, 1885, Dr. Carl Juehlke — the “rightful representative of the German East African Company” — continued the labors of the earlier commission and made further treaties³ with the local potentates until some sixty thousand square miles were marked off and a German protectorate officially proclaimed. At the same time — May, 1885 — the Denhardt brothers secured a concession of five hundred miles from Sultan Simla of Witu and formed the “Witu Company.”

On April 27 the Sultan of Zanzibar sent a protest to the German Government against the treaty-making operations of Peters and Juehlke in Usagara, Nguru, Usegusa, and Ukami, claiming those districts as his possessions; and on May 11 he made a similar protest to Great Britain through Sir John Kirk. Bismarck, accepting the treaties at their face value, insisted that Germany was not interfering with any valid sovereign rights of Zanzibar, but that she was merely establishing posts for the protection and advancement of trade in East Africa, as any European power was entitled to do by the terms of the Berlin Agreement. And he asked the assistance of England in securing from Barghash the recognition of the new German protectorate and the acceptance of certain commercial arrangements.⁴ Lord Granville, as soon as he had assured himself that Germany

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 77, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-22.

⁴ See correspondence beginning on page 1099 in the *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 77.

was harboring no serious hostile intent against the kingdom of Zanzibar "per se," accepted the statement of the German Chancellor without further question and ordered Kirk to render every assistance to Herr Rohlfs, German consul-general of Zanzibar, in his efforts to bring about a satisfactory adjustment of the matter. Thus deserted by his sole European friend, Sultan Barghash was compelled to accept unconditionally the ultimatum laid before him by Commodore Paschen on August 11, 1885. He retracted his protest, recognized the German protectorate in East Africa, and promised to withdraw his troops from the disputed lands, as a necessary preliminary to the opening of "negotiations to arrange by treaty," wired Sir John Kirk, "the conditions for the well-being of the lands under his protection which the Emperor thinks urgently necessary."

Great Britain, not intentionally neglectful of her obligations to Zanzibar or indifferent to her own interests in East Africa,¹ insisted on an investigation of the claims of Barghash and a delimitation of the territorial boundaries of the Sultan's domains, as a prerequisite to all further action in East Africa. A commission of three was suggested, France, as one of the guarantors of the integrity and sovereignty of Zanzibar in 1862, being asked to name a member with Germany and England. Granville nominated, in October, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Lord) Kitchener; Germany, Dr. Schmidt, consul at Cairo; and France, M. Patrimonio, consul-general at Beirut. The Commission rendered its report on June 9, 1886; and, on the basis of their decisions, Barghash was assigned, in an agreement between Germany and

¹ In the spring of 1884, Joseph Thompson had successfully completed his remarkable journey to Lake Victoria from the Zanzibar coast via the Masai country, and proved to the Royal Geographical Society (which sent him), and to the British Government, the future commercial value of this direct route to the interior and the commercial possibilities of East Africa.

England dated October 29, 1886,¹ the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, and Mafia, and a strip of the coast ten miles wide extending from the middle of Tungi Bay to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana River, — approximately one thousand miles, — with five towns north of Kipini including Kismayu. This was accepted on December 4 by the Sultan and recognized by all the powers, except Portugal, which had not been consulted and which seized the whole of Tungi Bay by force in 1894.

Germany and Great Britain then proceeded to define their respective "spheres of influence"² in East Africa, Germany taking the southern portion from the mouth of the Rovuma to the Umba River — 620 miles; and England the northern half from the Umba to the Juba River — 405 miles. Considerable uncertainty existed with regard to the geographical features and extent of the inland territory; but it was understood that the claims of both states were to embrace the interior as far as Victoria Nyanza, in accordance with the newly enunciated German doctrine that possession of the coast implied ownership of the "hinterland." The correspondence which ensued between Lord Salisbury and Baron von Plessen, at the time, shows that a definite agreement existed to the effect that the Germans were to keep south of Lake Victoria in their exploration and expansion, and the British north of it, the boundary being a line drawn from the mouth of the Umba River past the northern base of Mount Kilima-Njaro to the point where the first degree of south latitude intersects the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. Thus an area of approximately 200,000 square miles was marked off in the rough for the Kaiser

¹ Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, vol. 18, pp. 1174-76.

² A term used at the Berlin Conference to denote territory not completely under the control of a given European state, but soon to be definitely occupied by it and from which it wished to exclude the political activities of other powers.



BRITISH AND GERMAN EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA

British Territory German Territory Railways

and 170,000 for Queen Victoria. And in 1888, Germany leased the coast strip bordering on her sphere, with harbors and customs, from the Sultan at an annual rental for fifty

years, thus securing adequate seaports and the control of the coast trade.¹

Already, in May, 1887, the Imperial British East Africa Company had been formed and secured concessions from Sultan Barghash, which gave them the control and administration of his possessions on the mainland from the Umba River to Kipini, for fifty years. In return the company was to pay him the full amount of the usual customs dues of the district and fifty per cent of all additional revenue.² He was favored still more by the gift of one founder's share in the stock of the corporation. By the end of the year the company had concluded twenty-one treaties with native chieftains, giving it sovereign control for two hundred miles inland; and, in April, 1888, it was duly incorporated with a paid-in capital of £250,000. Sir William Mackinnon, who, through his interests in the British-India Steam Navigation Company, which had maintained a regular service between India, Zanzibar, and Europe since 1872, was thoroughly familiar with the situation and an enthusiastic believer in colonization, became president and one of the largest investors. In September of the same year a royal charter was issued, assuring the company a practical monopoly in the development of the region and its natural resources. But trade was to be free except for the regular customs dues. In return the company was to rule the country, administer justice, protect the missionaries and foreign residents, preserve the ivory trade, and promote as far as possible the material welfare of the whole protectorate.

In 1889 the award of Baron Lambergmont in the British-German controversy concerning the control of the islands of Lamu, Manda, and Patta, and the ports of Kisimayu,

¹ The whole of the Sultan's rights in this district were acquired by Germany in 1890 for 4,000,000 marks.

² Great Britain now pays the Sultan an annual rental of £17,000.

Brava, and Merka, placed the administration of these places also in the hands of the British company. In the same year the German Witu Company failed, and Witu with its "hinterland" was transferred to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1891, after Great Britain and the German Empire had settled all their differences in East Africa through the celebrated Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890.¹ This document set definite limits to the British and German East African protectorates, assigned Witu, Zanzibar, and Uganda to England, and awarded Heligoland (in the North Sea) and a large district west and south of Lake Victoria to Germany. It was preceded on June 14 by the acceptance of British protection by the Sultan of Zanzibar: and on August 4, this protectorate was recognized by France in return for the British recognition of her protectorate over Madagascar. In May, 1889, the Italian Government had secured a protectorate over the Sultanate of Oppia; and in November of the same year the officials of the Imperial British East Africa Company had assisted the Italians in the extension of their control along the Somali coast. Finally, in 1891, Great Britain signed an agreement with Italy making the Juba River the boundary between their respective "spheres of influence" and recognizing the Italian claims north of that river. Thus European expansion in East Africa became a recognized fact; and the map of the whole region was definitely adjusted to the satisfaction, in a large degree, of all concerned.

The Anglo-German treaty of 1890, however, aroused the most violent criticism in both of the countries concerned. The British and German press vied with each other in trying to prove that their own Government had needlessly sacrificed a quarter of the African continent to the other. Yet no better solution of the problem could have been

¹ Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, vol. 18, p. 455.

found at the time ; and it possessed decided advantages for Great Britain. By generously conceding one half of a wild and undeveloped country, difficult and costly to administer, she acquired a good neighbor, relieved her own colonial budget of a heavy burden, and closed an intricate and heated controversy. When one recalls the many and serious blunders of the British Foreign Office in its African policy during this period, one feels inclined to regard this treaty as a sudden stroke of real diplomatic genius. It evidently appeared to Bismarck, then out of office, in some such light, for he was most outspoken in his condemnation of the German part of the affair.

While the events just narrated were in progress, Carl Peters, sent out from Berlin in February, 1889, by the German Emin Pasha Relief Association, ostensibly to rescue Emin (imprisoned in the Sudan since the Mahdi uprising and the death of Gordon), successfully eluded the British warships under Admiral Freemantle at Lamu and effected a landing in Witu. He advanced rapidly inland via the Tana River, Kikuyu and Kavirondo, thinking to steal a march on the Imperial British East Africa Company and to win glory and territory for the Fatherland by securing through treaties the lands in the rear of the company's concessions.¹ Circumstances were far more favorable for such a move than he knew. For when he reached, in February, 1890, the borders of Uganda (a native feudal kingdom located between Lakes Victoria and Albert, the Nile River,

¹ Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa*, 1891 ; a bombastic but accurate account of his own expedition. Peters claims Professor Schweinfurth suggested to him at Cairo, in 1886, the plan of seizing Uganda by a relief expedition for Emin Pasha. The subject was first discussed seriously on his return from Zanzibar in February, 1888. The German Colonial Society took up the plan in April ; a special appeal for funds was sent out to the German people in September by the German East Africa Company and the German East Africa Plantation Company, after a commission had been appointed in July to raise 400,000 marks.

and the Congo State), he learned to his satisfaction, by opening letters intended for Emin and Jackson, that the country was in the throes of a conflict between rival chieftains.

Uganda had been visited as early as 1858 by Captain Speke and Burton and again in 1875 by Stanley, all of whom were enthusiastic over the fertility of its soil and the intelligence of its people. They referred to it as the "pearl of Africa"; and Stanley, impressed with the good will and open mind of King Mutesa, had sent a stirring letter to London urging that missionaries be sent out at once to Uganda. The first mission of the Church Missionary Society, led by Lieutenant Shergold Smith, accompanied by Alexander Mackay, C. T. Wilson, and two others, reached the country in 1877 by way of Zanzibar. In 1879 two more missionaries arrived, coming up the Nile and through the Sudan; and, early in 1883, four more, including Bishop J. Hannington and R. P. Ashe, joined the little band of workers at Mengo.¹ Meanwhile the French "Mission of the White Fathers," organized by the energetic and ambitious Cardinal Lavigerie, of Algiers and Tunis, to evangelize the Congo and the Sudan and commissioned by Pope Leo XIII to convert the whole of Central Africa, opened a station in Uganda in February, 1879. The Mohammedan preachers and emissaries were already on the field; and before long, since the masses followed almost implicitly the individual chiefs, the whole country was divided into three bitter and jealous factions, each striving for power and control of the public offices. King Mutesa, though a cruel and unscrupu-

¹ R. P. Ashe's *Two Kings of Uganda* (1889) should be read in this connection. Mr. Mackay and Mr. Ashe were two of the most devoted, energetic, and successful of the British missionaries in Africa. The former, greatly beloved by the natives, unfortunately died in 1890 in Uganda. The latter, after a rest in England, returned to the country in 1891, but resigned in 1894.

lous tyrant, indifferent to religion except when it promised some political or personal advantage, was skillful enough to maintain an uncertain peace until his death in 1884. But in the five years that followed, Uganda suffered severely through the weakness and ambition of its rulers, the competition of the three religious parties, and a struggle of the royal brothers for possession of the throne. Mwanga, the son and successor of Mutesa, alarmed by the progress of the Europeans in the Sudan, the Congo, and East Africa, and by the representations of the Arab traders, began the troubles by persecuting the Christians and bringing about the death of Bishop Hannington. He next attempted, unsuccessfully, to rid the country of the leading chiefs of all parties, through a sudden *coup d'état*, and civil war ensued. At first, the Mohammedans secured the ascendancy and placed Karema, the brother of Mwanga, on the throne; but the two Christian factions combined and ultimately overthrew the followers of Mohammed in October, 1889, restoring King Mwanga — the least of several evils — to power.¹ In 1890, his position was still exceedingly precarious; and Peters determined to hasten to his assistance and thus win over the country for Germany.

Although just at this juncture he received news of the safe arrival of Stanley and Emin Pasha at Victoria Nyanza, Peters decided to proceed into Uganda, since the question of its ownership had not yet been determined. He pushed on, and reached the capital, Mengo, on February 22, where he remained about a month. With the assistance of Père Lourdel of the French mission, Peters secured a treaty from King Mwanga, signed on February 27, 1890, of which he made a good deal, but which really gave to Germany nothing more than equal trade rights with other European states. He then crossed Victoria Nyanza and returned by

¹ A good account in R. P. Ashe's *Chronicles of Uganda*, 1894.

way of German East Africa and Zanzibar, reaching Berlin on August 25.

Six weeks after his departure, Mr. Jackson — representative of the Imperial British East Africa Company — arrived at Mengo. He had been forbidden by the company to enter Uganda, but felt compelled to do so at length by the activities of Peters. After a month's fruitless negotiation, impeded at every step by the astute French missionaries, he returned to British East Africa without having improved matters or procured an alliance with the king. Meanwhile the situation was becoming very serious. King Mwanga was quite ready to sell his country to whatever nation would guarantee him sufficient protection to insure him his crown. The French and English missionaries were hopelessly divided; and the country seemed again on the verge of revolution. The Church Missionary Society issued imperative appeals for aid and the philanthropic spirit of the British nation was speedily aroused.

The Imperial British East Africa Company acted promptly. On November 1, 1890, Captain (now Sir Frederick) Lugard left Mombasa with a large force, reaching Mengo on December 18. He secured a concession of Kampala Hill near by, and immediately fortified it. After extended negotiations he succeeded in patching up the chief differences of the three religious parties and in settling each faction on a territory specially assigned to it by Mwanga. Next he brought to Uganda Selim Bey and 8000 Sudanese, whom Emin Pasha had left in the Sudan, and utilized them to police the country and to preserve order. Journeying through the Unyoro, Buddu, Kavalli, and Ankoli districts, he made treaties with the feudal chieftains of those regions and placed them directly under the protection of the company. And finally, after the king had organized a revolt early in 1892, he returned to Mengo, pacified the

country again, and compelled Mwanga to sign a treaty on March 30, 1892, placing Uganda, comprising 117,681 square miles with a population of 2,843,000, permanently under the control of his corporation.¹

Thus the Imperial British East Africa Company accomplished a remarkable pioneer work and performed an inestimable patriotic service. It had secured control over a vast region with an area of nearly 400,000 square miles and a coast-line of over 400 miles. It had made permanent the British protectorate in East Africa by a large number of treaties with native chiefs and won the key to the Nile Basin² for Great Britain through the acquisition of Uganda. Exploring parties had penetrated to all the important points; and steamers had been placed on the Juba and Tana Rivers. The coast region was fairly well administered; a great deal had been accomplished toward the suppression of the slave trade; and large sums had been expended to develop the general trade and resources of the interior. And with it all the representatives of the company enjoyed a phenomenal success in treating with the natives. "In fact," wrote Sir Gerald Portal in his report on Uganda, "to the founders of the company belongs the sole credit of the acquisition for the benefit of British commerce of this great potential market for British goods. It should, moreover, be remembered in justice to them that in the face of many initial difficulties they succeeded, in marked contrast to the neighboring European colonies, in establishing their influence without bloodshed and by their own unaided efforts."

But the task was too great; the pace too rapid. The funds

¹ For detailed account of his work, see Lugard's *Rise of Our East African Empire*, 1893, 2 vols. The terms of the treaty are given in Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties*, vol. 19, p. 5.

² It was extremely important for Egypt that England should control the headwaters of the Nile, for only in this way could she be assured of a regular water supply, without the danger of interruption from savage tribes or ambitious neighbors.

of the company were exhausted and it was already beginning to think of retrenchment. In February, 1891, an attempt was made to induce the British Government to vote a subsidy for a railway to Uganda. Lord Salisbury was favorable to the plan and agreed to pay four fifths of the expense of a preliminary survey. Unfortunately Parliament was not willing to take up the question at the time; and on September 4 the company announced its decision to reduce its yearly expenditure from £100,000 to £40,000, and to withdraw from Uganda. Great excitement prevailed in England when this determination of the company was made public — especially when it was seen that this meant the desertion of the British missions at Mengo. Stirring appeals for aid were made by Bishop Tucker and others; and subscriptions, of which Sir Mackinnon himself gave £20,000, were raised sufficient to enable the company to hold Uganda till March, 1893. It was hoped that the Government would come to the rescue of the company before that date; but Parliament had no desire to provide funds to sustain a private corporation. It voted only the necessary £20,000 for a survey "to suppress the slave trade in East Africa," on March 4, 1892.

The British East Africa Company did its part of the railway plan promptly, entrusting the survey to Captain Macdonald and making its report on August 7, in which it was estimated that the road could be constructed for £3,000 per mile, or from Mombasa to Kikuyu for £1,022,000, and to Victoria Nyanza for £2,240,000. The Foreign Office, however, postponed action on the report; and it was three years before the question of a railway in East Africa was taken up again by the British Government. But, in December, 1892, Lord Rosebery ordered Sir Gerald Portal, then British consul-general at Zanzibar and a promising young diplomat, to visit Uganda and report on conditions

there. That country passed out of the hands of the Imperial British East Africa Company on March 31, 1893; and the British flag replaced the ensign of the corporation. A new treaty was obtained from Mwanga in May; and Portal returned, leaving Captain Macdonald in charge. Unfortunately he died in London the following January at thirty-five years of age; but his report, dated at Zanzibar November 1, 1893,¹ is an admirable testimony to his talents and ability. He favored the direct control of the country by Great Britain under a royal commissioner; and Uganda was declared a British protectorate in September, 1894.

Sir Gerald Portal laid great emphasis on the need of a railroad and on the strategic value of the land to England. It would give the British the complete control of the Nile Valley, provided Egypt reconquered the Sudan, and enable them to hold the Arabs in check, thereby rendering well-nigh impossible such Mohammedan coalitions and risings as the Mahdi's. His views on the slave trade coincided precisely with the words of Lord Salisbury at Glasgow on May 20, 1891: "Whenever that railway can be made, I believe that the end of the African exportation of the slave will have been attained at the same time. Because it will not only prevent the passage of caravans from the Victoria Nyanza eastward, but will place you in command of the valley of the Nile, so that slaves will not be able to cross thence to the Red Sea." At the time, practically all the produce of the interior was transported to the coast on the backs of negroes. In 1892, Stanley estimated the number of porters actually in service in British and German East Africa at 240,000; and thousands of these poor fellows, when they reached the seashore, were secretly shipped to lives of servitude in Persia and other Asiatic countries. So

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1894, *Africa No. 2*. Also in *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 85, p. 845.

the railroad would not only serve to develop very materially the trade of East Africa and Uganda, but would doubtless put an end to this slave traffic as well.

Meanwhile, the position of the Imperial British East Africa Company as a trading corporation had become practically untenable. Its resources had been exhausted before the commerce of the country could possibly be raised to a paying basis. By the treaty of Brussels in 1890, the powers agreed that all trade in Central and East Africa should be free, with a duty of five per cent to be levied only in districts where the products originated or were to be consumed. In 1892, upon the advice of Great Britain, the Sultan of Zanzibar fell in line with this agreement and placed his territories on the list of free countries. This worked a great hardship on the company, because it could now collect no duties on articles going inland and only five per cent on those destined for the Sultan's coast possessions, but was still compelled to pay Zanzibar's ruler the old annual revenues. Consequently the company withdrew from the Witu district in July, 1893, and, soon after, offered to sell all its claims and properties in East Africa to the British Government.

A tedious correspondence followed, lasting nine months and ending, in March, 1895, with the company's acceptance of the nominal offer of £150,000, made by the Foreign Office, for the whole of its assets and rights in East Africa.¹

At first, however, the British Government was hardly more successful in its management than had been the company, for both failed to evolve a policy of rule based on a scientific knowledge of the country and the conditions prevailing among the natives. And a procession of governors — six within ten years — was certainly not conducive to

¹ *The History of the Foundation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company*, 1895, by P. L. McDermott (acting secretary).

the best administration. The representatives of the Foreign Office, moreover, were lacking in tact and experience in handling the natives. In 1893 and 1894, Colonel (now Major-General Sir Henry) Colville, Acting Commissioner for Uganda, felt it necessary to break the power of Kabarega, King of Unyoro, which he accomplished in a spirited campaign of several months. A large section of southern Unyoro was added to Uganda; and the British flag was raised at Wadelai on the White Nile — only to be ordered taken down by the British Government later.

In 1895, however, the work had all to be done again; and, after a series of successful campaigns¹ conducted with great skill, protectorates were established permanently over Unyoro, Usoga, Nandi, and Kavirondo. The whole region east of the White Nile and north as far as Dufile, which had been held since 1888 by the Mahdi, was occupied and placed under the British flag. The Nile now became the frontier of Uganda; and material assistance was rendered the trade of the country by the establishment of general security, the extension of the main trade road straight through from Entebbe to the Nile, and the stopping of hostile attacks on caravans. Force had thus been applied with no uncertain hand and considerable progress been made. But too little consideration had been given to the rights and interests of the natives; and no special effort was made, to conciliate and provide adequately for the chiefs, whose possessions and powers had been materially curtailed in the process of military occupation. And the end was not yet. The revolt of the Sudanese troops which followed in 1897, and the rebellion in Uganda in which both King Kabarega and King Mwanga took part and which lasted from 1897 to 1899, were unfortunate affairs

¹ A graphic description will be found in *Campaigning on the Upper Nile and Niger*, 1898, by Lieutenant Seymour Vandeleur.

that might have been avoided if the proper precautions had been taken and a more just treatment been accorded the native leaders.

The outcome, however, was beneficial, since it ended in the permanent pacification of Uganda. Mbogo, the Mohammedan claimant to the throne, who had been banished to Mombasa during the struggle, was brought back; and the various royal factions reconciled by the deposition of Mwanga¹ in favor of his infant son, Daudi Chua.² In December, 1899, a special commission, headed by Sir Harry H. Johnston, reached Uganda; and three months later, on March 10, 1900, a general treaty with Great Britain was signed by the regents (for the king) and all the leading chiefs, which has been faithfully kept by all parties and has given peace and prosperity to the country. In this agreement a system of government for Uganda was outlined, and the old, vexatious problems of land tenure, taxation, justice, and military service were settled to the satisfaction of all concerned.³ A regency of three now manages the affairs of the kingdom through two prime ministers — one Protestant and one Catholic — assisted by the Lukiko, or national assembly. In 1895, Fume Amari — the treacherous Sultan of Witu — was forcibly dethroned by the English, and Omar-bin-Hamid appointed in his stead. By supporting Rashid-bin-Salim for the Sultanate of Takaungu and driving the older claimant, Mbaruk, over into German territory, Great Britain completed the subjugation of the realm of the Mazrui, the oldest and most influential Arab

¹ Kabarega was banished to Kismayu and Mwanga to the Seychelles Islands, where he died May, 1903.

² Now (1914) he is nearly eighteen years of age, and will assume the reins of office within the year.

³ An excellent account of the work of this commission will be found in H. H. Johnston's *The Uganda Protectorate*, vol. 1, chap. 8 (Hutchinson & Co., London, 1902); also in his official "Report," dated July 10, 1901, in the *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1901, *Africa*, cd. 671.

power on the East Coast. The pacification of all the British possessions in East Africa was thus attained and the way paved for the steady and systematic development of the country.

The Uganda Railway was commenced at Mombasa in 1895, and the first train reached Lake Victoria in December, 1901. It was built with great technical skill under the direction of Sir G. Whitehouse, coolies being brought from India for the purpose; but it proved a most costly undertaking, the final expenditure amounting to over £5,317,000 — more than double the estimate of the East Africa Company. So many temporary bridges and sections were constructed along the line that a prominent German official, who passed over the road shortly before its completion, was moved to exclaim: "I am ashamed of my country. We have not built one road to the Lake yet, and the English have built *two*." No one knows just why the Foreign Office suddenly determined to put through this railway; but it has amply justified the expense since it began operations, being worked at a substantial profit ever since 1904–05. The exports of East Africa, which only approximated £70,000 to £75,000 in 1893, rose to £113,000 in 1901–02, the year the road opened, and reached £1,016,000 in 1911–12. The imports increased correspondingly — from £106,000 (in 1901) to £1,330,000 — in the same period, while the total trade of Uganda was growing from a merely nominal sum to the very promising figure of £1,017,000, considerably more than half of which was with Great Britain.

On August 31, 1896, all the British territory on the East Coast, except Uganda and the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, was united in the British East Africa protectorate. Since that date the two districts of East Africa and Uganda have been administered directly through royal commission-

ers, responsible till 1905 to the Foreign Office, and since then to the Colonial Office. The area of the protectorate is about 250,000 square miles ; and the total population just a little over 4,000,000. The offices of the central administration are divided between Mombasa on the coast and Nairobi, capital of the Ukamba province, in the interior. On April 1, 1902, two provinces — Naivasha and Kisumu — were transferred to it from Uganda ; and it now has seven provinces administered by subcommissioners residing at the local capitals, except in Jubaland and a large unorganized territory to the northwest (near Abyssinia), which are under military rule. The subcommissioners are assisted by collectors and subcollectors in the gathering of taxes and other local work ; but, wherever possible, the services of the native chiefs¹ and leading men are enlisted, usually to great advantage. The Uganda protectorate, with an area of 223,500 square miles and a native population equal to that of East Africa, although divided for administrative purposes into five provinces, is still ruled through the King of Uganda and some twenty local chieftains — each entrusted with the administration of a given district ;² and the native institutions and customs have been carefully preserved and protected.

The planters have had great hopes of their grain crop since the opening of the railway has cheapened transportation, but recent experience gives little promise of substantial profit from this source at present. The mainstay of the country, next to rubber, maize, and coffee, the exporta-

¹ For instance, Lenana, the leading chief of the Masai, was given a prominent share in the administration of his country and his loyal services have contributed much to the maintenance of the present friendly relations between the British and the ablest and most warlike of the tribesmen of East Africa.

² The kingdom of Uganda proper was bounded by the territories of Usoga, Unyoro, Ankoli, and Koki, now all in the protectorate of Uganda.

tion of which is increasing rapidly, promises to be cotton¹ which can readily be raised there in large quantities. East Africa has large areas of sterile territory and some very unhealthy districts near the coast; but there is plenty of good land on the uplands of the East Africa protectorate and on the fertile plateau of Uganda, where Europeans can live in safety and comparative comfort. Yet it is not a poor man's land. Only colonists with a fair capital—estimated by the British authorities at not less than £1200—and an enterprising spirit should venture into the country. Mr. Roosevelt has been quoted recently as saying that British East Africa has a most promising outlook, but that its chief need is a race of sturdy pioneers such as opened up the center and west of the United States. But such colonists will not go there in any large numbers until the British Government has established a working connection between East Africa, the Sudan, and South Africa, and has solved successfully the problem of colonization. Title deeds and leases on over 3,000,000 acres of land were issued in East Africa, to be sure, between 1903 and 1911; but a great deal of dissatisfaction still exists among the planters. This is due to the ill-advised system of land grants employed by the colonial administration. Nothing has done more, indeed, to retard the development of the country and to arouse the enmity of the colonists than this mistaken agricultural policy, accompanied as it has been by an over-zealous desire to protect every right—fancied and real—of the natives. Two classes of cessions have been permitted by the British Government: freeholds to natives and leases for ninety-nine years at nominal rentals to whites. On account of the great diversity of the land,

¹ Cotton to the value of \$860,000 was shipped from the two protectorates in 1909 and 1910, or about 2312 tons, and over \$840,000 from Uganda alone in 1911 and 1912.

the territory was divided into sections and the maximum number of acres possible to obtain was fixed at from 900 to 5000, according to the nature and value of the property. The government might convey, in special cases, as high as 1500 acres of the best land to an individual or corporation. The process of surveying the districts was necessarily slow ; but, as soon as this work was finished in any section, a proper applicant, appearing in person at the right office, might secure a lease for two years at a rental of from one and one half pence to three pence per acre according to the class of his land. If, however, he failed to introduce certain enumerated improvements within six months and a day, the lease would not be extended to ninety-nine years, but the land would revert to the government with all improvements at the end of two years. And from May 7, 1908, to March, 1911, all leases had a clause permitting the raising of the rental at the end of thirty-three and of sixty-six years. The colonists have vigorously protested against this system ; and, within the past year, the Colonial Office has made some important concessions.

The government of East Africa has always been strongly centralized under the British home authorities. It consists of a Governor, assisted by an Executive Council of four members, a Legislative Council of eight official and four non-official members, a Land Board, and an Education Board, the last three of which are appointed by the Governor ; but popular representation is secured by means of local nominations. The country is divided into seven provinces and one unorganized territory, each under a Provincial Commissioner and divided into districts supervised by District Commissioners, all of whom are responsible to the Governor. Unfortunately, these under-officials are poorly paid and the opportunity for promotion slow and not suf-

ficiently promising, from a financial standpoint, to attract the best men.

The white settlers want a share in their own government, particularly the right to elect members to the Legislative Council which they hope will be made truly representative in time. A Colonial Association, organized in 1910 by Lord Delamere and Mr. Grogan, represents the interests of the colonists and is making a valiant fight for popular government and better colonial laws. It was an outgrowth of the Convention of Associations including all branches of agriculture and industry, which had an attendance of fifty deputies in its session of July, 1913. Trouble and discontent are liable to prevail in any colony where the citizens are not given a share in the administration of the country, or are not taken into the confidence of the ruler. This is certain to be the case, when a committee in London supervises the leading matters of administration, takes a hand in the distribution of the land, and is susceptible to the influence of large corporations, like the East Africa Syndicate, which received a lease of five hundred square miles of the best land on April 29, 1904, at an extremely reasonable figure.¹ The resignation of Sir Charles Eliot² in 1904, caused by a difference with the Foreign Office on the question of land distribution and the control of the Masai, and the recent deportation of the Honorable Galbraith Cole³ because he fired at and killed a native sheep-

¹ A twenty-five-year lease without rent for seven years and only a nominal rental of £500 a year for eighteen years, and the privilege of purchasing the whole tract for £5000 at any time within that period.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1904, *Africa No. 8*, ed. 2099; and introduction to his book on the *East Africa Protectorate*, published in 1905. This excellent volume contains a comprehensive description of present conditions in the East African protectorate; but it has been superseded somewhat by Lord Cranworth's work entitled *A Colony in the Making*, published in 1912.

³ Mr. Cole was one of the most respected colonists in East Africa. He caught the native in the act of stealing, and was afterwards exonerated from the charge of murder by a jury. *London Times*, September 11, 1911.

stealer, demonstrates the evil of a too minute supervision of colonial administrations. It is usually a wiser and saner policy to permit wide discretionary powers to colonial officials — particularly in the minor affairs of administration — when they are thoroughly trained, competent, and forceful, like Sir Percy Girouard, who resigned the governorship of the East Africa protectorate in July, 1912, — greatly regretted by the colonists.

The whole region should be placed under one resident commissioner or governor with full powers, who should be assisted by deputy commissioners on the coast, in the highlands, and Kisumu, and in Uganda, and who should control the allotment of lands and the work of developing the country. Large areas are still untouched and are certain to repay the investment and labor necessary to render them productive. A large increase of subordinate officials is needed to assist in the organization of new districts, the opening of new land, and the promotion of trade. They would soon more than earn their salaries through the increased traffic. The British investments in East Africa, outside of the cost of the Uganda Railway, have not been excessive, while the revenue has been steadily approaching the expenses. In 1902, the expenditures were £312,000 and the receipts £95,000; but in 1911–12 the sum expended in both protectorates reached £1,055,000, while the income equaled £932,000. It is evident that these colonies are still far from being a paying investment, for the governmental grant-in-aid to them for 1910–11 amounted to over \$1,100,000, chiefly, however, to meet the expenses of railway extensions, of the care of certain native tribes, and of military protection. No one can safely predict when the country will become self-sustaining; but if the present rate of development is maintained, that point ought to be attained before many years have elapsed. The Uganda Rail-

way is now the main outlet for the trade of the eastern portion of the Congo State, the German territory about Lake Victoria, Uganda, and British East Africa. Steamers run once a month from Khartoum to Gondokoro on the White Nile; and the waters of Victoria Nyanza are being connected by rail with Lake Kiogo, and Albert Nyanza with the navigable part of the White Nile. The railway of South Africa and that of Germany in German East Africa are approaching Lake Tanganyika. When regular and adequate connection has been established between these centers, the rapid development of the country and its commerce can confidently be prophesied.

Of East Africa, Great Britain holds the best and most promising portion. Italian Somaliland, although comprising some 100,000 square miles of territory and administered since 1905 directly by government officials, is still in a wild and undeveloped condition for the most part. The soil is poor and the country thinly settled, with a forbidding coast line and no harbor worthy of the name. In the interior there are some fertile districts, like the valley of the Webi Shebel; but they are relatively insignificant. It is difficult to imagine how anything worth while can be made out of such an unpromising district.

German East Africa, with an area of 384,000 square miles and an estimated population of 10,000,000, has a longer coast line than the British sphere, but it is lacking in fertility, in good natural harbors, and in navigable rivers. The climate is probably less healthy; but the mineral wealth may prove to be greater than that of British territory. The best routes to the interior — those of the Uganda Railway and the Zambesi River — lie either side of the German possessions. There is an Imperial Governor with an advisory council for the colony, which is divided into twenty-one administrative districts and nine communes. The latter

have administrative officials and councils of three to five members appointed by the Governor. The Imperial Government has spent large sums on the protectorate and made earnest efforts to develop its trade; and this, despite the fact that its annual revenues have hardly exceeded £390,000 at any time. In 1900-01 Germany was contributing to the budget of East Africa as much as £618,000 yearly, in addition to ship subsidies and other special aids; but this amount has since steadily decreased until only £180,900 (approximately) was voted in 1912. A fine harbor has been constructed at Dar-es-Salaam; and an imposing city laid out there with stately government buildings, substantial residences, and a splendid hospital. Railroads have been extended over two hundred miles into the interior in two directions; and one—the Central Railway—is seven hundred and eighty-eight miles long and was completed to Lake Tanganyika from Dar-es-Salaam in February, 1914. It is hoped to connect this ultimately with the railways of the German Cameroons and of British South Africa. But that day is far distant. So, too, is the dream of a German India in East Africa. Thirty-one public schools, including four for handicrafts, have been opened for the natives, in addition to those conducted at the missions. The greater part of the country has been accurately explored, surveyed, and mapped at considerable expense; and serious efforts have been put forward to open up the country in all directions. Yet one cannot say that any remarkable progress has been achieved, either in the colonization or in the development of the region as a whole. It is true that the total exports and imports reached the goodly sum of \$17,082,000 (approximately) in 1911-12, having increased over fifty per cent in three years. Yet, when it is remembered that at least \$11,475,400 of this amount represents imports, it will be seen that Germany has, indeed, found an excellent

market for her cotton goods and other wares, but that her new possession is not intrinsically an "Eldorado." And even this amount of trade is relatively insignificant for a country one third larger than Texas, when one bears in mind the fact that Germany's commerce in 1912 with her smallest European neighbor — Portugal — was approximately one and one half times that of her East African protectorate.


Enough has been said to show that colonization in East Africa is not the rosy-hued affair that Captain Lugard and some others would have us believe, and that it is yet far from being on a self-sustaining basis. The history of East Africa has, however, amply demonstrated not only the folly of entrusting administrative powers to commercial companies, but also that it is practically impossible for trading corporations to develop vast territories successfully without governmental coöperation and support. It is equally evident that African protectorates are unwieldy and extremely expensive affairs, imposing great responsibilities and heavy burdens upon their possessors, which should be undertaken only after the most careful consideration of the obligations, the risks, the costs, and the profits involved. And when one compares the confusion that existed in the early days, and the serious blunders committed in both the British and German protectorates, with the present orderly and enlightened administrations, one is reminded of the proverb: "Fortune brings in some boats that are not steer'd."

CHAPTER VI

FRENCH COLONIAL EXPANSION IN WEST AFRICA THE SUDAN, AND THE SAHARA

FRENCH colonial enterprises in Africa began in 1636, when Claude de Rochefort built Fort St. Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River on the West Coast and explored the interior for a hundred miles. He was followed during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by other intrepid explorers, who made settlements at Mellicouri on the Guinea Coast and at Assinie and Grand Bassam on the Ivory Coast, and who penetrated farther and farther into the interior until the valiant René Caillé, after marvelous adventures, reached Timbuctu, on the Upper Niger, in 1837. The French holdings on the Senegal were extended and consolidated into an effective base for future operations by the energetic General Faidherbe from 1854 to 1865, who added the Oulof country as far south as Cape Verde and the kingdom of Cayore, and built the harbor at Dakar. He was the first to recognize the possibilities of West Africa as a colonial center. "Our possession on the West Coast," he wrote to the Colonial Office, "is possibly the one of all our colonies that has before it the greatest future; and it deserves the whole sympathy and attention of the Empire."

By the middle of the nineteenth century, other trade centers had been established at Libreville on the Gaboon River, and at Porto Novo on the Dahomey coast; but it was not until the early eighties that the dream of a wonderful colonial empire, stretching from the Mediterranean to the Congo, was first conceived. It arose when the Senegal



colonists had reached the Niger, and De Brazza was exploring the Gaboon and Congo Rivers. The French statesmen, studying eagerly the map of the continent, determined to push their pioneers and explorers east from the Niger and north from the Upper Congo until they met at Lake Chad, and then to join hands with them from Algeria across the Sahara Desert.

In order to execute successfully such a plan, it was necessary, first of all, for the French Republic to consolidate its holdings and establish itself firmly in West Africa and on the Congo. Under the able leadership of such men as Captain Gallieni, Colonel Frey, and Colonel (now General) Auchinard, their forces, beginning on the Upper Senegal, worked their way rapidly east and south. Between 1880 and 1890, they occupied the territory lying between the Senegal and Niger Rivers, set up a strong outpost at Bamaku on the Niger, subdued the southern portion of the kingdom of the Ahmadu, drove the armies of Samory beyond the Niger, made numerous treaties with native chieftains, and, finally, established a direct connection between Senegal and their little colony of French Guinea.

By 1891, Colonel Auchinard had overrun the greater part of the Ahmadu country as far as Nioro and Segou; but he found Samory difficult to handle. This able and crafty chief, although of humble origin and a native of Segou, possessed a commanding personality and a remarkable talent for organization. Through intrigue, treachery, and a skillful use of force, he had succeeded in constructing an extensive kingdom, extending in 1880 from the Kong Mountains nearly to the Senegal River and embracing both banks of the Upper Niger, with its capital at Bisandugu. His army was well disciplined and armed with modern rifles; and he lived in comparative luxury with the government of his realm well in hand. He opposed the

French vigorously at the opening of their campaign for expansion; but, after suffering several severe defeats at their hands, Samory placed himself and his country under French protection in 1886.

In the treaties of 1887 and 1889 this relationship was confirmed; but his territory was limited to the east side of the Niger and the Bafing (or Tankisse) Rivers. He did not long remain satisfied with this situation, but invaded Kenedugu, seizing and sacking its capital, Sikasso, and made a league with the Sultan of Segou and with the Sefas to drive out the French. The French forces resumed operations, and in a brilliant series of maneuvers, lasting from 1891 to 1894 and conducted by Colonels Auchinard, Humbert, and Combes (known among the natives as "Coumbo, the All-conquering"), reduced Samory to desperate straits. Owing to the recall of Colonel Auchinard and the decision of the French Government to stop operations in the Sudan for a time, he was given, however, a breathing space for three or four years.

Meanwhile in September, 1887, Captain Binger left Bamaku on what appeared to be a madcap attempt to reach the Ivory Coast. Passing in the rear of the British colony of Sierra Leone, he visited Bissandugu and Sikasso in the Samory country, pushed on south and east into the Gourounsi and Mossi districts, where for a time he was thought to have lost his life, made treaties with the chiefs of Kong and Bonduku, and reached Assinie finally in the spring of 1889. A distance of four thousand kilometers had been traversed and the French possessions of Senegal and the Ivory Coast definitely united. Between 1890 and 1895, Captains Quiquandon and Destanave completed the union of the two districts, by establishing the French supremacy from Tiola to the Bobos country, and by making treaties with the chiefs of the Gourounsi and Mossi countries. In



December of the year 1890, M. Monteil crossed the whole of Central Sudan from the eastern border via Kano to Lake Chad, and returned to Europe by way of Tripoli, which he reached on December 10, 1892. He had traveled five thousand miles and explored a path by which France might reach the lake.

Meanwhile, Colonels Frey and Auchinard were taking over for France the whole of the great district between the Senegal and the Upper Niger, as far north as Nioro ; and Lieutenants Caron Jaime and Davoust explored the Niger northward from Bamaku to Kourioumé.¹ Jenne was permanently occupied in 1893 and the gallant Colonel Bonnier took Timbuctu in 1894. In this latter year, in Dahomey, which had been taken under French protection in 1884 at the instigation of Felix Faure (then Secretary of the Colonies) and created a French colony in 1893 through the campaigns of General Dodds against the King of Behansin, Captain Toutée was starting on a remarkable journey. From Porto Novo on the Gulf of Guinea he made his way slowly north to Badjibo on the Niger River, which he ascended past Boussa and Say to Tibi-Farca (opposite Zinder). On November 8, 1895, Lieutenant Hourst² left Timbuctu in an aluminum boat, brought from France in sections and specially constructed for running the cataracts ; and, carefully surveying the country as he proceeded, he made his way down the river to Zinder, Say, and Boussa. After remarkable adventures, he reached the northern outposts of the British Royal Niger Company, by whose agents he was escorted to the coast, and, finally, arrived at the French consulate in Porto Novo on November 1, 1896. Thus accurate knowledge of the Upper Niger was obtained for the

¹ The port for Timbuctu.


² His adventures are described in detail in his entertaining volume, entitled *French Enterprise in Africa*, published in 1898.

first time by the French and a definite connection established between their Senegal-Niger lands and the colony of Dahomey.

To make sure of this connection, the French had already begun active operations in the Dahomey "hinterland." In 1893 and 1894, Captain Decœur founded Carnotville and pushed northeast to the Borgu country, while Lieutenant Baud made treaties with the chiefs of Gambarri and Gourma and pushed north to Say. But the Royal Niger Company had been trading for some years in this region. Under the energetic leadership of Sir George T. Goldie, this company — organized as the United National African Company in 1879 and chartered by Great Britain as the Royal Niger Company in 1886 — had negotiated over three hundred treaties with native chieftains by 1894 and placed over three hundred thousand square miles of Nigeria, as far north as Gando and Sokoto, under British protection. A military government was established; and an efficient constabulary was organized from the Hausa tribes. The headquarters moved north to Lokoja in 1889; and a treaty with France on August 5, 1890,¹ fixed the boundary roughly between the British and French spheres of influence by a line drawn from Say on the Niger due east to Lake Chad. But the western boundary of Nigeria, the Lagos-Dahomey hinterland, remained undetermined.

The officials of the company were busy consolidating their holdings and developing the trade of the region, when the news of the arrival of Captain Decœur in the vicinity of West Nigeria reached them. Captain Lugard, who had distinguished himself in East Africa by saving Uganda for Great Britain, was ordered to the Nigeria frontier. By forced marches he reached Borgu, Nikki, Kishi, and Gam-

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1899, vol. I. *French Yellow Book, Affaires d'Afrique, 1881-93*, pp. 211-13.



baga and made treaties with the chiefs there, and Captain Wallace renewed the alliances with the Kings of Sokoto and Gando, before Captain Decœur's appearance on the scene in October. Thus, in the initial moves of the contest, the Niger Company scored first.

Still, the French pioneers were not discouraged. They held with great determination to their plan of securing a hold on the Lower Niger as an outlet for the trade of Upper Dahomey, and of establishing a thorough connection between Dahomey and their Senegal-Niger possessions. The next year, 1895-96, we find Captain Toutée quietly making his way up through the "debatable lands," as far as Boussa, signing treaties wherever possible; and Lieutenants Voulet and Chanoine coming down from Bandiagara in the north, which they left on July 30, 1896, and securing protectorates over Yatenda, Mossi, Gourounsi, and the Bobos. Captains Baud and Vermeesch left Porto Novo in November and, passing via Gourma to the northwest, finally effected a junction with Voulet's party at Tibja on February 17, 1897, thus completing the occupation of some 100,000 square kilometers of territory. The British Foreign Office notified the French Government, meanwhile, as early as January, 1895, of its treaties with the rulers of this district, and complained of these incursions of the Senegal officials. A diplomatic correspondence ensued concerning the limits of the French and British spheres of influence in West Africa, which lasted for nearly three years and which, though pressed with considerable firmness and heat at times, was conducted with the utmost courtesy and conciliation on both sides.

Before the questions at issue could be satisfactorily adjusted, however, the situation was complicated by events in Nigeria. On January 1, 1897, Naval-Lieutenant Bretennet, who had been commissioned to make a direct and permanent connection between Dahomey and the French Sudan,

left the northernmost French post in Dahomey and entered Borgu *en route* for the Niger River. Establishing stations at Bori, Saore, Bouay, and Kandi, he reached Ilo on the Niger January 25, and in February pushed on down the river to Boussa, which he occupied in a "façon effective." Late in 1896, a rebellion had broken out in Nupé and Ilorin; and Major Arnold and Sir George T. Goldie were busily engaged, during January and February, 1897, in overthrowing the insurgent forces and restoring peace and order in the district, when the news of the French approach reached them. They hastened north to Nikki and soon found themselves face to face with the determined French officials, who refused to withdraw without orders from Paris. Serious trouble seemed imminent and the wires between Europe and Africa were kept busy for days. The troops conducted themselves well. The officers held the situation well in hand. The two foreign departments acted promptly with a calmness and conciliation admirable in such a time of public excitement; and a settlement was finally reached in June, 1898, the military forces of both powers evacuating simultaneously, between the 15th and 17th, the lands in their possession on the Middle Niger.

This agreement of June 14, 1898, was the first of a series of treaties between Great Britain and France, that were destined to break down the old barriers of hatred, distrust, and personal ambition engendered by three centuries of almost uninterrupted rivalry, and to establish a thorough understanding and a practical coöperation between the two nations in all matters of importance affecting Africa and Asia. Between 1886 and 1893, Great Britain and Germany had adjusted satisfactorily and amicably a great controversy in East Africa without recourse to force and in spite of the violent diatribes and opposition of the imperialist leaders in both countries. And now France and England, declining an ap-

peal to arms, reached a similar agreement in West Africa. This conciliatory policy and willingness to make reasonable concessions and adjustments when great issues and problems affecting the future of a whole continent were at stake, is a striking example of the new spirit which has played a dominant part in European diplomacy in recent years. It is a long step toward the establishment of a genuine world peace and the creation of an international comity and competition of the right sort.

In 1880, Great Britain and France had been convinced by the increasing border difficulties that some understanding must be reached with regard to the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence in West Africa. The frontier of all the West Coast colonies was open and undetermined at the rear, exact geographical knowledge of the region was lacking, and no attempt had been made to delimit accurately the lines of division between the settlements. No scientific surveys of the "hinterland" had been made anywhere; and conflicting claims and overlapping jurisdictions were everywhere in evidence. In the agreement of June 28, 1882,¹ the watershed between the Mellicouri and Great Scareies Rivers was fixed as the dividing line between French Guinea and Sierra Leone; and on August 10, 1889,² and June 26, 1891,³ the boundaries between the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos and the adjoining French possessions were carefully outlined. The Gambia colony was to include all the land within ten kilometers of both sides of the river and to extend as far into the interior as Yarbataenda. Sierra Leone was to end at lat. 10° N.; Gold Coast, Lagos, and Dahomey at 9°; but the two latter were to be separated by a line running north from the intersection of the meridian

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 77, pp. 1007-12.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1892, *Africa No. 7*, ed. 6701, pp. 8-15.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

of the Ajarra Creek with the coast. Joint delimitation commissions were to be appointed to survey and mark out these lines accurately; and some general agreements were reached concerning freedom of trade on the rivers and in the interior, and the amount of customs duties to be levied. But the western limits of the Lagos-Nigeria protectorate were left indefinite north of lat. 9° N.; and various other vital matters were not seriously considered.


On March 30, 1892,¹ Lord Salisbury wrote to the Marquis of Dufferin, the British Ambassador at Paris, calling attention to the history of the relations of France and England in West Africa and the unsatisfactory status of affairs there, and urging him to secure, if possible, the coöperation of the French in completing the boundaries and arriving at a complete understanding on the whole subject. The question was constantly in the minds of both foreign offices; and the pressure to have it adjusted increased steadily, until an agreement² was signed on January 15, 1896, to appoint a commission of four, which should determine by an examination of the titles and claims the most equitable delimitation of the French and British possessions on the Lower Niger.

The first session of the delegates lasted from February 8 to May 22, 1896, but was discontinued because no definite agreement concerning the general line of partition seemed possible. The consistent conciliatory policy of M. Gabriel Hanotaux and Lord Salisbury, however, triumphed and the negotiations were resumed on October 24, 1897.³ René Lecomte, First Secretary of the Foreign Office, and M. Louis Binger, Director of African Affairs in the Ministry for the Colonies, ably represented France; while Martin Gosselin, Secretary of the British Embassy, and Colonel

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 84, pp. 844-50. And *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1892, *Africa* No. 7.

² *Arch. Dip.*, 1899, part 1, pp. 176-81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 181.



William Everett supported the British interests as skillfully as Edwin Egerton and Sir Joseph Crowe had done in the earlier treaties. The results of their negotiations were summed up in two "notes" presented by England and France respectively on February 18 and 24¹ and embodied in the convention of June 14, 1898,² referred to above as settling the Nikki-Boussa dispute.

In this treaty the northern boundary of the British Gold Coast colony was pushed up from lat. 9° N. to 11°, the "debatable" Borgu-Boussa district was practically divided between France and Great Britain, and the French claims to the "septentrionale et orientale" shores of Lake Chad, were confirmed. France did not get Boussa, or as much of a hold on the Lower Niger as she aspired to; but a hundred miles of cataracts between her "claims" and the navigable part of that river reconciled her to this concession. As a compensation, she was permitted to rent a piece of land for trading purposes, either on the Lower Niger opposite the chief trading center of northern Dahomey or at the mouth of the Niger. Nor did Great Britain secure Say, or all the territory to which she laid claim in the Say-Borgu country; but she was more than compensated by her gains on the Gold Coast frontier, and in the advantages incident to the settlement of the whole question of the boundary lines between the French and British spheres of influence in West Africa. Thus the first stage of French expansion was complete. Her colonial possessions reached from the Atlantic, via the Senegal and the Niger Rivers, to Lake Chad; and with this vast tract she had safely and securely joined her enlarged southern colonies of Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey.

Meanwhile, before the details of the agreement were worked out, an incident occurred in the eastern Sudan

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1899, part 1, pp. 188-93.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 195-201; and *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 91, pp. 38-54.

which threatened for a time to undo the good work of the commissioners and diplomats in western Africa, but which ended finally in an amicable delimitation of the French and British spheres of influence in the eastern Sudan and Sahara.

This incident is intimately connected with the attempt of the French to unite their Congo possessions with their Niger-Sudan territories, and is best understood when studied in the light of these operations. Savorgnan de Brazza, who for ten years, 1875 to 1885, was the inspired and energetic promoter of French expansion on the Gaboon and Congo Rivers, and who was only prevented from crossing the Congo by the earlier arrival there of Henry M. Stanley representing the Congo Association, was the originator of this design. He performed a remarkable work exploring the whole region between the Gaboon and Upper Congo and penetrating far to the east and north. His third journey, known officially as "*la Mission de L'Ouest Africain*," 1881-85, accomplished a particularly splendid piece of exploring and surveying for some four thousand kilometers from Franceville on the Upper Ogoove River northward toward Lake Chad. Between 1888 and 1891, Paul Crampel tried to establish a connection between this Congo Colony and Lake Chad. He traveled without European companions or interpreters, and had astounding adventures. For three years he was singularly successful, reaching the Baguirmi country and El-Kouti in safety; but unfortunately he lost his life in the territory of the chief of the Senoussi, who was severely punished by the French under M. Dybowsky in October, 1891.

Lieutenant Mizon attempted to make the connection in the reverse order, by going up the Niger and Benué Rivers to Yola and making his way south to the French Congo. He got as far as the Adamaua country in 1892; but the com-

plaints of the British and German Governments, which had claims in this region, prevented him from accomplishing anything of importance in this way. However, Casimir Maistre succeeded in the next year (1893) in mounting northward from the Congo and Ubangi Rivers to the basin of the Gribingui River, to Adamaua, and returning via Yola and the Niger. In the same year the last portion of the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier was worked out by Germany and England to Lake Chad, so that England received Yola and Adamaua went to Germany.

The French objected vigorously to this partition and refused to recognize the treaty until her claim to Baguirmi with access to Lake Chad from the south was recognized officially in the German-French treaty¹ of March 15, 1894. The southern boundary of the French Congo was definitely determined by a delimitation treaty² with the Congo Independent State on August 14, 1894; and finally, after M. Closel had founded Carnot on the Ekela-Sanga River and made his way north via the rivers Lobay and Bali to the Oua branch of the Bahr-Sara (a tributary through the Chari to Lake Chad) in 1894 and 1895, the whole Cameroon-Congo frontier was satisfactorily adjusted in a treaty with Germany in February, 1896.

The northeastern portion of the French Congo, bordering on the Bahr-el-Ghazal district of the Egyptian Sudan, remained still unexplored and lacking in definite frontiers. The Egyptian Sudan from Khartoum south had been lost to Egypt since the Mahdi insurrection in 1884 and 1885. The rule of the Khaliphate had steadily declined after the death of the Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, in June, 1885, until the government of the whole region was honeycombed with corruption and the extent of the atrocities committed

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 86, pp. 974-78.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 90, p. 1278.

by the leaders horrified the civilized world. M. Liotard, who had become Commissioner-General of the Upper Congo, determined to round out the northeast frontier of his colony; and at the same time, by taking advantage of the situation in the Sudan he hoped to add a large portion of Bahr-el-Ghazal to the French possessions and provide an outlet by way of the Nile for the trade of the northern Congo region. The establishment of a definite connection between the French protectorates in the Sudan and Upper Congo with Abyssinia and the French colony of Obock on the East Coast was even contemplated.

Accordingly, on June 25, 1896, he sent out Major Marchand with a small company of eight officers and one hundred and twenty men, who explored the Ubangi district and traversed the Bahr-el-Ghazal country successfully. He reached the Nile ultimately, equipped a small flotilla and pushed north to Fashoda, where he raised the French flag and took possession of the territory on the left bank, on July 10, 1898. He repulsed an attack of the Dervishes in August; but his position — so far from any reliable source of supplies — was extremely precarious.

Meanwhile Sir Herbert Kitchener was reconquering the Sudan for Egypt. In 1896, he defeated the Dervishes and occupied the province of Dongola. He constructed a railway and advanced steadily southward the next year. On September 2, 1898, he inflicted a decisive defeat on the chief Dervish army at Omdurman and two days later entered Khartoum in triumph. Without stopping to rest, he pushed on down the Nile with his army of 23,000 men, until he had captured, on September 15, the great camp of the Dervishes at Renkh, three hundred miles south of the capital of the Sudan. Here he learned of the presence of Marchand at Fashoda, through Said Sogheir, the captured leader of the Dervishes, and he continued his advance the same day.

When within twelve miles of Fashoda, Kitchener received on September 19 a letter from the French commander notifying him of the French occupation of Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Shillouks country from the confluence of the Bahr-el-Jebel along the left bank of the White Nile to Fashoda. He reached the latter place the same day, hoisted the Egyptian flag on the old Egyptian fort, five hundred meters from the French flag, and protested vigorously against Marchand's invasion of the Khedive's lands. Demanding immediate withdrawal, Kitchener asserted that England would never tolerate the occupation of any part of the Nile Valley by a foreign power. Marchand replied that he was unable to oppose the raising of the Egyptian flag, but that he was acting under the orders of the French Government and could not leave until ordered to do so officially. Kitchener left a garrison at Fashoda and proceeded south as far as Sobat reclaiming the country for the Khedive of Egypt; but he returned soon after, informing Marchand that the whole country was under martial law and the transport of munitions of war was forbidden, yet offering to furnish a boat and escort to accompany him down the river to Cairo.

Meanwhile the news of the encounter at Fashoda was heralded over two continents, great excitement prevailed in Paris and London, and a lively correspondence ensued between the Foreign Offices of both countries. A discussion of the British rights in Bahr-el-Ghazal, started by a statement of Sir E. Grey in a speech before the Chamber of Commerce on March 28, 1895, to the effect that England's sphere of influence based on the rights of the Khedive embraced the whole of the Nile Valley, had been carried on for some time by M. Hanotaux and Lord Kimberley. It was now taken up vigorously by M. Delcassé and Lord Salisbury. The French claimed that they had never

concurred in the British claim to all of the Nile Valley; that England could not claim lands never effectively occupied by her; that only Egypt could rightfully assert any ownership over the Upper Nile; and that the successful revolt of the Sudan separated that country distinctly from the Egyptian possessions and gave any nation the right to participate in the reconquest and partition of it. They asserted, moreover, that Major Marchand was not in charge of a "mission" sent out by the French Government to seize the Upper Nile district, but an "envoyé de la civilisation" sent out by M. Liotard to assist in putting an end to the frightful disturbances and misrule of the Dervishes. They were pleased with the successes of Lord Kitchener and very desirous of avoiding any serious difficulty with England; but they would not enter upon negotiations until they had received Marchand's official report, and then only on a basis of an equitable division of Bahr-el-Ghazal.¹

The British consistently and firmly refused to discuss the matter seriously until Marchand should be recalled from the Upper Nile. They asserted that Kitchener's conquest of the Sudan revived all the earlier titles of the Khedive of Egypt to the control of these lands which had been in his possession since the early days of the nineteenth century; that "effective occupation" was a vague and ill-defined term that could not be applied in Central Africa as it is used in Europe; and that, while the powers declined to recognize Turkey's claim to Tunis in 1856 out of courtesy to France, nothing was said at that time, or in 1878, as to the integrity of lands in the equatorial regions acquired after 1856. Salisbury was ready to join with France in the delimitation of the western frontiers of the

¹ Correspondence in *Arch. Dip.*, 1898, vol. II, pt. 4, pp. 22-72. M. Gabriel Hanotaux published in 1909 a little book entitled *Fachoda*, which contains an able and accurate account of the whole episode, from the French point of view.

Egyptian Sudan, and assured the French statesmen that the withdrawal of Marchand would in no way compromise their claims; but he declined to consider any division of the Bahr-el-Ghazal district.

While this discussion was in progress, the British forwarded a message from M. Delcassé to Major Marchand, asking for his report; and in October one of his officers, through the courtesy and assistance of the British officials, made his way to Paris via Cairo. In November, Marchand received instructions to withdraw from Fashoda by way of the Sobat River in Abyssinia. In due time he reached French Somaliland in safety and arrived in Paris toward the end of May, 1899, where he was welcomed with a great ovation. But the fate of the Upper Nile had already been definitely determined in an agreement signed by Salisbury and Paul Cambon on March 21.¹

The whole frontier between the French possessions in Central Africa and the British-Egyptian spheres of influence on the Nile and in the Sudan was carefully worked out in this treaty. Bahr-el-Ghazal and the old province of Dar-Fur were retained for Egypt; and the kingdom of the Ouadai (Wadai), with the two valuable oases of the Tibesti and Borku, went to France. By this arrangement France rounded out her Sahara possessions south of Tripoli, joined them securely with the Lake Chad lands, and these again with the Upper Congo. And thus a definite and permanent connection was established between all the French spheres of influence in West, Central, and South-Central Africa.

But already a movement was on foot to unite politically and scientifically these separate French territories, by means of three special and thoroughly equipped expeditions. The first, known as the "Mission Gentil" after its

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1899, vol. 1, p. 210; also Supplement to *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, 1907, vol. 1, p. 425.

leader, left Loango in the French Congo on July 27, 1895, and proceeding via the Congo, Ubangi, and Kemo Rivers, and the Baguirmi and Rabah kingdoms, reached the southern end of Lake Chad on November 1, 1897. Here it remained over two years establishing firmly the French suzerainty over the entire district between the lake and the Rabah kingdom. The "Voulet-Chanoine Mission" (changed later to the "Joalland-Meynier Mission" because of the insubordination of its two leaders) left northern Dahomey in February, 1897, crossed northern Nigeria taking Zinder *en route* in July, 1898 (where the gallant Captain Cazemajou¹ had been slain in the previous May), and reached the western shore of Lake Chad in October, 1899. The third force, "Mission Foureau-Lamy," set out from Biskra in 1898 and crossed the Sahara Desert by way of Temassinin, Tassili, In-Azaoua, Tadjén, Aïr, and Aguellal, making treaties with the desert chieftains *en route*. They arrived in the neighborhood of the lake early in 1900. The three missions, after the satisfactory conclusion of their individual tasks, triumphantly united their forces at Mandjafa on April 11, 1900.

Meanwhile, the French protectorates in the Sudan and on the Guinea and Ivory Coasts were being effectively joined. On November 3, 1896, the French occupied Timbo by force; and between 1896 and 1899, Dr. McLaud and Captain Salesses explored thoroughly a large part of French Guinea and its hinterland with a view to railroad construction as well as to political control. And Dr. Noël Ballay, who was Governor of the colony from 1891 to 1902, established an excellent seaport at Konakry, paid great attention to the trade and internal development of the province, and made strenuous efforts to construct a railway and roads that

¹ He left France in March, 1897, to explore the region between Lake Chad and Say, north of Sokoto, and to proceed east to the Wadai country.

should open a direct connection between his colony and the Upper Niger.

During the years 1895 to 1898, Captains Pobéguin, Marchand, Blondiaux, and Closel explored all the hinterland district of the Ivory Coast, covering the country between Beyla and Tenindieri, and penetrating into Indenie. Finally, Colonel Audeou resumed operations in the Central Sudan and occupied Sikasso on May 1, 1898; and Captains Gouraud and Gaden subdued and captured Samory, the Napoleon of the Sudan, who was transported to the Congo where he died on June 2, 1900. The subjection of the Sudan was now complete; and in 1899 the mission of Governor Hostains and Lieutenant D'Ollone explored and surveyed the country from Bereby via Cavally to Beyla, where they joined hands with the mission of Lieutenants Woelfel and Mangin, which had come from Kong to the northwestern part of the Ivory Coast colony by way of Touba. Thus was established effective connection between the three protectorates, the Sudan, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.

The union of all the French colonial possessions in Africa was now accomplished; yet four things remained to be done before this union could be said to be permanent and complete: the complete pacification of the Upper Congo; the subjugation of Mauretania, making connection between the Senegal and Algeria possible; the extension of the French control over the Algerian hinterland and the central Sahara; and the establishment of proper means of communication and transport between the various parts of this colonial empire. The first of these was speedily accomplished, during the years 1899-1901, through the capture of Dikoa and the subjugation of the kingdom of Rabah by Commandant Lamy and Captain Dangeville with the combined forces of the three missions.

Several attempts were made to penetrate the western Sahara, notably by M. Soleillet in 1880, by Camille Douls in 1887, and by Fabert between 1889 and 1893; but a successful connection of these territories with the other French protectorates was not accomplished until Paul Blanchet reached Atar, the capital of Adrar (T-Marr), in 1900. On June 27, 1900, the Sebkha d'Idjil was added in a delimitation treaty with Spain. In the two years that followed, the French power was firmly established in the northern portion; and in 1903 the districts of Trarza and Brakna, just north of Senegal, were taken over. Finally, the whole region was formed into the Territory of Maurétania and governed by a commissioner.

During the years 1859 to 1861, Henri Duveyrier executed a series of remarkable explorations covering nearly the whole of southern Algeria and the desert immediately south and penetrating as far into the central Sahara as Ghadames, Ghat, and Zouila. Then came a number of unsuccessful attempts, between 1873 and 1889, to establish a direct connection between southern Algeria and the Upper Niger country via the oases of the central Sahara. Of these the "Mission Choisy" penetrated twelve hundred kilometers south from Laghouat; and the ill-starred "Mission Flatters," going by way of Biskra, in 1879 and 1880, passed beyond Ouargla, only to be massacred in the heart of the Sahara by the Touaregs. Two natives survived and, after incredible experiences, wandered into Biskra with the terrible news. In 1886, Lieutenant Palet lost his life in a similar expedition; and in 1889, the gifted explorer, Camille Douls, perished.

The real work of southern expansion in the central Sahara was begun by Fernand Foureau, probably the greatest of the Sahara travelers, who explored carefully a number of routes across the desert between the years 1890

and 1894, acquired an intimate knowledge of the leading oases and their inhabitants, and extended his researches as far as In-Salah and Äir. He was the first to recognize the strategic importance of the great oases of In-Salah and Tidikelt as a key to the control of the Sahara; and upon his advice the French decided to use force against the Touaregs, as the only method likely to give them control of the desert and to furnish security for life and property. "There is a constant succession of pillaging forays," he wrote. "The consequence is, that the Sahara is in a constant state of turmoil and insecurity; murders, theft, pillage, and ambushes are of everyday occurrence. It is quite certain that this state of things must stop all intercourse and commerce as well as all hope of exploring the country."

Accordingly the forward movement of the French forces began. At that time, 1890, the outposts were El Oued, Touggourt, Ouargla, Ghardaia, and Ain Sefra.¹ El Golea and Hassi Inifel were now occupied and fortified; and between 1892 and 1895 the line was pushed forward one hundred to one hundred and fifty miles. A series of forts connecting the French outposts were erected and the railway extended from Ain Sefra to Duveyrier. In 1898, Foureau with Commandant Lamy set out on the great mission which was to bring him to Lake Chad and to a junction with the missions from Dahomey and the Congo in 1900. The "Mission Flamaud," two columns proceeding southeast from the Sud-Oranais and occupying the oases of Igli, Gourara, Aougerout, and Timminoun, joined the third, coming southwest from Algeria, successfully in securing control over the oases of Tidikelt, Touat, and In-Salah, in May, 1900. General Servi re occupied Adghar in Touat during August of the same year; and by 1901 he had completed the subjection of the whole region of the

¹ See map on p. 218.

central oases. On July 20 of that year, the Convention of Figuig was signed with Morocco, which confirmed these holdings to France, awarded Figuig to Morocco, and provided for a coöperation in the policing of the Morocco-Oranais frontier. Thus the French protection over the central Sahara and a direct connection with the Sudan via the desert were practically complete.

A magnificent colonial empire has been in this manner won for France. The lion's share of West Africa, the western Sudan, and the Sahara, together with a large portion of the Congo region, have passed under her control. To these Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis are now joined, so that her protection extends over an area equal to that of the United States including Alaska. From the earlier experience of France in Algeria and the Far East, it was inferred that the efforts of the Republic to establish a successful administration in these regions would more than likely end in failure. But the world has been happily disappointed. The twenty-five years of progressive and enlightened government, just passed, have demonstrated that the French deserve a place in the front rank of the world's greatest colonizers. Here we note again the evidence of the new spirit of progressive and triumphant democracy which came to life with the new Republic in 1871, and which rejuvenated the French nation, awakened the ambition of her leaders, saved the old stagnant colonies, and gave her a new colonial empire.

The work of unification and development has progressed steadily and intelligently. In 1895, the whole of French West Africa was brought under one government which was still further systematized in 1904. A governor-general responsible to the cabinet in Paris rules the entire district. Under him are lieutenant-governors who administer the colonies of Senegal, Upper Senegal and Niger, French

Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey. In addition there are commissioners superintending the five circles of Mauretania, that portion of the West Sahara reaching from the Morocco-Algerian to the Senegal-Niger frontier. The area thus administered amounts to more than 2,300,000 square miles and has a population of about 9,000,000.

By the use of native troops and methods, the French have succeeded in establishing a high degree of order and security. In the colonies of Senegal and the Upper Senegal and Niger, excellent roads have been built between the important centers and railways run from Dakar to St. Louis and from Kayes on the Senegal to Koulikaro (near Bamaku) on the Niger — altogether about 512 miles. So it is now possible to travel by rail and steamer from Europe to Timbuctu. Dakar, connected by submarine cable with Brest, is fast becoming one of the finest harbors on the African coast. A remarkable system of telegraph lines has been established, extending from Dakar as far as Zinder and Say on the Niger, and connecting with the Ivory Coast and with Porto Novo on the Dahomey coast. In 1908, France spent over \$3,200,000 for the defense and development of this region. A uniform system of education was introduced in 1903, the present annual expense of which amounts to \$250,000 or \$300,000. Some ten thousand children are regularly enrolled, of whom three thousand are girls.

Protection and increased transportation facilities affected immediately the economic condition of the region; and rapid strides have been made in the development of natural resources and in the increase of wealth. In 1906, the total trade of French West Africa reached \$18,000,000, of which the French enjoyed about \$11,000,000.

Southern Algeria, bordering upon an uncertain desert and a turbulent Morocco, has been the source of considerable trouble. But in 1905, it was effectively organized into

the four territories of Ain Sefra, Ghardaia, Touggourt, and the Sahara Oases. Direct communication has been established between the oases and Algeria on the one hand, and the colony of Upper Senegal and Niger on the other. And the entire region is thoroughly policed by the assistance of friendly native tribes and the "Meharis," the camel police. In 1905, Professor E. F. Gautier, of the College of Arts in Algiers, crossed the desert from Figuig to Gao on the Niger — a distance of thirteen hundred miles — unattended except by a guide and a servant. He was surveying the path of the new telegraph line which is being constructed to connect Algeria with the Senegal-Niger country. It is now proposed to establish wireless stations at the chief centers. Thus the great Sahara has been conquered and French North, West, and Central Africa permanently united. There remains only the eastern Sahara, the Bornu-Wadai regions. These are under military rule, and France and England are actively engaged at this very time in making secure the Wadai-Dar-Fur boundary.

CHAPTER VII

NIGERIAN ENTERPRISE

BRITISH NIGERIA, embracing some 335,500 square miles of territory with a population of over 17,000,000, has been characterized by the London *Times*, as "the only British dependency in any part of the world, which approaches the Indian Empire in magnitude and variety."¹ It lies on the West Coast wholly within the tropics, and possesses an area equal to that of the German Empire, Italy, and Holland combined, densely populated with intelligent and progressive peoples, and richly endowed by nature with a variety of soil, favorable climatic conditions and economic resources. Although this wonderful basin of the Niger and its tributaries was known to the people of ancient times and referred to by the historian Herodotus twenty-five hundred years ago, it has been one of the latest portions of Africa to be opened to the European world. Its history, however, is as fascinating as it is unique.

It has been shown above² how the upper waters of the Niger had been discovered and explored by Mungo Park, Major Denham, and Captain Clapperton, and how the brothers Lander — Richard and John — had paddled down this solitary but majestic stream from Boussa to its delta during 1830 and 1831, demonstrating at last that its out-

¹ The writer is here speaking of dependencies, not of colonies. He is also laboring under the impression prevalent for so many years that Nigeria was from 600,000 to 1,000,000 square miles in area. British East Africa and Uganda together, Rhodesia, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, all exceed it in area, but cannot be compared with it in density of population and fertility of soil.

² Chapter I, Introduction.

let was in the Bight of Benin. In 1832 and 1841, two ill-starred expeditions were organized and sent to explore and trade on the Lower Niger, but returned with a loss of from thirty to sixty per cent of their crews and little profit. MacGregor Laird — the energetic Liverpool merchant and chief promoter of these enterprises — was not discouraged; but fathered a third well-equipped party of scientific and experienced men, under the direction of Dr. William B. Baikie in 1854. This went out in the *Pleiad*, carrying some missionaries and a mixed cargo, and explored the Lower Niger and the Benué successfully. From 1857 to 1864 a consular agent — Dr. Baikie — was maintained at Lokoja (at the confluence of the Niger and the Benué),¹ and a number of companies began to send ships there at irregular intervals; but no real progress was made by the British in developing the trade of the region till the seventies.

In 1877, Mr. George Goldie Taubman (now Sir George T. Goldie) accompanied an exploring expedition to the Niger. He soon saw the fallacy of attempting to create a prosperous trade through the medium of a few poorly equipped trading posts and of a number of weak and rival trading corporations, engaged in a cutthroat competition, yet unable to maintain a steady intercourse with the chief trade centers. These steamship companies possessed neither the capital, the resources, nor the influence requisite for the opening of such a large territory to the commerce of the world. After considerable manipulation, he succeeded, two years later, in uniting all the various interests on the Niger into one organization, known as the "United African Company," with a capital amounting approximately to £125,000.

Its success was rapid. A regular system of trading stations was established and a fair-sized fleet of ships was kept

¹ See map on p. 151.

busy on a regular schedule between Great Britain, the West Coast, and the Niger. The agents of the company performed excellent service, not only in developing trade, but also in maintaining order, protecting traders and missionaries, and in securing treaties from the native chiefs. The British Government, finding that the new corporation, with commendable zeal, intelligence, and resourcefulness, was succeeding in keeping open the trade routes, stopping the slave trade, and preventing civil strife among the natives by the promise of British protection, began to subsidize it. In 1881, the capital was increased to £1,000,000; and in 1882, the firm was reorganized as the "National African Company," for the purpose of securing greater efficiency and of extending its operations into the vast region north of Lokoja.

The interests of two French corporations which, attracted by the success of the British organization, had established stations on the Niger were bought out in 1884. Treaties were concluded with the chieftains of Nupé, Sokoto (1885), and Boussa; and British trade and authority were carried energetically into the northern districts. Meantime, the British consul, Hewitt, was engaged in making treaties with the chiefs of the Oil Rivers district and competing with the Germans along the Cameroon border. And the French explorers from Senegal reached Bamaku on the Upper Niger about the same time, and began a work of expansion northward toward Timbuctu. Great Britain, at length, under the pressure of these French and German activities, realized the necessity of formulating a definite policy of expansion in West Africa, and of marking out promptly the future field of her operations. She had been in no haste to enter upon a race for territory in West Africa. Many of her statesmen were strongly opposed to any further acquisitions in that region; but the march of events

and the rise of unforeseen circumstances were slowly but surely forcing the British Government into the path of expansion. In 1873, the first Ashanti war had led the imperial authorities into an extension of their authority into the hinterland of the British Gold Coast colony; and in 1882, competition between the French and English colonists in West Africa forced them to join with the French in delimiting the northern boundary of Sierra Leone, as far inland as the head waters of the Mellicouri and Great Scarcies Rivers. And now, in order to reap the results of the efforts of the National African Company and to protect her interests on the Niger, a British protectorate was proclaimed on June 5, 1885,¹ over the coast region extending from the river Benin (eastern boundary of Lagos) to the west bank of the Rio del Rey, and the hinterland reaching to Lokoja at the confluence of the Niger and the Benué, and to Ibi on the Benué. And in 1886 the English Government recognized the work of the company officially, appointing it their legal agent by a royal charter² issued to that corporation under the name of the "Royal Niger Company," which it still bears.

The entire region mentioned in the official declaration of the Niger protectorate was placed at first under the jurisdiction of the new company, together with any territory to the north that they might acquire in the future. In August, 1891, the Oil Rivers district and the trading posts of the coast section were organized into the "Oil River Protectorate" under an Imperial Commissioner, which changed its name to the "Niger Coast Protectorate" in May, 1893. This was extended in 1899 north as far as Idah on the Niger — 280 miles from the coast — under the title of the "Southern Nigerian Protectorate"³ which, in July, 1901,

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 76, p. 978.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 77, p. 1022.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 91, pp. 1140-55.

was added to the colony of Lagos;¹ and finally on February 16, 1906, the two districts were incorporated in the colony of southern Nigeria.² The Oil River and Niger Coast Protectorates were first ruled by commissioners or consuls, Lagos by a Colonial Governor, and northern Nigeria by the chartered company. Thus we have in Nigeria an excellent example of the three ways in which Britain governed her possessions — consular jurisdiction, chartered companies, and the Colonial Office. "The raw material is worked into shape by the Foreign Office until the time arrives when the finer processes of the Colonial Office are applicable," once remarked a noted British statesman, in explaining this process.

"Chartered companies in Africa," writes *The Scotsman*, "as elsewhere, have been the best pioneers of British commerce and authority." The Royal Niger Company was no exception. It was given political as well as commercial powers, and held responsible for the control of the river traffic which England at the Berlin Conference of 1885 promised to administer equitably. In addition, the company was granted full jurisdiction over all British and foreigners in the country, and authorized to make treaties with the chieftains, protect natives, abolish the slave trade, and promote British interests. It was, however, permitted no trade monopoly; and, although allowed to collect customs dues on imports and exports amounting to about two per cent and taxes which in time reached £90,000 a year, it had to pay its share of the governmental expenses. "Ours is the only chartered company of our time," exclaimed the chairman at the annual meeting of 1897, "which is forbidden to earn profits on its capital out of customs duties or other taxation; the entire revenues so raised having to be expended for public purposes."

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 94, pp. 194-95.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 99, pp. 398-402.

An Agent-General with an executive staff and a Chief Justice were appointed to administer the affairs of state and the department of justice, consisting of one high and several lower courts. A native constabulary consisting chiefly of Hausas was created, numbering at first four hundred, but soon increased to one thousand ; while a fleet of vessels kept communication open for hundreds of miles along the Niger and its tributaries. But wherever possible the country was ruled through the native chiefs and their assistants ; and local customs, languages, and methods were preserved.

The success of the company was remarkable. Almost from the start, by skillful financial management the enterprise was made to pay, the natives were well cared for, and British interests actively promoted. By 1888, some 275 treaties had been signed with local rulers giving the Royal Niger Company control over all the territory along the Benué to Yola, the Lower and Middle Niger, and one thousand miles into the interior — as far as the states of Borgu, Gando, and Sokoto. Approximately 500,000 square miles were placed under the protection of the British flag by the agents of the company ; but this vast area was materially reduced later by the Franco-British treaty of 1898. A system of forts and interior patrols, antedating the scheme proposed at the Brussels Conference of 1890, was inaugurated, which proved most effective in stopping slave raids and in promoting trade. Yet sterner measures were necessary, as will soon be seen, before the slave trade could be exterminated ; and the competition with other European states along the borders had to be eliminated before the country could be effectively organized and security firmly established.

In 1886, a line was drawn from the Rio del Rey northeast to a point on the Benué a little east of Yola, to mark

the boundary between British Nigeria and the German Cameroons. A sharp competition ensued for the Adamaua country at the end of this line, which was finally ended in 1893 by the delimitation of a line from the vicinity of Yola to Lake Chad, giving both powers an entrance to the lake and assigning the most of the Adamaua district to Germany. In 1890, England and France marked out the limits of their respective spheres of influence in the Niger country, by a line drawn from Say on the Upper Niger to Lake Chad. It has been shown above¹ how active the French were on the West Coast, and how a contest arose over the possession of Nupé, Boussa, and Borgu on the Niger-Dahomey border, which was amicably adjusted in the Anglo-French treaty of June, 1898.

Therefore, by 1898, the Royal Niger Company was free to organize and develop the country in its own way. This work had already been started in the southern districts in an efficient and methodical manner. In 1897, the Mohammedan Emir of Nupé, who had ignored the messages of the British Resident and continued his slave raids and oppression, was captured in Bida, his capital, by Sir George Goldie and 550 men. He was promptly deposed; and his son, promising obedience to Great Britain, was installed ruler in his stead. The southern and pagan portion of the state was removed from his control to that of the company, the people freed from oppression, and slavery abolished. The Mohammedan Emir of Ilorin was next threatened with the same fate; but he hurriedly made his submission, and signed a treaty with Sir George. In 1898, Colonel Frederick Lugard came out with a number of assistants and organized the military forces. The Hausas, particularly, made excellent soldiers and soon Lugard had two battalions of infantry, two batteries and one company of engineers well

¹ Chapter VI, *ante*.

drilled and in active service. The next two years were occupied by the company in consolidating their holdings and in peaceful organization.

The work of the Royal Niger Company thus far had been admirable. In addition to securing an immense territory for Great Britain, it had created the basis for a great commercial development; pacified the country by freeing a large portion of it from slave raids and the incubus of tyranny and ignorance; established communication from the coast to Sokoto; and laid the foundations of an efficient government. All this had been accomplished without serious bloodshed, without injury to the country or its inhabitants, and without arousing the hostility of any large proportion of the varied population of the region. There remained, however, much to be done and many intricate problems to be solved. In large sections of northern Nigeria the submission of the chiefs was still merely nominal, the people warlike and restless. The whole of the North had yet to be consolidated under one administration; the entire country to be unified by roads, railways, and trade routes; and several delicate international questions to be solved.

The British Government was, however, convinced that the time had arrived for it to take over the direct administration of northern Nigeria. Accordingly, on June 15, 1899, after the conclusion of the Franco-British treaties of June, 1898, and March 21, 1899, Lord Salisbury, in a note to the Treasury, expressed the desire of the Government to relieve the company of its political powers. The matter was immediately taken up with Sir George Goldie and an agreement reached on June 30. The charter was canceled;¹ and arrangements were made for the imperial authorities to take

¹ The revocation of the charter was announced in an Order in Council, dated August 9, 1899, authorizing payments to the company not to exceed in all £865,000. The official notice of the revocation of the charter appeared on December 28, 1899. *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 91, pp. 124 and 1031.

control on January 1, 1900. The British Government acquired all war materials, administrative buildings and posts, steamers, wharves, and other property designated for the public service; and it was assigned the benefits of all treaties, and of land and mining rights. The company was permitted to retain all its commercial privileges, plants, stations, and accessories, was paid £150,000 for the rights surrendered (in addition to £300,000 refunded for sums advanced for the development of the country), and was to receive one half of the mining royalties for ninety-nine years. The public debt of Nigeria, together with the annual interest charges, was assumed by the Imperial Government. Thus, after fourteen years of progressive and efficient service as a public servant, the Royal Niger Company reverted to its original position as a commercial enterprise.

The whole region north of Idah on the Niger was now incorporated in the protectorate of northern Nigeria, and, together with the two protectorates of Lagos (including the old colony and protectorate of the same name extending north to Borgu) and of southern Nigeria, was placed under the Colonial Office. Each sphere was to have its own commissioner, or governor, and a separate administration. In 1901, however, Lagos and southern Nigeria were placed under one administrator; and, in 1906, both were incorporated into one protectorate having three provinces and known as southern Nigeria. The general policy of the new régime included free trade (except in northern Nigeria, where all traffic in firearms and liquors was forbidden), abstention from all direct taxes (for some time at least), abolition of slave raids, noninterference with native religions and customs, and rule through the coöperation of native rulers and chiefs.

Colonel Lugard was appointed the first High Commis-

sioner of northern Nigeria; and he set to work at once to organize an efficient administration which should embrace the entire region.¹ The company had kept very largely to the chief waterways, and the territory, now taken under direct control by the British authorities, extended from Idah to Boussa on the Niger and from Idah to Lau on the Benué. It was divided into nine provinces, over each of which was placed a British officer, known as a "Resident." Some of these provinces were as large as Scotland, and the difficulties of administration were enormous. The Resident, who had only one or two English and several native assistants, was expected to preserve law and order; hear all complaints and investigate all crimes; to superintend the police, transportation, sanitation, and the erection of all public buildings; to administer the provincial accounts and revenue; to get off the daily mail, including reports on native statistics, languages, and customs; to map and become familiar with the conditions and resources of his province; and to encourage trade and agriculture.

The whole staff for northern Nigeria at first consisted of but eighty-five men, including secretaries, treasurers, doctors, and marines, of whom only fifty-seven were on duty at any one time, owing to the established rule that a year's service in West Africa be followed by a six months' leave, on account of the climate and unfavorable local conditions. By utilizing the local chiefs and natives, it proved possible to administer a province with from ten to seventeen men, where ordinarily three hundred would have been necessary. Proclamations were speedily issued by the High Commissioner, with the approval of the Crown, forbidding foreigners to acquire land from natives without the consent of the

¹ For the pacification and organization of Northern Nigeria, see the North. Nig. Annual Reports, 1900 to 1909, 1910 to 1911, and Orr, *The Making of Northern Nigeria*, 1911; an excellent account by an officer in the political service.

Government, establishing a system of courts, prohibiting the sale of liquors and firearms, and forbidding the enslavement of any person after April 1, 1901.

The Royal Niger Company had directed its affairs from Lokoja and Jebba; but a suitable site for an administrative capital was now selected at Zungeru, ten miles from the Kaduna branch of the Niger, and in a fairly central location for all northern Nigeria. It also had the advantage of being in one of the disaffected districts; and the High Commissioner was thus enabled to keep a close personal watch upon one of the least trustworthy native rulers. Within three years several comfortable and serviceable administrative buildings had been erected and a light railway built down to the river, the headquarters of the Government being permanently moved to Zungeru in September, 1902.

The British authorities desired to establish a strictly civil administration as rapidly as possible throughout the country. The Residents were instructed to get in touch with the people, win their confidence, and aid them as far as practicable to rule themselves. In a number of instances, however, military officials and garrisons had to be maintained in the provinces, owing to the restlessness of the natives and unsettled conditions. In some of the outlying states, prominent and corrupt native rulers, who had defied the officials of the company, continued to ignore the overtures and demands of the administrators of the new Protectorate. Their lands lay for the most part either along the main trade routes or in the vicinity of the chief markets of the North; and they were a constant menace to the peace and security of the country on account of their slave-raiding expeditions and attacks upon the caravans. It was, therefore, imperative, not only to insure the abolition of the slave trade, but also to protect life and property and to establish respect for British authority, that these refrac-

tory chieftains be brought under control. Particularly was it necessary that the Sultan of Sokoto should be forced to submit to British suzerainty, since he was the recognized overlord of all the Emirs of northern Nigeria.

The constabulary of the Niger Company was incorporated in the West African Frontier Police, which was reorganized by Colonel Lugard and raised to over one thousand men. From the spring to the autumn of 1901, Sir Frederick was called away to assist in putting down a rising in Ashanti-land, and compelled to take a large portion of his new force with him; but by the end of the year he was back and ready for action. His first move was in December against the Emir of Bida, who, since his expulsion by the company in 1897, had returned and secured control of the government of Nupé, and the Emir of Kontagora—a notorious “destroyer” (slave-hunter) and tyrant. The lands of these two chieftains lay on both sides of the main caravan route between the great trade mart of Kano and the Middle Niger, which must be kept open and safe. These rulers had, moreover, been defying the Government and devastating the country during the absence of the troops. In January, 1902, Kontagora was taken and the forces of its Emir dispersed without difficulty, but he unfortunately escaped capture. In spite of the peaceful overtures of the British commander, the Emir of Bida fled without waiting for Lugard to approach his capital. He was deposed soon after; and the chief, formerly installed by the Niger Company, re-appointed in his place. Garrisons were left temporarily in both states and a Resident at Bida.

The people everywhere made demonstrations of delight at the overthrow of these well-known despots; but the British authorities were careful not to be led astray from their established policy of maintaining everywhere members of the ruling families on the thrones of the different states.

The Mohammedan Fulani, who had secured the sovereign power over the pagan blacks throughout northern Nigeria, had amply demonstrated their political sagacity and ability. If only they could be properly advised and the abuses of their rule corrected, their natural genius for administration would render their services of inestimable value, both to their country and to the British. Sir Frederick urged the Residents everywhere to "utilize their wonderful intelligence, for they are born rulers and incomparably above the negroid races in ability."

The next move was against the Emir of Yola,—four hundred miles up the Benué River,—the most notorious slave-raider on that branch of the Niger, where whole districts lay desolate from his depredations. He had refused to permit the Niger Company to trade within his territory, and finally compelled them in 1901 to take down their flag from the old hulk in the river which served as a trading post. In September of the same year, however, the High Commissioner sent an expedition of four hundred men against him, which took his capital, in spite of a spirited resistance, and set up a legal heir in his place.

Meanwhile, the neighboring state of Bornu had become a scene of conflict and anarchy. Rabah,—one of the ablest lieutenants of Zubeir Pasha in the Sudan,—after the overthrow there of the slave-holding Sheiks led by Zubeir's son, Suleiman, through the genius of Gessi Pasha, had formed a kingdom of his own on the Dar-Fur-Wadai border. In 1891, he came into conflict with the French; and, after some reverses moved into Bornu, where he slew the reigning Sheik and made himself ruler. Rabah took up his residence at first in the chief town,—Kuka,—but later moved to Dikoa within the German sphere. While here, he again incurred the enmity of the French by attacking the expedition of M. Gentil, then on its way to connect the

French Congo with Lake Chad and to set up a protectorate in Wadai. This was some time before definite boundaries had been set up between the French, British, and German spheres of influence about Bornu; and the British had not yet assumed control there. So the French, after the three expeditions sent out to unify the French possessions in West Africa, the Sahara, and the Congo, had successfully joined hands near Lake Chad, pursued Rabah and dealt a crushing blow to his forces in a well-directed attack, in the course of which the adventurous Sheik lost his life.

His son, a gifted and forceful character named Fadr-el-Allah, succeeded him, but finally withdrew into the interior of Bornu and asked for British protection. Sir Frederick Lugard, who had been watching the manoeuvres with great interest, sent an officer to interview him in June, 1901; but while these negotiations were in progress, the Arab leader became again involved in a struggle with the French. They pursued him one hundred and sixty miles within the British territory, and defeated his army in an eight-hour engagement near Gujba. Fadr-el-Allah was slain in the conflict and his brother, with the remnant of the forces, compelled to surrender two days later. Five thousand Bornu natives, who had been enslaved as captives during the wars of Rabah and his son, were freed immediately; and the French thereupon retired to their own country.

The High Commissioner at length sent Colonel Morland with five hundred men into the Bornu country in February, 1902, to investigate the situation. *En route*, the column made a special détour through the state of Bauchi to depose its Emir, who had been a slave-hunter, and who had caused great suffering among the pagan tribes under him. His son was installed in his place and given a Resident with a garrison to assist him. A little farther on, a usurper named Mal-

lam Jibrella, who had proclaimed himself a Mahdi, killed the Mohammedan ruler of Gombé in 1894, and seized the most of his lands, attempted to bar the progress of the expedition. His forces were easily dispersed, however, Jibrella himself being captured after a brilliant pursuit, and exiled to Lokoja.

On reaching Bornu, Morland learned that the legal Sheik of the country, who was a nephew of the Emir slain by Rabah and who had been installed as ruler in 1900 by the French, was being held at Dikoa by French officials for a war indemnity of \$50,000, while his state was being ransacked for the money. But he returned quickly and was duly installed in office after the British commander had sent him a promise of protection and arranged for withdrawal of the claims for ransom. A Resident and a company of troops were left to assist him in reorganizing his province and in repairing the losses and devastation caused by the long conflict. A German force appeared just at this moment at Dikoa; and the presence of three European armies in the vicinity of Lake Chad led to various international complications which were happily soon dissipated by a prompt delimitation of the frontiers between the spheres of influence of the three powers. In this way Great Britain was definitely assigned some 60,000 square miles—organized as the province of Bornu—together with an opening on Lake Chad.

Between Bauchi and the Lower Benué lay an important district through which two caravan routes passed from Kano and Zaria. It was dominated at this time by a deputy of the Emir of Zaria, known as the "Magaji," with headquarters at Keffi. This personage, Dan Tanmusa by name, was a resourceful character, independent and unscrupulous, using his position and energies to thwart the efforts of the British agents to maintain order and in robbing caravans and steal-

ing slaves. At length the High Commissioner was aroused and, early in 1902, organized the district into the province of Nassarawa, sending a Resident with troops to Keffi to put an end to the lawlessness and brigandage. In June a successful expedition was made to the important town of Abuji, where order was restored, the murder of a native missionary punished, and a new chief installed. But in attempting to win over the Magaji by a firm but conciliatory policy, without a display of force, the Resident and a political agent were treacherously killed ; and Dan Tanmusa fled at once to Kano, where he was received with honor.

Meanwhile trouble was brewing in the North. The Emir of Kontagora, Ibrahim, deposed by the British in 1901, appeared suddenly with a large following in the domains of the Emir of Zaria, who appealed in January, 1902, to the British for aid. The High Commissioner responded promptly ; and the Emir of Kontagora was surrounded and captured after a brilliant campaign. He was exiled for a time to Lokoja, but ultimately restored to his old position as sovereign of Kontagora, where he has since done excellent service under a Resident. In the mean time the Emir of Zaria, who had been freed from attack and whose state had been definitely formed into the province of Zaria in 1902, refused to coöperate with the Resident appointed and began to intrigue with the rulers of Kano and Sokoto. He was adroitly seized and transported to Zungeru, where he was kept under the eye of the Government, practically a prisoner, for some time.

It was now apparent that the unrest and troubles of northern Nigeria could not be dissipated, nor peace, security, and prosperity permanently established, until the northern states had been brought fully under the supervision of the Government of Great Britain. The paramount overlord of the region was the Sultan of Sokoto. His authority was

recognized throughout all the Hausa states and in the districts beyond, while the Emirs paid him tribute and were selected by him for their offices from the members of the ruling families, exercising their authority independently, however, in all local matters. Accordingly, Sir Frederic tried patiently and diplomatically in various ways to establish friendly relations with this renowned sovereign and his chief associate, the Emir of Kano, but without success. No reply was vouchsafed to the messages of the High Commissioner until May, 1902, when a letter of defiance was brought to his hand from the haughty ruler of Sokoto.

Matters dragged along without change until the end of the year, when the approaching mission of the Anglo-French Delimitation Commission to mark the boundaries necessitated steps being taken immediately for its protection. On January 29, 1903, an expedition comprising some twenty-four British officers and seven hundred West African Frontier troops set out from Zaria for Kano and Sokoto. Considerable resistance was expected at the former town, since it was defended by a strong wall and moat. But the Emir, Aliu, with two thousand horsemen, happened to be absent in Sokoto at the moment; and the place was easily and quickly taken. A new ruler was set up and slavery abolished; but otherwise no one was molested or deprived of his possessions. After leaving a Resident and garrison in Kano and receiving the submission of the Emir of Katsena in the northern part of the province, the column advanced toward Sokoto. *En route* it met and defeated the forces of the returning Emir of Kano, and finally forced an entrance into the capital triumphantly without encountering serious resistance. The Sultan, Attahiru, fled and was deposed, a new Sarikin or king being nominated by the High Commissioner, after an assembly of the chiefs and elders had agreed unanimously upon the best candidate.

Sir Frederick Lugard took advantage of the occasion to explain the changed situation to the native rulers and people and to outline the main features of the future British policy. He had come, he declared, to settle the country and to give it peace. Since the Sultan of Sokoto and a number of the Emirs, in whose name the treaties had been signed, had broken the Niger Company treaties, declared war on the British, and finally been beaten, the old treaties were dead and the sovereignty of the country, taken over by the Fulani through right of conquest, now passed to the British. "Every Sultan and Emir will [henceforth] be appointed by the High Commissioner who will be guided by the usual laws of succession and the wishes of the people, but who reserves the right to set them aside for good cause." There would be no interference with their religion, or with its head, the Sarikin Muslimin. For, added Lugard, "the British Government never interferes with religion; taxes, law, and order, punishment of crime, these are matters for the Government, but not religion."¹

The Emirs and chiefs were to continue their rule and the collection of taxes, as formerly, but they must obey the laws and coöperate with the Residents. "Buying and selling and enslaving of people," the importation of firearms, bribery in the courts, and mutilation or inhuman treatment of prisoners were forbidden. Every person, including slaves, would have "the right of appeal to the High Commissioner," who would "uphold the power of the native courts." "If slaves are ill-treated," concluded Sir Frederick, "they will be set free as your Koran orders, but otherwise there will be no interference with domestic relations. Slaves once free, however, must work and not become idlers or thieves."²

¹ Address of Sir F. Lugard on March 20, 1903, printed in Appendix III of Orr's *The Making of Northern Nigeria*.

² Address on March 21, *ibid.*

Before peace and security could be permanently established, however, one more military expedition was necessary. The ex-Sultan of Sokoto, the ex-Emirs of Kano and Bida, the Magaji of Keffi, and other dissatisfied leaders had collected a large following to dispute the control of the country with the British. After some maneuvering they were driven eastward to Burmi by the English forces, where with the assistance of a new Mahdi — son of the old Mallam Jibrella — they successfully repulsed their pursuers. The troops of the High Commissioner withdrew to Bauchi temporarily; but, being soon reinforced by a new expedition from Lokoja, returned and stormed the town of Burmi on July 27, 1903. It cost the British their commander and some eighty men; but the ex-Sultan, the Magaji, and most of the rebellious chieftains were slain in the conflict, and their following completely dispersed.


With this victory, the pacification of northern Nigeria was practically complete. Only one serious outbreak, that of 1906, has occurred since then. In January of that year, when the Government had sent an expedition up the Benué to stop a conflict between the Hausa traders and some pagan tribes assisted by the warlike Munshi, the country was suddenly startled by the appearance in the northeastern corner of the protectorate of a "marabout," or itinerant priest, preaching a holy war and arousing the natives against foreign domination. The Resident of the province, his assistant, and twenty-five soldiers, who went to arrest the marabout, were killed. Fortunately the Sultan of Sokoto and the other leading chiefs of the North remained faithful to the British. Troops were hurried up from Zungeru, Kontagora, Lokoja, and Kano; and on March 10, the rebels were defeated, their leader captured (and later executed), and the town which had sheltered him razed to the ground. The failure of this rising and the fate of its pro-

moters, together with the prompt punishment inflicted upon the rebellious chiefs three years previously, had a wholesome effect upon the natives of the protectorate and enhanced the reputation and position of the new sovereign power. Minor expeditions have been occasionally necessary since then, but only to prevent strife between tribes and to preserve order.

The two great needs of the protectorate were an efficient administration embracing the whole country and direct and rapid communication between all the centers of administration and of trade.¹ The first was soon met in a satisfactory way by the division of northern Nigeria into fourteen provinces, each under a civil Resident to whom were assigned two assistants, a military officer or two, a physician, and some dozen native policemen. Later the provinces were divided into districts under Sub-Residents and assistants responsible to the Resident; and in 1907 the West African Frontier Force, which had been increased by a regiment of mounted infantry in 1903, was reorganized as a constabulary under the Residents. The second was not so easily or speedily established in a country where, aside from the rivers, the narrow caravan paths were the only means of intercourse and the backs of men the sole method of transport. Some of the best trading centers were at great distances from the Niger and Benué, and many of the new provincial capitals were from four to fourteen days' march inland from the waterways.

Work was immediately begun on a system of telegraph

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1898, *Africa No. 3*, cd. 8775; 1903, *Kano*, cd. 1433; 1905, *Nigeria*, cd. 2787; 1907, *North Nigeria*, cd. 3620; 1910, *North Nigeria*, cd. 5102. The best of the recent books on the protectorate are: E. D. Morel, *Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems*, 1911; A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Niger and the West Sudan*, 1910; Mockler-Ferryman, *British Nigeria*, 1902; and *British West Africa*, 1900. Lady Lugard, *A Tropical Dependency*, 1905. Mary Kingsley, *West African Studies*, 1899. Delafosse, *Le Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, 1912.



lines, which would connect all the provincial centers with the capital; but it was not till 1909 that the High Commissioner at Zungeru was holding weekly conversations with all the Residents in northern Nigeria, owing to the great distances to be traversed and the numerous local, financial, and other difficulties to be surmounted. The main caravan routes were, meanwhile, improved and kept open, a transport department organized, and a wagon road built from Zungeru to Zaria and Kano in 1904 and 1905. As early as 1900, Sir Frederick Lugard had asked for a railway; but it was not till 1907 that the Secretary of State, upon the earnest solicitation and recommendation of Sir P. Girouard, — the second Governor of northern Nigeria, —

authorized the construction of a line 350 miles long from Baro on the Middle Niger to Kano. This has since been completed, together with a connecting line from Lagos on the Gulf of Guinea via Ilorin, Jebba, and Zungeru, and a branch line to Bukuru in the vicinity of the valuable tin mines of Bauchi — 928 miles in all. It is now possible to travel direct from the coast to the great mart of Kano — not far from the northern limits of northern Nigeria. The growth of the traffic during the first two years has been remarkable; and the railway has proved of inestimable value both to the administration and to the trade of the country.

The next serious difficulty was the problem of creating a revenue sufficient to meet the needs of the new government. The people were unaccustomed to regular taxes; and many of the chiefs had been deprived of their main source of income by the abolition of slave trading. Recourse was had at first to a light tax upon the caravan and canoe men, whose business had greatly improved with the stopping of the slave raids and the establishment of peace. In 1903, all canoe men were ordered to take out licenses varying from five shillings to three pounds according to the size and capacity of their canoes, and the caravan men to pay tolls of from five to fifteen per cent *ad valorem* on all goods, according to the number of provinces traversed. Although the income from this source rose from £7826 in 1903–04 to £39,250 in 1904–05, it afforded but a temporary relief; and in 1907, the canoe licenses and caravan tolls were abolished in favor of a general tax system. The influence, however, of the increasing number of caravan and canoe traders bringing news, trade, and civilization into all the out-of-the-way places had been almost incalculable, and had prepared the way for the levying of general taxes.

The new scheme of taxation was simple and based upon

the old method employed by the Emirs of the Mohammedan states, who had farmed out the taxes to certain favored headmen and levied them on the basis described in the Koran. These assessments usually included tithes of corn, sugar-cane, tobacco, and onions, together with taxes upon agriculturalists (except in Sokoto), butchers, dyers, hunters, etc. They were not heavy, because of the large returns from slave raiding; but the system was wasteful and inefficient, owing to the large number of officials employed and the prevalence of corruption and oppression. Early in 1904, the issuance of a proclamation ordering all the Emirs to pay one fourth of their incomes to the government was followed by an attempt to unite all the petty assessments into one levy resembling a poll tax — the Residents, visiting every town and village within their provinces, explaining the plan. And in 1906, the Native Revenue Proclamation was issued containing the detailed provisions for the levying and collecting of all the public revenues of the Mohammedan states, the assessments in each province and district being based on the annual return from lands, flocks, trade, manufacture, etc., and being payable once a year — alternatively in money and kind. All the chiefs of districts and headmen of communities, employed to collect the taxes, were to be appointed by the Resident and their duties carefully prescribed with penalties for breach of orders or corruption. The wild pagan tribes were assessed a small sum arbitrarily by villages, in order to accustom them to an annual payment in return for protection and security; and the more advanced pagan communities paid according to their soil, wealth, accessibility, etc.

This improvement in methods produced an instant and pronounced increase in revenues, the native returns for 1904–05 reaching £94,026, while those of 1903–04 were only £53,726. Of course the administration of northern

Nigeria would not have progressed very far or successfully if it had been dependent entirely upon these local levies. From the start, however, the home authorities had been liberal in voting supplies. In 1902, the grant-in-aid was £280,000, which was increased by 1903-04 to £405,000, a large portion being devoted to military purposes and to telegraphs. Since then, the native revenues have been steadily increasing and the imperial grants diminishing, until 1911, when the income from local taxes reached £344,000, and the imperial contribution, £275,000. This gave a total income of £619,000 against an expenditure of only £565,000; and in 1912, the ratio was £905,000 to £827,000. In this later year the revenue of southern Nigeria, including the grant-in-aid, exceeded its expenses by £238,917; and it is now hoped that the united colony will become practically self-supporting within a decade.

An attempt was made to use the English common law in the courts; but in 1904, the local criminal law was very wisely substituted for the British. In 1906, detailed proclamations were published reëstablishing the Alkali's Court, authorizing the Judicial Council, and empowering the provincial courts to punish for disobedience to the native authorities or courts within their spheres. And this combination of native law and native courts has worked admirably. The same was true in the matter of the public lands, for the British Government having acquired the territorial and mining rights of the Royal Niger Company and having taken over by conquest the sovereign rights of the Sultan of Sokoto over northern Nigeria with respect to ownership and control, considered itself the owner of all lands and proceeded to administer all questions of title, ownership, and rent from the British point of view. This led to various complications and innumerable difficulties, all of which were fortunately overcome later by the appointment of a

committee of investigation in 1908 and the issuance of the Land and Native Rights Proclamation taking effect on January 1, 1911.

In this ordinance it was decreed that, while all land — occupied or unoccupied — shall hereafter be considered native land, it is to be under the control of the Government and to be held and administered for the needs, use, and benefit of the natives. The British administration is to exercise its powers in accordance with native laws and customs; but it may give rights of occupancy at reasonable rates and may take over lands in return for compensation, nonpayment of taxes, or other good cause. In this way the land was communalized rather than nationalized, the occupant retaining full control of his holdings and complete enjoyment of his improvements, but paying a rent to the community in place of a landlord. And on its side, the Government will derive a large and steady revenue from the rentals.

Thus, within a dozen years' time, the whole of northern Nigeria, including some 255,000 square miles of territory and a population of approximately 10,000,000, has been occupied with little bloodshed, effectually organized into fourteen provinces, and set well on the way toward a peaceful and prosperous future. This has been accomplished without injury to public interest or private rights, through the purification and development of native political institutions and the assistance of local rulers, chiefs, and headmen. Some of the higher officials had to be removed, as we have seen, but most of the Fulani reigning families have been retained, and the minor officers, as far as possible. The Emirs rule as formerly, assisted by the Residents and their own Judicial and Executive Council composed of the Waziri (Vizier), Treasurer, Chief Justice, and five Mallemei, or teachers. This body acts also as the Supreme Court.

Below are the district chieftains, sub-district officials, and village headmen. A number of village communities form a tribe, over which there is a partly elective, partly hereditary, ruler who superintends the collection of taxes and regulates the occupancy of land, but against whom the natives may appeal to the native law and courts, in cases of oppression or corruption, and even to the Resident. So well does the system work in preserving order that the great market city of Kano, for instance, is policed by only twenty natives, while but ninety persons are employed in this service for the whole of that Emirate containing 1,500,000 inhabitants.

Charles Temple, recently acting governor, completed the organization of the Beit-el-Mal, or provincial public treasury. One half of the total annual revenue of each province goes directly to the Nigerian Government and one fourth to the native Beit-el-Mal for salaries and public works. The remainder is distributed among the district, sub-district, and village officials in the proportion of two fifths, two fifths, and one fifth. The Emirs receive a fixed annual sum commensurate with their position and the wealth of their states; and the other public expenditures are regulated by the Residents, the Waziri, for example, usually getting £1000. The payment of fixed salaries in this way has had the most beneficial effects, particularly in the courts, where much bribery existed on account of the low and uncertain income of the judges.

A good start has been made toward the organization of a national system of education. Elementary and technical schools, and an institution for the training of teachers and the sons of chiefs, are now in operation near Kano. In the last named there are eleven sons of Emirs among the pupils. Every scholar pays his way and is instructed in his own religion, African geography, agriculture, institutions,

and in the elements of education. All the work is in the Hausa language and along practical lines, so that the youth may be kept constantly in touch and in sympathy with his own land and people. In the Church Missionary Society school at Lokoja practically the same methods are employed, no child being allowed to learn English till he can read his own native language, and all the pupils being trained for the governmental or educational service. The young sheiks will in time succeed their fathers as rulers or fill important official positions. The other scholars will become clerks in the different departments of the Government, or teachers in the elementary schools to be established throughout all the provinces, where technical instruction will also be provided as widely as possible.

Northern Nigeria is not a rich country, but it contains a large amount of good land; and its future is promising. Its imports — cotton goods, kola nuts, salt, and cigarettes — are steadily increasing, the largest article of importation — cotton goods — rising from £63,000 in 1909–10 to £107,000 in 1910–11. Its ordinary exports of shea-nuts, rubber, palm oil, skins, and ostrich feathers are also multiplying, but are still relatively insignificant. Cotton is grown in considerable quantities, but not more than is consumed locally. The rich tin deposits form the only really great asset of the country. They have been found in more or less paying quantities on over 9000 square miles of territory; and 41,000 acres, approximately, have been leased to companies between 1910 and 1913. The exports of this mineral rose from £26,000 in 1909–10 to £71,000 in 1910–11, or about 1642 tons, and to 3000 tons in 1911–12. The completion of the railway to Bukuru will greatly facilitate as well as reduce the cost of exportation; and the value of the industry is destined to be considerable, the regular yield being now about 5000 tons a year.

The relation of this northern country to southern Nigeria has always been a source of difficulty and apprehension to the British authorities ; and the Imperial Government has but recently hit upon what promises to be a happy and skillful solution of the problem. Southern Nigeria is a richer country than its northern neighbor, though only one fourth its size, and it has been administered on quite different lines. After the union of the whole southern region, including the Lagos colony and protectorate, into one protectorate in 1906, it was divided into three provinces : the eastern, with 29,000 square miles of territory and headquarters at Old Calabar ; the central, comprising 20,000 square miles with its capital at Warri ; and Lagos, including about 27,000 square miles of land, whose seat of government and that of the whole protectorate was located at the old seaport of the same name. Each province was administered by a commissioner and assistants, who ruled as far as possible with the aid of local chiefs and native councils ; and the whole protectorate was governed by a governor and commander-in-chief, aided by executive and legislative councils. The general tendency here was toward a direct control by British officials of all branches of the administration, while in the North an opposite policy had been followed, as far as practicable. No direct taxes were levied upon the natives, while the chiefs were frequently helped and subsidized by the Government ; but a great deal more had been accomplished in the construction of public buildings, public works, and in the establishment of a widespread system of public education, than in the North.

Toward the end of 1911, a plan was devised for the amalgamation of all Nigeria into one protectorate. It was proposed to consolidate the northern and southern administrations into one thoroughly reorganized and progressive government, under the control of one governor and com-

mander-in-chief, and to divide the entire country into four administrative districts according to the natural and political boundaries, each under lieutenant-governors to whom the Residents in the different provinces should be responsible. The most workable and generally approved plan for the creation of these four units is: (1) The northern, including the most of the Mohammedan states with its capital at Kano; (2) the central, comprising the territory north of the Benué and west to the Kaduna-Kara Rivers (west of Zungeru); (3) the western, containing the region between the Niger, the sea, and the western frontier; and (4) the eastern, embracing the district lying between the Niger, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Cameroons. The headquarters of the new government will be located at some central point near the Niger River — preferably on the plateau behind Lokoja.

In the spring of 1912, Sir Walter Edgerton who had been Governor of southern Nigeria for eight years, was transferred to British Guiana, and Sir H. H. Bell, who had administered northern Nigeria for some time, was made Governor of the Leeward Islands. The way was now open for the work of unification; and in May, Sir Frederick Lugard, who had been serving as Governor of Hongkong since his resignation as High Commissioner of northern Nigeria in 1906, was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of both northern and southern Nigeria. In August of the same year, John Eaglesome, C.M.G., who had been the Director of Public Works in northern Nigeria in 1900 and of the Baro-Kano Railway construction in 1907, was nominated Director of Railways and Public Works in Nigeria. Sir Frederick went out to Nigeria in September, where with the exception of trips to London for conference with the home authorities he has been busily employed ever since, studying present conditions and preparing the way for the

amalgamation of the two protectorates. Meanwhile, the British authorities issued an Order in Council on November 22, 1912, authorizing this unification, which was successfully achieved on January 1, 1914. Sir Frederick Lugard became the first Governor-General of Nigeria, with A. G. Boyle as Lieutenant-Governor of the South and C. L. Temple, Lieutenant-Governor of the North, assisted by nominated Executive and General Councils. The composition of the latter is unusual. It contains, besides the Governor-General and members of the Executive Council, one member from each of the Chambers of Commerce of Lagos and Calabar, one from the Chamber of Mines, four Europeans representing the commercial, shipping, mining, and banking interests of the country, and six natives. There is to be a Chief Justice appointed for the whole land and the entire system of justice will be reconstituted. A comprehensive scheme of readjustments, in addition, is being worked out as rapidly as possible, which includes a consolidation and reorganization of finances, some important reforms affecting administration and taxation, and various vital improvements in the line of public works and railroads. Among the last-mentioned projects, the most important is a new eastern railway which, starting from Port Harcourt at the head of the Bonny estuary, will run north through the central province to the coal fields of Udi, thence north-eastward, via Abinsi on the Benué and Jemma, till it forms a junction with the Kaduna River-Bukuru branch of the Baro-Kano line.

On January 1, 1913, the new Governor-General held a great Durbar of northern Nigerian chiefs, at which sixty-three emirs and rulers, representing sixty-eight different tribes, were present, and the representatives of many pagan hill tribes were in attendance, unarmed in the presence of their traditional enemies. Lugard was assured by all the

leaders, "with the greatest emphasis, that everything was entirely satisfactory, prosperous, and peaceful." These conditions are confirmed also in the reports of missionaries and officials — all testifying to the remarkable success of the northern Nigeria administration; and equally satisfactory reports are being received from the southern district. The reorganization of the whole country upon ethnographical and geographical lines, the abolition of the old artificial divisions, the consolidation of governmental forces, and the introduction of an enlightened program of public improvements, will go far toward placing the administration of Nigeria upon a permanent, progressive, and highly efficient basis. The beneficent effects of British control are, however, already noticeable in all parts of the protectorate. The total trade of the country has risen from £5,076,339 in 1902 to £12,795,178 in 1911-12, of which Great Britain's share was over fifty-eight per cent. The soil of the southern portion, comprising the delta district and the great forest region behind it, is extremely fertile. The trade in palm oil, which is the chief product, reached the remarkable figure of £4,295,195 in 1911-12; and the exportation of cocoa, which was only £8,622 in 1900, amounted to £164,666 in the same year. There are also good harvests of rubber and cotton. In the northern portion there are some fine agricultural sections, particularly in Kano and Zaria, where the science of land cultivation has reached a high development; and the agricultural possibilities of the whole protectorate are excellent. The natives are industrious, intelligent, and skillful workmen, and good traders. They raise sufficient quantities of all the necessities of life to supply the needs of their country. "Cassava and cotton, indigo and sugar-cane, sweet potatoes and tobacco, onions and ground nuts, beans and pepper, yams and rice, according to the locality and suitability of the soil. The farmers

of a moist district will concentrate on the sugar-cane — its silvery, tufted, feathery crowns waving in the breeze are always a delight; of a dry, on ground nuts; those enjoying a rich loam, on cotton, and so on.” And when the work of unification and reconstruction is successfully achieved, Great Britain will have under her flag in West Africa — in spite of the fact that it is a country in no way suitable for the residence of white men — one of the richest and best administered protectorates in the world, with its millions of inhabitants prosperous and happy. The British statesmen have already ample reason to congratulate themselves upon this triumph of the New Internationalism, which has demonstrated what admirable service a rich and civilized state can render an undeveloped and unenlightened people — oppressed by ignorance and superstition — without the destruction of native ideals and institutions or the seizure of their rights and properties.

CHAPTER VIII


SOUTH AFRICAN EXPANSION AND UNION

THE term "South Africa" has been employed in such a variety of ways that it no longer conveys a definite impression to the mind of the general reader. To the ordinary Britisher or Cape resident it means the territory included in the four states of the Union — Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River Province, and the Transvaal — and lying between Cape Town, Durban, and the Limpopo River. For administrative, strategical, geographical, and commercial reasons, the vast regions of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, stretching northward to Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika, should be considered integral portions of British South Africa. The English residents of northern Rhodesia are in no haste to see their territory linked definitely to the South African Union; the citizens of the Union are apt to look upon the northern regions as outside the natural limits of their own country. Yet, so intimate are the present relations, and so closely are the futures of the two districts interwoven, that the whole region from the Cape to Tanganyika must — for some time to come at least — be regarded as a geographical unit.

The story of South Africa is one of a conflict for supremacy between two distinct political ideals emanating from different branches of the great Teutonic family, complicated by a vexatious "native question," and the interposition of an imperative expansion policy. The landing of Jan van Riebeck at Table Bay in 1652, the subsequent rule of the Dutch at the Cape for 162 years, and the coming of



BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA



some hundreds of Huguenots in 1688, introduced a racial element into the social and political life of the South African communities, which the British, who came into final possession of the colony in 1814, were inclined to minimize, but which has played an all-important rôle in the history of the country from that day to this.

It is to be noted that the physical characteristics and the political and religious ideals of the Dutch inhabitants of the Cape in the eighteenth century bear a striking resem-

blance to those of the "Boers" of the nineteenth. The unjust and oppressive rule of the Dutch East India Company and its hard-headed and selfish governors had aroused in the people a desire for independence and freedom from control. This, coupled with an innate love for the open, free life, a disregard for the conventionalities of life and the rights of others, a proud spirit of self-reliance, and a narrow religious morality, made them a difficult people for the British to handle. The long isolation of South Africa from European intercourse, due to the great distance and the lack of direct and close communication for so many years, placed them completely out of touch with Continental developments and movements down quite to the middle of the nineteenth century. And, while Europe progressed, the Cape practically stood still.

Unfortunately the British Government did not grasp the salient features of the situation at the Cape when it took over the control of affairs. It did not approach the problem with sympathy, intelligence, and firmness at the start, or appreciate the paramount necessity of preserving social and political equality and of cultivating the respect and confidence of its South African subjects. In fact, the Home Government never evolved any continuous and enlightened policy till the days of the Boer War; but preferred to follow a sort of "hit and miss" plan, adjustable to circumstances. "I have never been able to discover any principle in our policy in South Africa," said Sir Bartle Frere, one of the ablest and most popular British representatives in that country in the last half of the nineteenth century, "except that of giving way whenever opposition or trouble is encountered." The intentions of the English authorities were usually excellent; but they had the happy faculty of doing those things most likely, not only to destroy every vestige of confidence in the justness and wisdom of their

rule, but also to antagonize the very people whose coöperation they needed. The Home Government, for instance, showed so much interest in the welfare of the native tribes and gave so much more credence to the testimony of the missionaries than to the reports of its regular officials during the first thirty years of British rule at the Cape, that any resident there — British or foreign — might well have believed that the philanthropic ambitions of the English nation were of far more importance than the welfare and progress of its colonies.

When Lord Charles Somerset, the first regular British Governor, arrived at Cape Town in 1814, he found himself ruler of an unprogressive, ill-developed, and poorly protected region of some 120,000 square miles, with a population of 60,000, of whom 17,000 were free Hottentots, 13,000 slaves, and about 30,000 whites. The majority of the last-named were Dutch settlers who had won their own homes through a constant struggle with nature and were living in imminent danger from the warlike natives of the North. They were slave-owners and their occupation was chiefly agriculture, viticulture, and stock-raising. They lived on widely scattered farms which were worked indifferently; but they were closely bound together by common ideals, language, and customs, as well as by a natural instinct of self-preservation and a suspicion of all government, with which they always associated corruption and autocracy. In spite of the democratic character of their local institutions and their general belief in the freedom of the individual, they had no desire to see political equality extended either to the blacks or to the incoming foreigners.

No regard, however, was paid by the new rulers either to their preferences or their beliefs. The British considered that the will of the master was the dominating factor in the situation, and began the anglicizing of the colony at

once. In 1820, the first large installment — approximately 4000 — of English settlers arrived and the next few years saw this number greatly augmented. In 1825, English became the official language, its use being made obligatory in the law courts in 1828; and the Dutch form of local government, in which the colonists shared in the management of local affairs, was replaced by a nominated legislative council in 1835 that barred Dutch and English alike from participation in their own government. Meanwhile, political equality had been extended to all free blacks in 1828 and the slave trade abolished between the years 1833 and 1834, the slave-owners being awarded a small compensation for their loss. In 1835, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, — an able and cautious administrator, — on the occasion of the third Kaffir war, advanced the frontiers to the Kei River and defended it with forts; but Lord Glenelg committed the unpardonable blunder of ordering him to abandon the new territory, thus leaving the northern boundaries again in an undefended and unsettled state. Yet this was not all. Treaties were soon concluded with the native tribes placing them under the protection of the British Government.

The situation became at last unbearable to the old settlers; and in 1836, Pieter Retief led the first migration of the Dutch farmers — known as the "Great Trek" — out of the Cape of Good Hope colony into the hinterland of Natal. Despairing of saving the colony from the evils that had fallen upon it, complaining of severe losses from the emancipation of slaves and the plundering of country districts by Kaffirs, and referring to the unjustifiable odium placed upon them by "interested and dishonest persons under the cloak of religion, whose testimony is believed in England," Retief, in a "Manifesto" published on February 2, 1837, declared their purpose to be: the leading of a more quiet life, the "upholding of the principles of liberty,"

and the taking up of a new residence without molesting "any people or depriving them of the smallest property."¹ During the next ten years many thousands followed the first intrepid band; and by 1838, a "Republic" had been founded with its headquarters at Pietermaritzburg.

But the English residents of Natal did not wish the Dutch for neighbors or fellow citizens. So they persuaded the Home Government, which had refused to make the region a British colony in 1835, to send out General Napier, who drove out the Dutch farmers in 1842 and annexed the district in 1843. In the same year treaties were made with the chieftains Moshesh and Adam Kok, which placed the Basutos and Griquas under British protection; and it became at once apparent that the future policy of the British Government would center upon the control of the coast and the protection of the native states. However, they continued the pressure on the Dutch trekkers forcing them gradually northward. Kaffraria — the district between the Keiskamma and the Kei Rivers — was reoccupied in 1847 and 1848; and English sovereignty was extended to the region between the Orange and the Vaal by the defeat of Andries Pretorius near Boomplaat in August, 1848, who with his Dutch followers was forced to seek a new home beyond the Vaal River. But the Home Government let it be clearly understood that it had no intention of inaugurating a policy of territorial expansion by these moves. "It must be superfluous for me to disavow on the part of Her Majesty's Government any wish to extend the dominions of the Crown in South Africa," wrote Earl Grey to Sir Henry Pottinger in November, 1846. "Considered in themselves, such acquisitions would be not merely worthless in themselves but pernicious — the cause not of increased

¹ The *Grahamstown Journal*, February 2, 1837; reprinted in Appendix I of Cana's *South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union*, 1909, p. 295.

strength but of weakness — enlarging the range of our responsibilities while yielding no additional resources for properly sustaining them.”¹

Meanwhile with the increase of settlers in the Orange River territory and in the regions beyond the Vaal, troubles arose between natives and the white home-seekers. Difficulties multiplied and disputes arose, culminating in the eighth Kaffir war of 1850–51. At length the British Government decided to rid itself of the expense and responsibilities incident to all these border complications; and on January 17, 1852, Earl Grey gave his approval to the Sand River Convention, recognizing the independence of all communities north of the Vaal River. Two years later, in the convention of February 2, 1854, Lord Aberdeen withdrew British sovereignty from the Orange River territory, in spite of the fact that the majority of its ten thousand population did not desire independence. Through the influence of Sir George Grey — Governor of Cape Colony from 1855 to 1862 — the Cape was given representative government; and in 1856, Natal was separated from it and given its own representative institutions. The province of Kaffraria was definitely annexed to Cape Colony in 1865; and, through the assistance of Dr. Moffat, a road was opened directly into Bechuanaland in the interior.

But the Dutch communities were left to shift for themselves. The Orange Free State was the first to perfect an organized “republican” government. In 1856, Mathinus Pretorius united the communities of Petchefstroom, Rustenburg, and Pretoria into the South African Republic, which by 1864 included all the Dutch settlements north of the Vaal. Thus two rival and independent states were created on the north, which had to be reckoned with in every step that was taken in the internal development and interior

¹ Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, February, 1848.

expansion of British South Africa. In spite of the fact that the Orange Free State maintained friendly relations with the Cape Government for thirty years (largely through the efforts of the late John Brand, its president for several terms beginning in 1862), conditions were always far from satisfactory. Jealousies and commercial rivalries constantly impeded the development of the colonies, which was very slow at the best. Custom houses were maintained on every frontier; and the relations of four independent states, each striving to get on at the expense of the others, were frequently strained and antagonistic. The financial and administrative difficulties were great in all the colonies; and the situation was not improved by the intimate assistance of the imperial representatives in Natal and Cape Colony, and by the placing of the direction of native affairs throughout South Africa in the hands of a British High Commissioner. In general, conditions contrasted favorably with those in the American colonies, when the complete failure of the Confederation necessitated the formation of the present Union.

Sir George Grey was the one British statesman to grasp the real situation and suggest a possible solution. Realizing that the colonies were of necessity interdependent and in need of a common commercial and fiscal policy, he became convinced that "federal union alone" could bring relief, and he urged in March, 1857, a treaty of alliance between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State. Finally, on November 19, 1858, he sent an imperative dispatch¹ to the Home Government earnestly advocating the union of Cape Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State into a federal government with a representative congress, a responsible cabinet, and an appointive governor who should replace the High Commissioner. Each state was to retain its inde-

¹ Reprinted in Appendix II of Cana's *South Africa*, p. 298.

pendence and the control of its own local affairs. The time was, indeed, ripe for such a move; the administrations all willing, and the people as a whole favorable. No plan better suited to the general needs of the country and to the special interests of the individual communities could have been devised. And it would have made possible the organization of a sound South African government, which in time would have proved self-supporting and prosperous, and thus relieved the imperial authorities of many worries and responsibilities.

Yet Sir George failed to convince the leaders in England. To his first suggestions the Secretary for the Colonies replied: "I must remind you that the policy of recognizing by treaty the formation of independent states on the frontiers of British possessions by emigrant British subjects, and thus raising an effectual barrier to the system of continual and indefinite expansion of those frontiers towards the interior, has now been for some time established." And to his demand for union, Sir Bulwer Lytton answered: "After weighing the arguments which you have adduced, Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to depart from the settled policy of their predecessors by advising the resumption of British sovereignty in any shape over the Orange Free State." Sir George was soon after recalled and all chance of union postponed for a quarter of a century.

By 1871, conditions had changed and Her Majesty's Government had experienced a "change of heart." The discovery of the diamond mines between 1869 and 1871 brought a large influx of British and other settlers and transformed the economic and social status in the outlying provinces of South Africa. On October 27, 1871, the district of Griqualand, including the chief diamond mines, the ownership of which was in dispute between the Cape and Transvaal authorities, was awarded to Great Britain in the decision of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, based on the claims

of Nicholas Waterboer, — a Griquan leader, — and annexed. In the same year, Sir Henry Barkly, Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner from 1871 to 1877, asked the Home Government if it would take the question of forming a union in South Africa under advisement. Lord Kimberley replied on November 16, giving a general assent and asking that the presidents of the Dutch or Boer Republics (as they were beginning to be called) be approached on the subject. In these states conditions were far from satisfactory and troubles were numerous and increasing. In the Transvaal the independent rule had proved a failure. The government was practically bankrupt and the leaders divided and selfish. Added to these difficulties, there was constant friction between the Boer farmers and the native tribes — particularly the Zulus of Natal who were on the verge of revolt.

Lord Carnarvon, who took over the direction of the Foreign Office at this juncture, believed that the security and public order of South Africa — constantly endangered by conditions in the Transvaal and on the borders — imperatively demanded the formation of a union. So convinced was he of the merits of his plan as a panacea for all the troubles of that country that he was prepared to force the different states into line if necessary. In 1874, and again in 1875, he sent out James Anthony Froude, the historian, on a special mission of investigation, summoned Sir Theophilus Shepstone — a great authority on native affairs — to England to give advice, and finally held a general conference on the question in London, to which he unfortunately permitted himself to nominate all the South African representatives. After due deliberation and the passage of the "Permissive Federation Bill" to enable the colonies of South Africa to unite, Carnarvon appointed Shepstone Special Commissioner to the Transvaal toward

the end of 1876. He was ordered to make a full inquiry "into the origin, nature, and circumstances" of the "grievous disturbances—in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa," and authorized to annex such territories provided it was "necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said colonies, and of our subjects elsewhere."

Sir Theophilus reached Pretoria on January 22, 1877; and, after being fully convinced by personal investigation and by letters of the necessity for union, he annexed the Transvaal in the name of Great Britain on April 12. Unfortunately, though able to place his hand to the plough, Shepstone lacked the ability of directing it safely through the furrows of trouble and discontent that lay before it. He is described by Frere as a "shrewd, observant, silent, self-contained, immobile man—having a vast fund of useful information if one could get at it." His popularity and ability as a native administrator naturally handicapped him as a ruler of the Boers. But he seems to have been lacking in initiative, energy, force, and the ability to win the confidence of the Boer farmers, the majority of whom were unsympathetic with the move for annexation. And he failed completely both in setting up a successful régime in place of the one he destroyed and in redeeming his promises to the Boer leaders made when the new administration began. Trouble ensued from the start. The discontented politicians, instead of being admitted to places in the new régime and treated with a firm and just hand, were permitted to intrigue and organize for the recovery of independence. Kruger and Joubert were even allowed to set out for London in 1879 to ask for self-government. "It was not the annexation," wrote Frere to his wife in 1879, "so much as the neglect to fulfill the promises and anticipations held out by Shepstone when he took over the government, that has stirred up the great mass of the Boers and given a

handle to agitators." Colonel Owen Lanyon, — a brusque and tactless administrator, — who succeeded Sir Theophilus in 1879, was equally unsuccessful in an attempt to rule by force and oppression.

Fortunately, in the mean time, Lord Carnarvon, in the pursuit of his scheme for union, had called Sir Bartle Frere from a distinguished service in India to be Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner. He was pre-eminently fitted for the work of reconstruction and reconciliation, by reason of his extensive experience, practical common sense, judgment, and tact. He visited Natal and the Transvaal, grasped the salient points of the situation at once, and won the confidence of all classes of settlers. "Any attempt to give back or restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal," he wrote in 1879, "must lead to anarchy and failure. . . . There is no escaping from the responsibility which has been already incurred ever since the English flag was planted on the castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility. . . . Your object is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not become easier by delay." If he had been given a free hand and been firmly supported by the Home Government, there is no doubt that Sir Bartle could have brought about an adjustment of the situation acceptable alike to Boers and British. The success of his efforts was thwarted by a serious reversal in native affairs and the triumph of Mr. Gladstone and the Liberals in the English elections of 1879, who were committed by their campaign speeches to independence for the Boers and who represented that section of the British public which opposed imperial expansion and understood but little of the real situation in the colonies. Nothing is more pathetic in the annals of Africa than the

fall of Sir Bartle, at whose departure strong men wept, and the reversal of whose policy entailed disaster and trouble for many years to come on the British Government.

Just at the moment when Frere was getting a firm hold on the situation, Cetywayo, — the Zulu king, — assisted by his neighbor, Sikukuni (the Transvaal chief), declared war. Sir Bartle, realizing clearly that trouble with the natives would never cease until they were compelled to respect the British authorities, planned to force the chieftains into submission by a well-arranged display of force. While the High Commissioner, Shepstone, and Henry Bulwer (Lieutenant-Governor) of Natal were making every effort to win over Cetywayo, and the British forces were being moved along the Zulu frontier, the troops of Lord Chelmsford were drawn into an engagement at Isandlwana on January 20, 1879, by Cetywayo's Impis, and terribly defeated. Frere, whose policy was unpopular at home, but who was in no way responsible for this defeat, was recalled to Cape Colony and left for home on September 15, 1880. Sir Hercules Robinson succeeded him as High Commissioner and as Governor of the Cape; and Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent with a large force to "settle Zululand," which he did in 1879 and 1880 most effectively.

Meanwhile conditions had gone from bad to worse in the Transvaal. The Boers, disgusted with the vacillating policy of the home officials, lost all confidence in the integrity of the Liberal party leaders, who, now that they were finally in office, seemed to have forgotten the burning appeals of their campaign for Transvaal independence.¹ They became

¹ "Now there is but one cry, 'We will have no imperial help!' Why is this? We have lost confidence in a Government who could play with our welfare, and among the many injuries done us, the greatest was to remove from among us a ruler such as Your Excellency was." Madame de Wet to Frere on November 16, 1880, reprinted in J. Martineau's *The Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Sir Bartle Frere*.

at length suspicious of every word or move of the Foreign Office, and on April 12, 1879, some twelve hundred of them started a revolt near Pretoria, demanding independence. Frere promptly held a meeting with the leaders — Kruger, Joubert, and M. Pretorius — and averted any serious outbreak for a time. But his recall shortly afterwards and the attempt of Lanyon to collect taxes from the “passive resisters” by force was the last straw. The seizure of Piet Bezuidenhout’s ox wagon in default of taxes on November 11, 1880, was made an occasion for open revolt; and on December 16, 1880, the Boers proclaimed a republic at Paardekraal. Kruger and M. Pretorius were nominated executives, Joubert being chosen commander-in-chief of the military forces; and an appeal to arms followed.

When the British tried, by the use of troops, to compel the Boer farmers to remain within the empire, they were twice defeated, and finally suffered a disastrous blow at Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881, where Sir George P. Colley’s army — unexpectedly engaged — was defeated and he himself slain. The news caused great excitement and chagrin in England. Demands for the retrieval of British honor were heard on all sides. Suddenly the British government changed its mind. Sir Evelyn Wood, in accordance with instructions from England, concluded a temporary peace on March 22, which was ultimately transformed into a permanent treaty at the Convention of Pretoria on August 3, 1881,¹ and the London Conference of February 27, 1884.² The independence of the Transvaal Republic was recognized. It was not to tax foreigners more than burghers or attempt to extend its borders; nor was it to make treaties with other nations, except the Orange Free State, without the approval of Great Britain.

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1881, *South Africa*, ed. 2998.

² *Ibid.*, 1884, *South Africa*, ed. 3914.

Religious freedom and the earlier regulations against slavery were to be enforced; and certain well-defined provisions providing for the protection of the natives and their property rights were added. Thus were all difficulties adjusted and the problem of the Transvaal solved; but at what a cost to the honor and to the interests of Great Britain in South Africa!! Gladstone gave rein to his "change of heart" too late. The Liberal leaders gave, under compulsion, what they had refused repeatedly to permit earlier. There were undoubtedly good grounds for giving the Boer farmers their own government and their own state under British suzerainty; but this was neither the time nor the way in which it best could be accomplished. It was a great political blunder which had to be rectified years later at a great sacrifice of men and money. And it was a tremendous blow to British prestige in South Africa, giving simultaneously an enormous impetus to the development of Boer ideals of exclusiveness and independence.

During the next quarter of a century, three new factors intervened to change completely the situation in South Africa. The first of these was the inauguration of a movement to secure the union of South Africa upon the basis of local independence and coöperation, yet under the British flag. It was started at the first congress of the "Afrikander Bond," held at Graaff Reinet in 1882, and ardently championed by the Bond, which comprised all the Boers and pro-Boers in all the colonies, and by its able leader (after 1883), the late Mr. Hofmeyr. The Farmers' Protective Society of Cape Colony joined the Bond in 1883; and soon a lively agitation for a customs union was set on foot. In 1889, Cape Colony and the Orange Free State perfected a zollverein, which was joined by Basutoland in 1891, by southern Rhodesia in 1898, and by Natal in 1899. The Transvaal alone held aloof. There is little doubt that, if

that republic had been ruled by open-minded and conciliatory statesmen and had participated actively in this movement, a real union might have been ultimately attained in South Africa without conflict or serious friction.

The second factor was the economic revolution which began with the discovery of diamonds between 1869 and 1872, but was given a tremendous stimulus by the gold discoveries on the Kaap fields, the Witwatersrand, and the Rand near Johannesburg,¹ and by the railway competition of the early nineties. The finding of gold brought into the country — particularly the Transvaal — a great influx of English and other foreigners, who soon threatened to outnumber the original white inhabitants. Their presence affected materially the whole social and political situation, bringing at the same time a tremendous increase to the financial and commercial wealth of the community. By 1891, the Natal Government, with some outside assistance, had completed their line from Durban to the Transvaal frontier. The Cape Railroad — a sharp competitor — pushed its line to the edge of the Transvaal by May, 1892, with the assistance of the Government and the consent of the Orange Free State, and completed its connections with the chief ports of Cape Colony in September of the same year. Meanwhile, the Netherlands South African Company started a line from Lourenço Marques on Portuguese territory, which was brought successfully into the Rand in May, 1894. The Transvaal Government, which owned a material interest in this latter line, attempted to turn all the traffic to this shorter road to the coast; and it was only the interference of the Home Government that secured for the railways of Natal and the Cape an entrance to the Transvaal on anything like an equal commercial basis. The building of these railway lines, however, proved a great stimulus to the trade and development of the country.

¹ The gold production rose from £34,710 in 1886 to £8,603,821 in 1896.

The third element, which played an important rôle in the changing conditions of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was the transformation in the colonial policy of the British authorities. Aroused by their reverses at the hands of the Transvaal Boers, the serious native troubles between 1879 and 1884, and the entrance of Germany into Southwest Africa in 1884, the English leaders were convinced that a sound and definite policy should be elaborated in the conduct of South African affairs. They were very slow, however, in determining the main principles to be followed. The Conservative party, which after 1885 remained in power most of the time till the end of the century, decided at length upon two leading features of their program: protection of natives and native states, and freedom of action for the Transvaal Government, as long as it did not interfere in native affairs or attempt to extend its territory. This was soon evident from the recognition of the "New Republic" formed by Dinizulu — son of Cetuyayo — in 1886 and added to the Transvaal, the establishment of the Basutoland and Bechuanaland protectorates in 1884 and 1885, and the annexation of Kaffraria to Cape Colony during the years 1890 to 1892, together with the passage of the Glen Grey Act for the protection of its black inhabitants in 1894. The creation of the two native protectorates, followed as it was by the issuance of a charter in 1889 to the British South African Company, which proposed to carry British sovereignty into the extensive territories of the Matabeles and the Mashonas north of the Limpopo River, had a still further significance. It marked the conversion of the British Government to a policy of colonial expansion. Pressed on all sides by the lively ambitions and competition of other European powers, Great Britain was forced to participate in the general forward movement for African colonies; but she did so with great

hesitation and deliberation. For the moment she remained content with issuing permits to commercial companies, such as the British Nigerian, South African, and East African Companies, to mark out and occupy those hinterlands most desirable for her future control.

Meanwhile, matters in the Transvaal had taken on a serious aspect. The old burghers, or the more conservative element of that Boer community, held control of the government. Their leaders were not only extremely cautious, but also narrow-minded and suspicious of all outsiders and new things. They favored high tariffs and an exclusive policy, disdaining all suggestions of customs or federal union not in strict conformity with their own ideals. They were as hostile to the neighboring states, in many ways, as they were to the ever-increasing number of foreigners who took up their residence within the Transvaal. The presence of these "Uitlanders," as they were called by the farmers, was most distasteful to the old burghers, who feared these immigrants and considered them interlopers and "polluters of the country." President Kruger was the personification of the old Boer ideals, and, as such, staunchly supported and respected by a strong following. He was an able leader and a shrewd politician, possessing a sincere devotion to his country and its interests. But he was lacking in education and breadth of view, and permitted his own prejudices and his ambitions for his own people to override an ordinarily sound judgment. He and his friends seemed obsessed with the idea that every move by the colonial or imperial authorities was part and parcel of a deep-laid plot to steal the Transvaal from the Boers.

To secure his aims and the preservation of Boer control, Mr. Kruger descended ultimately to questionable methods; but he began by laying obstacles in the Uitlanders' path toward the suffrage. In 1882, the period of residence

necessary to qualify for citizenship was raised from one to five years;¹ and in July, 1887, the same prerequisite, together with the requirement of membership in a Protestant church, was laid down for all candidates to the Volksraad. Finally, in 1889, the franchise was limited to persons born in the Republic; and in 1893, the approval in writing of the burghers in the ward where the candidate resided, together with the consent of the President, the executive body and the First Raad, were made necessary to the issuance of citizenship papers. In this way the party of Mr. Kruger and his friends retained control of the government and successfully prevented the aliens, of whom there were some 48,000 in the Transvaal by 1890 and over 100,000 by 1895, from participation in political affairs.

This would not have been a serious matter, even though the Uitlanders did possess sixty-three per cent of the land, ninety per cent of the personal property, and were paying ninety-five per cent of the taxes (as was claimed on good authority), if the country had been ably and equitably administered. But this was not the case. The conditions of life in the neighborhood of the mines were frequently distressing and irritating; and little was done to improve them. It is true many of the newcomers were not the most desirable material for citizens. Violent acts by some of the more radical members brought the whole body under suspicion; and no one would have criticized a fair-minded government that sought to protect itself from the evils of a precipitate adoption of unrestricted manhood suffrage. In fact, the better element of the foreign population cared little for citizenship, and would have given the Transvaal authorities no serious trouble if the proper protection for life, property, personal and corporate interests had been forthcoming. On the contrary, troubles and conflicts between Boers and aliens were constant and increasing. In addition to in-

¹ Reduced some years later to *two* years.

creasing the taxes upon the industries at every opportunity, many serious and vexatious restrictions were laid upon trade and the corporations, while little was done by the Government to promote the commerce and economic development of the Transvaal. Hollanders and other foreigners were often given the preference over the British residents; and numerous instances of official graft, speculation, and favoritism came to light. British subjects were even commanded for service in the Transvaal army without recourse; and only the kindness of the wealthier Uitlanders prevented great suffering among families deprived of their breadwinners. The advice of President Brand of the Orange Free State, "If you wish to govern the strangers successfully, make friends with them," was ignored; but every move of the aliens toward reform, either through the ballot or other means, was looked upon as a plot to seize the Transvaal for Britain.

For some time the leading capitalists declined to have anything to do with politics or to assist the foreign residents to secure the franchise. In the early nineties, it became impossible longer to ignore the situation; and in 1892, the Transvaal National Union was formed with the assistance of some capitalists, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the alien population. In 1893, Kruger was reëlected president by an official majority of 800 out of 15,000 votes, and his election was approved by the Volksraad, although the facts seem to show that Joubert — the reform candidate — actually received a majority of the ballots. All hope of real reform seemed now indefinitely postponed; and "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." Conditions remaining unchanged and no signs of improvement in sight, the leading Uitlanders in Johannesburg were encouraged to consider plans for securing control of the administration by strategy or force.

Mr. Rhodes discussed an action of this sort with Mr. Lionel Phillips, chairman of the National Union, in December, 1894, and sent Mr. Beit in June, 1896, to Johannesburg to consult with the alien leaders and assist in working out a suitable plan. Between August and October, Mr. Rhodes, who was then Prime Minister of Cape Colony, went in person to the Transvaal, and a general scheme was outlined. But the Uitlanders disagreed. Some favored the use of force and the placing of the Transvaal under the British flag. Others, more conservative, preferred to secure reform and self-government within the Transvaal from Johannesburg as a center. "We don't want any row," wrote Mr. Lionel Phillips to Messrs. Beit and Wernher on July 15, 1894. "Our trump card is a fund of £10,000 to £15,000 to improve the Raad."¹

Finding it practically impossible either to reconcile these conflicting elements or to secure a necessary working co-operation among the leaders, the great imperialist abandoned for the moment all hope of immediate action. One of his chief aids, however, thought otherwise and launched the movement, while his colleagues in Johannesburg hesitated and the world was unsuspecting. Dr. Jameson — familiarly known throughout South Africa as "Dr. Jim" — who during the past four years had met with unprecedented success as administrator for the South African Company in southern Rhodesia, had concentrated some six hundred of the company's police near the western border of the Transvaal, under the suggestion of Mr. Rhodes, to assist the Uitlanders if necessary. On December 29, 1895, he started these troops on the historic but ill-starred "Raid" to Johannesburg, which ended so abruptly and ignominiously at Krugersdorp four days later. "I received so many

¹ Printed with other letters from Mr. Phillips in Appendix C of Scoble and Abercrombie's *The Rise and Fall of Krugerism*, 1900, p. 274.

messages from day to day, now telling me to come, then to delay starting, that I thought it best to make up their minds for them, before the Boers could get together,"¹ said Jameson to Lady Sarah Wilson a few days later. But he had underestimated the real strength of his adversaries, and was unaware of their quiet but effective preparations to head off such a movement, while the aliens in the Transvaal were not sufficiently united, organized, or prepared to be of any real assistance to him. He and his fellow officers who were captured at Krugersdorp were sent immediately to England for trial; but the Johannesburg leaders, who surrendered a few days later, — January 7, — were tried and sentenced to death as rebels. Kruger, however, under pressure from the Home Government and appeased by a congratulatory telegram from Emperor William of Germany, commuted their sentences to heavy fines.

The "Raid,"² was one of those movements which are condoned if they succeed, but, if failure results, condemn those connected with them to unmitigated censure and disapproval. The well-deserved popularity of Cecil Rhodes and Dr. Jameson (the former had been as popular with the Boers as with the British) disappeared in a day; and both lost their positions as public officials and political leaders — Mr. Rhodes voluntarily, though he managed to save the South African Company from dissolution. If it had succeeded, it would no doubt have transferred the control of the Transvaal from the old burghers to the Uitlanders and have prevented the Boer War of 1899 to 1901. But its failure reacted in such a way as to remove practically every chance of reconciliation between Boer and British interests in South Africa. Race feeling was embittered and the Boer

¹ Lady Sarah Wilson, *South African Memories*, 1909, p. 35.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1897, *So. Af. Rep.*, cd. 8380, 8404, 8423. *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1899, *So. Af. Rep.*, cd. 9343, 9507, 9521, 9530. *Arch. Dip.*, 1896, vol. I, pt. II, pp. 121-23.

contempt for English authority and suspicion of British honor and integrity increased. All the Boer interests of South Africa were drawn together; and the Transvaal leaders were given a most effective argument for their charges of aggression and discrimination on the part of the Cape Government and the imperial authorities. Boer ambition advanced by leaps and bounds; and the serious conflict which now ensued between the two national forces was brought on — next to the mistaken diplomacy of Kruger himself — through the agency of this ill-advised military expedition.

The policy of Mr. Kruger and his friends embraced three main issues: control of the Transvaal administration, freedom from British suzerainty, and advancement of Boer unity in South Africa as rapidly as possible. On March 17, 1896, a defensive and offensive alliance¹ was concluded with President Steyn, of the Orange Free State; and the following year the President of the Transvaal repudiated the overlordship of Great Britain, while bidding strenuously for the friendship of foreign states like Holland and Germany. "In the convention of 1881 the suzerainty was mentioned, but not in the treaty of 1884. It has therefore ceased to exist, . . ." said Mr. Kruger to the Volksraad on August 25, 1897. "On the other hand, I recognize the right of England to oppose, within six months, treaties made between the Transvaal and foreign powers." And his interpretation was unanimously approved by the popular assembly. The British Government, however, steadily refused to recognize this view of their relationship to the Boer Republic, and tried every means to secure a reasonable and mutually satisfactory understanding on the question.

Relations were strained still further by the attitude of

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1897, vol. i, pt. ii, pp. 118-21.

the Transvaal authorities toward the British residents of that country. Aroused and irritated by the "Raid," Mr. Kruger and his supporters were determined thereafter to hold the foreign element in complete control. On September 28, 1896, the Alien Expulsion Act was passed, empowering the President and Executive Council to expel any alien from the state who was in any way a danger to the public peace.

Two days earlier, a press law¹ had been enacted giving the Executive the right to prohibit the circulation of all printed matter which he should consider a menace to the peace and morals of the Republic. And in November, 1896, a further alien law was decreed by the Volksraad requiring all foreigners entering the country to be provided with passports showing that they possessed proper means of support or were in a position to obtain such by work. The British Government protested in vain against this discriminating legislation; and the consistent, conciliatory efforts of Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Alfred Milner (who was appointed High Commissioner in May, 1897) were unavailing to secure any proper recognition of the rights and interests of the British residents. At length the chief, and practically the only, safeguard of these residents was removed in 1897, when the Volksraad was permitted to override the decisions of Judge Kotze of the Supreme Court—a proceeding with which Mr. Kruger had threatened Mr. Kotze as early as 1895.²

It was no longer possible for the British Government to ignore the conditions existing in the Transvaal. The Uitlander Association in Pretoria petitioned the Home Gov-

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1897, *So. Af. Rep.*, ed. 8423, p. 5.

² In an interview on September 7, a "Memorandum" of which was made at the time by Kotze and witnessed to by Paul Mare and a notary public. Printed in Appendix H of Scoble and Abercrombie's *The Rise and Fall of Krugerism*, p. 292.

ernment in 1897. After the reëlection of Kruger in 1897, and the killing of an Englishman named Edgar by a Boer policeman, a monster petition signed by 21,000 people was forwarded in March, 1899, to Queen Victoria. Something more must be done than the issuance of protests. It was finally decided to use pressure, upon the advice of Sir Alfred Milner, who wired on May 4, 1899, asking for some "striking proof of the intention of Her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position." "The only condition on which they (the two principal white races) can live in harmony and the country progress," he added, "is equality all around. South Africa can prosper under two, three, or six governments, but not under two absolutely conflicting social and political systems. . . . The attempt to remedy the hundred and one wrongs springing from a hopeless system by taking up isolated cases is perfectly vain. It may easily lead to war, but will never lead to real improvement. The true remedy is to strike at the root of all these injuries — the political importance of the injured. . . . It seems a paradox, but it is true that the only effective way of protecting our subjects is to help them to cease to be our subjects. The admission of Uitlanders to a fair share of political power would no doubt give stability to the Republic, but it would at the same time remove most of our causes of difference with it, and modify, and in the long run entirely remove, that intense suspicion and bitter hostility to Great Britain which at present dominates its internal and external policy. The case for intervention is overwhelming."

At the suggestion of Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Alfred met President Kruger in a conference at Bloemfontein lasting from May 31 to June 5; but no agreement was reached. Hofmeyr and Abraham Fisher were sent to Pretoria to use their influence with the Executive and the Volksraad;

and an offer to submit the differences to a joint commission for settlement was made by England. All in vain. The only compromise to which Mr. Kruger would listen was his own impossible, arrogant, and dictatorial proposal on August 18: To give the aliens the franchise after five years' residence, provided Great Britain dropped her claim of suzerainty and agreed not to interfere again in Transvaal affairs, but to submit all future disputes to arbitration. Such a demand no self-respecting nation could consider for a moment. Certainly England could not afford to see the Majuba mistake committed a second time if South Africa was ever to be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon race. It was not for her to be the aggressor, however; and she waited in dignified patience the onslaught of the leaders of the Boers, who had sowed the seeds of discord and were now to reap the whirlwind. On September 27, 1899, the Orange Free State voted for joint action with the Transvaal Boers; and, after issuing an ultimatum to Great Britain on the 9th, demanding a withdrawal of her troops from the frontier, the Boer forces invaded Natal and Cape Colony on October 12.

The events of the Boer War are too well known to be detailed here.¹ There could be but one result of such a conflict; and Great Britain, who suffered some serious reverses in the beginning, demonstrated the superiority of her arms and saved her good name in the end through the genius of Lords Roberts and Kitchener, after she had learned to respect the courage, the dogged perseverance, and the skill of her undaunted opponents. We resume our story with the signing of the treaty of peace at Pretoria on May 31, 1902.² It was a remarkable treaty, for never before had a conquering power meted out, in a spirit of friendly gener-

¹ See *Report of Com. on the War*, 1903, ed. 1789, 1790, 1191.

² *Arch. Dip.*, 1902, vol. II, pt. III, pp. 271-84.

osity, such favorable terms to a subjected people. At the opening of the negotiations, the Boer leaders tried to retain their independence and to secure a share in the settlement of all important local matters, such as internal reforms, the franchise, the language question, economic development, etc. They offered to surrender all control over foreign affairs if permitted to retain these national rights and privileges ; but Great Britain remained firm and dictated the terms of peace. This was necessary, not only in the interests of British supremacy and self-respect, but also to cultivate a feeling of confidence and respect for the English Government in the minds and hearts of the Boers themselves, who had harbored so long sentiments of distrust and contempt toward the dominant race of South Africa. The British authorities, moreover, rightly insisted upon the retention in their own hands of all political power, both in national and local affairs. This was imperative, not only in the interests of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies, but in those of the whole of South Africa as well. The future development of the two revolting states and of the rest of South Africa, as well as the relations between the Home Government and these colonial units, demanded that the affairs of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies should be directed by a powerful and unbiased hand, tempered firmly by justice, intelligence, and patience, for some years to come. It is not always wise to submit entirely to the mercy of the conqueror, but the Boer leaders, having no other alternative and trusting the word of the British authorities, signed the terms of peace, after these had been approved by their people. The results have justified this submission and this trust.

In the treaty of Pretoria, provision was made for the surrender of the Boer armies and for a general amnesty for all burghers, both inside and outside of the Transvaal and

the Orange River Colonies, who had participated in the struggle. The two states were to be placed under a British military government; but a civil administration, followed by local autonomy, was to be introduced as soon as practicable. No one was to be deprived of liberty or property, and no special tax for the payment of the costs of the war was to be levied. The Dutch language would be taught in the schools and used in the courts, but the question of the franchise was postponed, dependent upon later developments. In addition, the British Government offered to furnish £3,000,000, together with a number of expert officials, to assist the people in resettling and restoring their lands and to care for the poor and helpless. Additional money would be loaned for two years without interest, and thereafter at three per cent, to assist the Boer farmers in procuring seeds, implements and other necessities for the reopening of the lands and the resumption of ordinary occupations.

All these promises the British authorities kept well. On June 21, 1902, the great work of repatriation began and in a little over eight months' time about 200,000 old burghers had been transported to their homes, fed and cared for, and assisted in planting their first crop. This colossal undertaking was carried out successfully in spite of the difficulties of transportation, the condition of the country, and the winter season, through the medium of Central Repatriation Boards in each colony and local District Commissioners, all of whom displayed great energy, diligence, and resourcefulness. Many officials of the neighboring colonies gave material assistance and took a great interest in the work, Lord Milner himself traveling two thousand miles to oversee the direction of the operations personally. The expense of the movement was enormous, some £9,000,000 being paid out by the British Government during this

period, which included the £3,000,000 given to the Boer families and £2,000,000 distributed among the British subjects and others, who had suffered by the war.

The military government, established by the proclamations of Lord Roberts and the letters patent of August 2, 1901, was replaced in the Orange River Colony on June 23 and in the Transvaal on September 23,¹ 1902, by civil administrations consisting of a governor, lieutenant-governor, executive and legislative councils—all appointed through the imperial authorities. The work of this new régime was excellent. By 1904, the people were again settled on their homesteads and over 1,132,000 acres were allotted to some 656 new settlers, of whom 435 were British. Roads were built, public works started, industries reopened, police forces organized, and considerable progress made in education and in the construction of schools. Local government, which had always been too largely under the control of the central authorities, was revived upon a sound and equitable basis, and a steady political development took place. At length a strong sentiment in favor of self-rule arose, which soon took on a definite form. In the beginning of 1905, there were three parties in the field advocating responsible government, the most important of which was "Het Volk," or the people's party, organized in January, 1905, composed almost entirely of Boers. The British authorities were not long in recognizing that the time had come to give the two recalcitrant colonies some form of local autonomy. Late in March, 1905, draft constitutions were drawn up with the coöperation of Lord Milner; but, owing to the necessity for a further investigation and the firm conviction of some of the British statesmen that nothing short of complete home rule would fit the case, the final letters patent authorizing the new administrations were not

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1903, *Transvaal No. 8*, cd. 1463, 1551, 2400.

issued until December 6, 1906, for the Transvaal and June 5, 1907, for the Orange River Colony.¹

The government in each colony under the new régime was to consist of a governor and commander-in-chief appointed by the Crown, an executive council nominated by the Governor, and a legislative assembly with full powers elected by the people. At the end of four months, the Governors were empowered to form a ministry of six persons in their respective colonies, who should have the right to sit in either of the two houses of legislation. Citizenship in the new colonies had already been provided for in the naturalization laws of May 20, 1902,² which required a previous service in the employ of the Crown, or a five years' residence in the revolting districts, and the taking of an oath of allegiance to Great Britain. They were now extended to include "every white male British subject of the age of twenty-one and upward," who was not serving in the armies of England and who had resided in the colonies for six months just preceding the date of registration. Thus the British nation at one stroke gave the conquered provinces responsible government and admitted the former citizens of the two Boer states to an equality with all the subjects of the British Empire. This may have been a bitter pill for the old burghers to swallow, but it was a vital and significant move in the interests of all the people of South Africa. All real progress, all internal development, prosperity, and good will, depended upon the preservation of political equality and of personal initiative. The future, not only of the two colonies, but also of all South Africa, was wrapped up in it. For "the Dutch can never own a perfect allegiance merely to Great Britain," said Lord Milner in his farewell speech at Johannesburg. "The British can never, without moral

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1907, *Orange Riv. Col.*, cd. 3526.

² *Arch. Dip.*, 1903, pt. iv, pp. 306-17.

injury, accept allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of dignity, without sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal devotion to an Empire-State, in which Great Britain and South Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for the good of South Africa as a member of that great whole."

It so happened that Lord Milner, who had been Governor of the two Boer colonies from 1900 to 1905 and High Commissioner, was succeeded in all three offices by the Earl of Selborne in May of the last-named year, and by Sir Hely-Hutchinson as Governor of Cape Colony. Selborne was assisted by Lieutenant-Governors in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal until the new constitutions went into effect in 1907, when the office of Lieutenant-Governor was abolished, and he became Governor of the Transvaal and Sir H. J. Goold-Adams of the Orange River Colony.

Meanwhile excellent progress was being made under the two new governments, and things were picking up throughout all of South Africa. Railway systems were reopened and adjusted to the new conditions; some obnoxious taxes abolished; the finances reorganized; public improvements instituted; and numerous measures for the improvement of economic and agricultural conditions introduced. In spite of this material progress, however, conditions were far from satisfactory. This was due chiefly to rivalry, competition, and jealousy among the South African colonies, of whom there were now five distinct communities, each with its own independent administration, system of laws, railways, commercial and economic problems. In many instances, these vital interests overlapped; and an increasing number of intercolonial questions were constantly arising, which caused friction and distrust among the colonists and upon which it was impossible to make permanent or lasting settlements.

The situation had, indeed, reached a state comparable to that in Canada before the Union or in the North American colonies before the adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1789, where the individual communities engaged in a cut-throat competition for trade and a lively but vicious competition for individual rights and special privileges.

The existing political system was a failure, both in the way of meeting present demands and in preparing the ground for future developments. The Governors of the different colonies exerted every nerve to bring about coöperation and to promote general prosperity, with indifferent success. Lord Milner, who strove impartially to further the development of the country, found the interests he was advocating as Governor of the Transvaal often diametrically opposed to those he wished to advance as Governor of the Orange River Colony. A successful administration of South African affairs was impossible, as long as there remained a complete division of authority between five groups with no proper means of coöperation or of central control. Nor could any form of real home government be attained, as long as Great Britain possessed such a strong hand in the direction of all local affairs as existed in the High Commissioner, the Governors, the native commissioners, and other Imperial representatives. No matter how capable or efficient such officials might be, they were not ruling as South Africans, — nor did their policy represent that of the people of South Africa.

The old Customs Union, founded in 1898 by the Cape of Good Hope Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State, was resurrected in March, 1903, at Bloemfontein by the Governors of the same colonies and of the Transvaal, and the administrator of Southern Rhodesia.¹ This new Union

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers* 1903, *So. Afr.*, ed. 1599 and 1640; supplementary agreements on May 6, 12, 25; June 3; August 15. Hertslet, *Com. Treaties*,

included the protectorates of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and proved very helpful within the sphere of its activities, a special tariff schedule being established at a convention held at Pietermaritzburg in March, 1906.¹ But it was only one step in the direction of South Africa's greatest need: real union. On February 16, 1903, Lord Milner recommended the organization of an Intercolonial Council to deal with those questions of administration, railways, and finance common to the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. This Council was created by letters patent in May and put in operation in the colonies on June 15.² It was composed of the High Commissioner of Railways, two members nominated by the Secretary of State, and two members each from the Executive and Legislative Councils of each colony. It soon proved of great value to the communities concerned and to southern Rhodesia; but it failed to relieve the general situation in South Africa, the real solution of whose difficulties lay beyond customs-union or intercolonial confederations.

On November 29, 1906, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, Governor of Cape Colony, transmitted to Lord Selborne a "minute" from the ministry of the Cape and signed by L. S. Jameson, the Premier, suggesting that the people of South Africa be given an opportunity to express their opinion as to the desirability and best means of bringing about a "central national government embracing all the

vol. 24, p. 52; *Arch. Dip.*, 1904, vol. II, pt. III, pp. 822-38. Swaziland was admitted in 1904. Hertslet, *Com. Treaties*, vol. 24, p. 120.

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1906, *Sp. Afr.*, ed. 2977.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1903, *Transv. and Orange Rv.*, ed. 1641. This Council was increased on April 24, 1904, by the addition of four members from the public officials of each colony, and by increasing the number of members from the Transvaal Legislative Assembly to six, and from the Orange River Colony to four. It was renewed again in 1906-07, the last-named members being now elected by the Assemblies in question and their number being raised to seven and five respectively.

colonies and protectorates under the British South African administration.”¹ Lord Selborne sympathized, as fully as Sir Walter and the ministers, with the general desire for reform and Union. “What South Africa requires,” he wrote, “more than anything else is stability — stability in political conditions, stability in economic conditions, stability in industrial conditions. Stability alone will enable the farmer securely to reap what he has sown; stability alone will give security to the investments of the merchant and the producer; stability alone will improve credit; stability alone will tempt the investor back to South Africa. But true stability will remain impossible so long as there are five separate governments in South Africa, each developing a different system in all branches of public life and each a potential antagonist of the other, but no one national government with authority to harmonize the whole.”

On January 7, 1907, he sent out a circular letter advocating colonial union to all the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors of the colonies involved, together with an exhaustive memorandum carefully prepared and covering the whole question of the existing relations of the South African colonies. He followed this with another excellent study on the vital problem of railway management on January 21, adding a powerful argument to his first contentions for a federal union. For he was firmly convinced that it presented the only satisfactory and possible solution of the political, financial, and economic difficulties, and that only a strong central government could successfully undertake and ultimately solve the four great pressing problems of South Africa: political organization, railway coöperation, the native question, and colonial expansion and consolidation to the north.

Meanwhile, the leaders at Cape Town, Durban, and Pre-

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1907, *So. Afr.*, cd. 3564.

toria were asking for union ; and " Closer Union Societies " were being formed in all the colonies through the instrumentality of such men as Lionel Curtis, Patrick Duncan, F. S. Malan, and Mr. C. J. Smuts. In England the Liberal party, led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann, came into power in December, 1905, and the new Parliament — the first under Edward VII — met on February 13, 1906. The Liberal leaders had regarded the annexation of the South African Republics as unjustifiable and were committed to a policy of self-government for the Boer communities. They now took up with enthusiasm the proposals for union, and in 1907 summoned a Colonial Conference, which met at Pretoria in May, 1908, and finished its labors at Cape Town, and which completed arrangements for the calling of a national convention with power to take definite steps to form a union. The elections of 1907 and 1908 had resulted favorably to the pro-Boer and the pro-union forces, Louis Botha and Het Volk securing a majority of seven in the Transvaal ; the Orangie Unie, led by A. Fisher and Generals Herzog and de Wet, getting twenty-nine out of thirty-eight seats in the Assembly of the Orange River Colony ; and the Bond, with Mr. Merriman coming into control, in Cape Colony. So no difficulty was experienced in prevailing upon the different parliaments to appoint delegates to a constitutional convention.

This assemblage met in October, 1908, at Durban and continued till February 3, 1909, finishing its work at Cape Town. The ablest and most experienced statesmen of South Africa were among the delegates, such as Dr. Jameson, Chief Justice de Villiers, ex-President Steyn, Sir George Farrer, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, F. T. Moor (Premier of Natal), Mr. Smuts, and the Boer leaders just mentioned. The convention drew up a " Draft Act " which provided for the incorporation of the colonies of the Transvaal, Orange River,

Natal, and Cape of Good Hope into the South African Union on an equal basis — a unitary state composed of provinces rather than a federal union. This was submitted to the legislative bodies of the four colonies for discussion, and was approved with certain amendments — Natal and Cape Colony suggesting eleven each — by March 30, 1909.¹ From May 3 to 11, a second convention was held at Bloemfontein, where the Draft Bill was finally approved by the representatives of the four colonies with some alterations, the chief of which was the elimination of the principle of proportional representation in favor of general majority representation based on the number of voters in any district or area. It was then promptly submitted to a popular vote, and, after an exciting campaign, successfully adopted in all four states, Natal being the last to vote on June 10. A select committee took the bill to England, where it was introduced into Parliament in July and became law on September 20, 1909. The Union went into effect on May 31, 1910, on which day Viscount Gladstone — appointed the first Governor-General by King George — was duly inaugurated.

Steps had already been taken to organize political parties, resulting in the formation of the "South African" or "Nationalist Party" during April 24 to 27 — a pro-Boer but conservative organization led by Generals Botha and Herzog and controlling a majority of votes in three of the provinces — and the "Unionists" or "Progressives," who inaugurated their party at a meeting of 150 delegates from the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and the Cape at Bloemfontein on May 23 and 24, 1910.

Dr. Jameson struck the keynote of their policy when he said, at the closing session, it was hoped that "measures, not men, should be the dividing line in the future politics of

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1909, *So. Afr.*, ed. 4525 and ed. 4721.

the Union," and that the new party stood for "equality of opportunity and rapid development of the country," coupled with adequate national defense, moderate protection, and "reciprocal preference with the sister states of the Empire." It was hoped that the new government would be organized on a coalition basis, including the best men of all persuasions. But the Governor-General selected General Botha as Premier, who finally decided to rely chiefly upon the men of his own party. The first parliamentary elections were held upon September 15, 1910, resulting in a majority of thirteen seats for the "Nationalists"; and the first session of the Union Parliament began on November 4, 1910.

The Union Government was admirably adapted to the conditions and needs of the country. All invidious and irritating distinctions were removed by the adoption of a provincial system of absolute equality, instead of a federal union. A due regard for British ideals and proper respect for their vital relationship to the Empire were shown in the recognition of the King as sovereign with the power of appointing the Governor-General, who should exercise the executive authority of the Union through a ministry of his appointment, not exceeding ten in number. The legislative functions were delegated to a Senate and House of Assembly. The former numbers forty, of whom thirty-two are elected by the provincial assemblies — eight from each — and eight are nominated by the Governor-General, four of whom must be specially familiar with the conditions and needs of the native races. To qualify for Senator, one must be a British subject of European descent, thirty years of age, a resident of the Union for five years, and own property amounting to \$2500, without incumbrance. The House of Assembly consists of one hundred and twenty-one members distributed as follows: Cape, fifty-one; Transvaal, thirty-six; Natal, seventeen; and Orange River Province,

seventeen ; and each province is divided into a similar number of electoral districts. The franchise for parliamentary voting is on the same basis as that in force in each province for its own assembly ; but to sit in the Assembly a candidate must be a British subject of European descent and have resided five years in the Union, as well as be "qualified as a registered voter."

All money bills originate in the Assembly and are passed up to the Senate with the approval of the Governor-General ; but the upper house enjoys only a restricted power of amendment. The Governor-General has power to call and dissolve the houses ; but it is provided specially that the present Senate shall not be dissolved for ten years. The existing Assembly is expected to stand for five years. To satisfy equitably the claims of the different communities, it was provided to place the government of the Union at Pretoria, the seat of legislation at Cape Town, and the home of the Supreme Court at Bloemfontein. A special commission was established to take over the control and administration of the railway systems ; and free trade was set up throughout the Union. A central financial administration was to be worked out through the consolidation of the monetary systems and funds of the provinces ; and a Supreme Court was established with branches in each colony. The provincial administration was taken out of party politics by making the colonial states into mere congressional units of the Union. The provinces are governed by administrators appointed for five years by the Governor-General and by elective provincial councils that sit for three years, but whose activities are strictly limited to purely local affairs.

Provision was made for the admission of Rhodesia to the Union ; but no mention was made of the subdivisions of this great district. Southern Rhodesia is being settled

rapidly with a European population to which it is well adapted, and may some day become a member of the Union. But northern Rhodesia—the region north of the Zambesi River—is tropical and belongs more properly to Central Africa and the Nyasaland protectorate. Their fate must be left to future developments. The question of the natives was one of the most difficult problems confronting the Unionists, all of whom were anxious to treat the blacks fairly and handle the problem wisely. After an extended discussion, a schedule was agreed upon and added to the Draft Act providing for the proper administration under the supervision of the Governor-General of all the native protectorates—Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—in the event that the control of them should be transferred to the Union by the imperial authorities.

The future of South Africa is intimately bound up with that of the native protectorates; and to understand its significance, one must go back to the early eighties for a moment. In those days the relations between the native chieftains and the British and the Boer colonies were a constant source of trouble and irritation to the Imperial Government as well as to the colonial authorities. As has been shown above, the Home Government's policy in these matters was almost continually one of protection for the natives and of suspicion of the motives and acts of the colonists as well as of apparent indifference to their interests. Another element of discord was introduced when the Transvaal Boers attempted to expand their state by the annexation of the neighboring native states. In 1882, the "Stellaland" and "Goshen" republics were set up by the Boers, who also established Dinizulu, son of Cetywayo, as king in the "New Republic" on his father's lands, in May, 1884, and attempted to penetrate into Bechuanaland as well. Great Britain recognized these new organizations and permitted

them all to be incorporated within the Transvaal by 1888; but, after the Boer War, in 1903, the "New Republic" — known as the "Vryheid District" — was transferred, together with the Utrecht District and a part of Wakkerstrom, to Natal, to which Zululand had already been annexed in 1897. And to-day, the minister of native affairs of Natal, with the aid of commissioners and native chieftains, rules these districts.

Meanwhile, aroused by the entrance of Germany into Southwest Africa in 1884, and the pushing of the Boers westward, the Imperial Government placed Basutoland in 1884, Bechuanaland in 1885, and finally Swaziland in 1894, under its protection. A Resident Commissioner was put in control over the first immediately; but the others were administered for a time by the South African Company — Bechuanaland till 1891 and Swaziland till 1903. They are all now under resident commissioners, subject to the High Commissioner of South Africa, and ruled through the native headmen and chiefs, of whom there are usually one paramount chieftain and a number of lesser rulers responsible for their respective districts or tribes to the head chief. Local customs, rights, tribal government, languages, and methods of life, trade, and agriculture have been carefully preserved. England has been well served and her resident commissioners have been uniformly able, tactful, broad-minded men, inspiring the confidence and preserving the good will of both the people and the chiefs. This system of rule has been very successful among the native states in South Africa, and it has given to these protectorates many years of peace, fair prosperity, and steady development, and removed a serious thorn from the side of the colonies. In addition 300,000 square miles, approximately, have been added to the British possessions in South Africa.

While this movement was in progress, another of far

more consequence for South Africa was inaugurated and brought through tribulation to a successful issue. North of the Transvaal and the Limpopo River lay the two native districts of Matabeleland and Mashonaland covering an area of 144,000 square miles and reaching to the Zambesi River. Beyond that great waterway, a vast unoccupied region stretched away northward to the Congo and Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. Cecil Rhodes, who later earned the title of "empire-builder," was among the first to see the possibilities of this great hinterland and what its possession might mean to the British South Africa of the future; and he conceived the project of taking over the habitable portion of the immense plateau between the Limpopo and Zambesi Rivers for Britain, with the hope that it and the vast tropical region behind it would ultimately become part of a strong and prosperous Federal Union of South Africa.

It was due to his influence largely that the way to the north was kept open by the annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885; but he knew it was out of the question to persuade the Home or the Cape Government to undertake such an extensive policy of expansion. He, therefore, determined to work out the enterprise through a commercial company, being convinced, through observation and the expert advice of such men as John Hays Hammond, that the mineral and agricultural wealth of the region would in time make the venture a paying one. Accordingly, Rochfort Maguire, accompanied by Messrs. C. D. Rudd and F. R. Thompson, went into Matabeleland and secured a "concession," on October 30, 1888, from King Lo Bengula, who ruled over that district and Mashonaland, giving them full mining rights and the ownership of all metals and minerals in his kingdom in exchange for 1000 Martini rifles, 100,000 cartridges, £500, and a subsidy of £100 per month.

The British South African Company was then formed with a capital of £1,000,000, under the presidency of the late Duke of Abercorn. Among the original directors were the Duke of Fife, Lord Gifford, Alfred Beit, Cecil Rhodes, and other prominent and able British financiers. A formal petition was prepared asking for imperial recognition and protection, and on October 29, 1889, the British Government issued a charter¹ formally incorporating the British South African Company and endowing it with political as well as commercial powers. On February 3, 1891, a deed of settlement was issued authorizing the company to explore, colonize, and develop the country between the Limpopo and Zambesi Rivers; and the organization was ready for business.

The same year the "Pioneer Column" of first settlers — numbering five hundred — left Fort Tuli, on the southeast corner of Matabeleland, for the plateau of Mashonaland which they reached on August 13, 1891, after a one thousand-mile march, four hundred of which was through dense forests. They found the "promised land beautiful but an open waste," as Mr. Rhodes said two years later; and the difficulties of settlement and of opening up the country in an undeveloped region, cut off from civilization, seventeen hundred miles from the sea, where food cost £70 per ton, were many and serious. However, headquarters were established at Fort Salisbury and after six months of isolation, rain, and discomfort, the most serious phase of the occupation was passed. A second "concession" was secured from Lo Bengula by Edward A. Lippert on November 17, 1891, giving the company the right to lease farms and land and to levy taxes and rents for one hundred years, for the payment of £1000 down and an annuity of £500. Dr. Jameson (now Sir Starr and the recently elected presi-

¹ Hertslet, *Com. Treaties*, vol. 18, p. 134.

dent of the company) was persuaded by Rhodes to become the first administrator of the new protectorate. Soon a large influx of new settlers ensued; and the towns of Salisbury and Victoria were laid out. The following year — 1892 — Mr. Rhodes himself visited the country and assisted in a complete reorganization of the financial and administrative system, so that it became possible for Dr. Jameson to strike a favorable balance in his accounts the following year.

Disputes and difficulties between the natives and colonists over land, cattle, and pasturage led to the great raid of the Matabeles into Mashonaland in July, 1893. This was followed by the successful campaign of Major Forbes into Matabeleland, the death of Major Wilson, and the flight and death of King Lo Bengula in the last part of the year. With the occupation of Matabeleland, came the incorporation of that district within the sphere of the company's activities; and in 1894, the whole region between the Limpopo and the Zambesi Rivers was organized under one government, known as Southern Rhodesia, which consisted of an administrator and a council of four members, nominated for three and two years respectively by the company with the approval of Great Britain. In 1898, when the white population had grown to about 14,000 persons, Orders in Council were issued creating Southern Rhodesia a separate protectorate and adding to its governmental organs a legislative council numbering ten, of whom six (including the Resident-Commissioner) were nominated by the company and four elected by the people. A movement was soon set on foot to increase the popular representation and steadily fostered, until in 1903, it was decreed that seven should be appointed and seven elected. The population has increased as well as the demand for popular control, until there are now about 25,000 people in the pro-

tectorate and they elect twelve out of twenty members of the Legislative Council.

In the mean time another movement was starting in the North. The African Lakes Company, directed by the energetic Moir brothers, undertook to open to British trade and British missions the district lying to the south and west of Lake Nyasa and brought to the notice of the world by Livingstone's explorations. Trading stations were opened, beginning at Karonga; and the representatives of the London Missionary Society arrived in 1887. Through the assistance of Captain Lugard, Alfred Swann, Sir Alfred Sharpe, and H. H. Johnston (now Sir Harry), who was Commissioner of this region under the South African Company (including northern Rhodesia) from 1891 to 1895, the slave trade was stamped out, treaties made with the natives up to Lake Tanganyika and west to Msiri and the Congo, and a district six hundred miles long and seventy miles wide marked out for British control. On February 12, 1893, a protectorate was officially proclaimed over this region which was designated as "British Central Africa," but has been known since 1907 as British Nyasaland. In the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 11, 1891, the boundaries between Portuguese East Africa and the new claims of Great Britain in South Central Africa were delimited and Britain's right to Nyasaland and Rhodesia recognized. In the Anglo-German treaties of 1890 and 1893, the German Empire officially ratified England's claims in this region, and the boundary between them and German Southwest and German East Africa was marked.

The extension of British authority to the great plateau of Tanganyika and Northeastern Rhodesia followed rapidly, through the able efforts of Major P. D. Forbes and Robert Codrington, the latter being administrator of Northeastern Rhodesia from 1898 to 1907. Abercorn was founded in

1893, Fife in 1895, numerous treaties arranged with the native chiefs, slave raids and the practice of mutilation stopped, peace established between the tribes, and the headquarters of the company's government removed from Blantyre to Fort Jameson. Late in 1898, Codrington, at the invitation of the "White Fathers," who had been prevailed upon by King Mwamba to take land and set up a mission near his capital earlier in the year, sent M'Kinnon and Young to Kasama and secured a protectorate over the Awemba—the most powerful tribe of the whole region.¹ Within a year he succeeded in organizing the whole northeastern province into nine fiscal and magisterial districts and in placing the administration on a sound and permanent basis. And in 1899 and 1900, the entire region, reaching from the Zambesi to the borders of the Congo and German East Africa, was divided and organized into two separate protectorates known as Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia, the definite boundary between Northwestern Rhodesia and Portuguese West Africa being finally adjusted in the Barotse treaty between England and Portugal in 1905.²

Thus, and chiefly through the efforts of the South African Company, a vast territory—amounting approximately to 479,376 square miles—had been secured for England. If we add to this the area—293,252 square miles—of the three other protectorates controlled by Britain—Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—we get the total of 772,628 square miles; and putting with this the territory of the Union, the grand total of land under the British flag in South Africa is 1,245,812 square miles, or nearly one half the size of the United States, not

¹ Gouldsbury and Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, Arnold, 1911.

² Hertslet, *Com. Treaties*, vol. 24, p. 936.

counting Alaska and the outside territories — certainly a wonderful expansion from the insignificant settlements under the shadow of Table Mountain.

The value of the vast Rhodesian territories is no longer problematical. The great mineral wealth and agricultural possibilities have been thoroughly tested and proved. The foresight and wisdom of Mr. Rhodes have been more than justified in the results. The South African Company has gone on pouring money into the country until their report for March, 1913, showed that £7,500,000, or approximately \$37,500,000, had been invested there. They are not at all disturbed that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of their company is nearly here without a single penny having been paid in dividends. The fact that a respectable excess of income over expenditures has been achieved since the year 1909-10 does not signify greatly. It is the way in which the immense capital of the company has been administered that counts; and a glance at the map of South Africa shows how efficiently this has been done — the history of the company is writ large upon the face of the country. A railway system has been built across the Rhodesias and connected with the Transvaal and Cape Colony systems, and with the Portuguese line running down to the port of Beira. Roads have been built; public improvements inaugurated and completed; farms mapped out and settlers assisted to occupy them; towns and cities with all modern conveniences and advantages have arisen; and the civilization of the white man brought to the heart of the Dark Continent. The foundations of British rule and of the commercial and economic development of the Rhodesias have been laid thoroughly and well; and the directors and friends of the company, with the white citizens of Rhodesia, may face the future with confidence.

Southern Rhodesia, with its 144,000 square miles of fer-

tile plateaus, uplands, and favorable climatic conditions, is a suitable country in every respect for the white man, and some day will support a large population of European extraction. During the first fifteen to eighteen years of its history, the influx of whites was comparatively slow; but recently the immigration has steadily increased until the population for 1912 exceeded that of 1911 by thirteen per cent. At this rate it will not be much over a decade before the country will be thoroughly settled and on a self-governing basis. Because of complicated interests and problems, such as the ownership of land, the introduction of settlers, and control of railways and their rates, it is impossible for the company to separate its commercial from its governmental powers. It is the present policy of the company, however, to continue giving an increased share of political power to the citizens until the people are able to rule and the country is ready for self-government. In March, 1914, the people voted by a substantial majority in favor of the continuance of charter government. The result of the recent anti-charter agitation and of the visit of Sir Starr Jameson has been to convince the people of the sincerity and integrity of the South African Company; to assure them of increased popular control and to make it apparent to all that no better means for promoting the future development and prosperity of the company can be found than in the new proposals of the company. For the present all serious thought of union with South Africa is abandoned, out of fear of the grave economic and political complications that would be sure to follow such a move. It is even possible that a new independent state may arise in the North if the conditions in the South African Union do not improve very materially in the future.

In spite of the slowness of its early development and the unfavorable criticism and prophecies of the first eight years,

the country has proved to be rich in minerals. Gold, diamonds, copper, lead, coal, chrome iron, and asbestos have been found in abundance; and the mineral output of 1912 was £2,890,757 greater than that of 1911. Gold mining, which produced only £83,000 between 1890 and 1898, increased steadily until at the end of twenty-three years' labor £22,250,000 of gold have been shipped to London, and in 1912 one company at least was paying thirty per cent on its capital. Tobacco-raising and general agriculture are profitable; but this is not a poor man's country, only settlers with from £700 to £1000 being encouraged to come out. The most promising crop now is citrus fruits, the production of which increased from £450,000 in 1911-12 to £1,397,000 in 1912-13, and a great future is predicted in this industry. One of the leading sources of wealth and industry in the near future will be cattle-raising. Since 1906, the number of cattle in Rhodesia has increased 264 per cent; and Earl Grey and others who have visited the country within the past year are enthusiastic over the conditions and prospects, mentioning especially one herd of 25,000 cattle in excellent condition. The Company has a ranch of 500,000 acres in the Gwelo district and has brought Mr. Walsh, of twenty-six years' experience in Texas, to instruct the whites and natives in the science of making ranches and of cattle-raising. It has been estimated that there are 50,000,000 acres of unalienated land available for ranching in both northern and southern Rhodesia, which would support 25,000,000 head of cattle. The chief work in the development of the country has, thus far, necessarily been in the hands of large corporations such as the Transvaal-Rhodesian Estates owning 37,698 acres in Rhodesia and a half interest in four estates of 298,430 acres in the Gwanda and Tuli districts; the Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia controlling the other half-interest in the four estates

just mentioned and sixty-six additional farms containing 1,239,000 acres, and the equally prosperous Rhodesian Gold Mining and Investment Company. But the time has now come when the individual investor, farmer, and ranchman of limited capital can enter the field with every chance of success. Indeed, the number of such colonists is increasing rapidly every year — though as yet not fast enough to suit the hopes of the South African Company; and it is very desirable that it should.

The protectorates of Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia, since August 17, 1911, united in the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, lie in the tropics and at a much lower level than of Southern Rhodesia. The difference is noticeable as soon as one crosses the Zambesi. Large areas will always have to be left to the black man and the tsetse fly; but there remains considerable territory suitable to the use of the white man. The mineral wealth is probably the greatest asset of this vast region. This has been fully demonstrated by the Zambesi Exploring Company and the Tanganyika Concessions Limited, which have financed and built the Rhodesia-Katanga Junction Railway from Broken Hill to Katanga, and are constructing the Banguello Railway from Lobito Bay on the West Coast through Portuguese West Africa to Katanga and the headwaters of the Congo. These roads are already yielding a good profit on all the sections opened; and the Rhodesia-Katanga Company, seventy per cent of which is owned by the Tanganyika Concessions Limited, is now bringing out from ten to twelve thousand tons of copper yearly and delivering it in Europe at about £37 per ton.

In the Rhodesias, as well as in the provinces of the Union, one tremendous problem faces the governing bodies — and probably always will do so — the status and care of the immense black population which in the Rhodesias alone totals

approximately 1,600,000 souls. They furnish the manual labor of the country and therefore form an important asset of its wealth. Many of them own and till large tracts of land from which they ought not to be driven. Just how far they ought to be trained, educated, and cared for is still a question; but their advance in many sections, since the coming of the whites, has certainly been remarkable. Their lives and property must be protected, and their interests conserved: but, while the colonists are evidently well-intentioned toward the aborigines, they are determined not to give them the ballot, but rather to make South Africa a white man's country. The Natives' Lands Bill — by some called the "Natives' Charter" — passed at the last session by the Union Parliament, in 1913, suggests the probable direction that the future general policy of the South African administrators in native affairs will take. This provides for the gradual introduction of territorial segregation of whites and blacks, including the removal of some 900,000 negro squatters on public lands to lands set aside for blacks and forbidding in the future all new leases, exchanges, or purchases of lands between natives and Europeans, and squatting or giving labor in exchange for land. If this plan is carried out carefully and justly, it will probably result in many advantages to both parties. Yet it is only one step in the great and vital work of outlining a comprehensive policy for the preservation of the proper relationship between both elements of the population, and for the protection of the interests and future development of all concerned. This is imperative, and bears a vital relationship to the future peace, prosperity, and welfare of South Africa; for, as Viscount Gladstone said in a recent address, "The problem is not how to make this a white or a black man's country — it should be both — but how to adjust the relations between black and white."

The old racial animosity and composition still exists within the Union, but it probably will not be a serious menace in the future. The leaders of both political parties are making every effort to overcome racial prejudices, to avoid conflicts along the old British and Boer lines, and to concentrate their energies along lines of national development, unity, and progress. Their success is evidenced by the bills passed at the last session of the Union Parliament providing for large railway extensions, public works, the equalization of taxation throughout the Union, and the organization and expansion of the national finances. The recent attack of General Herzog upon the Prime Minister — General Botha — and attempt to arouse a racial partisanship in politics will probably not have serious consequences. At any rate, it will not be the British colonists who will fan such a movement; and, in process of time, — the healer of many ailments, — this racial drawback to complete harmony and unity of effort in South Africa will cease to be a serious impediment to progress and stable government.

CHAPTER IX

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

ALGERIA, ORAN, AND CONSTANTINE

THE opening of the nineteenth century found all the commercial nations of the world paying tribute to the Bashaw of Tripoli, the Bey of Tunis, and the Dey of Algiers in order to secure the safety of their subjects and their trading vessels on the Mediterranean Sea. These Arab potentates, as well as the rulers of Morocco, Oran, and Constantine, had all secured a practical independence from Turkish domination, but governed territories of uncertain extent and limited natural resources. Morocco and Tunis possessed reigning families of importance, enjoying absolute power, but the heads of the others were feudal lords owing their power chiefly to the election and the support of tribal chieftains. The jurisdiction of all these rulers was very largely confined to the seaports and their immediate hinterland. The regions of the interior, composed of mountain ranges, high arid plateaus, deserts, and oases, were inhabited by wild and warlike tribes of Kabyles, Berbers, and Touaregs whose chieftains paid tribute to and recognized the authority of the seaboard monarchs only when compelled to do so by a strong hand or a military demonstration. Only two of the capital cities — Fez in Morocco and Constantine — were in the interior. The others lay on the coast. And the boundaries between these little states were ill-defined; their administration in every case inefficient and corrupt; their income uncertain, often dependent to a large degree upon the booty from the ex-

peditions of their admirals — or Barbary pirates as they were known to Europe; their lands undeveloped or but poorly cultivated.

Since the days of Mohammedan expansion under the successors of Mohammed, all of these states had been dominated by the Arabs whose numbers and importance increased after the fall of Granada and the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. The entire population of North Africa was Mohammedan and led by two classes of influential men: the marabouts, or religious wise men, and the tribal chiefs who were warriors. Men with military protection, or those who could obtain it, got on fairly well; but the lot of the common man was hard. Justice and security were practically unknown, and nowhere were life and property safe. Robbery and brigandage were as common on land as piracy on the sea — and had been for four centuries. Trade languished; and it was impossible to make any headway in agriculture or industry. The towns and villages were groups of unsanitary plaster dwellings, scantily furnished; and the masses led a hand-to-mouth existence, constantly subject to the rapacity and corruption of rulers and chieftains.

Most of the European states, and the United States as well, had relations of a desultory sort with these Barbary states, and, early in the nineteenth century, finally forced the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to respect their flags and protect their citizens. But it remained for France to start the movement for the reoccupation of northern Africa by Europe. This action of the French was not, however, the result of any preconceived plan of colonial or national expansion. It was rather the result of a political accident; and the policy pursued in the early stages by the French authorities demonstrated clearly their lack both of colonial experience and of a definite, enlightened colonial

program. In the treaty of December 28, 1801, with Algiers, the French representatives secured promises that French subjects would no longer be enslaved; their property already seized by the Algerian Government would be restored and thereafter protected; and their financial claims properly adjusted. The Dey of Algiers and France were to exchange consular agents; and the representative of the latter country was to be accorded a position of honor and to enjoy a complete supervision over all French subjects in Algeria.


The memory of a Barbary monarch, however, was as short and his word as fickle as his character was unstable. In a few years the terms of the treaty were forgotten or ignored and the French found it practically impossible to secure the fulfillment of Algerian financial obligations. Little respect was paid to their authority or to the rights of French subjects, and the protests of their consul were unheeded. At length, in 1827, when the French agent attempted to press the claims of his Government against two Algerian Jews, he was deliberately and publicly insulted by the Dey Hussein himself. No adequate apology or reparation being offered by the Algerian ruler, the French navy blockaded his seaport capital for three years without results. Finally, exasperated into drastic action, the French Government sent out an expedition of 40,000 men from Toulon, which landed successfully on June 14 and took the city of Algiers on July 4, 1830.

Wellington, then British Premier, tried to extract a promise from the French authorities that this occupation would not be permanent. Polignac, however, declined to commit his Government to any definite policy, for Charles X was hoping to brace up his tottering throne by popular military successes in northern Africa. Thus it came about that the French occupation was from the outset purely a

military affair, and their first North African possession a military colony. They deposed the Dey and proceeded to take control of his possessions by force of arms, without making any serious effort to win the confidence of his people or to conciliate their chosen leaders. But weary years elapsed and much blood was shed before their ambitions were realized and ere they saw the enormity of their mistake.

In 1830, the regency of Algeria was not very extensive. It included the port and adjoining district of Algiers, the three districts of Titeri immediately to the south, the province of Oran to the west, and that of Constantine to the east — roughly estimated at 60,000 square miles. The Beys of Oran and Constantine and the chiefs of Titeri were under the suzerainty of the Dey of Algiers, but enjoyed a large amount of independence in the administration of their own lands. The capture of the city of Algiers and the seizure of its Dey, therefore, by no means implied the subjugation of the whole regency. The subsequent submission of some of the chiefs of Titeri and the occupation of the ports of Bougie, Mostaganem, and Oran within the next three years failed to improve the position of the French materially. For their control remained limited to the sea-coast, and the French authorities became involved in a contest with the chieftains and tribes of the hinterland which lasted seventeen years before the whole country was subdued, and forty years ere it was completely pacified and ready for a civil régime.

At the start, the advantage lay with the French, as the Arab leaders were scattered, disunited, and unprepared, but political intrigues at home and the lack of a definite colonial policy by those in authority (who found it difficult to obtain any substantial support for the occupation of territory in northern Africa) prevented them from making



use of this favorable circumstance. Meanwhile, the French forces carried on a few half-hearted campaigns, and the land was given over to anarchy and desolation, for numbers of the local mountain chieftains took advantage of the situation to prey upon the French outposts and on the helpless inhabitants. The successes of the French on the coast and their tentative attempts to push into the

interior aroused the rulers of the hinterland to concerted action, at length, through the fear of losing their own independence. After appealing for aid in vain to the Sultan of Morocco and Mehi-ed-Deen, a noted sage and chief of Oran, they elected as their leader and Dey of Algiers Abd-el-Kader, the gifted son of Mehi-ed-Deen, on November 21, 1832; and thereafter the contest was conducted with energy and skill. For the new Dey was a man of intelligence, of force, and of decision, who, though preferring a life of retirement and religion, soon gave evidence of possessing military abilities of a high order.

In a short time the French were compelled to recognize his genius and were glad to conclude a truce in 1834,¹ which confirmed their right to maintain French governors in the ports of Oran, Mostaganem, and Arzeu, and admitted a French agent into Mascara, the old capital of Oran, where Abd-el-Kader had taken up his headquarters. Unfortunately this peace was of brief duration; but, after several reverses, the French agreed to a partition of the country in the treaty of Tafna² on May 30, 1837. They received in Oran the littoral districts of Mostaganem, Mazagran, Oran, and Arzeu and a strip between the river Nakta, Lake Oued-Maleh, and the sea, and in Algeria, the Sahl and the plain of Metijda to Oued Kaddera, the Chiffa and the bend of Mozafren, and thence to the sea. The Dey was to have the administration of the interior regions of Oran and Algeria, including the Titeri districts, Tlemcen, Rachgoun, and the Mechourar. Commerce and immigration were to be free, and protection was to be afforded to persons and property. French consuls were to be admitted into the

¹ E. Rouard de Card, *Traité de la France avec les pays de l'Afrique du nord*, 1907, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

chief cities, and no part of the coast was ever to be ceded to any third power.

The French then turned their attention to the Bey of Constantine, who the previous year had successfully repulsed the attempt of Marshal Clauzel to take his picturesque capital. The Duc de Nemours and General Damrémont led a large and well-equipped army into his province in 1837, and, after a severe struggle, captured Constantine by assault, in spite of its almost impregnable position and excellent fortifications and the death of General Damrémont during the attack. The Bey was deposed and a relative of the Bey of Tunis was installed in his place. The rest of the province was gradually occupied as far as the frontier of Tunis; and, between 1841 and 1843, the country was pacified and numbers of French and other colonists introduced.

The French were far from being satisfied with the situation in Algeria; and, as time went on, the Government of Louis Philippe felt the need of further victories and expansion in North Africa to strengthen its waning prestige. In December, 1840, Marshal Bugeaud was appointed Governor-General of Algeria, and the following year he undertook the conquest of the whole country with a force of forty to one hundred thousand men. Abd-el-Kader called out all his forces and resisted the advance of the French step by step; and when his losses were apparently irreparable, he recruited his armies with fresh levies from the hinterland of his own possessions, Morocco and Constantine. All in vain. The genius of Bugeaud and the Duc d'Aumale, his chief aide and successor as Governor in September, 1847, was too much for him. They defeated him again and again, beginning with the victory of the Duc d'Aumale at Smalah in May, 1843, until he fell back on Morocco as a base of supplies and operations. In 1844, the French

troops crossed the frontier of this neighboring but unfriendly state, and inflicted a decisive defeat upon its sultan Isly on August 19, while their fleet under the command of Prince Joinville was blockading the port of Mogador. And, finally, the Prince of Morocco was induced, on March 18, 1845, to sign a treaty¹ defining the boundaries between his own country and Algeria and depriving Abd-el-Kader of any further assistance from his country or his resources.

Meanwhile, in 1843-44, French forces were occupying Dellys (the last open port of the Bey of Algiers), the high plateaus in the interior of Algeria and Constantine, and were pushing over the mountains to Batna and Biskra to the south. In this way, Abd-el-Kader was cut off gradually from all outside help and hemmed in in the mountains of Oran. Yet he struggled on for two years longer until, completely surrounded and unable to continue the contest, he surrendered to General Lamoricière in December, 1847. Notwithstanding the assurances of his captor that he would be exiled to Alexandria, the mighty warrior was transported as a prisoner to France and kept in confinement till freed by Louis Napoleon in 1852. During the ensuing year, an expedition was sent against the great Kabyles, who had not yet submitted, and the remaining interior districts of Algeria were successfully occupied. The conquest of the country may, therefore, be said to have been complete by August, 1848.

The occupation of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, although it was considered a military triumph, did not add greatly to the glory or the resources of the French nation. On the contrary, it burdened their Government with the administration of an undeveloped colony of doubtful value and uncertain extent, whose Arab inhabitants were improv-

¹ E. Rouard de Card, *Traité de la France avec les pays de l'Afrique du nord*, p. 334.

erished and embittered by the long conflict and whose hill and desert peoples had still to be pacified. It is true that France made her name respected in North Africa and earned a reputation for valor and firmness in the Mussulman world. This, together with her interference in Syria in behalf of the Druses and Maronites, and her attempt to assist Mehemet Ali of Egypt in the crisis of 1840, secured for her an influence in Mohammedan circles unequalled by any other European power for some years. And, by the middle of the century, we find the representatives of all the leading Mussulman states gathered at Paris, such as Sidi-ben-Achache, Minister of Morocco, Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, the Bey of Tunis, and diplomatic agents from Turkey and Persia. Yet in spite of all, and notwithstanding the fact that the French had procured greater protection and security for the Christians in Syria and Turkey and for their own trade and citizens in northern Africa, the position of the French Government was exceedingly precarious. Their hold over the Arabs of Algeria was uncertain and only skin-deep, for it was based solely upon military power; and their influence in the Mohammedan world ephemeral — likely to vanish in a night with any sudden, overwhelming blow to the prowess of French arms or diplomacy.

Algeria was acquired at the cost of 150,000 lives, and the expenditure of \$600,000,000; and for over a quarter of a century afterwards, it remained of little value, but was a constant source of trouble and expense. This was due chiefly to three things — probably impossible for the French to have avoided entirely at that time: a mistaken colonial policy, an ignorance of the fundamental requirements for organizing and developing a colony successfully in northern Africa, and the confused and uncertain state of French home affairs during the whole period. Of her colonial

dealings, which had neither perspective, nor continuity, nor background enough to deserve the name of "policy," Thiers wrote: "It is not colonization; it is not occupation on a large scale; it is not occupation on a small scale; it is not war; but war badly made." From the days of Louis XVIII to the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, there was constant party strife and contention for power in France, to such an extent that every government was compelled to devote much of its energy to the work of maintaining itself in office or of conciliating contending factions. The conflict between the forces of monarchy and constitutionalism was incessant and uncompromising. And conditions were so uncertain, so irritating, and so difficult to control that any progressive internal development was well-nigh impossible. The execution of any continuous and thoroughgoing foreign policy was an equally hopeless task; and it is no wonder that the French statesmen failed to evolve any enlightened and progressive colonial program until the Third Republic had been in operation for ten years.

There is, however, little excuse for the many blunders of the French authorities in Algerian affairs during this long transition period. Life and property within the limits of their North African possessions were fairly safe, and their government cannot be accused of cruelty or injustice. But they neither won the confidence or respect of the inhabitants, nor succeeded in establishing the colony upon a sound basis, either politically or economically. To be sure, the French greatly extended and consolidated their holdings between 1849 and 1871. The oasis of Zaatcha was occupied in 1849; those of Laghouat and Tougourt in 1852 and 1854; the remainder of the Kabyle and Berber districts were subdued in 1856-57; some rebellions were put down; and all the strategic and important places in

the immediate hinterland of high plateaus and desert to the south were placed under French control. So that the French possessions in Algeria finally reached a total of some 184,000 square miles of territory, with a population estimated at a little over 2,000,000; but the colony remained a mere military protectorate. Little improvement took place in the condition of the masses and no material progress was noticeable in the internal development of the country. The chief causes of this unfortunate situation were to be found in the failure of the French to study the whole problem scientifically and their ingenious attempt to adapt French legal and economic systems to African conditions and to graft European methods upon Mohammedan customs.

Nowhere do we find a better example of their numerous blunders than in the policy pursued by the Home Government in the matter of land titles. In order to provide a legal basis for the sale of lands and to encourage French and other European colonization in Algeria, the French authorities adopted a system of land tenure based on European practice, which was in force till 1892, and the main feature of which was an attempt to change all the tribal holdings into state or individual titles, and to make all land alienable. This was a terrible mistake in a country where the individual farmer or landsman has been unable to purchase land and unused to ownership. Its consequences were disastrous; its effect upon the masses pitiful; and most of the land passed into the hands of Jews, capitalists, and speculators. "The land legislation of Algiers," writes M. Piquet, ". . . immortal in its errors and omissions, terrible in its consequences, and which after sixty years of effort and summersaults has ended by avowing its impotence, this legislation will remain as the most characteristic monument of this policy of wild groping, which was the

achievement of the Europeans when two different civilizations came in contact on the soil of Africa.”¹

After the acquisition of Tunis in the early eighties, the policy of the French in Algeria entirely changed. The colony was made a part of the mother country, although retaining its own administration under the Foreign Office in local affairs, save certain general legislation which must have the sanction of the French Chambers. A transformation in the attitude of the home officials toward the territory, its needs, its people, and its prospects was soon noticeable and accompanied by an earnest and able effort to study and comprehend the whole problem. At the same time a new energy and a new life permeated the whole colonial department of the French Republic, and, for the first time in the recent history of her colonies a definite, progressive, and enlightened colonial program was established, embracing all the French activities in North, West, and Central Africa. Its effect was quickly apparent in Algeria, where conditions rapidly improved along all lines. The whole country was divided into administrative divisions, which were subdivided into districts and subdistricts, under trained and capable French officials whose success in promoting public order, public improvements, and the general welfare has been remarkable. Fortunately the French Government has been most liberal in all financial and economic matters and the native taxes have been light. The cities and towns have been greatly improved by sanitation, paved and well-lighted streets, public edifices, and other modern improvements. Railways have been constructed across the country, from Oran and the Moroccan frontier, to Tunis and south to Figuig and Biskra — something over two thousand miles in all — and a splendid network of over eighteen hundred miles of macadamized national roads built,

¹ V. Piquet, *Colonisation Française dans l'Afrique du nord*, 1912, p. 176.

like all the other public improvements, at the expense of the Home Government. It has been estimated that the total expenditure of the French authorities in Algeria reached 4,000,000,000 francs in 1912.

The government of the country is now concentrated in the hands of the Préfet, or Governor-General, who controls the North through a civil administration and the South by means of a military régime. He prepares the annual budget and supervises the work of the departments of State, except those of Justice, Worship, Public Instruction, and the Treasury, which are non-Mussulman and under competent ministers. He is assisted by an executive and an appointive council; and all new imposts and the annual budgets have to be approved by the Superior Council — partly elected and partly appointed — and by the Delegations. Of the last there are three — one to represent the French colonists, one those taxpayers not colonists, and one the natives — all elected to advise and express the approval of their respective constituencies on all matters of taxation. Northern Algeria is divided into seventeen arrondissements and two hundred and sixty-two communes with French officials scattered throughout the country to assist and advise in all matters of local government; and extremely well they perform their duties, in most instances.¹ The southern division is composed of the four territories of Ain Sefra, Ghardaia, Touggourt, and the Sahara Oases, as organized by the decree of August 14, 1905, which are ruled by military officers. The whole colony is policed in a regular manner, the natives being employed wherever practicable. In the mountainous districts and the Sahara, the assistance of native chieftains, the camel patrol, and the army are enlisted.

¹ For detailed description of this colony, see A. Rambaud, *La France coloniale*, 1895, *L'Algérie*, pp. 55-127; O. Réclus, *La France, Algérie et ses colonies*, 1889, 2 vols.; M. Bentham-Edwards, *In French Africa*, 1912.

The last-named force, in addition to some eleven regiments of French regulars, consists in times of peace of two regiments of the Foreign Legion (officered by the French but containing soldiers of all nationalities), four of native Algerian Tirailleurs and four of Spahis (Arab cavalry). In 1912, the total enrollment approximated 56,000 men.

The administration of justice is well and equitably conducted. All minor native cases are adjudicated by the Kadis in courts of the first instance. Appeal is allowed to the French courts, of which there is one in each arrondissement. There are also criminal courts for Europeans, commercial and other tribunals with special and extensive powers. The finances of the state are well managed; and since 1901 Algeria has had a separate budget and all the receipts of its own revenues, the military and naval expenses and the interest on the railway loans being borne by France. In 1904, the full control of the railroads, with a participation in the profits and a subvention of 18,000,000 francs, was turned over to the colonial administration. The trade of the country has risen rapidly, while considerable work has been done to improve agricultural conditions and to induce European and French colonization. The imports, which reached £9,600,000 in 1892, approximated £28,734,000 in 1912—twenty years later, while the exports rose from £9,128,800 to £24,846,000 in the same period; and France has had her reward, for her share in this notable development has never been less than three fourths of the annual trade.

Meanwhile, a movement was set on foot to secure the southern frontier of the colony, and to open a direct connection between it and the French possessions in Senegal and the Sudan. This was necessitated by the constant border troubles arising from the movements of the uncontrolled desert peoples and the attacks of the Touaregs upon

the caravans and French exploring expeditions. After the massacre of the unfortunate Flatters mission in 1881, the French forces began to occupy the oases and strategic points in the Sahara to the south of their North African possessions, beginning with the five villages of the M'Zab in 1882. Then came the advance to Ain Sefra and Tougourt, the occupation of Touat in 1892, and the work of the final mission, which crossed the Sahara and joined hands with the other French missions from Senegal and the French Congo near Lake Chad in 1900.¹ The result of this movement was the acquisition and organization of the Territory of the South, amounting to nearly 140,000 square miles, which since 1901 has been united with Algeria, whose total area is now about 343,500 square miles, and whose population exceeds 5,560,000.

Of this extensive and remarkable country, approximately one third larger than Texas, only some 3,500,000 hectares lying in a number of fertile valleys and plains are at present cultivated. About eight tenths of this acreage in use is devoted to grain, such as wheat, barley, and oats. The greater part of the northern country is mountainous with high arid plateaus and desert stretches, more suitable for grazing and forestry than for agriculture, while the southern portion is nearly all desert except for a few fertile and valuable oases. The chief exports are wine, wheat, sheep, fruit, tobacco, oats, and iron ore, in the order named, the first three being far in excess of the others. Iron, zinc, lead, and copper ore of considerable value have been discovered and are being worked, the entire output in 1909 reaching 21,634,043 francs. The possibilities of future development are excellent; and, since the frontier question has been definitely and finally settled with the acquisition of Morocco in 1911, the position of Algeria is assured and her

¹ See chapter VI, *ante*.

material progress made certain. The colony is, and will continue to be, of undoubted value to France — particularly as a trade center and as an outlet for her own products. Yet, in spite of its remarkable development and the liberality of the Home Government, it should not be forgotten that, as a financial proposition, Algeria does not pay. The debt of the northern district, or the colony proper, in 1906 amounted to over 53,300,000 francs in capital and nearly 108,000,000 in interest and annuities; and its annual expenditures still exceed its revenues by 75,000,000 francs, inclusive of military and extraordinary disbursements.

CHAPTER X

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

TUNISIA

As early as 1824, France had secured by treaty a recognized position for her nationals in Tunis and a favorable commercial agreement. In 1830, she persuaded the Bey to renounce privateering and to admit foreign consuls into his capital. After the occupation of Algiers and Constantine by the French, the boundaries of their colonial possessions in northern Africa were contiguous with those of Tunis; and it became necessary for the French authorities to protect the frontier of their new colony and its trade, as well as their own interests in the regency of Tunis itself. By right of concessions secured from the Bey Mohammed-es-Sadok, through the instrumentality of their able and astute agent in Tunis, Léon Roches, in 1859 and 1861, the French built two telegraph lines, one from the city of Tunis to the frontier of Algeria and the other from the same center to Sousse and Sfax, and connected them with her own Algerian system. She was further given permission to join any part of the Tunisian system with European cables, although the Bey reserved the right to make a similar grant to any other government.

During the next ten years the pacification of Algeria, accompanied as it was by frequent insurrections, occupied completely the attention of the French. Then came the Franco-Prussian War and the troubles and disorders accompanying the establishment of the Third Republic, which precluded any further colonial expansion for the moment.

During the seventies, however, a constant intercourse between Algeria and Tunis was maintained, trade was encouraged, the railway system of Algeria was extended into the neighboring state, and French influence there was materially strengthened. In 1874, M. Roustan, a diplomat of exceptional abilities and energy, was installed as French consular agent in the city of Tunis. He gradually won the confidence of the Bey, while preserving friendly relations with the other consuls, and within six years greatly increased the prestige of France.

Meanwhile, conditions on the Algerian frontier began to create trouble and cause complaint. The boundary line had never been definitely fixed and no extradition treaty existed between the two countries. Murderers, brigands, and other criminals avoided arrest and punishment by crossing the frontier. Robberies, the destruction of property, and the burning of forests were common occurrences. Tribal conflicts were frequent, for these restless and warlike peoples, who preferred a nomad existence and a bandit career, wandered from one side of the border to the other with impunity, and a constant state of disorder and friction prevailed. By 1880, the situation had become intolerable; and in February, 1881, the French consul reported that claims had been entered with the Tunisian Government for the extradition of 24 criminals, for 6170 head of cattle and 100 other animals stolen, and for 300,000 francs to cover losses from robberies, murders, fires, etc. In the same month, word reached Paris that 300 Khroumirs, a wild and warlike people living in the northwest corner of Tunisia, near the sea and Algeria, had crossed the frontier again and were attacking Algerian tribes and villages.

The weakness and inefficiency of the Tunisian Government were notorious. The ruler, a sort of feudal monarch, possessed little real control outside of the coast cities. His

methods of administration were antiquated and his efforts to preserve order often futile, as the more powerful chieftains of the interior had little respect for his authority. From 1859 to 1867, the country had been systematically exploited and robbed, through the work and advice of Mustapha Kasnadar, a former Greek slave and minister of the Beys from 1837 to 1873, who encouraged the rulers in their extravagant tastes and personal indulgence. The land was now overburdened with taxes, impoverished and rebellious; the treasury empty and the financial disorder acute. And the Beys had only been saved from bankruptcy by the work of an International Commission of Finance which, through the prompt introduction of reforms and businesslike methods between 1869 and 1875, reduced the national debt by 35,000,000 francs and the annual interest by nearly 14,000,000 francs.

The position of the Bey was, indeed, critical; and, just at this time, a controversy arose between the French and Italians,¹ which completed his embarrassment and brought matters to a crisis. For some time the Italians had been looking upon Tunis as a legitimate basis for their trade and commercial expansion. In the spring of 1880, a skillful attempt was made to secure certain concessions for a railway and telegraph to the capital city and to head off the growing influence of France in Tunisian affairs. The Italian consul, M. Maccio, and the British agents, Mr. Wood and later Mr. Thomas F. Reade, laboring zealously in the interests of their own states, convinced the Bey that the French were harboring designs of intervention with the object of acquiring control of his country. Accordingly, he ceased his friendly attitude toward the French authorities and became suspicious of their moves. And for a whole year the French tried in vain to secure an indemnity

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1882-83, vol. II, pt. II, pp. 179-331.

for the losses of their subjects along the Algerian frontier, to get permission to cross the frontier in order to punish some of the most offending tribes (although they offered to coöperate with the Bey's troops), to obtain a proper disposition of the Khereddine property purchased from Turkey by French subjects, or a guaranty that their special commercial monopolies would be respected.

It was at this opportune moment that the border difficulties again became acute and the invasion of the Khroumirs, referred to above, took place. At the Congress of Vienna in 1878, Lord Salisbury had assured the French representatives that Great Britain fully understood their need of controlling Tunis and would take no steps to oppose it.¹ The French Government now decided to act promptly and decisively in the interests of their trade and North African possessions. Finding that no serious opposition was likely to be encountered, either from any of the powers or from Turkey, which was loudly claiming a suzerainty over Tunis, the French authorities gave orders for a military expedition. And on May 9, 1881,² M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued a circular letter to the French representatives at European capitals, explaining the reasons for this appeal to force. After describing at length the increasing disorders and troubles on the Algerian-Tunisian frontier, he showed how impossible it was to expect any longer that a definite and satisfactory settlement could be secured through diplomacy alone. The French policy was dictated solely by a desire to safeguard the welfare and safety of Algeria; but lately, he added, "a war has been waged upon all French enterprises in Tunis, and we must have a neighbor who will have the sin-

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1884, vol. I, pt. I, pp. 214-16. Correspondence between M. Waddington and the Marquis of Harcourt.

² *Ibid.*, 1882-83, vol. II, pt. I, p. 357 *ff.*

cere good will for us that we have for him, and who will not yield to foreign suggestions for our injury." He felt, moreover, that there was no good reason why France should not do for Tunis what she was doing for Algeria and what Great Britain was doing for India. "For it is a sacred duty," argued Saint-Hilaire, "which a superior civilization contracts toward less advanced peoples."

Already, early in April, the French had approached the Government of the Bey on the matter of the frontier troubles; and throughout that month a lively exchange of notes took place without result. The Bey sought to prevent the French forces from entering Tunisia by every means in his power except the giving of adequate guaranties that the French demands would be satisfactorily adjusted and their claims met. He tried to postpone their action by assurances that he had sent letters to the chiefs and ordered his own forces to the border to preserve order. Finding the French firm, Mohammed-es-Sadok Bey appealed to Turkey for assistance, and finally, on May 4, to the European powers.¹ But in vain. The French Government, acting upon the advice of M. Grévy, Governor-General of Algeria and commander-in-chief of their North African forces, who claimed that it was imperative to chastise the Khroumirs at once with or without the consent of the Bey of Tunis, had already given the orders for the advance.

An Algerian army, under the command of General Forgemol de Bestquenerd, and numbering 24,000 men, which had been concentrated on the frontier since March 30, entered Tunisia without opposition, on April 24 to 26, in three divisions led by Generals Logerot, Japy, and Delabecque. They defeated the rebellious tribes promptly, restored order in western Tunisia, and occupied Khroumiria. Meanwhile, the French fleet appeared off Tarbarka and Bizerte, and,

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1884, vol. I, p. 159 ff.; *ibid.*, 1882-83, vol. II, pt. I, p. 371 ff.

on May 1, a fourth army of 8000 men under General Bréart was landed without difficulty at the latter port. The forces of General Bréart left Bizerte on May 8, and his advanced column reached Fondouk on the 9th, and Manouba, about two kilometers from the city of Tunis, on the 12th, without meeting serious resistance. The Bey was greatly alarmed and most anxious, not only to prevent the entry of the French into his capital, but also to preserve in the eyes of his subjects and of the world his own prestige and dignity. He, therefore, readily consented to an interview with General Bréart, which was arranged through M. Roustan for four o'clock in the afternoon of May 12. The French general brought with him a special agreement executed earlier by his Government, and demanded its signature at once. Mohammed-es-Sadok at first refused; but, knowing that M. Roustan had ready another royal candidate in the person of Taieb Bey, after considerable hesitation, at six in the evening, he signed the document known as the Treaty of Kasr-es-Said,¹ placing his country definitely and irrevocably under the protection of France.

The French authorities had hoped to achieve this diplomatic triumph without the expense, difficulties, and dangers of an extended military conquest and occupation. Their plans were skillfully laid and executed with promptness and decision, while the greatest care was taken not to arouse the suspicion and hostility of the inhabitants or to estrange the Tunisian tribal leaders. And their success was remarkable. Only one serious uprising occurred. This was led by Ali-ben-Khalifa, a prominent chieftain of the south, who seized the city of Sfax and attempted to arouse the tribes of that region to arms. Sfax, however, was promptly bom-

¹ Rouard de Card, *Traité de la France avec les pays de l'Afrique du nord*, pp. 232-34. For a British summary of the events leading up to this treaty, see *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 73, p. 437 ff.

barded on July 15 by Admiral Garnault and successfully occupied on the 16th and 17th. Ali fled south toward Tripoli. The French followed and took possession of Gabes, the island of Djerba, and the country between Gabes and the Tripolitan border without difficulty. Meanwhile, Generals Forgemol, Logerot, and Étienne were advancing into the interior of the regency; and, on October 27-30, their columns met and took without resistance the old and sacred capital of the country, Kairouan. Thus, by the end of the year, the whole of Tunisia had been quietly and expeditiously occupied without encountering any serious obstacle.

The terms of the treaty of guaranty, signed on May 12, 1881, were very definite in regard to the new French protectorate. The French officers were to occupy such places on the seaboard and frontier as were essential for the establishment of order and security, but their forces were to be withdrawn as soon as the local authorities were in a position to administer the affairs of their districts satisfactorily. The French agreed to protect the person, the dynasty, and the state of the Bey from danger, and guaranteed all his treaties with European powers. In order that these new duties might be properly fulfilled, the Tunisian monarch acquiesced in the appointment of a French Resident-Minister with power to see to the execution of the new treaty and to act as an intermediary between the Bey and all foreign states. The French diplomatic and consular agents were, thereafter, to have the charge and protection of Tunisian interests abroad; and, in return, the rulers of Tunis were not to enter into any international arrangements without previous consultation and agreement with the French Government. A financial reorganization was promised: a military tribute for the insurgent tribes agreed upon; and the importation of arms and munitions of war through the

isle of Djerba, Gabes, or any southern Tunisian port, forbidden, with the announced purpose of preventing contraband in Algeria.

On May 13, the day following the establishment of the French protectorate in Tunisia, Saint-Hilaire sent a circular letter to the powers. While giving assurance that all European treaties with the Bey would be safeguarded, he explained the necessity for this extreme step on the ground that, in addition to rendering further depredations upon Algerian lands impossible, a prompt and firm settlement was imperative by reason of the dangerous fomentation, accompanied by unforeseen complications, arising within the country and caused by the work of hostile influences at the court of the Bey. On June 8, M. Roustan was raised to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and entrusted with powers of an intermediary between the Bey and the representatives of foreign powers. He was followed by Paul Cambon as Resident-General of Tunisia in February, 1882, whose appointment preceded by eight months the death of Mohammed-es-Sadok and the accession of his brother, Ali Bey, on October 28.

Already, on November 20, 1881, Gambetta, then French Premier, and Jules Ferry, influenced by the opinions of Baron de Courcel and Saint-Hilaire, had determined upon the establishment of a thorough-going French rule in Tunisia, the first move toward which was the appointment of Paul Cambon. On March 27, 1883,¹ a law was authorized by Ali Bey establishing a system of French courts in the leading cities, the details of which were provided in the later decrees of April 14, 1883,² and July 9, 1884. This was followed by an ordinance dated May 5, giving these courts jurisdiction over all foreigners who gave up their extra-territoriality. Thereupon, Great Britain in December, 1883,

¹ *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 74, p. 144.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 75, p. 472.

and Italy, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Netherlands in 1884, issued orders abolishing, respectively, their consular jurisdictions in Tunisia. Conditions remained far from satisfactory; and it was evident that the proper adjustments would not take place or the introduction of reforms essential to the development and progress of the country be possible under the existing régime. The French, therefore, decided to strengthen their position and secure the necessary powers to inaugurate a comprehensive reform plan.

On June 8, 1883, Paul Cambon secured a new treaty from the Bey, known as the Convention of Marsa,¹ in which Ali agreed to permit such administrative, judicial, and financial reforms as the French deemed advisable, and the French promised to guarantee loans of 120,000,000 francs on the Consolidated Debt and 17,550,000 francs on the Floating Debt of Tunisia. The interest charge on these loans was to be a first lien on the revenues of the regency, after which were to come the funds for the civil service and the expenses of the Tunisian administration and of the protectorate. Thus was accomplished the final step in the creation of a French protectorate over the dominions of the Bey of Tunis. Gambetta's saying that the configuration of the French coasts and the establishment of French rule in Algeria had made the Mediterranean, and the western Mediterranean especially, their "scene of action," was at last realized. The lines of French expansion in North Africa had been definitely determined, and the security of the French position in Algeria assured by the acquisition of Tunisia. It was a costly affair, however, the French exchequer being drawn upon for over \$12,600,000 in the years 1881 and 1882 alone.

¹ Rouard de Card, *Traité de la France avec les pays de l'Afrique du nord*, pp. 235-36; *Brit. and For. St. Papers*, vol. 74, p. 743.

Before the French could feel secure in their North African possessions, however, much remained to be done within Tunisia itself. They had learned a great lesson in Algeria; and, instead of attempting to impose any French system of law or government upon the country, the French authorities worked out the necessary reforms in finance, justice, and administration with the local customs, methods, and institutions as a basis. A system of French supervision, similar in theory to that of the British in Egypt, was imposed quietly but effectively upon every branch of the state and local public service. So far-reaching and minute is this oversight that nothing can escape their notice, no law be enacted or public act performed without their knowledge.

By the decrees of April 22, 1882, November 10, 1884, and June 23, 1885, the position and powers of the Resident-General were definitely determined. While responsible directly to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was entrusted with an extensive discretionary authority and a wide freedom of action. He has command of all the naval and military forces of Tunisia, approves all general legislation and that affecting French colonists, and presides over the cabinet of the Bey, whom he serves as Minister of Foreign Affairs and whom he counsels on all financial, administrative, or other reforms. On February 4, 1885, the office of Secretary-General was created to relieve the Resident-General of a constantly increasing mass of detail work. The French incumbent of this new position passes on all the correspondence of the Premier, directs the details of the whole administration in his name, publishes the laws and keeps the public records. The ministry consists of nine directors, seven French and two native, holding the usual portfolios of finance, justice, interior public works, foreign affairs, instruction, etc. The country has been gradually divided into administrative districts, totaling thirteen by

1899, over each of which is a French civil controller who speaks Arabic, and, while acting as intermediary between the government and the local rulers (Kaid and Sheiks) and keeping himself in the background, superintends all the acts of the chiefs of his district, reads their correspondence, and gives advice on all matters.¹

The old local subdivisions were retained as far as possible, but some readjustments were necessary. There are now thirty-eight instead of eighty "Kaidats." The civil functions in these subdistricts are divided between the Kaid, who represents the central government and administers the political, judicial, and financial affairs, and the Sheiks, who are elected by the tribes and have charge of the collection of the taxes and the maintenance of public order. In the south and on the frontier of Tripoli, the French military commanders have special authority over the Sheiks and natives. An important feature of the new régime, since 1907, has been the "Conférence Consultative," composed of twelve members each from the commercial, financial, and other French organizations in Tunis, and of sixteen natives (including one Jew) appointed by the Government, which discusses questions of national importance and the annual budget. In 1910 a "Conseil supérieur du Gouvernement" was established, consisting of the members of the ministry, the heads of the public service, and three representatives from each section of the "Conférence," the native and French members of which have sat separately since April 27, 1910.

The reform of the finances was undertaken promptly. Trained French financiers were loaned to the Bey; a regular national budget formed; much useless expenditure eliminated; and the entire public debt refunded into one loan in 1884 and guaranteed by France. The annual govern-

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1890, vol. II, pt. IV, p. 323 ff.

mental receipts were raised from 5,500,000 francs in 1885 to 8,000,000 in 1899, and approximately to 49,275,000 in 1911, while the expenses were gradually adjusted and reduced till they came well within the income of the state, being only 45,749,000 francs in 1911. The taxes, also, were revised to meet the conditions and resources of the people and the country; many irritating abuses and inconveniences removed; and the methods of collection reorganized and freed from graft and severity — all without any great loss to the annual revenues. The conditions of land tenure were greatly improved by the law of 1885 affecting titles to all the land in Tunisia and removing many causes of complaint and obstacles to the development of the country.

Public order and security were established throughout the land, and the prosperity of the whole protectorate has been remarkable. Over a hundred thousand people fled into Tripoli at the time of the French invasion, but within a few years all except some three hundred had returned. Numerous public improvements have been introduced, including telegraphs, telephones, posts, government buildings, schools, hospitals, over 2500 miles of splendid national roads and 949 miles of railway. The substantial progress of Tunisia is shown nowhere better than in the development of its trade. In 1885, the total of its exports and imports amounted only to about \$9,200,000; but twenty-five years later — in 1910 — this total had multiplied approximately fivefold, reaching \$45,179,000. About one half of the imports in this year came from France, one eighth from Algeria and Great Britain, and one twentieth from Italy. Of the exports, France again received about one half, but Italy was favored with nearly one fifth, while one tenth went to England and one twentieth to Algeria. The chief exports are grain, phosphates, and a goodly product of cattle, esparto grass, olive oil, and lead, iron, and zinc ore. The

leading imports include cotton goods, iron, hardware, flour, and machinery. While the French attempts at colonization and irrigation have not yielded as yet any noteworthy results, — only about 1,000,000 hectares being cultivated at present out of a possible 12,000,000, — a good deal of French and Italian capital has been invested in the country to the great improvement of trade and other conditions generally. The chief credit for all this striking transformation and progress must be attributed to the skill and tact of the French officials and to the adaptability of the new administration. M. Piquet expressed what is apparent to every intelligent traveler in North Africa to-day, when he wrote: "It is impossible not to be struck with the happy results of the marvelous suppleness of the Tunisian administrative system."

Since 1881, France has reorganized her administration in Algeria until it is as progressive and enlightened as in Tunisia. Just at present she is busily engaged applying the general principles of her Tunisian system to her new protectorate of Morocco. And, when this work is finished, the French Republic will possess a splendid colonial empire in North Africa, organized upon a sane and progressive basis, and ruled as well as any European protectorate or colony in the world. The area of Tunisia is about 46,000 square miles; and, with Algeria, the French territory amounts to 389,500 — a little less than the 400,000 square miles controlled by Great Britain in Egypt and the 406,000 owned by Italy in Tripoli. Yet this is not very far from twice the size of the French Republic or the German Empire. With Morocco, the French will possess a grand total of 608,500 square miles (a little less than the kingdom of Persia) — about one half greater in area than the regions administered by the other two European powers with whom she now shares the control of the North African littoral.

CHAPTER XI

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

MOROCCO

“THE devil ships of the Nazarene nations came again and again to the bay of Tanjah to see if the Prince of the Faithful were indeed dead, as rumor so often stated.”

A Moorish tradition relates that Allah, when He created the world, called all the nations of the earth together and gave unto each the choice of one good thing for its kingdom. Some selected fertile lands ; some delightful climate ; others beautiful scenery ; but the English alone asked for good government. The failure of Mohammedan states to solve the problem of self-rule has become a proverb ; and Morocco is no exception to the rule. Indeed, the misgovernment, the corruption, and the lack of security and public order in this African state, extending through a long period of years, not only involved her sultans in frequent disputes with their European neighbors, but also made the “ Morocco question ” one of the chief sources of European diplomatic activity during the past quarter of a century.

Morocco, or Moghreb-el-Aksa, — the Key of the West, — is, by reason of its fertility, its natural resources, and its geographical position, the most desirable of the North African countries. It is slightly larger than France, being equal in area to the State of Pennsylvania plus Cuba, and has a population of about 5,000,000. The country is protected by the Atlas ranges from the winds, storms, and heat of the desert. The climate is delightful and the soil of the valleys and plains exceedingly rich. Agriculture is

now one of the chief occupations of the inhabitants; and there is no reason why Morocco cannot become a great grain-producing region. Every known variety of vegetable and grain can be raised there, and it could easily supply all the markets of Europe with early spring vegetables.

The mountain pastures are among the finest grazing districts of the world and the sheep industry is already extensive. In 1911, \$1,178,225 worth of wool and \$1,594,150 worth of hides and skins were exported under unfavorable conditions.¹ With proper methods for the development of these industries, with adequate protection for life and property, and with suitable transportation facilities, the trade of Morocco could easily be trebled or quadrupled within a few years. Regular steamer service has been established by English, French, and German companies during the past ten years; and the total trade of Morocco, which remained practically stationary in the decade prior to 1896, rose from \$13,000,000 in that year to over \$23,600,000 in 1906-07.²

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Great Britain controlled the larger share of this commerce — about 40 per cent — while France came next with 20 per cent, and Germany third with 9 per cent. In recent years Germany has made determined efforts to increase her trade, and has underbid the English and Spanish, whose percentages have fallen, while her own rose to 12 per cent in 1906.³ Great quantities of cheap goods and utensils have been imported by Germany, sometimes even stamped with the names of English mercantile or manufacturing centers.

¹ The exportation of these commodities was nearly equal to the figures for 1911, before the civil war in Morocco during 1907-08, and the subsequent troubles, occurred.

² By 1909, this total had reached \$29,572,000, in spite of the civil war; and \$43,597,000 by 1911, notwithstanding the still unsettled condition of the country, while the report for 1912 shows a further increase of 27.5 per cent.

³ It was only 9.5 per cent again in 1909.


On the other hand, France, with skillful generalship and persistent, enlightened effort, has outdistanced all competitors. Her share of the entire trade in 1906 was over 41 per cent, while England retained 32 per cent,¹ and Spain 4.8 per cent. Through her superior position in Algeria, the Sahara, and Senegal, France possesses unrivalled advantages for trade with Morocco; and she is destined to secure more and more of it as time passes. Her citizens have already invested above 30,000,000 francs there, and these claims must be cared for and protected.

The topography of the country has exerted a great influence upon the history and government of Morocco. The state is crossed by a number of mountain chains which have effectively divided it into several distinct provinces, and prevented, thus far, all efforts to promote a real unity. Tribal independence, local jealousies, and personal rivalries have been encouraged and perpetuated. These natural divisions gave rise to the two capitals of Marrakesh and Fez, and the minor principalities of Sus, Taflet, and the Riff. This separateness has been further accentuated by the lack of good roads and of modern means of transportation and communication.

Over various parts of the empire, the control of the Sultan has been uncertain and often merely nominal. The more powerful rulers have succeeded in maintaining a real supremacy over the strong tribal chieftains, frequently calling them to account with a ruthless hand. The weaker sultans have, however, sometimes gone for years without having been able to collect the customary tribute. In recent times, foreigners and natives have been afforded a precarious protection when in districts under the immediate supervision of the imperial authority. But elsewhere life

¹ In 1911, the proportion was: France 40 per cent, Great Britain 26.4 per cent, and Spain 13.77 per cent.

and property have had no security, and the natives have been compelled to buy protection, as in mediæval times, from powerful chieftains or from influential government officials, or to put themselves in some way under the mantle



NORTHWEST AFRICA

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| --- Spanish zones according to the Treaty of 1912 | French territory |
| ■ Tangier neutral zone | ■ Morocco |
| ■ Spanish territory | |

of foreign powers. In many cases it has been practically impossible for the sovereigns to enforce their decrees or introduce reforms; and Mulai-el-Hasan, father of the present sultan, lost his life marching to Tafilet to put down a rebellion in 1894.

Besides the strength of the local authorities, favored by the natural features of the country and the tribal condi-

tions, the peculiar position of the Shareefian or royal family and the method of government contributed materially to the weakness of the empire.

There are three Shareefian families, but the right of succession is restricted to one — the Filali Shareefs of Tafilet. No regular law or custom of succession exists, but the new Sultan must be a relative of the old. Usually the old sovereign designates some member of his family whom he considers the best qualified ; but the office is elective, and no succession is legal without the consent and vote of the family council and of the Ulemas — the legal representatives of the religious orders at Fez. The other branches of the royal family — the Idrees Shareefs of Fez and of Wazzan — have a vote. They cannot rule, but no one can ascend the throne without their approval. Their social and political position is one of great importance ; and they are really more respected by the masses than the sultans themselves. At present they are under the protection of France — the Idrees Shareefs of Wazzan being particularly friendly with the French ; and their position cannot be interfered with by the reigning family. On the contrary, they have had to be constantly conciliated by the Filali Shareefs and have been, therefore, often a hindrance rather than an aid to good government.

The government of Morocco was absolute in theory till 1912, there being no fundamental laws or constitution to hold the sovereign in check ; but the Sultan was far from being a despot. The free exercise of his powers was hampered on all sides by custom and restrictions. Not only was he unable to enforce his will against the great Shareefian families and the powerful tribal chieftains, but he was also continually at the mercy of his Vizier or Prime Minister, who in wealth and influence has often been superior to the ruler himself. The Government was administered through

a group of six ministers of whom the Grand Vizier was the chief. If these administrators were corrupt — which has happened often in the past — it was possible to remove them only by a cabinet crisis, which involved intrigue and a display of force, resulting in the imprisonment and death of the ministers and the sequestration of their property.

A systematic plan for the administration of public affairs had never been evolved ; nor did the methods employed in the management of matters of state attain any high degree of efficiency or intelligence. The court of the Sultan had always been a center of great corruption and the ruler himself a legitimate object of prey for the unscrupulous. Nothing could be accomplished without a resort to intrigue and bribery, or to an occasional display of force in the shape of cruel and inhuman punishments of rebellious Kaid, or of other officials who had betrayed or defied or disobeyed the monarch. Every public service had its price or its financial reward, and the most trusted officials of the empire did not hesitate to rob their master shamelessly on every hand, as in the case of Abd-el-Aziz, and in the end to betray him when nothing more was to be gained by serving him. The sultans for the most part were as skillful in the methods of deceit and intrigue as their subjects. For thirty years — 1880 to 1910 — they successfully evaded all the efforts of the European states to induce them to introduce effective governmental reforms, to abolish cruel customs and punishments, and to provide some adequate system of protection for life and property. So corruption in private and public life, slavery and the slave trade, oppression and tyranny in high places and in the tribal communities, went on unabated.

The Sultan is the religious head — the Defender of the Faithful — as well as the political sovereign of the empire. This places him in a unique position, but at the same time it increases his responsibilities and hampers his freedom

of action. The Mohammedan peoples of northern Africa are held together by a common religion, and also by a number of powerful secret fraternities. The Senoussi of Algeria and Tripoli and the Derkaoua are intensely anti-European, while the Tedjinia and the Moulay Taieb of Morocco and the northern Sahara are friendly to the English and French. The influence of these societies is so great and far-reaching that no sultan would dare to ignore them for long; and when one or more of them is once aroused to demand a religious war or an anti-foreign crusade, the rulers are practically helpless before them. The French rule the largest portion of Mohammedan Africa, and so they cannot permit any one section, like Morocco, to remain free from their control and a hotbed of Mohammedan conspiracies. England, threatened by similar outbreaks, such as the Mahdi uprising in the Sudan in the eighties, has gladly joined hands with France to hold in check these restless religious peoples, who chafe naturally under foreign control and a restricted freedom.

The possession of Morocco is, for other reasons, a vital necessity for the success of colonial enterprise of France in Africa. It is the keystone of her arch. Without it, she cannot hope to solidify her extensive domains, or to control the trade routes and commerce of northern Africa and the Sahara. Without it, there is little chance of her coping with those endless border difficulties and desert robberies which have hampered the trade of the entire region since the French-Moroccan treaty of 1845. Patiently and thoroughly France has studied the problem for years, and has woven a network of influences within and without the country so powerful that neither the Sultan nor any outside power can hope now to shake off her hold. This prolonged effort to secure the suzerainty of Morocco was not accomplished without encountering many and serious difficul-

ties, not the least of which were the intrigues of competing European states. But it has contributed materially to the development of an equitable balance of power in Europe and to the establishment of an enlightened coöperation of the powers in the partition and administration of the Dark Continent.

It has been shown above (chapters VI, IX, and X) how France secured control over Algeria and Tunisia, the Sahara and Senegal, so that her possessions extended from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean in the rear of Morocco, and how she fortified her position by treaties with Great Britain in 1882, 1889, 1898, and 1899, and with the German Empire in 1894 and 1896. But this was not sufficient to insure the complete success of the French colonial empire and the permanent establishment of good order and security in northern Africa. Three things remained to be accomplished: the completion of a definite understanding with Great Britain as to the administration of affairs in North Africa, the development of a system of alliances that would give France a position of security in European circles, and the placing of Morocco under French protection. Accordingly, M. Delcassé, who had been so successful in conducting French colonial politics, turned his attention to the field of continental diplomacy.

In 1891, the first and basal of all the treaties — that between France and Russia — was arranged; but it did not become the present complete and harmonious alliance until 1898. This was followed by the Italian-French "Rapprochement" which began with treaties of commerce and navigation in 1896-98 and was consummated through definite understandings concerning Tunis and Tripoli in 1899, 1900, and 1902. And since 1900 the relations of France and Italy have been most friendly and cordial. Then came the "Entente Cordiale" with Great Britain, which com-

menced with the visit of King Edward to Paris in 1903 and the return trip of President Loubet to London, and was concluded in the remarkable treaties of 1904,¹ which concerned not only all the French and British possessions in northern Africa, but also embraced their interests in Siam, Gambia, Nigeria, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, and Newfoundland. Here the agreement was reached that England, on the one hand, should be unhampered in her administration of the finances and government of Egypt as long as the French bondholders were protected, and that France, on the other hand, should be free to assist the Sultan of Morocco in "improving the administrative, economic, financial, and military condition of his country," provided that the integrity of the Sultan's domains was preserved, the commercial interests of Great Britain safeguarded, and the special rights of Spain in northern Morocco recognized.

The friendship of Spain was cultivated by the mediation of France in the negotiations which closed the Spanish-American War, and by coöperative arrangements between the two neighbors for the economic development of northern Spain in August, 1904, and February, 1905. The King of Spain visited Paris and London, and in 1906 married the niece of King Edward. Spain gave her adhesion to the Franco-British treaty of April, 1904, in an agreement with France concerning Morocco in October of the same year,² and the whole series of alliances and treaties was successfully capped in 1907 by a three-cornered arrangement between France, Spain, and England, guaranteeing the perpetuation of the *status quo* in North Africa.³

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1904, vol. I, p. 413; and letters of Lansdowne and Delcassé, *ibid.*, pp. 557 and 771.

² *Ibid.*, 1905, pp. 677-78.

³ *Ibid.*, 1907, vol. II, pp. 49-53.

Meanwhile, the French were taking definite steps to put an end to the disorders on the Algerian-Morocco frontier, and to bring about the much-needed reforms within Morocco itself. They occupied the Touat Oasis — south of Algeria and southeast of Morocco — and, through the efforts of M. Reveil, Governor-General of Algiers, a definite arrangement was reached with the Sultan on July 20, 1901, concerning the regulation of trade and the police on the Algerian-Morocco frontier, France agreeing to assist with troops in restoring order and establishing the imperial authority in east and southeast Morocco. In June, 1903, the French occupied Zanagra and aided the Moroccan forces in suppressing brigandage in the region of Figuig. In August, the French and Shareefian troops occupied the district of Oudjda in eastern Morocco; and the French were permitted to establish military posts there to preserve order.¹

When the Franco-British treaty of April, 1904, had been arranged, France made every effort to procure the consent of the Sultan to the general terms of this agreement and to the acceptance of her aid in the maintenance of order, the establishment of the royal authority, and the reorganization of the finances and government of the realm. Abd-el-Aziz and his advisers, although friendly to the French Republic in a general way, hesitated to give any foreign power a large share in the direction of the local affairs of the kingdom. They understood full well the advantages; but they realized, on the other hand, the unpopularity of such a move with the majority of the inhabitants of Morocco. And they foresaw the probable effect on their own position if the scheme were attempted at that time. At this critical moment, Germany suddenly broke into the field of

¹ French *Yellow Book* or *Documents diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-05, nos. 83-84.

Moroccan diplomacy with a stroke so powerful and skillful that the perplexed mind of the Sultan took hope afresh; and for a time the beautiful fabric which the French had been so carefully constructing threatened to fall to pieces at the moment of its completion.

Germany had not been consulted in the arrangement of the Franco-British-Spanish treaties concerning northern Africa, and she felt that these agreements did not contain a sufficient guaranty that the commercial rights of her citizens in Morocco would be respected. On March 31, 1905, while engaged in a Mediterranean cruise, Kaiser Wilhelm suddenly appeared off Tangier and sent a message of friendship to the Sultan at Fez, through his uncle Moulay Abd-el-Malek, in which he assured Abd-el-Aziz of his support and announced that he would do all in his power to safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco.¹

Through the influence of the German minister to Morocco, the Sultan was led to demand, in May, that the question of reforms in his domains should be submitted to a conference of those states which had participated in the treaty of Madrid in 1880, by which the policy of the "Open Door" had been introduced into Moroccan commercial affairs. This was in direct opposition to the plan of France and a blow at the Franco-British *entente* of 1904. M. Delcassé refused to admit that any other power, except Spain and the French Republic, had a right to participate in the proposed interference in Morocco; and a spirited correspondence ensued between the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Paris. At length, Germany, putting the matter in the form of an ultimatum, demanded either the resignation of M. Delcassé and the appeal to a general conference or war. France, which had maintained a dignified attitude through-

¹ French *Yellow Book*, *Affaires du Maroc*, 1905-06, pt. II, no. 234; German *Weiss Buch*, 1905-06, *Morocco Correspondence*.

out the controversy, agreed on July 8 to the dismissal of Delcassé and the calling of a European congress, on condition that the French and German representatives at Fez should be withdrawn simultaneously, and that the two powers should unite later in urging the conclusions of the conference upon the Sultan. In addition, the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of his empire, the freedom of trade, the paramount interests of France in Morocco, and the introduction of reforms through a court established by the European powers were fundamental principles agreed to by both parties.¹

Thus came about the famous Algeciras Conference of 1906, the Sultan agreeing to its being held at Algeciras, in southern Spain, and issuing the formal invitations to the European states. In the negotiations which followed, the United States played the part of a neutral umpire desiring to see fair treatment for the claims of both litigants. England, Spain, Italy, and the smaller powers approved the French policy; and Germany, supported only by Austria and unable to secure the recognition of her claim for the establishment of a general international committee of reform, acquiesced in entrusting to France and Spain the introduction of financial and military reforms into Morocco.² The German Emperor's real motive in forcing this meeting of the powers, in addition to a desire for the participation of Germany in the final settlement of the Moroccan question, does not appear to have been the humiliation of the French Republic. It was rather a move to test the Franco-British *entente* and to force the diplomatic isolation of France,³ Russia being then occupied with the Rus-

¹ *Arch. Dip.*, 1905, *Affaires du Maroc*, vols. III-IV, pp. 559-746.

² Act published in *Arch. Dip.*, 1907, vol. II, pp. 5-49, and in the *Yellow Book*, 1906, *Affaires du Maroc*, pt. II.

³ Compare article on "Morocco and the Powers" by Edwin Maxey in *Arch. Dip.*, 1908, pt. II, pp. 280-86.

sian-Japanese War. The results of the Algeciras Conference were exactly opposite to these expectations. The bonds between France and her new friends — England, Spain, and Italy — were materially strengthened. Germany was shown to be no longer dominant in European politics, and the diplomatic isolation of the German Empire itself was hastened.

But, before France and Spain were able to put into execution the Algeciras program, troubles arose within Morocco which threatened to nullify all the good intentions of the European states. In May, 1906, M. Charbonnier, an employee of the French-Algerian steamboat company, was murdered in Tangier and serious anti-foreign demonstrations occurred in Sud-Oranais, Tafilet, and Mogador. In February, 1907, Ben Mansour, an Arabian Sheik of pro-French sympathies, was assassinated in Tangier; and the killing of Dr. Mauchamp, a French surgeon, by a mob in Marrakesh on March 23, was followed by a terrific outbreak in Casa Blanca on March 31, in which a large part of the town was demolished and nine Europeans slain. Similar uprisings took place in various parts of the country, and all the foreigners in the interior fled to the seaports, as rapidly and as secretly as possible, most of them suffering great hardships. Raissuli, the most powerful and intrepid of the sheiks now rising in rebellion throughout the land, carried off Kaid McLean, the Scotch commander of the Sultan's bodyguard, on July 3; and by the middle of the summer Morocco was in the throes of civil war.¹

Abd-el-Aziz, who, since the death of the Grand Vizier, Sidi Akhmed, in 1900, had been ruling in person, was now thirty years of age and a man of European training, considerable culture, and good intentions. But he was lacking in energy, in will power, and in political experience; and

¹ French Yellow Book, *Affaires du Maroc*, 1906-07, pt. III.

he was rapidly losing popularity on all sides because of his extravagance and his predilection for Europeans, a large number of whom — particularly Englishmen — he had drawn into his service. His country was practically bankrupt through a lax financial system, and through his gratification of a costly taste in jewels and modern toys, such as Krupp guns. He not only made treaties with the hated Nazarenes and borrowed money from them, but he took delight in their latest inventions, such as automobiles, cameras, phonographs, billiard-tables, and even clothes! Surely, he could no longer be a true Mussulman! It was even rumored that Abd-el-Aziz had sold himself and his country to the foreigner — or to the devil; and the anti-foreign party was not long in securing a formidable following.

In May, 1907, his brother, Mulai-el-Hafid, who had been governor of a portion of western Morocco for several years and had lived in comparative poverty in Marrakesh, was induced to head the rebellious forces. He was joined by the Glowî, Kaid of the Atlas (whose daughter he had married), and Si Aïssa ben Omar, Kaid of Abda, whom he later created Grand Vizier; and he was hailed as Sultan in Marrakesh on August 25. The example of the two most powerful Kaid of the country was speedily followed by other chieftains and tribal leaders; and in a short time Mulai-el-Hafid had a formidable "Mehalla" at his command. He defeated the forces of Abd-el-Aziz, who retreated to Rabat, where he remained inactive and was deserted steadily by his followers, while Mulai-el-Hafid was officially proclaimed Sultan by the Ulemas on January 11, 1908, and warmly welcomed by the people in Fez in February. After firmly establishing his control at the capital, the new ruler was able to send out a strong military expedition, or Mehalla, in March, under the Glowî to es-

tablish his authority in those districts still faithful to Abd-el-Aziz and to complete the subjugation of his brother's forces. In a short campaign lasting until early in September, the Glowî successfully subdued the followers of Abd-el-Aziz and completely defeated that prince himself near Marrakesh on August 22. This royal potentate had marched out from Rabat bravely, but leisurely, to meet the enemy. His army was increased gradually, as he proceeded, by various chieftains and their followers who, together with a large portion of his Mehalla, deserted him, however, on the field of battle when it was seen that he had little chance of success.

Abd-el-Aziz luckily escaped capture through the assistance of a few French and British officers in his service, while the enemy stopped to loot his camp, and fled to Settat, where he was under French protection and where he abdicated.

Meanwhile, France and Spain had not been idle. From November, 1906, to July, 1907, they were busy introducing the new police régime into the port towns of Morocco. When the anti-Christian riots occurred, they hurried warships to Tangier, Mogador, and Casa Blanca, to protect Europeans and to restore order. In March, 1907, the French troops occupied Oudjda, near the Algerian frontier; and in August, the French and Spanish landed at Casa Blanca, the former under General Drude, and took possession of the surrounding district. The troubles continuing, the French deemed it expedient to advance into the interior for the purpose of preserving order and protecting the trade of southwestern Morocco. Accordingly, General D'Amade occupied the whole of the Chaouia,¹ a large region lying immediately south and east of Casa Blanca,

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1908, *Affaires du Maroc*; R. Rankin, *In Morocco with General D'Amade*, Longmans, 1908.

between January and March, 1908, and held it in trust for the Sultan until the affairs of the kingdom could be satisfactorily adjusted. France refused to take sides in any way during the civil struggle between the royal brothers, or to permit either claimant to make use of the Chaouia or of Oudjda; and she maintained a strictly impartial attitude throughout the entire conflict. The French were fully conversant with the whole situation, being as fully aware of the poverty, the weakness, and the indecision of Abd-el-Aziz as they were familiar with Mulai-el-Hafid's lack of funds and of adequate popular support. They declined to take any steps toward the recognition of Mulai-el-Hafid until he had demonstrated his ability to rally the country to his support and to strike a blow that would render all resistance by Abd-el-Aziz practically impossible.

On August 23, 1908, immediately following the defeat of his brother near Marrakesh, Mulai-el-Hafid was proclaimed Sultan at Tangier; and one after the other the coast towns recognized him until Mogador finally tendered its allegiance on September 11. During the entire summer the new ruler had been hoping that the European powers would recognize him, and he had chafed under the delay, not comprehending its real significance. At length, he entered actively upon the task of procuring the official European confirmation of his position and powers, by appealing first to that state which had the least at stake within Morocco itself, and which seemed the most likely to be conciliatory, i.e., Germany. Emperor William hastened to welcome the new monarch, ordering Dr. Vassel — the German representative at Tangier — to proceed to Fez. He then sent a note to the powers on September 2, announcing his intention of recognizing Mulai-el-Hafid officially, and urging the other states to do the same. This was a grave error, for it was contrary to the spirit of the agreement of 1906, and it led

to a loss of German prestige in Morocco. Dr. Vassel, who left Tangier on August 31, and who was received in numerous audiences by the Sultan, was a fine gentleman, of a retiring disposition, but not qualified for a delicate and difficult task of this nature. He soon fell into disfavor, because Mulai-el-Hafid, with native shrewdness, quickly perceived that Germany did not intend to stand by him in his move for recognition, or to support him in his endeavors to thwart the aggressive policy of France and Spain. Ben Gebritt, the French agent, who arrived at Fez shortly after Dr. Vassel, was an astute and capable official with seventeen years of experience in Moroccan politics and had the advantage of being a Mussulman and of speaking Arabic fluently. At first, he was rebuffed and almost ignored by Mulai-el-Hafid; but eventually he gained his confidence and succeeded in the mission on which he had been sent.

It was this move of Emperor William, it will be remembered, that brought upon his foreign policy the bitter attack of Herr Bassermann in the Reichstag and the criticism of the German press in the fall of 1908. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, on September 3, after inquiring whether Germany was acting in accord with the European powers and asking whether the Emperor was prepared to recognize Mulai officially and independently and to assume all the risks of European war it might involve, exclaimed: "We would prefer to assume that the action of the German Government represents another of those sudden impulses of German policy, which make a terrific noise, but afterwards vanish, leaving not a wrack behind. The only harm they do is that German policy has once more shown itself to be incalculable, untrustworthy, and, therefore, disturbing. But this, unfortunately, is harm enough." By way of reply to the German demand for immediate recognition, M. Reveil explained in a speech before the French Chamber, on September 2, that

France and Spain were willing to recognize Mulai-el-Hafid, and that they had been busy since August 25 preparing a joint agreement on the subject which would be submitted shortly to the powers. The two Governments, however, felt it was necessary to proceed with caution, as the internal situation of Morocco still contained many uncertainties. The position of the European states must be carefully defined; and it was imperative that they should agree upon certain guarantees which must be obtained from Mulai-el-Hafid in order to protect adequately European interests in Morocco, and to secure the enforcement of the Act of Algeciras.

On September 14, 1908, France and Spain sent a joint note¹ to the powers recommending the combined recognition of the new Sultan, provided he confirmed the Act of Algeciras and all the executive measures already adopted for its application, recognized all the other existing treaties between Morocco and the European states, accepted the work of the Casa Blanca Indemnity Commission, resumed the responsibility for Abd-el-Aziz's debts up to the moment of his abdication, and made an official disavowal of the Holy War proclaimed against Europeans. In addition, Mulai-el-Hafid was to be asked to accord honorable treatment to his brother, Abd-el-Aziz, and to settle promptly and individually with those states which had special interests in, or claims against, Morocco. The same day a note from the Sultan to the powers arrived in Paris, in which he begged for recognition on the ground that, without it, it was impossible for him to exercise sovereignty, afford protection to his subjects and to foreigners, and to fulfill his obligations to European countries; and he offered to recognize all the treaties of his predecessors with the powers — particularly the Treaty of Algeciras. In closing, he hoped that the European states would coöperate with him "on

¹ Supplement to *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, vol. III (1907), p. 101.

equal terms in the deliberations with regard to these reforms (proposed in the Act of Algeciras) and in their execution."

In this last statement, one notes Mulai-el-Hafid's dread of being left to the mercy of France in the negotiations, the sincerity of whose motives and policy he seems to have doubted. In view of this situation, and in deference to some suggestions of the German Government, France and Spain drew up a second note which they agreed to present to the Sultan through the *doyen*, or chairman, of the whole diplomatic corps at Tangier. The only vital change in the wording of the notes was in the omission of the article on the Holy War, which, it was felt, would impose an unnecessary hardship and humiliation on a sovereign whose position was still exceedingly precarious. Instead, he was asked to announce to his people his willingness to maintain, with all the countries and their "nationals," relations in conformity with international law. This note was approved by all the powers by November 3, and delivered by Count de Buisseret, Belgian Minister and *doyen* at Tangier, to the representative of Mulai-el-Hafid on November 19, addressed "To the august, victorious, enlightened and exalted Shareefian Prince, Mulai-el-Hafid, proclaimed Sultan by the entire population of Morocco." The plenipotentiaries of this ruler, who had been in residence at Paris for some time, were received by M. Pichon on November 11; and on December 5 the representative of the Prince of Morocco at Tangier handed the *doyen* the official acceptance of the terms of the joint note by his sovereign. In a note of December 17, the powers announced officially their recognition of Mulai-el-Hafid as Sultan of Morocco.

The first stage in the reconstruction of the Shareefian Empire was thus safely accomplished. Abd-el-Aziz was permitted to retain private property left him by his father,

given a pension of \$35,000 a year, and assigned a residence in Tangier, where he has lived in peace and retirement since December 10, 1908. The French suppressed an uprising of Berbers on the Oudjda-Algerian frontier, sent a commission to Fez in December, 1908, to secure an agreement concerning the Algerian-Morocco boundary on the basis of the treaties between France and the sultanate in 1901 and 1902, and opened negotiations with the new ruler in regard to the Casa Blanca indemnities and the reforms of the Treaty of Algeciras. They did not, however, withdraw all of their troops from the Chaouia or Oudjda, because they were not yet sure that Mulai-el-Hafid would pay the war indemnities or keep his promises concerning the treaties.

The German Foreign Office professed to see in this an evidence of France's ulterior design of annexing all or a large portion of Morocco, and it raised frequent queries as to the correctness and sincerity of the French motives and policy. Finally, however, by January, 1909,¹ the French were able to convince Emperor William of their pacific intentions, and on February 9, the two countries reached a complete understanding. Germany agreed to give France and Spain a free hand in the settlement of the Morocco question; and France promised to respect the integrity of the Sultan's domain, to preserve the freedom of trade, and to place no obstacle in the way of the commercial and economic interests of the German Empire within the Sultan's domains.² The French policy throughout the entire period of this Moroccan controversy, from 1904 to 1908, was as straightforward and honest as their diplomacy was consist-

¹ By the end of December, 1908, France had reduced her forces in Oudjda from 7000 to 3500, and in the Chaouia from 15,000 to 8000. Her expenses, regular and special, in connection with the operations at Casa Blanca and the Algerian-Moroccan frontiers in 1907 and 1908 amounted to over \$9,600,000.

² *Arch. Dip.*, 1910, p. 83.

ent and skillful; and there is every reason to believe that the French authorities tried to safeguard the interests of all the Continental states, as well as their own and those of Spain. "In the examination and defense of her interests and her rights, France has not separated her own cause from that of Europe," said M. Pichon in a speech at Poligny on September 20, 1908. "She has remembered that it was her duty to aid the march of civilization. She acted in a spirit of elevated patriotism — European patriotism. For, if it is true that the peace of Europe has not been disturbed for a long time, and if it is true that this is due to the influence of universal public opinion and to the efforts of the various governments, we are entitled to say that the services rendered in this respect by the Republic are second to none. Is it not a fundamental principle of the Republic and characteristic of her destiny that she should defend and propagate ideas of peace, justice, and brotherhood?"

France had now, apparently, a clear field for the cutting of the "Gordian knot" in the little "Kingdom of the West." Mulai-el-Hafid must deal with her alone and without hope of assistance from without. Till 1904, the sultans had skillfully evaded their obligations to foreign states, postponed reform, and held off the French by various subterfuges and by appeals to England or to the powers. Since then, they had leaned for support chiefly on Germany, as we have seen; but now Europe presented a united front and France could no longer be betrayed in the rear. M. Regnault was, accordingly, sent immediately to Fez on a special mission to the new sovereign for the purpose of securing his agreement to a plan for carrying out the terms of the French-Spanish note and for the reorganization of the Moroccan government. A prolonged diplomatic struggle, however, ensued between Mulai-el-Hafid and the French

Foreign Office, lasting over a year, the former demanding the immediate withdrawal of the French forces from the realms and the latter consistently refusing to do so until the Sultan had consented to some definite plan for enforcing the regulations of Algeciras and of the French-Spanish note, and promised to pay an indemnity to cover the cost of the French and Spanish military expenditure during the recent disturbances in Morocco. The situation of Mulai-el-Hafid was indeed difficult. He had no special love for Europeans or European methods. He had secured his crown and his present powers chiefly through the support and assistance of the anti-foreign party, and was bound, therefore, not to concede too much to the French or other outsiders. On the other hand, there were powerful interests in his state favoring the French, and he himself was considerably indebted to them for their policy of non-intervention during the recent revolution. Then, the many necessary reforms — commercial, economic, educational, and hygienic — could only be introduced with the aid of European capital; and the Sultan could not hope to maintain order on his frontiers or provide protection for the lives and property of his subjects throughout the kingdom without French assistance. Mulai-el-Hafid, therefore, shrewdly allowed matters to drag on for an indefinite time, in order to give his followers and supporters the impression that he was acceding to the demands of the Christian nations — and particularly of France — only after great pressure and in the last extremity.

The negotiations were considerably impeded by the outbreak of hostilities in July, 1909, between the chieftains of the Riff country (in northern Morocco opposite Spain), over whom the sultans exercised an uncertain control, and the Spaniards who had some military posts and mining concessions there. A severe conflict ensued, lasting several

months and proving most costly to Spain in men and money.¹ Ultimately, in December, 1909, the leading Kaids were induced to make their submission and the main questions at issue were satisfactorily adjusted. Thus another of the serious obstacles to the complete pacification of Morocco was removed.

Meanwhile, the French were pressing Mulai-el-Hafid to accept their assistance in restoring order and in setting up an efficient administration in his country. On August 14, 1909, they submitted to the Sultan's representatives in Paris a definite plan² providing for the evacuation of Chaouia and Casa Blanca by the French forces, the creation of frontier police and settlement of certain frontier questions, the liquidation of the Moroccan debt, and the payment of the military expenses of France incurred in Morocco. This was supplemented and modified in subsequent notes between the French Foreign Office and the representatives of the Sultan, dated December 15, 21, and 25 ;³ but Mulai-el-Hafid successfully evaded for some time any definite answer or acceptance of its terms. At length, the French, becoming exasperated at this evasion, and feeling that the needs of the country called for immediate action, sent an ultimatum to him through M. Regnault on February 19, 1910, giving His Highness forty-eight hours in which to accept the proposed "Franco-Moroccan Accord." The Sultan is reported to have flown into a terrible rage, but he cooled down sufficiently to give his adhesion to the French proposal on February 21,⁴ and on March 4, his representatives — duly authorized — signed the formal treaty.

¹ Ashmead-Bartlett, *The Passing of the Shareefan Empire*, 1910, chaps. xxvii-xxxiV : a good description of the chief Spanish campaigns by an eyewitness.

² French *Yellow Book*, 1910, *Morocco*, vol. v, pp. 196-200.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 290, 297-99.

⁴ *Ibid.* ; correspondence between Pichon and Regnault, pp. 319-29, 334-35.

By the terms of this agreement the French promised to evacuate the Chaouia and Oudjda as soon as the Moroccan Government was able to place in these regions its own forces, — amounting to 1500 and 2000 men respectively, — which should be organized and trained under the direction of the French military mission. The Sultan was to nominate a Shareefian High Commissioner with full powers to coöperate with a French High Commissioner in adjusting the Algerian frontier difficulties; but the French were to retain the “territory of the Doui-Menia and the Oulad-Djerir, who have accepted the jurisdiction of the general government of Algeria,” and the post named Berguent, since they are necessary to the protection of the Algerian frontier. In addition the French Government offered to assist the Moroccan Government in securing funds to take care of its national debt and to insure an annual income, sufficient to enable the Sultan to organize a well-equipped and reliable army and police, to maintain an efficient administration, and to place his affairs generally on a stable basis. With exceptional generosity, the French offered to postpone for five years the payment of their own indemnity for the expenses of their military occupation of the Chaouia and Oudjda.¹ On November 16, 1910, the Spanish Government negotiated a similar agreement with the Shareefian representatives concerning the affairs, the finances,² and administration of their sphere of influence in the Riff country and the Ceuta district, which was officially approved by Mulai-el-Hafid on December 23.³ The signing of these “Accords” naturally placed the sovereign of Morocco more than ever under the supervision of the French and Spanish authorities. For it

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1910, *Morocco*, vol. v, p. 343; 2,740,000 francs a year for seventy-five years.

² Spanish claims for indemnity for military occupation amounted to 65,000,000 pesetas, to be paid at the rate of 2,545,000 pesetas a year.

³ Supplement to *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, January 1912, p. 54.

was practically impossible to rid his state of the enormous public debt, amounting to approximately 150,000,000 francs, except through the reorganization of the finances and internal administration of his realm, which could be accomplished only with outside assistance.

Before the movement to carry out these agreements was under way, difficulties arose once more between several of the chieftains and the Sultan's Government, owing to the re-imposition of certain taxes that Mulai-el-Hafid had promised on his accession not to levy, and to the tyranny of his Prime Minister. On January 14, 1911, Lieutenant Marchand and several comrades were slain by the Zaer tribesmen near Rabat; and soon several tribes were in open revolt. The movement spread. A brother of Mulai-el-Hafid was proclaimed as a rival sultan, and in a few weeks a great portion of the country was in arms. The warring factions converged on the capital, defeated the Sultan's forces, and finally besieged him in Fez. On May 21, 1911, the French relieving column, composed mainly of local levies, reached the beleaguered sovereign, and the revolting tribesmen were dispersed without difficulty. A number of chieftains, whose grievances were real and whose complaints were fully justifiable, were won over by conciliatory measures and friendly treatment. The offending Vizier was dismissed from office, and the French entered energetically upon the task of restoring order and security in the country.

Just at this critical moment, the German Government decided to send the warship — Panther — to Agadir. Their ostensible and publicly announced purpose was to afford protection to certain German traders and German commercial interests in that neighborhood. Their real object was something quite different. The French Government had taken great care to keep all the powers posted concerning their movements in Morocco and their advance to Fez, and

to see that each step in their program was in strict conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of Algeciras. There were no serious grounds for complaint on the part of any of the European states; but it was evident that the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco had become inevitable. Every one — the Germans included — felt that this was the only possible solution of the problem. "France was the only power which could restore order in Morocco," said Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in his opening speech to the Reichstag on this question on November 9, 1911. "The greater the freedom given to France, the greater the security and the responsibility for order." But the German leaders were of the opinion that, for two reasons, it should not be permitted to take place without an official protest on their part. In the first place, it would be a reflection on their diplomatic acumen and a blow to their national pride, if a matter of such great importance to the European states was finally adjusted without their coöperation or without their advice having been sought. In the second place, by making the protest, they would be in a position to take advantage in the shape of increased commercial rights and privileges, or even territorial gains, in Morocco, or elsewhere in Africa.

In the early stages of the French advance to Fez, the German Foreign Office had called the attention of the French Government to the fact that such action would result in the establishment of a protectorate in Morocco. The French, on the other hand, in their communications to Germany,¹ in their general circulars to the powers,² and in their instructions to General Moinier, emphasized clearly the great necessity for the expedition — to protect the lives

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1912, *Affaires du Maroc*, vol. VI, pp. 179, 189-93, 221, 239, 247, 289.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 181, 219, 235, 261, 288, 303, 342-43.

of resident foreigners and European consuls, and to preserve the Shareefian Government — and stated that the occupation of Fez was to be only temporary. The Germans, however, reserved the right to resume complete liberty of action as soon as the French forces were established at the capital.

Meanwhile, difficulties had arisen with regard to the application of the commercial and economic provisions of the Franco-German agreement of 1909. The French Republic wished to interpret them in accordance with its general policy of free trade — adopted under pressure from England and Spain in 1904 and of the powers at Algeciras; but Germany was inclined to insist on a narrower principle of economic monopoly of individual sections — divided proportionally to the existing spheres of influence. In this connection, there arose the question of “compensations” — economic or commercial — for the Germans, in case the French assumed political and territorial advantages. It is not known with whom the idea first originated, but it came out in the conversations between M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter held in Berlin on June 11,¹ and at Kissingen on June 20 and 21. “If we only talk of Morocco,” said Kiderlen-Waechter, “we cannot succeed.” “You are right,” replied Cambon. “If you desire to have some portion of Morocco, the conversation had better not begin. The French opinion would never allow it on this land. One might seek elsewhere —” The idea of “compensation” was, however, new to the French Ambassador, who had no instructions along this line; but he agreed to bring the matter to the attention of his Government. On June 22, M. Cambon wrote to Paris, describing the whole interview in detail and asking for instructions, but added: “It is no longer open to us to draw back, and we must now decide

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1912, *Affaires du Maroc*, vol. VI, pp. 349-50.

what elements are to form the basis of further conversations.”¹

It is well known that as early as May, 1910, France and Germany had opened conversations with a view to securing coöperation in trade and transport facilities in the Cameroons and the Congo; but no agreement was reached, although a tentative arrangement had been worked out just before the fall of the Briand-Pichon Cabinet in February, 1911. M. Caillaux—Minister of Finance in the new cabinet—opened some secret negotiations with the German Foreign Office, which led them to infer at least that he and his friends were willing to concede some “compensations” in the French Congo, or elsewhere, to secure a final settlement of the Moroccan question. M. Caillaux became Prime Minister on June 28, 1911; and the Panther was sent to Agadir on July 1, to give Germany a good “handle” to use in the negotiations which were sure to follow.

As soon as the news of the German move on Agadir officially reached the French Cabinet, the French Foreign Office approached the British Government to learn its attitude in the matter. Finding that their views practically coincided, and being assured of a cordial and firm support by Great Britain, the French Government consented to open negotiations with Germany. Secret informal discussions—technically known as “conversations”—on the Moroccan question ensued, lasting—with but one serious interruption—from the middle of July till November 4. The diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse began by claiming that Germany was entitled either to an “economic condominium” with France in Morocco, which would insure to her an equal share with the French in the commercial and economic de-

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1912, *Affaires du Maroc*, vol. VI, pp. 372-74; see also M. de Selves's speech in the Chamber of Deputies on December 14, 1911; London *Times*, December 15, 1911.

velopment of the land, or to "compensation" elsewhere, which she intimated might properly take the form of the cession of the whole of the Gaboon district and that portion of the French Congo lying between the ocean and the Sanga River. In the event that the latter alternative alone was to be considered, Germany was prepared to turn over Togoland and a portion of the Cameroons to France in order to facilitate matters and equalize the larger transfer by France. The German contention for a position of special privilege in Morocco, and the claim by the press of the Fatherland that their country was "fighting the battle of the world," seem not to have been well taken. By the Conference of Algeciras and her own promises, France was irrevocably committed to an "open-door" policy of commercial freedom in Morocco; and Great Britain and France were enjoying over sixty-six per cent of the trade of that country, while Germany's share had not yet reached thirteen per cent.

France stood firm, refusing to admit that Germany possessed any special position of privilege in Morocco or was entitled *by right* to any "compensation" for giving France a clear field there, and insisting that the *status quo* of the Shareefian Empire must *first* be clearly and firmly established before any question of reward or "compensation" could be raised. Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd-George in England made forceful speeches, declaring Great Britain's determination not to permit any encroachment upon her rights and interests in northern and western Africa. This firm attitude, combined with a financial depression in Germany, which, on September 9, almost resulted in a panic on the Berlin Bourse, forced the Imperial Government to change front. The French financiers came generously and promptly forward with offers of assistance through the Swiss banks, and the day was saved. The French point of

view was accepted as a basis; and, thereafter, the negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory, straightforward, and businesslike manner on both sides.

The program of France included three main points: First, France was to have a free hand in Morocco, in order that she might successfully establish order and security, create an efficient and responsible government, and promote the economic, political, and moral development of the country. But her position must be thoroughly safeguarded with absolute guaranties, so that there would be no further disrupting interference by any of the European states. Secondly, the commercial position of all the European powers must be explicitly defined and their respective rights carefully and fully protected, and a definite understanding reached concerning the new methods of administering justice to both natives and foreign residents, and of affording protection for the lives, property, and financial or commercial interests of all concerned. And, in the third place, if it were possible to reach a joint agreement to all these points, France would then be willing to give certain economic guaranties that would assure the powers equal commercial protection in the Shareefian realm, and to consider the question of territorial "compensation." But the French Government let it be understood that, in case they did decide to make a gift of territory to Germany, it was not because of any unusual pressure of any right, — recognized or fancied, — but simply because of their desire to be conciliatory and to see the Moroccan question — so vital to them — settled once and for all time.

On this basis the discussions were renewed and continued till October 15, when it was announced that an agreement had been reached and initialed on the first two headings. The diplomats of the two countries entered on October 16 upon a "conversation" on the question of a land cession

in the French Congo. Germany began by asking for an extensive area of some 16,000,000 hectares of land lying south and east of the Cameroons, bordering on the Ubangi and Congo Rivers and possessing a seaboard outlet. This would have given the Emperor a fine piece of the Congo country, brought him to the banks of the greatest waterway of Central Africa, and put him in close touch with the great Belgian Congo trade — a long-cherished ambition. Unfortunately this would cut in two the French Congo, isolating the northern portion and making a great break in that magnificent stretch of French territory reaching from the Mediterranean to the southwestern coast, of which the French nation is justly proud. Then, too, this region embraced some of the best-developed sections of the French Congo where some fifteen chartered companies had invested over \$5,000,000, of which the Ngoko-Sanga Development Company is the chief, and were taking out approximately \$1,250,000 worth of rubber yearly. So the French Government could not afford to make so large a concession, particularly as that portion of the “duck’s beak” of the Cameroons, offered by Germany in exchange, was in no way a counterpoise to this, and since the French people remained steadily and unanimously opposed to any vital transfer of land in their Congo possessions.

In the course of several conferences, the problem was reduced to practically these limits: Germany needs an outlet on the Ubangi-Congo waters; how can this be best accomplished in a fair and equitable manner without doing any vital injury to French interests? After a careful study of the situation and an extended discussion of all the points at issue, the representatives of the two Governments reached a satisfactory agreement which was made public on November 4, 1911. This Franco-German treaty¹ con-

¹ French *Yellow Book*, 1912, *Affaires du Maroc*, vol. vi, pp. 622-35.

sisted of four documents: the first concerned the future status of Morocco; the second described the proposed territorial adjustments in Equatorial Africa; the third included two "notes" relating to the delimitation of the new frontier and the terms of lease of certain lands to France in Equatorial Africa; and the fourth comprised four "explanatory letters" exchanged between the German Foreign Secretary and the French Ambassador. It took the form of an expansion of the earlier agreement of 1909 between the two signatory powers. By the first part, France is to enjoy complete freedom of action in the introduction of reforms and in the supervision of the internal affairs of Morocco, after an agreement with the Shareefian Government. She shall be free to employ her police or military forces, to extend her control or define her authority more clearly, and to take whatever administrative or financial measures are necessary for the establishment of good government, the revival of national credit, and the development of the resources and trade of the country. The conduct of the foreign affairs of the Shareefian Empire is to be in the hands of the French, who will represent the Sultan in his dealings with foreign powers, and look after the interests of his subjects abroad. On the other hand, France gives adequate promises concerning protection and equality of treatment in the trade and commerce of the sultanate under her protection. There shall be no differential customs, dues, or other tariffs, or any partiality shown in the levying of mining or industrial taxation. The construction and management of the new railways is to be under French control, but other powers are to participate on an equitable basis in the letting of the contracts. The present system of consular courts is to be abolished as soon as a satisfactory judicial system can be worked out; but in the meanwhile, a provisional plan of settling all civil suits — particularly

those in which a foreign nation is a party — by arbitration under French supervision has been adopted.

In the second portion, or territorial treaty, the question of land cessions was restricted entirely to the Congo country. Here the French agreed to transfer to Germany a portion of the French Congo, lying directly east and south of the Cameroons and consisting of some 107,000 square miles of territory — about the area of the State of Nevada — with a population of 1,000,000. The value of the district is unknown and the greater part of it is still unoccupied by Europeans and undeveloped. It varies in character from unhealthy swamps and arid plateaus to promising hill country and extensive rubber forests, in which the *Compagnie Coloniale du Congo Français* and the *Uame Nana Compagnie* have monopolies guaranteed until 1930. The new line of the Cameroons is to run from Massoti on Corisco Bay eastward to Wesso on the Sanga River, where, leaving Wesso to France, it turns south as far as the junction of the Sanga and Congo Rivers. Then it proceeds directly north to Bera Ndjoko and thence along the Lubai to Mongumbo on the Ubangi River. After following this stream for a few kilometers — the German rights both here and on the Congo being limited to between six and twelve kilometers — the boundary turns northwest and proceeds till it strikes the Logoné River, along whose banks it goes northward until the junction with the Shari is reached. The small region, with an area of 6450 square miles, lying between the Shari and the Logoné Rivers and lat. 10° N., is transferred to France. The Republic is to secure a trade route from her Shari River lands to northern Nigeria by way of the Benué River, which will be a great commercial advantage in the development of the Upper Congo and Lake Chad trade. Each state is to have the right to free passage across the territory of the other,

and to construct railways and telegraph lines across, if necessary to maintain direct communication ; but the French are to retain control of the whole telegraph line along the Ubangi.

One of the most interesting of these agreements was the decision to submit to arbitration all disagreements that may arise in the future working out of the various articles of these treaties. This last point was carefully elaborated in one of the " explanatory letters " annexed to the main articles of the treaty. In the other letter, Germany urges that the Tangier-Fez Railway be constructed before any of the other projected lines, and demands that she be assigned a fixed share in the construction, which should include the connecting of the mining regions with the main line as far as possible.

The arrangements outlined above will not have any serious effect upon the French position on the Congo, so long as the Ubangi-Congo waters remain an international stream open freely to the trade of the world. Germany will, doubtless, on the other hand, be greatly benefited in time by access to the Congo and the Ubangi, and by the establishment in this way of a direct connection between the Cameroons and the great Congo Basin. In addition, she will be afforded an outlet for the produce and commerce of the eastern Cameroons, which will prove in all probability cheaper and more expeditious than any route to the coast they now possess. The general outcome of the long months of diplomatic maneuvers and discussions by France and Germany was, therefore, the creation of a French protectorate over Morocco and the substantial expansion of the German Cameroons with outlets on the Ubangi and Congo waters and on the seacoast. These agreements could not go into effect, however, until they had been approved by the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and by the Ger-

man Bundesrath, all of whom must be consulted when cessions of territory are under consideration.

The reception of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's explanation of the German "case" by the Reichstag on November 9, 1911, was chilly in the extreme. No government action in recent years had been received by the popular assembly with such a lack of enthusiasm. This was due, not so much to any deep-seated opposition to the treaties *per se*, as to the desire of many representatives to make political capital of them in the approaching elections, and to the feeling — particularly among the ranks of the opposition — that the Government had allowed itself to be browbeaten by England. The resignation at this time of Herr von Lindequist, Imperial Colonial Secretary, and of Herr von Dankelmann, chief of the Colonial Office, due very largely to the fact that these officials declined to assume the responsibility for the agreements and to explain them to the Reichstag, caused considerable comment and complicated matters somewhat. The onerous duty of defending the Moroccan policy of the German Government fell entirely upon the shoulders of the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter. The efforts of these statesmen, however, were successful, the treaties being speedily approved by the Bundesrath, upon the favorable report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In France, the Chamber of Deputies took up the matter promptly; and, after the Foreign Affairs Committee had expressed its opinion and a spirited debate lasting three weeks had ensued, approved the treaties by a vote of 393 to 36 on December 20.¹ Some 150 delegates from the eastern provinces refrained from voting out of sympathy with Alsace-Lorraine; and a large portion of those who cast

¹ London *Times*, December 21, 1911.

their ballots for the agreements did so with "la mort dans l'âme" — so strong is the feeling in France against the cession of any territory, once French soil, to foreign nations, and particularly to Germany. The Senate then began its consideration of the proposition; and, on December 20, appointed a committee of twenty¹ able and experienced statesmen — including such well-known and skillful diplomats as MM. Pichon, Clemenceau, Poincaré, and Bourgeois — to investigate thoroughly the whole affair from its inception. In the course of the proceedings of this committee, it came out that, while the French Foreign Office was regularly engaged in the discussion of the Moroccan question with Germany, private negotiations were carried on by a member or members of the French Government with influential persons in the German service, in such a way as to convey to the German authorities the impression that France was ready and willing to make "compensations" to Germany. On January 9, 1912, when forced to the wall in the committee, M. de Selves, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, refused to deny these allegations. The following day he resigned his portfolio; and, after trying vainly for two days to reconstruct his cabinet, M. Caillaux — the Prime Minister — was compelled to withdraw from office. M. Raymond Poincaré, a man of splendid abilities who enjoyed the respect and confidence of all parties, was appointed Premier on January 13 and formed the strongest and most capable cabinet that France has had for some years. On January 24, the committee brought in a favorable report; and, after an extended and lively debate, the Senate showed its confidence in M. Poincaré by approving the treaties, on February 10, by 212 votes to 42.² Thus was closed one of the most remarkable diplomatic episodes of recent times.

¹ *London Times*, December 25 and 27, 1911.

² *Ibid.*, February 12, 1912.

The attitude of the German press and of many of her prominent men, during the extended negotiations resulting from the Agadir incident, is not above criticism. Bitter attacks on Great Britain were indulged in, for reasons wholly without adequate foundation. Threats of war were current and a great deal of unnecessary bluster was resorted to, with the hope of intimidating France or England. And, during a great part of the period, the German Government had to conduct the negotiations without the aid of any sustained or widespread popular support or sympathy. Under all the circumstances, it is undeniable that considerable credit must be given to the imperial officials that their country issued from the controversy with dignity and with some substantial reward for their efforts. On the other hand, the French conducted themselves well, displaying a most commendable spirit of conciliation, mingled with dignity and poise. There was no commotion, no waste of energy, no frantic scrambling for rights and privileges. The work of her statesmen and diplomats — particularly of M. Jules Cambon — is deserving of high praise; while the Government and people stood together in mutual confidence and serenity of purpose — more united than at any other period in recent years. “The mingled dignity and conciliatoriness with which the French Government and the great mass of the French opinion have treated these serious and difficult negotiations throughout,” said the London *Times* editorially on September 12, 1911, “have done not a little to confirm the credit which their country has acquired in Europe by the conduct of former discussions.” France has thus placed herself in the forefront of the remarkable movement for universal peace, which has assumed such significant proportions during the past quarter of a century. She has demonstrated how it is possible, in the face of threats of war and of the most intricate and delicate

of situations and at a time of great national crisis and excitement, to hold successfully in check two heated nations and to carry through to an ultimate and reasonable conclusion political and commercial negotiations of the highest importance, not only to her neighbor and herself, but to Europe as well. And she has thus given to the world a splendid example of the higher and newer type of twentieth-century diplomacy — the diplomacy of the New Internationalism.

Nothing remained, after the ratifications of the treaties had been exchanged on March 12, 1912, to insure the validity of the agreements, but to secure the approval of the states which had signed the Algeciras treaty, the coöperation of Spain, and the consent of the Shareefian Government. The first of these acts was speedily effected; but the last two were consummated only at the expense of considerable time, patience, and tact. The special interests and rights of Spain in Morocco¹ had been recognized and protected by France in treaties with Spain in 1902, 1904, 1905, and in 1906, and France had kept her ally informed of the progress of the late negotiations with Germany. At length, after a detailed conference with England during most of November upon the future status of Tangier and the precise lines of delimitation for the French and Spanish territorial claims in Morocco, the French engaged the Spanish authorities, on December 7, in a series of confidential negotiations on the question, at which the British Minister to Spain was present. A great many intricate and delicate problems were involved; but they were centered about three main issues: the nature and extent of

¹ Spain had marked out three zones in northern Morocco — the Riff and its Hinterland with headquarters at Melilla, the district of Tetuan with the harbor of Ceuta, and the Spanish Gharb with the city of Alcazar and port of Larache; and she had spent approximately \$40,000,000 since 1900 to secure these holdings.

the Sultan's control over the Spanish sphere of the empire; the construction and control of the proposed railway from Tangier to Fez (part of which would have to pass through the Spanish zone); and the collection of customs and control of the public debt belonging to that portion of the Sultan's dominions under Spanish protection. The "conversations" were prolonged to an unexpected and extraordinary degree, owing to the varied character of the questions at issue and peculiar difficulties that arose in the path of the negotiators; and the definite agreements were not reached until October 25, 1912.¹ In these, it was provided that Spain, while retaining the control of the customs within its zone, should pay an annual sum approximating \$100,000 toward the interest and amortization of the Moroccan debt; that the boundary question should be settled by certain minor transfers of land — for a portion of the Riff country, Spain being given a good-sized piece of territory adjoining her colony of Rio de Oro on the north — and by a commission of delimitation to mark the precise frontiers; that the international position of Tangier should be settled by a special commission; that the Spanish zone should be administered by a Spanish High Commission, assisted by a Khalifa Resident at Tetuan and appointed by the Sultan from two persons nominated by Spain; and that the Tangier-Fez Railway should be built by a single company, of whose capital stock the French shall have fifty-six per cent, the Spanish thirty-six per cent, and other countries, if they desire, eight per cent.² The attainment of this happy solution was received with great satisfaction by the leading statesmen and people of

¹ Signed at Madrid on November 27 and approved by the Spanish Cortes on December 17, by 216 votes to 22. *London Times*, November 28 and December 18.

² *London Times* for November 27 and 30, 1912. It consists of twenty-nine articles and a protocol on the Tangier-Fez Railway.

the two interested nations, and with considerable relief by the European states, some of whom had feared an open rupture more than once during the negotiations. The credit for their successful termination is due to the tact and breadth of view displayed by M. Geoffray, the French Minister to Spain, and to the sincerity and conciliatoriness of Señor Canalejas, the Spanish Premier.¹

Meanwhile, the French were taking active steps to set up a protectorate over Morocco. On November 9, 1911, Mulai-el-Hafid was induced to give his consent to the Franco-German treaty of November 4; and on January 18, 1912, a committee with M. Regnault as chairman was appointed to investigate the question, and to draw up a plan for the organization of stable government in the Shareefian Empire. This committee made its report on January 28, urging that a French Resident-General be appointed and that a pacific and temporary military occupation of Morocco be undertaken at once. And it recommended the use of the local Shareefian administrative system and officials wherever possible, with the remark that the French Resident-General and counselors will give the necessary "impulse and direction to the services of justice, finance, public works, and domestic administration."

M. Regnault, French Minister at Tangier, who was well qualified by training and experience for the mission, was appointed at the head of a special commission to visit Mulai-el-Hafid at Fez and secure his consent to the establishment of the proposed protectorate. M. Regnault left Paris on March 1, reached Fez on March 24, and obtained the signature of the Sultan to the protectorate treaty on March 30, 1912. Unfortunately his visit was marred by the

¹ It was most fortunate that Señor Canalejas lived until the terms of this treaty were completed. He was assassinated by a fanatical Socialist on November 19, 1912, while the agreement was concluded on October 25.

insistent demands of Hafid to be permitted to resign, and the serious mutiny of the Shareefian troops, which broke out in Fez on April 17, but was easily put down by General Moinier in three days' time. Early in May, General Lyautey was appointed Resident-General with the approval of the Sultan, who telegraphed his satisfaction and promises of coöperation on May 2; but the general did not reach the capital of Morocco till the 24th. Two days later a serious rising of the tribes occurred, Fez being immediately attacked and besieged until June 5, when it was successfully relieved by French forces. A widespread opposition to French rule manifested itself throughout the country, which was fomented and strengthened by the efforts of two pretenders to the throne. For four months the situation was uncertain and exceedingly precarious. But the French acted promptly and had no difficulty in disposing of El Roghi, the pretender of the North, and in driving Sidi Mohammed Hiba of Tiznit in Sus, who had entered Marrakesh on August 18, back into the desert. General Lyautey, by firmness and conciliation, won the respect and confidence of all the chiefs and leaders with whom he came in contact, and restored peace and order within a comparatively short time.

Meanwhile, Mulai-el-Hafid, as soon as the siege of the capital had been raised, left Fez under guard of several regiments, and reached Rabat on June 13. His younger brother — Mulai Yusef — was left as Viceroy at Fez. After consideration, it was decided to carry out an agreement, made the previous October with the Sultan, at his special request, that he be permitted to resign when a French protectorate was set up. It was a necessary accompaniment of the establishment of French control in the country, because of the personal unpopularity, instability, and viciousness of the Shareefian ruler, and on account of the fact that he had secured the throne as the proclaimed leader of the anti-

foreign party. Accordingly, Mulai-el-Hafid abdicated on August 11, being promised the sum of \$80,000 down and an annual income of \$70,000; and on August 13, his brother Yusef, who is described as a man of moderation and piety, enjoying considerable prestige in the Mohammedan world, was proclaimed Sultan, after being elected by the Ulemas in accordance with the customs of the country.

The French Chamber approved the protectorate treaty on July 1, by a vote of 360 to 79. On July 19, the Berne Conference between France and Germany to arrange for the transfer of the Congo lands and the delimitation of the new boundaries, finished its sittings; and a definite agreement, fixing the precise boundaries of the German and French possessions in Southwest Africa, was signed by their respective representatives in Paris on September 28, 1912. Thus the terms of the treaties of November 4, 1911, were worked out to the satisfaction, and to the promotion of the interests, of all the parties concerned.

The protectorate treaty¹ shows clearly the nature and the extent of the future French control in Morocco. A new régime is to be instituted, "admitting of administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial, and military reforms," through the assistance of the French and by means of a reorganized Shareefian Government. The exercise of the Mohammedan religion and the preservation of the religious institutions, together with the traditional position and prestige of the Sultan, are guaranteed. The French Government is pledged, moreover, to protect the person and throne of His Shareefian Majesty. To insure this end, and to provide for the maintenance of good order and public security throughout the country, until the new régime shall be in full running order, France, after consultation with the Sultan, was to undertake such military occupation and

¹ Supplement to *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, July, 1912, pp. 207-09.

police supervision as should be deemed necessary. This the French proceeded to do at once, raising their forces in Morocco to 32,000 during the summer, and setting up a military régime throughout the country on the basis of a plan prepared by General Lyautey before he left Paris. Morocco was divided into five military districts, — Fez, Meknes, Rabat, the Chaouia, and Marrakesh, — over each of which was placed a superior officer and staff with the power of enforcing order, maintaining intelligence offices, and controlling posts, circles, and stations. The work of reorganization is proceeding slowly but surely, the French not attempting any general subjugation of the whole country, but remaining content with keeping the main trade routes open and maintaining order. The military and police forces of the Sultan are being reorganized on the French model, with the object of utilizing as many of the natives as possible in this branch of the public service, where they can rise to the rank of lieutenant — it not being considered safe or wise to admit them to the higher positions at present.

While the promulgation of all decrees and the new reform measures must be done in the name of the Sultan and with his consent, it is evident that the real ruler is to be the French Resident- or Commissioner-General to whom is entrusted the power of approving all decrees of the Government, of acting as an intermediary between the Sultan and all foreign powers, and of handling all “matters relating to foreigners in the Shareefian Empire.” He is of necessity a military officer; and it is the intention of the French that, owing to the critical state of affairs prevalent throughout the land and the pressing need of a firm but judicious hand at the helm, Morocco should remain for a time under military rule. But, no doubt, this will be replaced, as soon as it is practicable and advisable, by a well-organized civil administration — as was done in Tunis. In any case, it is

expected that the little "Kingdom of the West" will hereafter constitute a part of French territory — an adjunct of the Republic preserving its own integrity and institutions and a fair amount of local autonomy. The diplomatic and consular agents of France will undertake the protection of Moroccan subjects and the representation of their interests abroad ; and the Sultan can conclude no international act, or make any public or private loan, or concession, without the approval of France. The French Government is irrevocably committed, by their treaties and their promises to the Moroccan Government, and by the public assurances of their leading officials, to a policy of justice and equity and political integrity. They have agreed to stop all reported abuses in connection with the sale and occupation of land by foreigners in Morocco, to protect the rights and customs of the natives, to encourage the loyal coöperation of the Moroccan people by every legitimate means, and to employ their chiefs and leaders as far as possible in the administration of local affairs. "France must make herself loved as well as respected," said M. Poincaré in his explanatory speech in support of the protectorate treaty on July 1, 1912. General Lyautey, the first Resident-General, is an administrator of ability, accustomed to handling men and thoroughly conversant with the conditions and needs of the country ; and in the first eighteen months of his incumbency,¹ he has been remarkably successful in restoring peace and order, and in winning the respect and confidence of all with whom he has come in contact. The work entailed in introducing the new administration is enormous and the difficulties numerous. Everything in the country had to be reorganized ; but the highest authorities in France on finance, land tenure, Mohammedan law, education, and

¹ Summary of his work given in the *London Times* for November 9 and December 6, 1912 ; and subsequent reports at intervals since that time.

politics had been busy for months preparing the way and working out plans for the regeneration of this country, which the French officials are now following with the assistance and coöperation of the natives.

In spite of the permission given France and Spain at the Algeciras Conference, they had been unable to introduce any permanent order or system of policing in the country outside of such districts as Chaouia, Oudjda, and Melilla, where it was necessary to set up a temporary military occupation. Here a fairly satisfactory and efficient system of rule has been established. In other portions where the French had attempted to interfere, — such as the regions of Fez, Tangier, and the Gharb, — serious mistakes had been made, the effects of which it will take considerable time to eradicate from the popular mind. General Lyautey has already removed the worst abuses and modified the existing conditions in northern Morocco; and he has reorganized the government of Marrakesh and the southern portion promptly and effectively, appointing to all the important posts the most trustworthy and capable chieftains of the region. Thus a good beginning has been made in the work of reform and reorganization; but the task of establishing French control over the whole Shareefian Empire is a most difficult and delicate affair, requiring great patience, careful planning, and a rare combination of diplomatic tact and administrative skill. It must be accompanied by the immediate construction of certain important public works, such as railways from Tangier to Fez and from Casa Blanca to Marrakesh (together with a harbor at Casa Blanca), good roads throughout the country, public schools, hospitals, post-offices, irrigation systems, and other agencies of civilization and self-help. And General Lyautey's request for a loan of \$60,000,000, with which to effect this very work, has been recently granted.

To win over a stubborn, superstitious, and ignorant population to the acceptance of a form of government they dislike, the presence of foreigners they distrust and detest, and of customs and methods which they do not understand, is an exceedingly delicate and arduous task. As one of the Moorish statesmen said: "This country is not like the land of the Nazarenes and cannot be made like it in haste." The "blind prejudices of ignorance and superstition" are still holding the land in their clutches and impeding its development at every step. The French, therefore, must go slowly and seek earnestly to win the confidence of Mulai Yusef and his people. They must prove to the inhabitants that they are not coming to take their land and property away, but that they are honestly desirous of assisting in the material development of the country and in procuring for the citizens the protection for life and property so sorely needed. It must be "Morocco for the Moroccans" as far as possible; and the bitter and unreasoning hatred of foreigners and foreign ideas must be surmounted by fair treatment, an honest and straightforward diplomacy, and a friendly, unselfish spirit. Europeans should be allowed to penetrate only gradually into the interior under careful governmental supervision, and no colonization by French or Spaniards should be permitted for some time to come. No interference with the religious or private life of the people should be attempted, and native institutions, customs, and methods ought to be utilized and developed wherever possible. When necessary, force may be employed with discretion; but it must always be used with a firm and just hand through the recognized government. The people should be made to feel that it is the Prince of the Faithful who compels his subjects to accept the inevitable, and not the foreigner. In ten or fifteen years' time, with patience and forbearance, the French will be ruling a new

and reorganized Morocco; but it will be under a veiled suzerainty, as she is now managing Tunis, or as Great Britain controls Egypt. And the Moorish proverb, "He who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last," will once more have been fulfilled.

CHAPTER XII

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

TRIPOLITANIA

TRIPOLITANIA, the chief gateway to the Sahara, has been the last province of the North African littoral to be taken under the control of the European powers. It is large in area, but small in natural resources. While it contains some 406,000 square miles of territory, or about the same as Egypt (leaving out the Sudan), its population hardly exceeds 525,000 souls, and neither of its two chief cities — Tripoli and Ben Ghasi — has over 35,000 inhabitants. There are few fertile agricultural districts, like the Djebel Gharian, which furnishes the grain and other produce for most of the cities and towns. The desert approaches too near the sea to permit of much cultivation, and there are no rivers like the Nile to furnish water for irrigation. The Atlas range does not run far enough to the east to afford Tripoli any protection from the winds and heat of the Sahara; and what few mountains and hills the country possesses, outside of the Barca district, are so insignificant and so scattered that they are of little value as bulwarks against the ever-encroaching desert. The chief exports of the region are ostrich feathers, ivory, oil, and esparto grass, the two former of which have been brought from Lake Chad and Central Africa for years over the famous caravan route via Murzuk, Ghat, and Ghadames. Since the occupation of the Niger country and the Sudan by the British and French and the opening of direct connection by rail and water between the West Coast and Central

Africa, the greater part of this trade is going to Europe via the Niger and Senegal Rivers. Thus the dangers and delays of a thousand-mile caravan route are avoided ; but the traders and merchants of Tripoli are being compelled to procure their goods more and more from the distant eastern oases of Tibesti, Borku, and Kanem in the Wadai country, under French control.

In 1714, the Arabs of Tripolitania, which, with the rest of northern Africa, had fallen under the domination of the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, secured their independence and maintained it successfully for over a hundred years. In 1835, the Turks seized the port of Tripoli and put an end to the Arab régime, but it took thirty-five years before they were able to extend their administration over the entire province. Since then, what had they done to promote the welfare of the country ? Very little. In the past thirty years, remarkable progress had been made in Egypt, in Algiers, and in Tunis, by Great Britain and France, in the establishment of efficient governments, in the development of natural resources and commerce, in the construction of public edifices and improvements, and in the promotion of the public health and welfare. But Tripoli was still marking time. Her trade had remained stationary during the same period at the nominal annual figure of \$3,850,000. The Turks spent comparatively little on the country and reaped an insignificant profit from their investment, the annual income from taxes and internal revenue dues never exceeding the sum of \$540,000, out of which all the expenses of the provincial government and military protection had to be paid.

The governors were most invariably easy-going, unprogressive, and incompetent. During the administration of Marshal Redjet Pasha, Minister of War under the Young Turk régime from 1898 to 1908, some progress was made.

But, with the exception of sanitary reforms in the seaports and improvements in the methods of taxation, his efforts were mainly directed to the reorganization of the military forces. Being suspicious of the growing interests of Italy in Tripoli, he increased the Turkish garrison to some 20,000 men, constructed forts at Ghadames, Ghat, and Murzuk, and attempted to raise some 12,000 native troops by compulsory military service. But in spite of all these efforts, the Turkish military contingent never passed beyond the stage of service represented by the protection of caravans and the collection of tribute. This policy was continued by Ibrahim Pasha, who ruled the country two years from the middle of 1910, and who substituted enlistment by lot for compulsory military service. In addition, he united the various native elements and rallied them to his support by a firm administration and the organization of a system of public relief during the famine of the year 1911.

Ever since the occupation of Egypt by England, and that of Tunis by France in 1881, Italy had kept an anxious eye upon Tripoli. While other powers were marking out vast colonial empires for themselves in Africa, she had to content herself with the two insignificant and barren tracts of Eritrea and Somaliland. At length nothing remained unoccupied, outside of Abyssinia and Liberia, whose integrity is guaranteed by the powers, except Morocco and Tripoli; while the events of 1910-11 indicated clearly that Morocco would soon pass under the direct control of France. As a Mediterranean and a naval power, it is a matter of considerable economic importance and genuine national pride that Italy should share in the partition of the African littoral and in the material development of North and Central Africa. In 1881, when France signed its treaty with Tunis, and again in 1899, when France and Great Britain

determined the boundaries of Wadai and the "hinterland" of the Vilayet of Tripoli, the French Government was careful to inform Italy that she had no intention of molesting the integrity of Tripolitania. There were good reasons for her modesty in this instance. She did not think the country valuable enough to repay the expense of annexation in the first place; and, in the second, she already possessed more promising interests elsewhere in northern Africa. In December, 1900, and November, 1902, France made secret agreements with the Italian Government, promising not to interfere with the extension of Italian influence in Tripoli, provided Italy made no resistance to the French advance in Morocco.¹ The seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, which was supported diplomatically by Germany, was a sign that the Triple Alliance would raise no obstacle to an Italian invasion of Tripoli. The agreements of Great Britain with France and Spain in 1904, and again in 1907, concerning the maintenance and preservation of their respective spheres of influence in northern Africa, were further indications that these powers would hardly oppose the entrance of another European state upon the stage, whose presence would be an additional guarantee of the preservation of the *status quo* and the maintenance of European control over the numerous Mohammedan peoples of Africa.

During the first ten years of the twentieth century, the Italians were trying quietly to get an economic foothold in Tripolitania, and were anxious to see the country develop like its neighbors. They would willingly have furnished the necessary money and means of bringing this about if Turkey had been favorable to such progress and had afforded the necessary facilities and protection. But Tur-

¹ Rouard de Card, *La Politique de la France à l'égard de la Tripolitaine*, 1906.

key, naturally suspicious of Italy and jealous of its own rights, feared that economic and political infiltration would soon lead to administrative control and ownership. She declined to grant Italy any position of special privilege, and only grudgingly admitted her merchants and citizens within the country. As time went on, the feeling between the two nationalities became more hostile and more suspicious. The Turkish officials, past masters in the arts of procrastination, deceit, and intrigue, hindered the Italian movements at every step. The Home Government at Constantinople maintained a conciliatory attitude on the whole, but the local officers used every possible means to keep the Italians out of the vilayet. It made no difference whether the Banco de Roma was trying to procure land or business privileges, or private citizens were seeking to establish mills or oil factories, or learned scholars wishing to embark on archæological missions, innumerable and exasperating obstacles were constantly placed in the pathway. Every legitimate effort of Italy to develop trade in the country was opposed, either openly or secretly; and the *Marsad*, the Turkish paper of Tripoli, contained frequent and bitter attacks upon the resident Italians and on the policy of their Government. Matters came to such a pass, at length, that two Italians were slain — the murder of Father Giustino, of Derna, being particularly inexcusable; and the Italian Government had to threaten the coast with a naval demonstration before the Turkish cabinet would recall the unscrupulous and incompetent ruler of Derna.

But the Italians cannot be exempted entirely from blame. There is no doubt that their own aggressiveness and jealousy of foreign concessions, combined with the attacks of the Italian press, which established regular correspondents at the port of Tripoli in 1910, brought a good deal of trouble

upon them that might possibly have been avoided. Yet, if Turkey had been willing to render some real satisfaction for the numerous insults to Italian dignity and honor, Italy would have refrained from any forcible invasion of the country. Her ministers were very patient and anxious to avoid serious conflicts; but they could not close their eyes to the insults to Italian citizens and their national flag in Tripolitania, on the Red Sea, and in Asia Minor, which were increasing year by year. Italian trading vessels and the native Eritrean feluccas were frequently boarded in the Red Sea and the money and valuables of the crews and portions of the cargoes seized by the Turkish officials, on the ground that they were engaging in a contraband trade with Turkish ports. In Asia Minor numerous difficulties arose concerning Italian laborers employed on the railways under construction; and, among other troubles, came the report that the daughter of an Italian laborer had been abducted and forcibly converted to Mohammedanism. Turkey talked in a conciliatory manner, but never settled any of these vexing questions to the satisfaction of Italy. Matters became more and more strained. The Italian Government was impressed daily with the necessity of reaching some definite solution of the situation which was fast becoming unbearable. Their cup was full. It was no longer possible to endure in patience and meekness the insults to their national pride and honor, which they felt Turkey would never have dared to permit if she had had a wholesome respect for Italy as a military power. Knowing full well the reputation of the Turks for procrastination and evasion, they realized that a satisfactory and permanent solution of the problem could only be attained through some form of prompt and decisive action backed by a display of force.

After a careful study of the whole situation, the Italian cabinet decided upon a bold and ingenious course. Turkey

was to be submitted to a severe test; and, if this failed, Tripolitania was to be occupied by force. Realizing completely the difficulties and dangers of such a plan, the Italian leaders took every precaution to have each detail of their scheme thoroughly worked out and to avoid all outside complications. The most serious difficulty in the execution of such a plan lay in the fact that any attack upon any one of the outlying provinces of Turkey was likely to be followed by the dissolution of the Sultan's empire and a general European war, owing to the weakness of the Young Turk, or Constitutional Reform party, then in control of the Government of the Sublime Porte, and to the unsettled situation in the Balkans. The Italian Government was very far from desiring anything of this sort and they made every effort to eliminate any such possibility. In the first place, they delayed action until the last uprising in the Balkans — that of the Malissori — had been brought to an end and matters had, for the time being at least, been satisfactorily adjusted between the Albanians and the Turks. Then, at the moment when orders were being issued for the occupation of Tripoli, they sent a special message to all their ministers and consuls in the Balkan States to assure the rulers and people there that Italy desired to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and that she had no intention of waging war generally against the Sultan, or of invading his domains in Europe or Asia Minor.

Another difficulty in the way of the successful execution of their plan was the problem of secrecy. It was absolutely essential to the success of their enterprise that they should be able at a moment's notice to seize control of the eastern Mediterranean, in order to protect the fleet and army of occupation from interruption or attack. The required secrecy was obtained by exercising a stringent censorship of the Italian press for some time previous to the execution

of their design and during the initial moves. This was the reason why the press and the world at large were completely surprised at the suddenness of the event, and at a loss to explain its significance.

On September 28, 1911, after making the most careful military and naval preparations, the Italian Government sent the Sublime Porte an ultimatum demanding, within twenty-four hours, a satisfactory guaranty that substantial reforms would be introduced in the government of Tripoli and full protection afforded Italian citizens and trade within the vilayet, under the threat of an immediate military occupation of Tripoli and Cirenaica.¹ In this document the disorders and troubles due to the inefficiency and neglect of the Turkish officials, the great need of enlightened economic development similar to that provided in the neighboring countries of Egypt and Tunis, the paramount interests of Italy in the district, and the systematic opposition to all her enterprises and efforts to develop trade there, and the dangerous situation of the Italians and foreigners because of the present agitation, were all carefully recited. The Turkish cabinet replied in a conciliatory spirit, offering to give the required protection to Italian interests and to make all reasonable commercial and economic concessions that did not infringe upon the rights of the empire and those guaranteed by treaty to foreign powers, but asking what were the guaranties sought by Italy. This was not considered a satisfactory answer by the Italian authorities; and so the conflict commenced.

Nothing short of a position of special privilege in economic matters and a share in the administration of the province would have halted the Italians at this point. They were determined to take no chances concerning the future

¹ Supplement to *Amer. Jour. of Internat. Law*, January 1912, vol. vi, pp. 11, 12.

of Tripoli. The old corrupt régime must go and at once. The welfare both of the native inhabitants and of the foreign residents must be assured and a new field for Italian commercial expansion opened. The last stand of the interior slave trade must be done away with and the most radical of the Mohammedan secret orders, such as the Senoussi, deprived of their last stronghold in northern Africa. Thus, in the main, the Italian policy seems to be justified. Yet, in justice to the Turks, it ought to be said that the new Constitutional Reform party has had its hands too full with the innumerable difficulties of a complete reorganization of the internal government of the empire to give the proper attention to the Tripolitan situation. And, while the inhabitants of Tripolitania have lacked opportunities and facilities for development and have probably suffered some from excessive taxation, it has not yet been proved that they had been particularly oppressed or abused by the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Vilayet of Tripoli was composed of the two large seaboard districts of Tripolis with its port cities of Tripoli and Homs (or Lebda), and Cirenaica with the adjacent plateau of Barca possessing two ports of entry — Ben Ghasi and Derna. Between these two administrative regions lay a long stretch of desert coast line without harbors of any importance, while behind all were the great Sahara and Libyan Deserts, extending far to the south, and dotted here and there with fertile oases, the chief of which were Ghadames, Ghat, Socna, Murzuk, Sella, and Andjila. The problem of the Italians was therefore threefold: to prevent the Turks from throwing any military forces or supplies into the country; to seize promptly all the seaports; and, finally, to occupy the hinterland. The first two of these moves were carried out with energy and precision. A number of Italian warships were sent into the

eastern Mediterranean to head off any attempt of the Ottomans to interrupt their maneuvers from Asia Minor, while the greater part of their naval forces were employed in escorting a huge fleet of transports bearing their army to the coasts of Tripolitania; and within six weeks practically all the seaport towns had been occupied without great difficulty, and some 35,000 troops safely landed in the country.

Meanwhile, the Turks had not been idle. They managed to smuggle a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition into the vilayet with some of their best military leaders, — such as Enver Bey (now Enver Pasha and Turkish Minister of War), Fethi Bey,¹ and Aziz Ali Bey el Masri,² — before the Italians could establish an effective blockade of the coast, and France and Egypt set up a stringent watch on their frontiers. The Arabs and Berbers of the mountains and interior were aroused to action by the activities of Ferhat Bey and Suleiman el Barouni, former deputies in the Ottoman Parliament from the Tripolitan districts of Zavia and Gebel. And the support of Sidi Achmed el-Sherif-el-Senoussi and his brother, Sidi Hellal, was secured, the former of whom is the head of the Senoussi, the most powerful Mohammedan organization in northern Africa with branches in Syria, Arabia, and Asia Minor. He has had his headquarters for some time at the oasis of Kufra, in the Libyan Desert and technically outside of the boundary of any state; but he has been for several years in close and friendly touch with the authorities at Constantinople. In this way quite an extensive military force was organized and a determined resistance made

¹ Fethi Bey became a military airman and was killed in March, 1914, trying to fly from Asia Minor to Cairo.

² Aziz Ali succeeded Enver Bey as leader in Tripolitania, and was recently tried and acquitted of charges of incompetency and corruption while in control of Turkish forces in Tripoli.

to the advance of the Italians into the interior. So stubborn and effective was this defense that over a year elapsed before the European invaders were able to occupy permanently any important section of the hinterland. In justice to the Italian soldiers it ought to be added, however, that a part of this delay was due to unfavorable climatic conditions and to the peculiar and exceptional difficulties of desert warfare.

Meanwhile, both the Italian Government and the European powers were taking steps to end the conflict. On January 27, 1912, Russia issued a circular to the European courts urging joint action in the interests of peace. On March 25, Emperor William and King Vittorio Emanuele III met at Venice to discuss the same problem; and from April 15 to 23, the representatives of the European states at Constantinople, led by the Russian Ambassador, pressed their offers of mediation upon the Sultan. All in vain. The Ottoman Government steadily refused to consider terms of peace until the Italian troops were withdrawn from Tripolitania. This was a condition which the Italians could no longer be expected to consider seriously, for a royal decree had already been issued on November 5, annexing the newly occupied country to the Italian kingdom. This had been done, partly with the hope of coercing Turkey to accept the inevitable, and partly for the purpose of creating a legal basis for the introduction of a new administration, and for the inauguration of a carefully prepared scheme to promote the economic development of the province.

At length the Italian authorities realized that, as long as their operations were confined solely to Tripolitania, the contest was likely to be interminable. The Turkish officials, gifted with extraordinary powers of patience and procrastination, were finding the situation much to their liking.

The contest in Tripolitania was costing them comparatively little in men and money. No special burdens, either in taxes or in the recruitment of new regiments, had been laid upon their people: nor were the losses and inconveniences to business and trade within the Ottoman Empire of sufficient moment thus far to arouse the people to an insistent demand for peace. On the other hand, the Italians were spending thousands of dollars every day on military operations and suffering enormous commercial losses on account of the Turkish boycott upon their goods and ships, while the prospects for a speedy occupation of the hinterland of Tripolitania were not very promising. Accordingly, the Italian authorities devised a new method of coercion, which ultimately induced the Turks to change their attitude somewhat, but which might have failed in its chief object had not war broken out suddenly in the Balkans.

On February 22, 1912, Signor Giolitti, Italian Premier, introduced into the Chamber of Deputies a bill providing for the extension of Italian sovereignty to Tripolitania and for the creation of a special government for the new colony. The next day, the Chamber adopted the bill by a vote of 423 to 9;¹ and shortly afterwards it was passed unanimously by the Senate. Thus the Italian nation expressed in no uncertain tone its fixed determination to possess the old Turkish vilayet, so favorably situated with regard to their own kingdom. Already, in January and February, the Italian fleet had been blockading the Turkish coast in the Red Sea. On February 24, Beirut was bombarded, and the blockade was extended to the Syrian coast in March. Finally, this was followed by a naval demonstration at the mouth of the Dardanelles, April 16-19, when the cables between the mainland and some of the islands were cut,

¹ *London Times*, February 23 and 24, 1912.

which culminated in the seizure of the island of Rhodes and a number of other Sporades off the coast of Asia Minor.

Thus was the matter brought home to Turkey ; and, after considerable hesitation, informal discussions began early in June at Caux in Switzerland between Naby Bey, formerly Ottoman Minister at Athens, and Signor Modiano, a Solonika lawyer. These men were joined soon by other representatives from both states and the official "pourparlers" were transferred to Ouchy and Lausanne. July, August, and September passed without any material progress being made toward a final settlement, save that the position of each party was clearly defined and certain general concessions were offered on both sides. In October, the situation in the Balkans became critical. War was imminent ; and Turkey, in order to have her hands and resources free for a new encounter, suddenly became more conciliatory. Instead of insisting on the retention of the port of Tobruk and the control of the hinterland of Tripolitania, the Ottoman Government was now ready to withdraw from the whole country. The Italian authorities, grasping quickly the significance of the change, met them in a friendly and generous spirit, and an agreement was soon reached. At six o'clock on October 15, the terms of peace were agreed upon at Ouchy and the definite treaty was signed at Lausanne at three o'clock on October 18, 1912.¹ There were eleven articles in the treaty which contained the usual provisions for an immediate cessation of hostilities, exchange of prisoners, and the resumption of commercial and other relations between the two countries, and the evacuation of territories occupied by the two combatants. In regard to the last-mentioned stipulation, it was provided that the withdrawal of the Italian forces from the islands of the Ægean "will take place immediately after

¹ *London Times*, October 16 and 19, 1912.

the evacuation of Tripoli and Cirenaica by the Ottoman officers, troops, and civil functionaries."

No mention was made of the transference of Tripolitania to Italy or of the establishment of Italian sovereignty in that country. By the Ottoman law the Sultan is prohibited from disposing of lands belonging to the empire. In this case, therefore, the territory was tacitly understood to have passed into other hands, in spite of the will or the wish of the Ottoman ruler. Italy agreed to the conclusion of a new commercial agreement between the two states, which would permit a slight raise in the Turkish tariff rates, and to aid the Ottoman authorities in abolishing the foreign post-offices and other features of the capitulatory régime in Turkey. And the Italian Government was to pay yearly 2,000,000 lire out of the revenues of Tripolitania into the Administration of the Public Debt of the Ottoman Empire.

It was understood that the Italians would do nothing to interfere with the spiritual authority of the Sultan as Khalif, or head of the Mohammedan Church, in Tripolitania. To make secure his position in this regard, and to preserve the confidence of the faithful in the integrity and good intentions of Ottoman authorities, the Turkish monarch issued an imperial firman to the people of the old vilayet on October 18 — the same day on which the treaty of Lausanne was signed. "Since my Government," wrote the Sultan, "desires, on the one hand, to aid you effectively in the necessary defense of your country, but realizes the impossibility of doing so, and since, on the other hand, it regards your present and future prosperity, it wishes to terminate a war ruinous to you and to your families and disastrous to the state. Hoping to restore peace and prosperity to your country, We, basing Our action on Our sovereign right, hereby grant you full autonomy."¹ In this way, the suzerain handed

¹ London *Times*, October 19, 1912.

back the country to its inhabitants, instead of to the Italians, and shifted all the responsibility and sovereignty on to the shoulders of the people, whom he left to make the best terms they could with the Italian authorities.

The Sultan then proceeded to appoint Shems-ed-Din as his official representative in spiritual matters for five years with the title of "Naib-es-Sultan," and to authorize the appointment of a "Kadi" and several aids (Naibs) who should assist the Naib-es-Sultan in the enforcement of the law of the Sheriat and in the regulation of religious affairs. The Kadi was to be paid by Turkey, but the Naib-es-Sultan and the assistants out of the religious revenues of the country. And the religious supremacy of the Sultan is still maintained, though his prestige has diminished materially by reason of this unfortunate Tripolitan episode and the defeats of his armies in the Balkans.

Early in January, 1913, the Italians resumed their forward movement for the occupation of the interior of Tripolitania. Without great difficulty, though at the cost of great hardships to the troops, the Italian forces pushed their way through Zintan, Fessato, and Nalut to the Tunisian border and south to Ghadames, which was entered by Captain Pavone on April 27. At the same time other columns were pressing south through Misna and Socna to the Fezzan and Murzuk which was occupied in the fall of the same year. And practically all of Tripolitania proper has now passed under Italian control. In Cirenaica and Marmarica, however, the situation is quite different. The immediate hinterland of Ben Ghasi and Derna was taken over without much trouble; but the Italians are having a serious time subduing the peoples of the mountains and the plateau of Barca in the rear. The Arabs of the Green Mountains are more warlike and independent than those of Tripolitania proper, and the hold of the Turks over this region had

never been very effective. So the contest is still on, and it is likely to be some time before the entire country will be subdued and entirely reconciled to the Italian rule.

When this is accomplished, a new era will dawn for Tripolitania and its people. Order and security for life and property will be established, and no expense will be spared to insure the future development and prosperity of the country. If the Italian Government carries out its policy, as outlined in its message to Turkey and in its proclamations to the people of its new colony, honestly, intelligently, and unselfishly, all will be well. Already they have made an admirable beginning. The seaports have been cleaned up, supplied with proper lighting and sewage systems, and provided with an efficient and progressive government. Large sums are being spent on public improvements and proper methods for opening the country and developing its trade. The administration of the new colony is still on a military basis, but the young officers and soldiers are creating an excellent impression and performing a fine service, as advisers and local administrators. French methods are being followed in the preservation of local customs and in the use of native officials, such as the Maimakams and Sheiks, under Italian Residents and supervisors. The work of the physicians and teachers is splendid, and goes also a long way toward winning the confidence of the masses.

While the energies of the Italians at present are largely devoted to exploration and to providing cheap, safe, and rapid means of communication throughout the country, a multitude of things remain to be done before Tripolitania can be set upon its feet and turned into a self-supporting and prosperous colony. It will be a long and painful process. The difficulties will be great and the rewards few. For, "until the prosperity of the native population is soundly established upon the basis of agriculture and, in certain

districts, stock-raising," writes a competent observer who has visited the country since the Italian occupation, "or until minerals are found in paying quantities, there can be no great development of the Tripoli market. A few fortunate and far-seeing business men will probably make large sums, for the Government is bound to be a good customer for a considerable period of years, but much capital will have to be expended and many unproductive years must pass before a paying commerce is built up."¹

¹ London *Times*, special correspondent, September 4, 5, 6, 1913. For further details concerning the Italian occupation of Tripolitania, see Thomas Barclay, *Turco-Italian War and its Problems*, 1912; Tullio Irace, *With the Italians in Tripoli*, 1912. For conditions before the war, see Edmond Bernet, *En Tripolitaine; Voyage à Ghadames*, 1912. An excellent account of the Italian experiences in colonizing Eritrea and Somaliland will be found in Captain Pellenc's *Les Italiens en Afrique*, 1880-96, published in 1897.

CHAPTER XIII

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

EGYPT

NEVER, since its foundation by Mehemet Ali in the early years of the nineteenth century, had the Albanian dynasty been an unqualified success at the head of Egyptian affairs. It possessed some elements of strength, of stability, and of progress ; but it contained too much of selfishness, of inequality, and of injustice to retain a permanent supremacy in a land so peculiar, so poor, and so much in the public eye of Europe as Egypt. For nearly seventy years Mehemet Ali and his successors maintained an independent administration, completely untrammelled by outside influences or internal checks ; but this was due rather to the strength of the reigning family and the poverty and weakness of the governed than to any great genius for government on the part of the Khedives. These rulers cared more for the outward show and emoluments of power, office, and conquest than for the welfare of the people. They preferred to start at the top of the ladder with those improvements that appeal so strongly to the popular imagination, such as public edifices, railways, and palaces. The more prosaic reforms, that call for real effort and unselfish devotion to the common welfare, and which are essential foundation stones to the establishment of any successful and beneficent government, did not attract them. Nor were any of the members of this family trained in the science of government, or well equipped for the work of a sovereign. Some, like Mehemet Ali, were gifted with a rough genius for organization ; and

others, like Ibrahim Pasha, with marked native military ability; but one and all were as unsystematic and incompetent in public affairs as they were ambitious and improvident. They increased the governmental expenses and expanded their territorial possessions, — even to distant Dar-Fur and the Bahr-el-Ghazal, with the aid of Baker and Gordon, — but gave little attention to increasing the material wealth and productiveness of their realm. Expansion they understood, but “conservation” was a term unknown to their vocabulary.

Said Pasha loaded an already heavily burdened country with an immense debt in connection with the launching of the Suez Canal project; but the spendthrift of the family was Ismail Pasha, who ruled from 1863 to 1879. He spent enormous sums on wars with Abyssinia, conquests in the Sudan, and unproductive public works such as railways, administration buildings, and schools, which were of little real advantage to the country because of their expensive upkeep and the poverty of the Government. His reforms were too rapid and too ill-advised to reap at once the success they would otherwise have deserved, and the well-intentioned efforts of the Khedive were too often thwarted through the incapacity and corruption of his agents. Honest and able administrators were almost impossible to find, and the whole public service, including the courts, was tainted with graft, due to the small salaries and the uncertainty of the tenure of office. In fact, the entire state machinery was suffering from “ignorance, dishonesty, waste, extravagance, and corruption”; and, as Romola Gessi wrote to Gordon, “the whole strength of the Government is turned on amassing money, on outward forms of state, and on ruining the country by taxes and burdensome charges.”

At length the day of reckoning came; and Ismail Pasha, under whose wizard touch the public debt had risen be-

tween 1863 and 1874 from £E4,000,000 to over £E70,000,000, was compelled in 1875 to ask Great Britain for assistance in reorganizing the Egyptian finances. Stephen Cave — “Her Majesty’s Paymaster” — was sent out in December, 1875, and returned in March, 1876, with an exhaustive report,¹ which demonstrated conclusively the ability of Egypt, with careful and expert management, to carry the interest on her debts, at a reasonable rate. But it was no longer possible for her to go on renewing her floating indebtedness of £E18,000,000 at twenty-five per cent and raising new loans. He advised the appointment of a British agent at the head of a department of finance with power to supervise the laying and the collection of the taxes, and the employment of trained Europeans in the civil service.

In March, Mr. Rivers Wilson reached Cairo to act as financial adviser to the Khedive, but a whole year elapsed before any real progress was made, owing to the difficulties experienced by the British and Egyptian Governments in agreeing upon a plan for financial control and reform. Meanwhile, the public debt rose within three years from £E77,000,000 to over £E91,000,000, a great shrinkage occurred in the annual tax returns, and the credit of the Khedive disappeared altogether. He was therefore compelled to accede, on January 27, 1878, to the British demand for the appointment of a High Committee of Inquiry numbering seven — six Europeans and one Egyptian — to control the state revenues and expenditures, and to supervise the collection of taxes and the funding of the public debt. But this committee was not actually established until March 30, and then only through the pressure exerted by France and England. They had reached an agreement be-

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers, 1877, Egypt*, vol. 76, pp. 99-118, British Museum File.

tween February 4 and 9 to coöperate in solving the problem of Egyptian finance — such action being officially declared not to be “inconsistent with the Khedive’s independent administration of the finances.”

In spite of an excellent report on the necessary financial and economic reforms, made by the Committee of Inquiry on August 19, and the creation of a new cabinet under Nubar Pasha, including Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance and M. de Blignières as Minister of Public Works in December,¹ nothing of value was accomplished that year; nor, indeed, in the following twelve months. Meanwhile, political intrigues increased and the feeling of hostility toward the employment of foreigners in the high offices, which had early manifested itself in various quarters, now assumed alarming proportions. In February, 1879, anti-European riots broke out in Cairo and attempts were made on the lives of Rivers Wilson and Nubar Pasha, the latter of whom was compelled to resign his portfolio on February 19, through the pressure and accusations of the enemies of foreign control. Notwithstanding the nomination of his son, Prince Tewfik, to the presidency of the Council of State on March 12, the Khedive remained dissatisfied with the drift of affairs and opposed all reforms not in strict accord with his own ideas and plans. He rejected the financial schemes of Mr. Wilson, formulating some of his own and installing a new ministry under Cherif Pasha on April 7–10. The Committee of Inquiry resigned; Rivers Wilson was recalled on April 24; and on the 25th, Lord Salisbury warned the Egyptian ruler that his course was likely to bring upon him the retaliation of the European powers. He assured him, at the same time, that Great Britain had “no other policy than that of developing the resources and of securing the good government of the

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1878, *Egypt*, vol. 78, pp. 524–26.

country. They had hitherto considered the independence of the Khedive and the maintenance of his dynasty an important condition for the attainment of these ends."

Ismail Pasha, however, persisted in the attempt to rule in his own way; but, with bankruptcy staring him in the face and cut off from all European assistance, his position soon became intolerable. All the great powers protested vigorously against his decree of April 22, declaring that all debts and claims of creditors were subject to the authority of the Khedive, without appeal to the mixed courts. No help was forthcoming from any British or French source; and on June 26, 1879, the perplexed ruler, acting on the advice of the English Government, resigned in favor of Mohammed Tewfik Pasha, who was duly confirmed khedive by the Sultan of Turkey in a firman.

Cherif Pasha again formed a cabinet; and the new ruler, who had the welfare of his people at heart as well as a genuine sympathy with the reform measures, promptly started in to set up an efficient government along the lines suggested by Great Britain and France. These two powers, because of their special interests in the country and their conviction that some form of political supervision had become a necessity, began in September, 1879, to exercise a sort of dual control over the affairs of Egypt. Both agreed that the united action of two interested and well-informed states possessing a common program, had decided advantages over the joint supervision of all the European states. "However great the progress Egypt has made in the last half century," wrote Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire to M. Sienkiewicz — French agent at Cairo, — "it is quite clear that for self-government she will still need for a long time the guardianship of England and France. By herself alone she could not overcome the difficulties of all kinds which stand in the way of her regeneration. . . . The work of reform

will be long and toilsome ; but, if anything can hasten its progress and guarantee its success, it is assuredly the intervention of two well-enlightened nations.”¹

Great Britain, however, had her own reasons. “The action of England, though her interests are largely commercial, is dictated in the main by exclusively political considerations,” said Salisbury to Count Karolyi. “Egypt has, in that point of view, an importance for England which it has for no other country in the world, and we are unable either to forego our own claims to influence in that country or to accede to an arrangement of which confusion would be the necessary result. An international government of Egypt is, I think, quite impossible.”² Yet England had no intention at first of dictating in public affairs, preferring rather the part of a friendly adviser. The British Government “desires no partisan ministry in Egypt,” wrote Granville to Sir Edward Malet on November 4, 1881. “In the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, a partisan ministry founded on the support of a foreign power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign diplomatic agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their sovereign, and to give rise to counter intrigues which are detrimental to the welfare of the State.”³

The English authorities wished, indeed, to have the necessary reforms in finance, justice, and administration carried out through the agency of the Khedive and his ministers ; and France concurred with them fully in this policy. They failed to see, however, that, in the mind of the native politicians and leaders, there was little difference between

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1881, *Egypt*, vol. 82, pp. 110-13.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 79, pp. 136-37.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 82, pp. 2-3.

the rule of a "partisan ministry founded on the support of a foreign power" and the government of a native ministry supported by outside influences. For the fact remained that Tewfik Pasha and the men he chose for his ministers were regarded quite generally as the puppets of Great Britain and France, who were suspected by many influential persons of harboring, behind their philanthropic designs, a secret plan for securing possession of Egypt.

During the next three years little real progress in financial reform was accomplished, in spite of the good intentions of the Khedive, who issued a decree on August 10, 1879, establishing a Committee of Control ("Cadastre Général") for the finances consisting of a director-general and a commission under the Finance Minister, and orders on November 15, 1879, and April 5, 1880, creating a "Caisse spéciale de la Dette Publique" and a "Commission of Liquidation," comprised of seven European experts, with power to supervise the financial reorganization. An annual budget was created; an excellent system for consolidation and redemption of the public debt, and for control of the revenues, was devised and promulgated in the Law of Liquidation of July 17, 1880; and Mr. Rivers Wilson — now president of the Commission of Liquidation — was enabled in August to make an able report on the condition of the finances and the plans for reorganization. No definite steps were taken, however, to reorganize the courts of justice, the methods of taxation, or the administrative system. Intrigues were rife on all sides. The opposition to foreign interference was as great as ever, causing innumerable difficulties to the new government. Cabinet after cabinet tried its hand and failed, until seven ministries had held office without materially improving the situation. It was practically impossible to get a group of able and patriotic men together who could agree upon an enlightened and progres-

sive policy and firmly adhere to it until something worth while had been accomplished. The chief difficulty in the way of reform lay in the great lack of experienced and trained men in the native official circles. Another equally serious handicap was that the Government of Tewfik Pasha never actually held all the reins of power in its hands at any one time. And in attempting to secure its position by the aid of foreign experts and outside assistance, it lost the support of some of the most influential native elements.

But the new administration, busy with many pressing affairs and reforms, committed one tremendous and unpardonable blunder when it overlooked the serious and restless condition of the military forces and failed to provide for the immediate reorganization of the army — the one body really dangerous to the establishment of public order and the success of the new régime. As early as February, 1881, the signs of a military revolt were visible in the disagreements which arose between the ministry and the younger officers on the questions of pay and of an increase in the forces. It came to a head on September 9, 1881, when Colonel Ahmed Arabi and some other officers, who feared punishment unless they could coerce the Government and keep control over the Ministry of War, led the Arab regiments in a demonstration before the palace of the Khedive. As a result, Mahmoud Samy Pasha — representing the military party — became Minister of War, and the demands of the insurgents received a full hearing.

Meanwhile, another controversy arose over the control of the finances between the ministry and the National Chamber, which began its sittings on December 26, 1880. The leaders of the Assembly claimed the right of approving all taxation and of inspecting all the public expenses, but they raised no objection to an official budget or to the employment of foreign experts. The ministers, however,

would admit of no restriction on the right of the Khedive to control the finances; and after striving in vain for two months to enforce the will of the sovereign, Cherif Pasha was forced to resign in February, 1882. The victorious Assembly then compelled the Khedive to nominate a new cabinet with Mahmoud Samy Pasha as Grand Vizier and Arabi Bey as Minister of War and Marine.

From that time until June, the Government was practically under the thumb of the military, or "National Party," as they preferred to call themselves. The new combination proved little more successful than the earlier cabinets — chiefly because it had no definite program of reform or government, but preferred to use its energies in strengthening its hold upon the reins of power and in promoting anti-foreign demonstrations. The Khedive finally broke with this radical ministry and dissolved it on March 28; and its successor fell likewise in May, owing to the discovery of plots against the life of the ruler. Arabi alone remained at his post, as the Khedive postponed the nomination of a new cabinet.

It was now evident to Great Britain and France, who had followed closely the course of events and supported stoutly the Egyptian sovereign through their representatives in Cairo, that serious complications were impending. It was imperative that these powers should reach a definite understanding and be prepared for any emergency. Accordingly a lively correspondence ensued between Earl Granville and Gambetta — then Prime Minister of France; and it was agreed to give the Khedive their moral support and diplomatic aid in the event that anything occurred — either within or without the state — to threaten the existing state of things. They reserved, however, freedom of action with regard to future developments, and were careful not to promise material assistance or intervention.

Meanwhile, it was becoming clearer day by day that ere long it would be impossible to avoid some form of forceful interference in the affairs of Egypt. Both the British and French Governments were, however, undecided as to what form this should take. "Armed intervention will become a necessity," wrote Malet on January 20, 1882, "if we adhere to the refusal to allow the budget to be voted by the Chamber, and we cannot do otherwise, as it forms only a part of a complete scheme of revolution. . . . The united powers will be listened to, but not England and France alone, because they think we are actuated by selfish motives, and that the other powers will not allow us to deal with the Egyptian question alone."¹ The same day the Vizier of Egypt was notified that England and France would not consent to the Chamber voting on the budget, as this would be an infringement upon the international agreements concerning the control of the finances. The situation became acute; and Granville declared in favor of intervention by Turkey, provided it was arranged and supervised by his own Government and that of France. By February he had changed his mind and on the sixth notified Lord Lyons — British Ambassador at Paris — that Her Majesty's Government desired that any intervention in Egypt should represent "the united action of the powers of which Turkey should be a party." France at first agreed, but two days later M. Freycinet, who had succeeded Gambetta as Premier, expressed his disapproval of all measures requiring the use of force. Granville insisted, however, on sending a general circular letter to all the powers, dated February 11, in which he reiterated England's wish for the "united action of Europe" in case intervention should prove unavoidable.

After the complete failure of the Khedival Government

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers, 1882, Egypt, vol. 82, p. 154.*

to make any headway with its reform program and after the temporary triumph of the military party, Freycinet suggested, on May 11, that a naval demonstration might strengthen the position of the Khedive and enable him to proceed with the reorganization of the government. Granville approved on the 13th, though he thought it was a mistake not to ask the rest of the powers; and on the 20th the combined fleet of three vessels under the command of Admiral Seymour arrived off Alexandria. The Cairo representatives of the two powers announced that the ships had come to aid the Khedive in maintaining his lawful authority and in setting up a ministry of his own choosing under Cherif Pasha. No arrests, persecutions, or sequestrations of property would be permitted, but it was hinted that it would be well for Arabi and his friends to leave the country temporarily, after the establishment of the new cabinet. The military party paid no attention to these suggestions, but forced a new ministry under Ragheb Pasha upon the Khedive on June 16, Arabi retaining the portfolio of war. The good offices of a Turkish commissioner, Dervish Pasha, who came from the Sultan on June 7 at the personal solicitation of the Khedive, and the combined efforts of the British and French agents, were unable to bring about any adjustment or compromise.

On June 11, a serious riot broke out in Alexandria, during which six Europeans were killed and others wounded. Military preparations were begun by the leaders of the national party, and an attempt made to fortify the harbor of Alexandria — in spite of the warnings of Admiral Seymour. The Ragheb ministry continuing reactionary and inefficient, and the disorders increasing steadily throughout the country, Granville was forced to admit, on July 10, that the naval demonstration was a failure. "Her Majesty's Government now sees no alternative," he wrote, "but

a recourse to force to put an end to a state of affairs which has become intolerable." He still favored, however, a joint action of the powers, and added: "Her Majesty's Government has no interests or objects which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interests which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people."

M. Freycinet, when approached on July 11, declined to join in any military invasion, as this would be an act of war permissible to the French Government only through a vote of the Chamber of Deputies. The situation was still further complicated the same day, when Admiral Seymour opened fire upon the forts at Alexandria, after having exhausted all peaceful measures to prevent the fortification of the harbor. After appealing in vain to Italy and Turkey to coöperate with her, Great Britain decided on July 20 to send a military expedition to the support of the Khedive on her own responsibility; and General Sir Garnet Wolseley with 25,000 men was ordered to proceed to Egypt immediately. On August 18, he left Alexandria and occupied the following day without opposition Port Said, El Kantara, and Ismailia, to protect the Suez Canal in accordance with England's promise to the powers. The advance on Cairo was then begun, which culminated in an overwhelming victory over the forces of Arabi Pasha at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13 and a triumphal entry into the capital on the 15th. The same day Arabi and the other military leaders were captured, and though condemned to death in December, 1882, after a long trial, were finally banished.

Meanwhile the Khedive and a new ministry formed by Cherif Pasha on August 28 were duly installed at the head of affairs, the British announcing officially that they had intervened solely to "restore the power of the Khedive." Now that this was done, it was only necessary for them to remain long enough to "reëstablish on a firm basis the

authority of the Khedive and to make provision for the future well-being of all classes of the Egyptian people." In a note to the powers, dated January 3, 1883, Granville explained the reforms contemplated and added, "Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it [the army] as soon as the state of the country and the organization of the Khedival authority will permit of it."¹

The British prestige in Egypt had been immensely strengthened by their successes; and they were quick to see that this intricate problem could be more easily and more skillfully handled by one state alone. Out of courtesy, however, they offered France a minor participation in the reforms; but the authorities of that country declined anything short of an equal control over the finances. This Great Britain considered no longer necessary or wise. The British member of the Board of Control resigned; and, with the consent of the Sultan, the Khedive issued an order abolishing the Dual Control on January 18, 1883. On February 4, Sir A. Colvin, with the approval of England, was appointed "Financial Councillor" to the ruler. He might sit with the ministers, if requested, but his powers were advisory only and his position depended upon the will of the sovereign.

In September, 1882, Lord Dufferin, one of the ablest and most experienced of British statesmen and diplomatists, had been sent out to draw up a practical and comprehensive plan for the reorganization of the Egyptian Government. His report was submitted on February 6, 1883,² approved by the Home Government, and issued as the Organic Law by the Khedive on May 1, 1883. The new government, known as the "Institutions," consisted of the usual cabinet departments of Foreign Affairs, Interior,

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1883, *Egypt*, vol. 83, pp. 544-46.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 87-130.

Finance, Army, Justice, Education and Public Works, and two Assemblies. The Legislative Council numbering thirty was composed of sixteen deputies elected by the provincial assemblies and fourteen nominated by the Khedive. The General Assembly of eighty-two members embraced the whole of the Legislative Council, the six ministers, and forty-six elective deputies — two chosen by each provincial assembly and two by each town government. Candidates for membership in the General Assembly must be at least thirty years old, be able to read and write, and pay direct taxes yearly of not less than £E30. The Legislative Council, whose members were to serve a long term of years or for life, met once a month to discuss the budget and all prospective legislation, but it had no power to initiate or to veto measures. The General Assembly had to be summoned at least once in two years and no new taxes could be imposed without its consent. But it possessed no initiative, for all the reins of power lay in the hands of the Khedive and his ministers. Each province had its own elective assembly varying in number from four to eight members chosen by the custodians of the communes, one of whom was elected in each important village.

New criminal and civil codes were completed by a commission on April 24, and a system of mixed courts, with both Egyptian and foreign jurists, was provided under international agreements, known as the "Capitulations," which gave to the consuls of European states the right of jurisdiction over all cases in which their own nationals were a party. Then Lord Dufferin brought over the ablest men from the Indian service to organize the work of irrigation in Egypt, and began the reconstruction of the army upon a strictly Egyptian basis, and the complete reformation of the administrative system.

It was not advisable, in his opinion, to turn Egypt into

a British protectorate under a Resident, even though this form of government offered more immediate and certain prospects of success. The Gladstone cabinet would never have consented in any event; and it was opposed to his own desire not to hold the Egyptian people "in any irritating tutelage." He preferred rather that they "should lead their own lives and administer their own government unimpeded by any external anxieties and preoccupations." To secure stability and efficiency in the systems, while preserving all outward control in the hands of the Egyptian officials, Lord Dufferin, therefore, provided European advisers in every branch of the administration, but left all the public positions to be filled by Egyptians. The position of these advisers was extra-legal and they were subject to the control of, and in close touch with, the British Consul-General at Cairo; but the scheme has worked admirably ever since. Their duty was to furnish "sympathetic advice and assistance"; and, in the words of Lord Dufferin some years later, the reformation of Egypt was accomplished "not by what we did, but by what we did not do."

The author of the "Institutions" was firmly convinced that time was essential to the proper development of his system, that the people should be afforded every chance to learn the elements of self-government, and that Great Britain ought to remain in the country until the new régime was on its feet and the people able to take care of themselves. He was undoubtedly right. "Unless they [the Egyptians] are convinced that we intend to shield and foster the system we have established, it will be in vain to expect the timid politicians of the East to identify themselves with its existence. But even this will not be enough. We must also provide that the tasks entrusted to the new political apparatus do not overtax its untried strength. . . . We can hardly consider the work of reorganization complete,

or the responsibilities imposed upon us by circumstances adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt shake herself free from the initial embarrassments" of bankruptcy and agricultural depression. The Khedive and Lord Dufferin were anxious that Sir Edward Malet, who, as British Agent at Cairo, had rendered valuable assistance in the formation of the reform laws, should remain to see them carried out. However, the Home Government ruled otherwise. Mr. Malet was sent to Brussels; and, on September 11, 1883, Sir E. Baring (since 1892, Lord Cromer) arrived in Egypt to assume the position and duties of the British Consul-General. How successfully he did his work is too well known to be recorded in detail here. The story may be read at length in his own interesting book on *Modern Egypt*, or in Sir Auckland Colvin's *The Making of Modern Egypt*.

The progress of reform was slow but steady, and in proportion to the increase in the revenues of the state. Out of the theoretical scheme of Lord Dufferin, Lord Cromer gradually evolved a system of government which gave prosperity, peace, and security to the country and protection to all classes, though it may have savored at times of absolutism. During an administration of twenty-five years, there was much to praise and little to criticize. In the first five years the finances were completely reorganized, annual budgets formed, and the credit of the state established on a firm basis, without any substantial increase in the taxes. The *corvée* was abolished; and the taxpayers freed from an oppressive and vicious system of extortionate and corrupt tax-farming. In the next twenty years, some £E193,000,000 were raised easily by the reconstructed revenues, of which some £E73,000,000 were expended on public improvements and other measures affecting the material condition and interests of the masses. The "fellaheen," or common peasant inhabitants of the country,

were protected, given an opportunity to acquire land, and aided to get ahead as never before. In addition, some £E12,000,000 were devoted to irrigation, the Assuan Dam and the Assiut Barrage built, and over 500,000 acres reclaimed for farming in Middle Egypt.

"He must be blind," wrote an unbiased and competent Egyptian authority in 1906, "who sees not what the English have wrought in Egypt: the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow through the land and are not stopped at the order of the strong; the poor man is lifted up and the rich man pulled down; the hand of the oppressor and briber is struck when outstretched to do evil. Our eyes see these things, and we know from whom they come. . . . And very many of us . . . are thankful. But thanks lie on the surface of the heart and beneath is a deep well." In this "deep well" there has always remained a spirit of unrest and of suspicion, which has manifested itself occasionally at the call of Pan-Islamism, of the Caliph who sits at Constantinople, and of false prophets. For it is difficult for the European and the Oriental to attain the highest sympathy and coöperation in the joint rule of any country — no matter how great their respect for, and obligation to, one another may be. In Egypt the call of Islam is superior to all sentiments of loyalty to England, or even to the Khedive; and the volatile nature of the Egyptian makes him an easy victim of the political demagogue. It is, therefore, remarkable that, in thirty years, no far-reaching movement against the existing government has been successfully launched. The agitation caused by such skillful leaders of the so-called "National Party" as Mustapha Pasha Kamel (who died February 10, 1908) and the excitement created by the unhappy "Denishwei Affair" in June, 1906, have in no way vitally impeded the development and progress of the country or weakened the position

of England. The chief reason for this is to be found in the fact that the National Party, though led by able men who would naturally prefer to see their country ruled by its own citizens, has never produced an enlightened, constructive, and progressive platform. Its leaders have been too idealistic, bombastic, and impractical to attract the thinkers; and the masses have been too well satisfied with existing conditions to follow them.

There are many keen and gifted men, like Said Zaghloul Pasha and the late Sheik Mohammed Abdou, who wished to reform Moslem institutions without affecting the general faith in the religion of the Prophet, and to bring about the political regeneration of Egypt in the proper time and way, with the coöperation of Europeans. The real hope of the nation lies in this steadily increasing class of men. For no one can expect to work a rapid transformation in political ideals, or create democratic institutions offhand, in a country where, at the end of the nineteenth century, only 9.5 per cent of the men and .3 of one per cent of the women could read and write. Yet the British authorities have kept steadily in mind the wise suggestion of Lord Dufferin — that, in the fullness of time, representative institutions should be given to Egypt. In the spring of 1913, Lord Kitchener took up this matter again seriously and made an excellent report, recommending certain important changes in the electoral laws and in the existing form of popular representation. His suggestions were taken up by Parliament and embodied in the Electoral and Organic Law of July 21, 1913.¹

The old "General Assembly" has been abolished under the new law, and all popular authority concentrated in the Legislative Assembly which has become a real representative body. The number of deputies is increased to eighty-

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1913, *Egypt* No. 3, cd. 6875.

nine, including six ministers, sixty-six elected members, and seventeen appointed to represent minorities and interests not otherwise provided for. Although the representation is indirect, the method is simple and well adapted to present conditions. Every male Egyptian, who is twenty years of age and has his name registered in the electoral list of his town or village, is entitled to vote, except soldiers, criminals, bankrupts, and disbarred lawyers. Every fifty voters choose an elector-delegate for a term of six years, who must be thirty years of age and a registered voter. He is to act for them in electing deputies to the provincial assemblies and to the national chamber. The proportion in the latter is intended to be about one member to every 200,000 of the population. One third of this assembly will be renewed every two years; and the term of office is six years. Deputies must be thirty-five years of age, registered voters of three years' standing, able to read and write, and must have paid at least two annual tax assessments of £E50 on land, or £E20 if on a house. Holders of educational diplomas are required to pay only two fifths of these taxes, or £E20 or £E8 as the case may be.

The ministry may dissolve the Legislative Assembly at any time, but a new election must be held within three months. A bill has to be sent three times to the Chamber, however, for public discussion, and, in case of disagreement, one private conference must be held with the Government before a dissolution can be ordered. Laws relative to interior affairs, the organization of the powers of state, the civil and political rights of the people, and the public administration, cannot be promulgated without the advice of the Assembly; and all statutes must be countersigned by the President of the Council and the proper minister. No new tax — direct, personal, or land — can be established without the vote of this legislative body, which will sit yearly from

November 1 to May 1. Its advice must be obtained on all public loans and on canal, drainage, or railway projects affecting more than one province; and the annual budget has to be submitted for its scrutiny forty days before the end of the fiscal year. The Assembly may even initiate legislation, provided it does not pertain to constitutional matters, receive private members' bills, and question the ministers after due notice.

The provincial assemblies which are composed of two representatives from each subdistrict, elected for four years, possess a large amount of control over local affairs and the introduction of public improvements, being permitted to vote five per cent of the annual land taxes without further approval and to supervise the (elementary) agricultural, industrial, and commercial education.

To insure better public morals, all elections are to be declared void where any trace of fraud, violation of electoral laws, or irregularities by candidates or their agents is found. And all corruption, intimidation, and impersonation are punishable by heavy fines and imprisonment. To fit the masses for the proper use of the ballot and for greater self-dependence, great attention is being paid to the educational system. There are now some 1003 elementary public, 3951 elementary private ("Kuttab"), and 203 higher, schools in the country, including nearly 30 industrial, agricultural, and commercial institutes, with a total attendance of over 321,300. Since the Ministry of Education, led by Mahommed Ali Pasha, began its systematic work in 1897-98, the public expenditure for education has risen from £E3,000 to £E64,000 in 1910.

What Egypt now needs is a continued era of peace and internal tranquillity, in order to increase her material prosperity and to facilitate the growth of education, of moral strength, and of political institutions. Parties and political

agitation can avail little at this time. "We are in no need of parties," commented a prominent Egyptian writer upon the attempt of the "Al-Moayad" to revive the National Party recently. "We have had enough of them. All we need is to develop in our young men a desire for hard work in their spheres of action, more education, internal security, and good crops. Parties will not be of any use to us, as experience has amply shown." This feeling has become quite general; and the old days are past when a party could be launched in a night around the tables of an old café.

"There has been a marked diminution of party feeling and party strife," writes Lord Kitchener in his report for 1913;¹ "and I notice indications for a greater confidence in the Government, particularly among the silent mass of the people. I hope I am not too optimistic in considering these to be signs that in the near future the population will be again closely united, and, while placing personal interests aside, will endeavor to work loyally for the common good and to further the real interests of their country." There are, indeed, a goodly number of gifted and well-trained natives now filling positions of the highest trust and importance in a highly creditable manner. Said Zagloul Pasha, who resigned from the Ministry of Justice in 1913, had rendered excellent service on the Native Court of Appeals and as Minister of Education from 1906 to 1910. He introduced and was responsible for many valuable reforms in both departments. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, recently made Minister of Finance, was a most successful administrator as the Mudir of Menufia. Yusuf Wahla Pasha, a Copt and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1912-13, was the ablest member of the Mixed Court of Appeals and has achieved a great reputation as an efficient public official.

"The Government authorities," says Lord Kitchener,

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1913, *Egypt No. 1*, ed. 6682.

“are doing all in their power to improve the condition of the people and help them forward on sound lines, both as regards their material and political progress”; and there is ample testimony on all sides to prove his contention. The success of their efforts depends very largely, he claims, upon a steady and healthy financial and economic progress. Among other things, the importance of the cotton crop and the maintenance of the price of this staple export cannot be overstated. The country has now recovered from the fall in prices of 1895 to 1900 and the speculation which followed the rise of prices in 1907. The fellaheen are at length protected from the usurers and their own tendency to extravagance and mismanagement by the Five Feddan Law of 1912, which forbids the alienation of small farms for debt and provides government assistance in many districts on an easy loan plan.

Thus the country has been set on a fair way, under full sail, toward a prosperous and successful future. And Great Britain has most happily demonstrated how an enlightened European state can free an oppressed and impoverished people from the rule of a corrupt and selfish oligarchy, furnish them with an efficient administration, equal justice and protection for all, and a sound economic and financial system, and set them on the highroad of peace and happiness, without taking possession of their land or submitting them to an “irritating tutelage.” And this without a cent of return, save what comes through the legitimate channels of trade!

CHAPTER XIV

THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTHERN AFRICA

THE SUDAN

AFTER the intricate and difficult problem of reorganizing the Egyptian finances, no more important or perplexing task lay before the new Government of Egypt than the settlement of the Sudan question. Ever since its conquest by Mehemet Ali, that country had been a source of trouble and expense to the Egyptian rulers, although it only embraced then the region between Wadi Halfa and Khartoum. Ismail Pasha, ambitious and well intentioned, with the help of European officials whom he faithfully supported, subjugated all of the vast region extending from Khartoum south to the sources of the Nile and from the ancient kingdom of Dar-Fur to the Red Sea.

From 1869 to 1873, Sir Samuel Baker was busy annexing the equatorial region of the Nile Basin and fighting the slave traders of Unyoro and Gondokoro, yet thwarted many times by the corrupt and inefficient Egyptian officials above him and the Governor-General at Khartoum. General Charles George Gordon succeeded him as governor of Equatorial Africa. He surveyed the Nile from Gondokoro to Albert Nyanza, penetrated into the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Dar-Fur, stopped the slave raids, collected the taxes, and improved conditions generally, at the expense of his health and amid great physical exertions and discomforts. In spite of the assistance of an able staff of officers including Romola Gessi, Watson, Chippendale, and Enser, he too resigned his position in disgust, on account

of the lack of support from the Egyptian Government and of the intrigues of the Governor-General at Khartoum, and returned to London in 1876.

In 1877, he came back to Egypt at the special solicitation of Ismail Pasha, who appointed him Governor-General of the Sudan and the Equatorial Provinces. For two years he labored under great difficulties (being always in great straits to get money, officers, and troops sufficient to execute his plans) to maintain order and security in the country, so that the natives might live in peace and raise their crops. Conditions of life in the Sudan in those days were hard and the situation of the people pitiful. During the years 1875-79, Gordon reports that the loss of life from famine, disease, and wars exceeded 81,000 in Dar-Fur and 18,000 in Bahr-el-Ghazal, to which must be added a further decrease of eighty to one hundred thousand caused by the innumerable slave raids.

Every effort was made to stamp out the practice of slave hunting and trading, the slave traders being driven in large numbers out of all the towns and the slave bands freed at every opportunity. Zubeir Pasha, the Sultan of Dar-Fur and the chief of the Arab slave rulers, was captured and sent into exile at Cairo. His son, Suleiman, united all the chiefs of Dar-Fur and Bahr-el-Ghazal in an attempt to stop the progress of reform and to secure freedom from Egyptian domination. But the indomitable Gessi, after a terrific struggle lasting nearly two years, completely defeated and scattered the forces of the slavers in July, 1879. All the leaders, save Rabah, who escaped to Wadai and appeared later in Nigeria,¹ were captured; and, after being tried by court martial for treachery and the murder of Egyptians, eleven chieftains, including Suleiman, were condemned and shot. The country then settled

¹ See p. 143, *ante*.

down to a period of peace, security, and progress; and, under the skillful hand of Gessi, the Bahr-el-Ghazal became a garden, the confidence of all the headmen was secured, and the trade of the region was revived on a firm basis. Equally creditable progress was being made at the same time by Gordon's other lieutenants, including Rudolph Slatin Bey in Dar-Fur and Kordofan and Edward Schnitzler (Emin Effendi Hakim) Bey, in the Equatorial Province which extended from Lado and Rejaf on the Nile to Lake Albert.

After the abdication of Ismail Pasha in 1879, Gordon, realizing that substantial governmental support would no longer be forthcoming, resigned at the end of the year. Gessi resigned also in 1881, after receiving no supplies or steamers from Khartoum for eight months, and having the pay of his military and civil officials reduced by two years' time by the incompetent and corrupt Raouf Pasha, who succeeded Gordon as Governor-General. He was followed in the Bahr-el-Ghazal as governor by Lupton Bey. Civil and military centers were maintained also by the Egyptian Government at El Obeid in Kordofan, Sennar, Kassala, Suakim on the Red Sea, and at Berber and Dongola on the Nile.

Conditions generally went from bad to worse under the Egyptian officials, who cared more for money and gain than for real progress and an honest rule. Finally, in August, 1881, Egypt and Europe were aroused by the appearance in Dar-Fur of one Mohammed Ahmed, who proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, or successor of the Prophet, and as a savior of the Sudanese from the oppression and rule of foreigners and Egyptians. The Egyptian Government paid little attention to the movement at first, which spread rapidly until at length the Mahdi was able to take the field in person. After two or three slight successes, he



ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN in 1899

Regions in rebellion when General Gordon reached Khartoum in 1884

overran Kordofan and after a siege took El Obeid, its capital, on February 18, 1883, and made it his headquarters. Meanwhile, his emissaries were intriguing with the local chiefs and stirring up a rebellion in all parts of the Sudan. Serious uprisings broke out in the vicinity of Sennar

and Kassala, cutting off direct communication between those places and Khartoum.

The Cairo authorities, finally aroused to action, engaged General Hicks, a British officer of considerable experience in India, to put down the revolt. He reached Khartoum in March, 1883, and in September, after vain attempts to secure an adequate equipment, set out with an undisciplined force of 12,000 men (most of whom were unreliable Egyptian soldiers), 10 mountain guns, 6 Nordenfelts, 5500 camels and 500 horses, to march over the desert from the Nile to El Obeid. Failing to take proper precautions to insure a sufficient supply of food and water and the safety of his column, he was misled by his guides and his army totally destroyed; but the news of the disaster did not reach Cairo until November 5. General Valentine Baker tried in December to relieve the garrisons at Tokar and Sinkat from Suakim, but was driven back with a loss of 2400 men out of approximately 3800. Sennar was completely invested; Suakim in a panic; Khartoum threatened; and the revolt of Hadendowa in the east (Kassala), as well as that of the Mahdi in the west, given great encouragement.

At this moment, Great Britain, acting upon the advice of Sir Evelyn Baring, British Agent at Cairo, and the reports of Generals Wood, Stephenson, and Baker, who claimed that Egypt could no longer hold her southern provinces or hope to regain control of the rebellious districts, urged the Khedive to withdraw from the Sudan altogether. This the Egyptian authorities were loath to do, fearing the necessity of abandoning their own garrisons in distant Equatoria and Bahr-el-Ghazal and unwilling to sacrifice valuable territories. Tewfik Pasha wished to hold, at least, the Khartoum-Suakim line to insure the protection of Upper Egypt, while Cherif Pasha was opposed to any

withdrawal. Finally, after considerable pressure had been brought to bear, Tewfik acceded to the British demand and Cherif Pasha resigned in favor of Nubar Pasha on January 3, 1884. The Egyptian authorities and Cairo leaders were greatly excited; and every one was filled with uncertainty and apprehension. And, although the British plan was adopted, it was understood that the Egyptian garrisons would be brought out and that Great Britain would recommend a man to assist in their rescue. Accordingly, on January 18, General Gordon was nominated. His appointment was approved by the Khedive and he reached Cairo on January 24.

General Gordon was instructed by Earl Granville to report upon the general situation in the Sudan, the best mode of effecting the evacuation, and the probable effect upon the slave trade of the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces. By the Khedive and Baring he was especially charged to use every possible means to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian people and garrisons in the Sudan, including the civil population of Khartoum. There was evidently considerable uncertainty concerning the exact details of his mission. Was he to extricate the garrisons at once, or was he merely to report conditions and act later upon the receipt of other instruction? There is no doubt that Gordon was in entire sympathy with the British policy of giving up the Sudan when he left for Khartoum. "I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible according to their [Her Majesty's Government] wish," he wrote Granville in a memorandum written on shipboard and received in London on February 1, "to the best of my ability, and with avoidance as far as possible of all fighting. I would, however, hope that H. M. Government will give me their support and consideration should I be unable to fulfill all their expectations." ¹

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1884, *Egypt*, vol. 88, pp. 252-53.

Gordon thought at first that it would be possible to secure the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons and people, through the coöperation of the native Sudanese chieftains, to whom he proposed to turn over the government of the country. On February 5, the Khedive appointed him Governor-General of the Sudan with full power; and thereafter the work of protecting and escorting the Egyptians in safety out of the country became for him a sacred duty. After reaching Khartoum, he issued a proclamation promising protection and assistance to all Egyptians and Sudanese who would support him and urging all the chiefs to oppose the Mahdi. He then sent down a large number of sick men, women, and children to Dongola, opened communications with the beleaguered garrisons as far as possible, and tried to get a thorough grasp of the whole situation. The magnitude of the task before him was soon apparent. The difficulties in the way of a successful retreat from the Sudan proved much greater than any one had anticipated. For the rebellion was so widespread and the agents of the Mahdi so powerful that, without some military backing, his own personal influence and efforts could accomplish little. In fact, it was no longer possible to extricate safely the interior forces located at Sennar, Kassala, and in Equatoria, without the use of troops.

On February 4, General Gordon outlined his general plan as follows: to replace the Egyptian by native Sudanese officials under himself, open the road between Suakim and Berber and between Suakim and Kassala, relieve Sennar, send steamers up the Nile for the garrisons in Equatoria and Bahr-el-Ghazal, and arrange for a general exodus of Egyptians via Dongola; and he asked for English officers and men to assist him. Finding the British authorities indisposed to furnish any military assistance, he wired Baring on February 18, urging, as the only reliable plan of

evacuation and one which would afford proper protection to the natives and the interests of Egypt, the establishment of a local government under some native chieftain strong enough to withstand the Mahdi and to give an efficient administration to the Sudan. A general withdrawal at once, even if it were possible, "would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country." He begged that Zubeir Pasha, whom he considered the only man equal to the task, be sent from Cairo to undertake the work. For the present, Gordon thought he should be supported by the British and Egyptian Governments, and given a pension of £500 a year — the last conditional, however, on his promising to stay out of the Equatorial Provinces, to remain at peace with Abyssinia, to levy only five per cent duties, and to maintain the usual height of the Nile at Cairo.

Colonel Stewart, Gordon's chief aide at Khartoum, and Baring also strongly favored this plan; but Gladstone and Granville, influenced by their personal antipathy to any form of intervention and by the demands of the anti-slavery leaders in England, who knew little of the real situation in the Sudan, questioned the policy, though they hesitated to formulate any of their own. "How can you reconcile the appointment of Zubeir with the prevention of the slave trade and the policy of complete evacuation?" wired Earl Granville to Baring on March 5; and from February 27 to March 9 an extended exchange of telegrams on the subject took place. Granville feared Zubeir would join the Mahdi, restore slavery and slave trading, and be a personal danger to General Gordon. The general defended his policy earnestly but respectfully. He was willing to take all personal risks, and believed Zubeir the only person, powerful, popular, and skillful enough to handle the situation successfully and to extricate the garrisons in safety. There was little danger of his going over to the Mahdi, for

he would soon be the stronger of the two. As to slavery, "even if we held the Sudan, we could never interfere with it," wrote the man who had spent several of the best years of his life fighting the slave raiders and who knew that country as few Englishmen or Europeans in those days could know it. Zubeir would be too busy to indulge in slave raids, he was sure; but, in any event, the former Sultan could be held in check by means of the annual subsidy and English troops at Suakim.

Baring believed that the proposed plan was in "harmony with the policy of evacuation," and that the question of slavery could not seriously affect the issue one way or another, for no middle course was possible. Either they must "annex the country, which was out of the question," or they must accept the consequences of its abandonment. "It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge of the importance of public opinion in England," he wrote, "but I venture to think that any attempt to settle Egyptian questions in the light of English popular feeling is sure to be productive of harm, and in this, as in other cases, it will be preferable to follow the advice of the responsible authority on the spot."¹

Gordon, although extremely desirous of executing the plan of evacuation, could not carry it out without troops unless he deserted the garrisons and most of the Egyptian population of Khartoum. He kept hoping that the British Government would send some forces as far as Dongola and Berber to aid in the withdrawal from the country, or, at least, would permit Zubeir to come to his aid. He was, however, resigned to the will of his superiors. The Government could refuse Zubeir, he wrote Baring, but it was the "only chance. I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I feel I shall be caught in Khartoum." And Colonel Stewart

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1884, *Egypt*, vol. 88, pp. 520-21.

wrote on March 4, "I assure you none are more anxious to leave this country than Gordon and myself and none more heartily approve the Government's policy of evacuation. Unless Zobeir [Zubeir] is sent, I see little probability of this policy being carried out. Every day we remain finds us more firm in the country and causes us to incur responsibilities toward the people, which it is impossible for us to overlook."

Each day and each week brought fresh difficulties in the way of the complete abandonment of the country without the employment of military forces, raised stronger barriers to the rescue of the interior garrisons, and saw the lines drawn tighter and tighter about the city of Khartoum. On March 3, General Gordon wired Baring: "In the present state of affairs, it is impossible to withdraw the Cairo employees from Khartoum without it falling into the hands of the Mahdi's emissaries, and if this took place, then of course all hope of saving the garrisons of Equatoria and Bahr-el-Ghazal fails. . . . I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Sudan. I am quite averse to it; but I think we ought to leave it with decency. . . . You must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey until all the Cairo employees get out of all the places. . . . How could I look the world in the face, if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up here, but this having been done, I have no option but to see the evacuation through, for even if I were mean enough to escape, I have no power to do so."¹

He was still awaiting the decision of the British authorities at home. If ordered to withdraw and no troops could be sent, the only thing he could do would be to resign his commission and try to get out by way of the Equatorial

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1884, *Egypt*, vol. 88, p. 562.

and Bahr-el-Ghazal Provinces, which might be turned over to the Congo Government temporarily. On March 13, the Foreign Office wired Baring that the Government could not accept the proposals of Gordon. If unable to help matters by remaining longer, he was to retreat as soon as possible to Berber and save the garrison of Khartoum. They did not wish him to resign his commission. But, apparently, this telegram was never received by General Gordon, as Khartoum was surrounded and cut off from all communication on March 15 and Mr. Baring reported that it was impossible to reach him by wire after March 10. From that time till the middle of May, ineffectual efforts were made to get letters into Khartoum through special messengers. And, finally, on May 15-16, the home authorities wired the sum of £450 to pay expert envoys, secured through Zubeir, to take a message to Gordon; but even they failed to reach him.

Meanwhile, the followers of the Mahdi extended their operations northward, until Berber fell into their hands on May 21, and nearly all of the Middle and North Sudan was in their control. The British Government was at last forced to consider seriously the question of sending troops to the relief of Khartoum; but time dragged on and August came in, before Gladstone, impelled by the pressure of public opinion, rose in Parliament to ask for a vote of funds to finance an expedition to the Sudan. Another delay ensued before a plan of operations could be agreed upon. General Wolseley was chosen to lead the forces; but he did not reach Cairo until September 10, and the campaign was not actually inaugurated until October 5, 1884. There were two routes that might be followed: one across the Nubian Desert from the port of Suakim to Berber, and the other up the Nile to Wadi Halfa and over the desert to the same destination. It was ultimately decided to take the

latter ; and the late John M. Cook, of the Egyptian branch of the firm of Thomas Cook & Son, furnished the flotilla which transported the entire force of 11,000 British and 7000 Egyptians, together with 130,000 tons of stores and war materials, from Assiut to Wadi Halfa — a distance of 550 miles.

Although animated with the highest motives and enthusiasm, and pushed with all the energy and ability of the commanding general and his assistants, the progress of the army was necessarily slow. The leaders were compelled to follow the Nile from Wadi Halfa, instead of crossing the desert to Berber, in order to have sufficient water for so large a force. This increased their march about three hundred and fifty miles, during the latter part of which there was fighting almost constantly. However, when Wolseley received word from Gordon, on November 17, that Khartoum could hold out for forty days longer, all the troops had passed Wadi Halfa. On December 2, the army reached Dongola and by Christmas Day most of it was at Korti. Here the forces were divided, one division continuing along the river with a view of capturing Berber, while the other crossed the desert to Matammeh on the Nile, where they expected to be met by Gordon's steamers.

As this latter force of fifteen hundred men approached the wells of Abu Klea, it was attacked by some ten to eleven thousand Dervishes, but it totally defeated them, after a terrific struggle. While Colonel Charles Wilson was making preparations to take the town of Matammeh, on January 21, steamers arrived with urgent letters from Gordon. Wilson wished to set out at once, but he was delayed perforce a couple of days, in order to secure the position of his forces, select the best Sudanese officers and men for the dash to Khartoum, and complete his preparations. On the 24th of January, he set out with two steamers and twenty British

soldiers; and four days later, making every exertion, he reached Tuti Island, only to find himself facing the guns of Omdurman and Khartoum. Executing a rapid movement downstream till out of range of the forts, he sent scouts ashore and received indisputable evidence that the expedition was *three days too late*. Khartoum had fallen, through treachery, on January 25. Gordon had been murdered in the garden of his palace early in the morning of the 26th, and the city given over to pillage and slaughter. Colonel Wilson and his aides had hoped that the victory of Abu Klea would relieve the pressure about the capital, but it had the opposite effect. For it nerved the Mahdi and his followers to make every effort to seize the city, as a means of stopping the advance of the British. In this they judged correctly, for the military expedition withdrew from the Sudan almost immediately, the two divisions safely effecting a reunion at Korti on March 8, leaving the Mahdi supreme. And by September, 1885, the whole country to Wadi Halfa was in the hands of his followers.

The official reports¹ of Colonel Wilson and his superiors show that no blame for the failure of the expedition can be attached to the officers and men engaged in the enterprise. No one, however, has been successful in lifting the burden of criticism from the shoulders of the Gladstone Government. It has been justly censured because it permitted the sending of the Hicks expedition, dispatched a man of Gordon's courageous and upright character to Khartoum, failed to grasp the necessity for the employment of Zubeir, and for the delay in issuing orders for the military mission of rescue. The crux of the whole matter lies, indeed, in the inability of Gladstone and his colleagues to evolve a broad foreign policy and to enforce it with promptitude and decision. There was ample justification,

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1885, *Egypt*, vol. 96, p. 688.

undoubtedly, for a difference of opinion concerning the wisdom of retaining a hold over the Sudan in the early eighties; and there were good and sufficient reasons for adopting a policy of withdrawal at that time. But, if evacuation was necessary and expedient, there was no good reason why it should not have been executed promptly and with as little loss of life and property as possible. And if a military expedition was justifiable in October, 1884, could there have been any good grounds for refusing to send it in May? The equipment of a large force for the sole purpose of saving a solitary and noble British subject besieged in Khartoum — however laudable in itself — is not a proper method of solving a difficult political and colonial problem.

Gladstone's excuse, that they had "no proof that Gordon was in danger and Khartoum was apparently provisioned for a long siege," was wide of the mark. For this is simply another instance of the difficulties and disasters that are certain to follow whenever a state decides upon a policy of intervention, but is unwilling to assume the responsibility for all the consequences of such an action. Great Britain, although moved by certain vital political and economic considerations rather than by any preconceived policy of expansion, intervened with force in Egypt. This assumption of control in the internal and external affairs of the country necessarily implied a responsibility for the direction of its foreign policy — particularly in regard to the Sudan. This responsibility the British authorities tried to avoid by demanding an immediate evacuation of all of the Khedive's southern territories. It was no excuse to say that England was not inaugurating a policy of expansion; that her intervention in Egypt was only temporary. She *was there*, and, while occupying the position of "adviser," responsible in every way for the conduct of affairs. And,

as long as she remained, it was her duty to see to it (as she did later) that the interests of Egypt and its people did not suffer through any fault of hers. If the advice of Baring and Gordon had been listened to in May, the Sudan might have been evacuated with decency and dispatch, the lives of the garrisons and of Gordon and Stewart spared, and the name of Great Britain held in respect. The expedition of October was predestined to failure. Its result was not merely a disaster — it was a tragedy. It shattered the confidence of the Egyptians in the integrity and ability of the British, for they were impressed with the idea that the life of one Britisher was of far more importance than the interests of Egypt or the lives of thousands of its people. It strengthened vastly the hands of the Mahdi and his followers; it created a grave menace to the future of the Egyptian state on the south; and it multiplied the dangers and difficulties of a reoccupation that was sure to come.

On June 22, 1885, the Mahdi died suddenly. He was succeeded by Abd-Allah, known as the "Khalifa," who proceeded to subdue all the country south of Wadi Halfa and unite all sections under his rule. An invasion of Egypt was only prevented by the victories of Generals Stephenson and Grenfell over the Dervishes, as the followers of the Khalifa were called, at Koshah and Ginniss in December, 1885; and Suakim was saved by English valor from the hands of Osman Digna, the most skillful Dervish general.

The Egyptian Government, though employing British officers and men to defend its frontier, remained for many years simply on the defensive. Meanwhile, in the Sudan, conditions went from bad to worse. Under the reign of the Khalifa, whose government was as inefficient and corrupt as it was cruel and vicious, the country was speedily re-

duced to a state of anarchy and confusion. The people were oppressed and overburdened with taxes and imposts ; human life was of no consequence ; and the population rapidly diminished, until the land presented a scene of desolation and poverty unequalled in the annals of Africa. The terrible conditions prevalent under the Dervish rule and the atrocities and cruelties perpetrated by the leaders have been graphically described in the works of Slatin Pasha, now Sir Rudolph von Slatin, Inspector-General of the Sudan, and the late Father Ohrwalder, both of whom were prisoners of the Khalifa at Omdurman during many weary years. Europe was at length aroused, but it was the situation of Egypt that stirred Great Britain to action. Her frontier was in a state of constant unrest and never free from the danger of invasion. Her trade suffered immensely by the country being cut off from all intercourse with the Sudan and the lands to the south. And her people lived in daily dread of famine and disaster, through fear lest the Dervishes might interfere with the regular flow of the Nile waters.

At length, the British Government felt it was imperative to insure the safety of the border. The pressure on Wadi Halfa was, accordingly, relieved by the victory of Colonel Wadehouse over the Dervishes at Argin in July, and by the defeat and destruction of the army of Wadan Nagumi by General Grenfell at Toski on August 3, 1889. Then the situation about Suakim was greatly improved through the decisive victory of Colonel Holland-Smith over Osman Digna at Tokar in 1891, and again, in 1896, by Colonel Lloyd, Major Sydney, and Captain Fenwick, who inflicted another defeat on the same leader. But this was not sufficient. All traffic with the interior was still closed. The Dervishes retained their control over the Upper Nile, and Osman Digna continued his depredations

as formerly. In February, 1896, the Italians, who had successfully established a protectorate over Eretria and Abyssinia and advanced westward in the Sudan as far as Kassala, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the King of Abyssinia. In order to aid them by keeping the Derivishes so occupied that they could not assist Abyssinia or retake Kassala, the British authorities ordered an advance to Akasha and Dongola.

The English statesmen were now seeing clearly the responsibilities their country had assumed with the control of Egypt, and were realizing the necessity of maintaining a firm and progressive foreign, as well as internal, policy. Tewfik Pasha died in 1892, and was succeeded by his son, Abbas II Hilmy, an ambitious and visionary youth who had been educated abroad, and who was not in close touch with the conditions in Egypt. Great uncertainty and disquietude prevailed during the next half-dozen years; and some unfortunate incidents occurred to mar the close relationship that previously had existed between the Khedive and his British advisers. It, therefore, became imperative to do something to prove that the English Government was in earnest and intended to carry out an enlightened program with firmness and vigor. In his famous dispatch of February 16, 1893, Lord Rosebery, after calling attention to the important European interests, the genuine public opinion, the work of reform during the last ten years in the country, and the dangers attendant on a withdrawal of the British forces, declared, "There is but one course to pursue: we must maintain the fabric of administration which has been constructed under our guidance, and must continue the progress without impatience, but without interruption, of an administrative and judicial system which shall afford a reliable guarantee for the future welfare of Egypt."

The next three years a decided improvement was noticeable. In 1894, important reforms in the administration of the country were effected, and public security greatly improved. In 1896, the plans for the Assuan Dam and the opening of large areas to irrigation were inaugurated, and a material advance made in conditions generally. It was evident, however, that any genuine and vital effort to promote the real progress and "future welfare of Egypt" must of necessity include the solution of the Sudan question. In April, 1896, General Kitchener, who had succeeded General Grenfell as Sirdar of the Egyptian army in 1892, ordered a general advance of his troops, in accordance with instructions from the home authorities. He defeated the Dervishes decisively at Ferket on June 7, occupied Hafir on September 19, and entered Dongola on the 23d. At the opening of the following year, the British Government announced a definite forward policy which included the building of a railway from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed (thus cutting down the Nile journey 350 miles) and an advance to Khartoum. It was apparently now ready to assume the responsibilities that it had forced the Egyptian Government to evade twelve years before.

Kitchener thereupon resumed his march, completing the railway as he progressed. Abu Hamed was taken, and, on September 6, Berber was occupied. By November 4, the railroad had reached Abu Hamed and was being rapidly pushed to Berber. The next spring operations were resumed and a severe defeat inflicted upon the Dervishes at Atbara on April 8, 1898, where the Emir Mahmoud was captured. The followers of the Khalifa then fell back on their capital at Omdurman, gradually followed by the Anglo-Egyptian army under General MacDonald. Finally, on September 2, 1898, a terrific conflict took place before Omdurman in which 10,000 Dervishes were slain and the forces of the

Khalifa completely routed. Khartoum and the Khalifa's capital were occupied, and the great march of 550 miles over desert and barren land, in the face of tremendous difficulties on every hand, was successfully achieved. A memorial service was held in honor of General Gordon, the tomb of the Mahdi destroyed and his ashes thrown into the river, and the Egyptian and British flags raised. The advance was then resumed up the Nile; the Dervish camps were destroyed; Fashoda was reached on the 19th, and the whole of the river basin occupied as far as Gondokoro. The Khalifa had, meanwhile, taken refuge in Kordofan, but he was pursued in January and finally overtaken and slain on November 24, 1899, the majority of his Emirs being taken prisoners. Osman Digna escaped, but was at length captured near Suakim in January, 1900, and sent to join the other leaders in confinement at Damietta.

As soon as the country had been thoroughly pacified and the western boundaries adjusted through the Anglo-French Agreement of 1899, the British authorities were ready to consider the problem of the future status of the Sudan. A serious situation confronted them. Here was a country approximately one million square miles in area, of which only about one third, in the north, was cultivable and inhabited by a fairly industrious and intelligent people. The remaining two thirds, to the south, was a vast tropical region of apparently little value, occupied by wild warlike tribes, like the Shillucks and Dinkas, who were ignorant, restless, and difficult to manage. Business, trade, and all intercourse were at a standstill. Agriculture and industry languished; and there were no resources available for a new government. The wealth of the land seemed to have vanished completely under the ruthless hand of the Dervishes. It was as if a terrible blight had fallen upon the country, for whole districts were practically depopulated — particularly

of men — and the entire population of the Sudan had fallen from 8,000,000 souls to approximately 2,000,000.

Great Britain hesitated to assume the rule of so great a territory. Nor was it desirable that the Egyptian Government should again be placed in absolute control of it. To extend the administrative and judicial systems of that country with its "Institutions," "Mixed Tribunals," "Capitulations," and complex laws, would have been to court disaster. Lord Cromer suggested to Lord Salisbury that Egypt and Great Britain enter upon a sort of partnership for the occupation and control of the Sudan. This solution appealed to the British authorities, and the Anglo-Egyptian convention of 1899 was the result. By this a joint government was in theory established, although the actual work of administration was left to the British. The supreme authority was concentrated in a governor-general, appointed by Egypt with the approval of England, and a cabinet largely of his own choosing. Freedom of trade was permitted to all, subject, of course, to the usual customs, but no duties were to be levied on goods from Egypt. The southern boundary of Egypt was fixed at lat. 22° N., near Wadi Halfa, which became the chief port of entry, though a new one was ere long opened at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Mixed tribunals were prohibited; and the consuls, or agents of foreign states, were forbidden entrance without the consent of England. Slave trading was abolished, and the importation of liquors and firearms stringently restricted.

Great Britain showed no hesitation, this time, in undertaking the responsibilities incumbent upon any ruler in Africa. Major-General Sir Reginald Wingate was made Governor-General, Sir Rudolph von Slatin, K.C.B., etc., Inspector-General, and a corps of efficient and energetic British officials undertook the establishment of a thoroughgoing administration. Peace and security were given to the

land; schools were opened; the people were assisted to reclaim their farms and reopen their lands; and the country was divided into thirteen provinces, outside of Dar-Fur, which was left under its native sovereign. Lado was returned to England by Belgium in 1910, upon the death of King Leopold, and the control of Great Britain over the upper and the headwaters of the Nile was now complete.

Thus entered upon its labors a British régime in Central Africa, untrammelled by restrictions either from Egypt or England, the success of which in the first fifteen years of its existence has been phenomenal. "When you consider the vast extent of the country," wrote Lord Cromer, "the savagery of a great portion of the population, the enormous distances of waste and desert which separate one place from another, and the general economic condition of the country, the rapidity with which the Sudan has been regenerated is really marvelous." Nowhere has this remarkable development been better demonstrated than in the increase in the revenues of the state. These have risen from the nominal sum of £35,000 in 1898 to £1,423,000 in 1912. A railway from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum was constructed, with a branch from Berber to Port Sudan (Suakim), affording two outlets for the trade of the country. It has since been extended to Sennar, and finally to El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in February, 1912; and there are now fifteen hundred miles in operation. A scheme is already on foot to connect this system with a line from Sennar to Suakim via Kassala and Tokar. And the government steamers cover a regular schedule on the Nile and its tributaries of over twenty-five hundred miles.

Of the funds necessary for these improvements, Egypt has furnished material aid yearly in the form of a subsidy which in 1912 amounted to £E335,000. Her statesmen may

have wondered why the "junior partner" has had to carry the chief burden of the expense. But the reason is evident when one realizes how tremendous has been her gain in peace, in national security, and in trade, since the reoccupation of the Sudan. The subsidy will cease with the coming year; but Egypt will refund to the Sudanese Government all duties collected at its ports on goods destined for the Sudan. Great Britain has voted a £3,000,000 loan to assist in the erection of a dam and the irrigation of some 500,000 feddans in the Gezira district between the Blue and the White Nile, south of Khartoum.

The trade of the country has steadily increased, particularly since the opening of the railway. In 1908, the combined exports and imports reached £E2,538,000, and in 1911 they exceeded £E3,650,800. The progress in education has been equally remarkable. Immediately after the battle of Omdurman, in 1898, Lord Kitchener wired influential friends in London, asking that funds be raised for a college at Khartoum. The appeal met with a ready response, and in November, 1902, Gordon College was opened. During the first ten years of its existence the work of the college has been remarkable, both from an educational and from a scientific standpoint, and its growth has been steady, the attendance now totaling approximately 500. The equipment consists, at present, of an imposing College Hall, in which the classrooms, the drafting laboratory, the museum, and the Wellcome Research Laboratories are located; a well-equipped workshop; a fine primary school building; an extensive student dormitory; four comfortable staff-houses for instructors, and a small mosque. The work of instruction embraces the "Training College," where some 120 young Sheiks, sons of the best families, are being prepared for the public service, particularly as teachers and judges in the local courts; the "Instructional Workshop," where

carpentry, smith-work, and machine-running are being taught to an intelligent set of 150 to 160 boys from the poorer families; and the "Primary School," opened only in 1909, where the "three R's" are being infused into the minds of some 170 young lads.

A School of Engineering and Surveying has recently been organized on a plan prepared by Mr. Dupuis, adviser to the Ministry of Public Works, and with this has been combined a scheme for a secondary school, so much needed as a preparatory department to the work of the Training College. A military school numbering forty cadets is a successful and popular adjunct to the general curriculum of the institution. The Sudanese are fine soldiers and take to military service naturally, the only drawback being that too frequently the parents persist in looking on the military school as an institution for the free education of their children, and, thus far, the cadets have been drawn from the best families in the towns, while it is desirable to get them from the country districts as well.

In addition to these important local labors, Mr. James Currie, the Director of the College, and his able corps of assistants have organized the educational system for the whole of the Sudan, which is being improved and extended from year to year. Two other technical schools have been opened, at Kassala and at Omdurman, in addition to the one at Khartoum, where 258 young men are learning trades. Six excellent primary schools have been organized in the leading towns of North and Central Sudan, which have now an attendance of over 810 boys, while one girls' school numbering 60 exists at Rufala. In addition, 47 elementary schools, or "Schools of Vernacular Education," where the scholars, seated on mats in the native huts, are taught the Koran and the rudiments of knowledge by youthful masters, have been opened in as many villages. All this in a land

where the masses generally knew nothing of education before 1900!

And the amount of organization and work possible along these lines is limited only by the amount of money at the disposal of the Educational Department of the Government, thus far a comparatively insignificant sum, and by the problem of securing sufficient teachers and trained assistants. "Go slow," and "tell the truth," two of the favorite mottoes of Lord Cromer, have been well exemplified in the educational work here, where the policy of the leaders has been based upon certain broad principles and carried out in an eminently practical manner. In the first place, religious toleration has been insisted on from the first; and, in a land of Mohammedans, the sons and daughters are being taught the religion of their parents in the schools, along with their regular lessons. Even on the campus of Gordon College, there is a mosque conveniently situated, where the students may be seen, in obedience to the commands of the Prophet, bathing and praying five times a day. Yet Christianity is given its full due, the splendid lives and examples of the British officials and soldiers being no mean example of its virtues; and the missionaries, British, Austrian, and American, are maintaining schools and performing successfully other valuable works.

The idea of Mr. Currie and the Government is to train the Sudanese for the public service in such a manner that they will be able, in time, to replace all the Egyptians and Syrians now in the governmental employ, and to fill satisfactorily all the under offices in the public service, the courts, and the schools. The masses are being taught how to work, and there is being formed gradually a large and contented artisan class, which will furnish the labor and industry necessary for the successful development of the country.

Education will not be given the people faster than they

have need for or can assimilate it, and the greatest care is being taken to prevent the creation of an educated class without a proper employment. "Too rapid progress in higher education," wrote General R. T. Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan, "as evidenced in India and in Egypt, cannot be too strongly deprecated. The necessity of forming an artisan class, and the undesirability of creating a discontented and would-be politician class, have been so clearly demonstrated in other Oriental countries which have adopted Western educational methods, that it behooves the Sudan Government to take very careful stock of the situation in this respect."

Every scholar who is trained now in the College and schools must put his knowledge into practice, and finds suitable employment at once when he leaves the institution of learning. Thus far not a single student has tried to change his vocation or avoid the career laid before him. As Mr. Currie has said: "A people whose only ideal of higher education for centuries has consisted in the study of grammatical conundrums and arid theological and metaphysical disputations surely needs the lesson that all truth apprehended intellectually must first and foremost be honored by use before it can benefit the recipient."

Another leading feature of their policy has been the desire to study the country and its resources systematically and carefully, to learn all its possibilities, and to direct its development, industrially and commercially, through irrigation and other modern means, successfully and progressively.

The basis of this work has been laid by the researches of the Wellcome Research Laboratories, the generous gift of Henry S. Wellcome, under the able direction of Dr. Andrew Balfour.¹ Several splendid reports have already been published embodying the results of the first eight

¹ Resigned 1914.

years of their labors, which will be of inestimable value to the natives and the country, not only from a medical and a scientific, but also from an economic and commercial standpoint.

In addition to the detailed and scientific studies completed on the diseases of natives and animals, and those in the ethnology, religion, and customs of the country, a splendid work has been done in a careful investigation into the character of the soil, the forests, the produce, and the irrigation possibilities of the land, with a view to promoting scientifically its cultivation and development. The greater part of this work has been done under the direction of Dr. Bean, an American chemist, trained in forestry and agricultural work. Nowhere have the results been more apparent than in Khartoum itself, which presents an appearance of cleanliness and prosperity hardly equaled by any other tropical African city. With its waterworks, hospital, sewerage system and refuse destroyer, public gardens, tramway line, fine public edifices, and attractive residential streets, it will compare favorably with many of our modern European or American cities of its size. But it is better governed than most of them.

No attempt has been made to transform the natives into Europeans, or to introduce European methods and ideals wholesale. On the contrary, every effort has been made to preserve the customs, the dress, and the language of the people, to insure real religious toleration, and to instill a desire for work and progress and a pride in and love of their country into the minds of the people.

Great Britain has performed a great service, both to the people of the Sudan and to the citizens of Egypt. She has freed the Sudan from oppression and despotism, and has given it an efficient and enlightened administration. Egypt has been relieved from anxiety concerning the flow of the

Nile and the trade of the South, and from fear of invasion. A great country has been opened to the commerce of the world, and its people have been brought into touch with civilization, and are being trained in the schools, in the public service, and on the lands, to care for themselves, their property, and their country. There is peace and progress everywhere, and the future of the land is assured. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan stands for all that is best in European colonization to-day, and it is a good example of one cardinal principle of the present British foreign policy, i.e., conservation. Within the past year, Sir Edward Grey has pointed out, on more than one occasion, that England is no longer in search of new possessions, but is devoting her energies to the care of those she already controls. The other fundamental feature of the English foreign policy, which the history of the past ten years has amply demonstrated, is conciliation. "The British Government has only one wish," said the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs during a speech at London in 1909, "to live at peace with its neighbors. Its foreign policy is contained in a single word: conciliation."





APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF TERRITORIES (IN AFRICA) HELD OR CONTROLLED BY EUROPEAN STATES IN MAY, 1914

Colonies and Pro- tectorates.	Area sq. miles.	Total area, sq. miles.	Colonies and Pro- tectorates.	Area sq. miles.	Total area, sq. miles.
FRANCE.			Egypt	400,000	
Algeria	343,500		Anglo-E. Sudan	984,520	1,384,520
Sahara	1,544,000			—	
Tunis	45,779		GERMAN EMPIRE.		
Morocco	219,000		Togoland	33,700	
Senegal			Cameroons	291,950	
Upper Senegal and Niger			Southwest Africa	322,450	
Mauretania	1,585,810		East Africa	384,180	1,032,280
Guinea				—	
Ivory Coast			BELGIAN CONGO.	909,654	909,654
Dahomey				—	
Congo	568,460		PORTUGAL.		
Somaliland	5,790		Guinea	13,940	
Madagascar	226,015	4,538,354	Islands of Prin- cipe, St. Thomas	360	
			Angola	484,800	499,100
GREAT BRITAIN.				—	
Gambia	3,620		Mozambique	293,400	293,400
Sierra Leone	24,900			—	
Gold Coast	80,000		ITALY.		
Nigeria	335,580		Eritrea	45,800	
So. African Union	473,184		Somaliland	139,430	
Rhodesia	439,575		Tripolitania	406,000	591,230
Swaziland	6,536			—	
Basutoland	11,716		SPAIN.		
Bechuanaland	275,000		Rio de Oro, Guinea, Fernando Po, and islands	85,814	85,814
Nyasaland	39,801			—	
Zanzibar	1,020				
East Africa	250,000	2,232,432			
Uganda	223,500				
Somaliland	68,000				
	—				
Grand total					10,975,554

The results of the intervention of European states in Africa are remarkable. The alien nations have occupied, or secured

control over, more than 10,975,000 square miles of territory on that continent whose total area approximates but 11,500,000 square miles. The only two states which have retained their independence are Abyssinia and Liberia — the former with an area of 432,432 square miles and the latter with 40,000. From 1889 to 1896 Abyssinia was an Italian protectorate; but it resumed its complete sovereignty in the latter year through the defeat of General Baratieri and the signing of the convention of Adis Ababa. And, since 1906, its territorial integrity and independence have been guaranteed by Great Britain, France and Italy. The position of the Republic of Liberia is also secured by treaties with the European powers and the United States.

France and England control over three times as much territory as their nearest competitors — Germany and Belgium. Their possessions are, in the main, more fertile, valuable and promising than those of any of the other European states; and a large proportion of their lands lies within the temperate zone. The French Republic heads the list with 4,538,354 square miles — 921,000 more than Great Britain controls; but, since over a million and a half square miles of the French possessions consist of desert, the real value of their respective holdings is more nearly equal than these figures would indicate. In fact, although it is at present impossible to procure reliable figures on the actual value of these African territories, it is safe to say that the British — by reason of the enormous mineral wealth, the extensive fertile plateaus and the favorable climatic location of British South Africa — hold the most desirable portion of the continent. The value of the Spanish and Italian possessions is still very questionable; and, while some portions of the regions administered by Germany, Belgium and Portugal are promising, it is still uncertain whether their African colonial activities will ever pay.

As a commercial venture, African expansion is apparently worth while. All of the states concerned have secured control of important trade centers and have obtained extensive markets for their home productions. The state governments have not themselves reaped any great profit, except perhaps in the way of coal-ing stations or strategic harbors for their fleets; but their merchants have gained enormous advantages in many ways. Outlets

for the superfluous population of the Continental states have also been found ; but after all that has been done to open the countries to trade and to improve the conditions of life and health, there remains only a small portion of the continent which is suitable for the habitation of the white man. And it is only in the temperate colonies of the French and British, and in the highlands of a few of the tropical countries like Uganda and Northern Rhodesia, that the whites will be able to settle in any large numbers. Nor is it particularly desirable that they should, in a land two thirds of which lie within the tropics, which contains an excessive proportion of desert, arid and swampy territory, and which supports already a large native population. It is impossible to reconcile these two racial elements, or to weld a country populated by both blacks and whites into one harmonious nation. The experience of South Africa has amply demonstrated the follies, the evils and the difficulties of such a movement. It resulted there, as always, in the establishment of a state governed for and by the whites, the blacks being relegated to certain districts reserved to them by the Imperial government. It has, therefore, become quite clear that a very large proportion of the African continent is not adapted to the purposes of national expansion by Continental states, or to European colonization. Africa is furnishing a great and an ever-increasing market for the products of Europe and America (and openings for European capital are numerous and promising) ; but none of the sub-divisions of the Dark Continent — with the possible exception of South Africa — can be regarded as a national asset.

APPENDIX III

REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1887 AND 1912

1887

	Revenue in £1000	Expenditure in £1000	Imports in £1000	Exports in £1000
<i>Temperate Colonies.</i>				
Cape Colony	3,303	3,333	5,036	7,719
Natal	817	893	2,264	1,057
[Orange Free State]	210 ¹	141 ¹	800 ²	2,000 ³
[The Transvaal]	668	622	1,637 ⁴	900 ⁵
Egypt	9,856	9,439	8,344	11,148
Total	14,854	14,428	18,081	22,824
Algeria	1,814	{ 1,977 2,836 aid ⁶	8,252	7,436
Morocco	500 ⁷	500 ⁷	1,379	1,225
Tunis	796	634 ⁸	782	492
Total temperate	17,964	20,375	28,494	31,977
<i>Tropical Colonies.</i>				
British East Africa	21 ⁹	21 s 10	155 ⁹	104 ⁹
Nigeria	42	71	74	223
Lagos	51	79	415	491
Gold Coast	122	139	364	372
Sierra Leone	61	58	308	334
Gambia	13	24	81	87
Nyasaland	—	—	45 ¹¹	22 ¹¹
British Somaliland	—	—	26 ¹	27 ¹
Total British	310	392	1,468	1,660
Togoland	—	—	100 ^{5 12}	95 ^{5 12}
Congo State	—	70 ⁵	—	79 ¹³
Gaboon	—	—	117	178
Dahomey	—	—	160 ⁵	196 ⁵
Senegal	{ 120 ⁸ 420 aid ⁸	540 ? ¹⁰	1,032	558
Guinea (French)	—	—	87	104
Total tropical	850	1,002	2,964	2,870

¹ 1888.

² Estimated at £600,000 or 1,000,000 in 1886.

³ Estimated for 1886.

⁴ And much smuggled in.

⁵ Estimated.

⁶ French and Algerian finances are not always separable.

⁷ Budget estimates.

⁸ Approximately.

⁹ 1891.

¹⁰ No figure for the expenditure being found, the revenue figure is repeated.

¹¹ Via Chiromo, 1893.

¹² 1889.

¹³ Native products.

1912

	Revenue in £1000	Expenditure in £1000	Imports in £1000	Exports in £1000
<i>Temperate Colonies.</i>				
Union of South Africa	17,285	16,604		
Rhodesia (N. and S.)	934	902		
Bechuanaland	{ 59	66	41,524	65,066
	{ 10 aid			
Basutoland	162 ⁴	123		
Swaziland	57	62		
Egypt	17,213	15,244	26,540	35,439
Total British	35,720	33,001	68,064	100,505
Algeria	5,807 ^{1 2}	5,807 ^{1 2}	28,734	24,846
Morocco	550 ⁵	2,960	8,048	3,082
Tunis	1,971	1,830	6,252	6,186
French Somaliland	{ 56 ³ 6	76 ³ 6	1,405 ⁶	750 ⁸
	{ 20 aid			
German S. W. Africa	860	2,250	2,265	1,425
Total temperate	45,984	45,924	114,768	136,794
<i>Tropical Colonies.</i>				
British East Africa	{ 729	772	1,330	1,017
	{ 115 aid			
Uganda	{ 203	382	625	441
	{ 65 aid			
Nigeria (N. and S., incl. Lagos)	2,850	2,938	6,431	6,090
Gold Coast	1,231	1,137	4,023	4,308
Sierra Leone	560	524	1,425	1,541
Gambia	96	81	807	682
Nyasaland	{ 97	118	291	232
	{ 31 aid			
Somaliland	33	75 ⁷	267 ⁸	241 ⁸
Sudan	{ 1,409	1,758	2,322 ⁸	1,411 ⁶
	{ 167 aid			
Total British	7,586	7,785	17,521	15,963
German East Africa	{ 624	966	2,510	1,570
	{ 181 aid			
Cameroons	{ 343	623	1,712	1,165
	{ 117 aid			
Togoland	154	157	571	498
Belgian Congo	1,715	2,758	2,155	2,365
French Equatorial Africa	737 ³ 6	737 ³ 6	799	1,157
French West Africa	{ 835 ⁸	2,506 ^{7 8}	5,391	4,767
	{ 1,343 ⁸			
	{ 328 aid			
Total tropical	13,963	15,532	30,659	27,485

¹ Estimated.² French and Algerian finances are not always separable.³ Budget estimates.⁴ 1912-13.⁵ Customs only.⁶ 1911.⁷ Deficit met by previous surplus.⁸ Zalia, Berbera and Bulhar.⁹ The sum of the revenues of 1911, both general and the total for the separate colonies (£1,343,000) and the aid budgeted for 1912.

These figures have been taken wherever they could be found, but chiefly from the *Statistical Abstract of the British Colonies*,

the *Bulletin de Statistique et de Législation Comparée*, and the *Handelsarchiv*. These are the latest figures that could be found, as the French are slow in getting out their statistics. The conventional amounts, 20 marks, 25 francs, 40 Tunisian piastres of 1887 and 10 rupees (British East Africa and Somaliland, 1887) have been taken to the pound sterling. (In 1887 the rupee had stood at 1s. 7d. for several years, but it had fluctuated in a longer period between that and 2s. 2d. and the Statesman's Year-Book converts it at 2s.) The Egyptian pound has been reckoned at £1 $\frac{1}{4}$. "Aid" means a subsidy by the mother country. It is not always separately indicated. 1912 means a fiscal year ending some time within the calendar year.

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